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This thesis examines how national non-governmental development organisations (NNGDOs) in Ghana 
have responded to recent changes and on-going uncertainty in their operating environment, particularly 
the effects of shifting donor funding priorities, the country’s graduation to lower-middle-income status 
and a subsequent decline in availability of external funding. It is based primarily on data about NNGDOs 
operating in the health, education and agriculture sub-sectors in the Northern, Upper West and Greater 
Accra Regions of the country.  
While academic research on changing aid landscapes has grown significantly in recent years, there is a 
gap in knowledge concerning how NNGDOs in countries that have recently graduated into lower-
middle-income status respond to their changing environment to ensure their sustainability. This study 
addresses this gap. It addresses two central research questions, one empirical and the second theoretical. 
First, what different ideas and strategies have NNGDOs in Ghana developed in response to the changing 
opportunities and constraints arising from their uncertain external environment? Second, to what extent 
do resource dependency theory, neo-institutional theory and Oliver’s typology of strategic responses 
explain NNGDOs’ dependency in Ghana?  
The thesis is informed by a critical realist ontology, and employs a mixed methods sequential 
explanatory research design. This involved a preliminary qualitative phase (including ten in-depth 
interviews), followed by collection and analysis of quantitative data and a further qualitative phase. The 
quantitative phase drew on survey questionnaires administered to fifty-nine NNGDOs. Thirty-two 
NNGDOs were then included in follow-up qualitative interviews. In total seventy-two in-depth 
interviews were conducted with NNGDO leaders, donor representatives and government officials. 
To assess NNGDO responses, the research draws on and critically assesses resource dependency theory, 
neo-institutional theory and Oliver’s typology of strategic responses, and derives from them an 
integrated framework for explaining strategic organisational responses to a changing operating 
environment. Using this framework, it identifies eight main strategies and nineteen tactics employed by 
NNGDOs to secure their short-term survival and long-term sustainability. These strategies are: i) 
Resource diversification; ii) Networking and partnerships; iii) Cost recovery; iv) Branding and visibility; 
v) Conformance to institutional pressures; vi) Strategic planning; vii) Avoidance; and viii) Influence. 
This analysis highlights how NNGDOs play an active role in responding to their changing operating 
environment. Their response is also influenced by the emerging discourse of sustainability. But although 
donors were at the forefront of the sustainability discourse, their actions did little to enable NNGDOs to 
reduce their dependency on them.  
The study further demonstrates that organisational responses are not only shaped by resource and 
environmental factors, but also organisational characteristics including leadership. The changing 
operating environment encouraged ingenuity among NNGDOs to be creative and active participants of 
their environment through initiatives aimed at ensuring their sustainability. The thesis shows that 
NNGDOs’ dependency does not preclude agency given that their leaders make strategic choices in their 
operating environment. This study therefore questions and challenges a tendency for the NGDO 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
This chapter sets out the background to the thesis, explains its goals, methods, contribution and scope. 
It briefly describes key terms and provides a chapter-by-chapter outline. In brief, the thesis examines 
the strategic behaviour and response of national non-governmental development organisations 
(NNGDOs) in Ghana to uncertainty in their operating environment. In particular, it is interested in 
understanding how NNGDOs are adapting to changes following Ghana’s graduation to lower-middle-
income status and subsequent decline of external donor funding. These conditions create uncertainty 
about their short-term survival and long-term sustainability. At a more theoretical level, the thesis is 
concerned with understanding NNGDOs’ agency in actively responding to changes in their 
environment. In doing so, it integrates perspectives from organisational management and international 
development. 
1.1 Background of the study 
In the last few years, the aid ecosystem and operating environment of non-governmental development 
organisations (NGDOs) has been rapidly changing. This is caused in part by complex interlocking 
factors including the emergence of new development actors (e.g. non-traditional donors), fiscal austerity 
in many Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries and the graduation of many poor 
countries into the lower-middle-income status following sustained economic growth (Mawdsley, 2012; 
Gore, 2013; Alonso et al., 2014; Heinrich et al., 2016). In addition, the desire of many transitional 
economies to reduce their dependence on aid framed normatively as ‘beyond aid’ or ‘post-aid world’ 
has also led to the creation of an uncertain landscape within which NGDOs have had to operate (Janus 
et al., 2015; Appe, 2017). These factors have led to complex shifts in aid policies and patterns prominent 
among them include the changing strategic priorities and funding modalities of external donors in many 
developing countries. For instance, the recent years have seen the increasing emphasis on aid-for-trade 
and complex funding mechanisms including multi-donor pooled funding, results-based management 
and direct-government transfers (Eyben, 2013; Huyse and De Bruyn, 2015; Pousadela and Cruz, 2016).  
The changing strategic priorities of donors is far from new (Doornbos, 2003; AbouAssi, 2013), but it is 
especially worrying for NGDOs highly dependent on donor resources for their survival. The changing 
funding environment exposes NGDOs to financial vulnerability and environmental uncertainty 
especially where alternative resource mobilisation efforts are limited. This situation becomes even more 
challenging for small and medium-sized NGDOs perceived to have more limited organisational capacity 
than well-established NGDOs operating at both international and national levels. For this reason, their 
ability to acquire critical resources in their changing and uncertain environment is key to their survival. 
Some commentators argue that NGDOs’ resource acquisition within their operating environment 
exposes them to control by donors because of their dependence (e.g. Reith, 2010; Banks et al., 2015). 
The exercise of donor power over NGDOs is through funding requirements and conditionalities which 
in turn promotes upward accountability to donors rather than downward accountability to intended 
beneficiaries (Ebrahim, 2003; Agyemang et al., 2017). As a result, NGDOs are perceived to be 
weakened by being overly responsive to the strategic interests of donors. For this reason, the existing 
NGDO literature emphasised their dependence while understating their room for manoeuvre in 
circumventing resource dependency (see, for example, Hudock, 1995; Edwards and Hulme, 1996; Parks, 
2008; Reith, 2010; Morfit, 2011; AbouAssi, 2013; Banks et al., 2015; Suárez and Gugerty, 2016).  
The potential problem of donor induced NGDO dependency is particularly acute in countries like Ghana 
that have recently graduated into lower-middle-income status. The limited funding opportunities amidst 
an increasing number of NGDOs tend to fuel competition and expose them to financial vulnerability 
(Pousadela and Cruz, 2016). The issue examined here is how far this narrative of NGDOs’ weakness 
downplays their agency and room for manoeuvre. More precisely, I examine how NGDOs use their 
agency to strategically and opportunistically circumvent structural dependency to ensure their survival.  
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NGDOs’ environment is undergoing rapid changes as part of the ‘new aid landscape’. While discussion 
of changing aid landscape is far from new (e.g. Aldaba et al., 2000; Malhotra, 2000), recent years have 
seen a revived interest (see Mawdsley, 2012; Mawdsley et al., 2014). In particular, discussion of 
diminishing aid and donor withdrawal is gaining momentum (Pallas et al., 2017; Hayman and Lewis, 
2017; Kumi, 2017a). However, general analysis at the global level needs to build on more detailed 
research at the country-level, and there is a particular need to do so in countries that have graduated to 
lower-middle-income country status (Buckley and Ward, 2015). Evidence on the impact of aid reduction 
and donor withdrawal has to date also mostly focused on South Asian and Latin American countries 
(e.g. Parks, 2008; Appe, 2017; Pallas and Nguyen, 2017), rather than sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). This 
seems paradoxical given that official development assistance (ODA) to SSA in recent years has also 
been declining and is expected to continue doing so following the graduation of  countries to middle-
income status (Moss and Leo, 2011; AfDB, 2017). More importantly, the perspective specifically of 
NNGDOs at the country level is absent in much of the discussion. Given that most NNGDOs in lower-
middle-income countries are dependent on donor resources for their survival, a reduction in funding or 
change in priority areas poses a particular threat to their survival and sustainability. This in turn affects 
their ability to deliver on services to intended beneficiaries and contributions to the achievement of the 
Sustainable Development Goals (Arhin, 2016).  
While the middle-income status accolade is a ‘welcoming development’, Kanbur (2012) and Kanbur 
and Sumner (2012) remind us about the ‘changing geographies of poverty’ with the majority of the 
world’s poor living in middle-income countries. For example, although Ghana has made significant 
progress in human development in recent years, there are still many pockets of extreme poverty, 
increasing levels of inequality and lack of access to basic social services including health facilities and 
education (GSS, 2014a; Abdulai, 2017; McKay and Osei-Assibey, 2017). The burden of providing 
social and other essential services is daunting and therefore this presents a huge challenge to 
government. In this regard, NNGDOs complement government’s efforts in service provision and 
advocacy to address the social challenges confronting the nation. For this reason, NNGDOs have to 
survive and become sustainable to continue the provision of their services to intended beneficiaries. For 
this reason, understanding the multiple ways NNGDOs are reacting, responding and adapting to their 
changed environment to ensure their short-term survival and long-term sustainability is crucial. At 
present, the existing literature has failed to systematically explore how NNGDOs are using their agency 
to respond to changes in their turbulent external environment to remain sustainable.  
1.2 Research aim and questions 
The aim of this research is to examine how NNGDOs are adapting to a turbulent external environment 
to remain sustainable. More specifically, it focuses on two research questions with the first, empirical 
question being the most important.   
a) What different ideas and strategies have NNGDOs in Ghana developed in response to the changing 
opportunities and constraints arising from their uncertain external environment? 
b) To what extent do resource dependency theory, neo-institutional theory and Oliver’s typology of 
strategic responses explain NNGDOs’ dependency in Ghana?  
In answering these two interrelated questions, I question and challenge the existing NGDO literature 
understating considerably their room for manoeuvre in a resource-constrained environment. I argue that 
while NNGDOs are dependent on their external environment for resources, they are agile and proactive 
in exerting their agency to ensure their survival. NNGDO leaders strategically make decisions to remain 
dependent on donor resources because it is considered the best option at their disposal. In doing so, this 
thesis argues that survival concerns have led NNGDOs to become ‘dependent agents’ who have chosen 
to remain dependent in their resource-constrained environment.  
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In seeking to understand NNGDOs’ responses to uncertainty, this thesis challenges mainstream 
literature inclined to emphasise their dependency rather than agency and how they interrelate. In doing 
so, I draw insights from Resource Dependency Theory (RDT) (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), Neo-
Institutional Theory (NIT) (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991) and Oliver’s 
typology of strategic responses to institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991). I argue that RDT and NIT help 
in understanding how NNGDOs seek resources in addition to how power is distributed and contested. 
Resource dependence results in the exertion of institutional pressures and constraints in terms of 
institutional control. The need for resources therefore compels NNGDOs to conform to such demands 
in ensuring their survival, hence the need for drawing on NIT. However, NIT focuses more on 
institutional stability than the organisational change that might arise from the exercise of agency and 
strategic choice by NNGDOs. This study therefore also draws on insights from Oliver’s typology to 
understand NNGDOs’ agency. The integration of these theoretical perspectives helps in building a 
comprehensive framework for understanding the multiple ways in which NNGDOs respond to 
uncertainty by exercising both agency and dependency at the same time in their operating environment. 
1.3 Research methodology  
In understanding NNGDOs’ behaviour and strategic responses to uncertainty, I adopt a critical realist 
ontology and use a mixed methods sequential explanatory design. This consists of three phases:  
qualitative, then quantitative and again qualitative. Most weight is given to the qualitative data. The first 
phase involved an in-depth interview with ten key informants with extensive knowledge of the NNGDO 
sector between August and September 2015. The aim was to understand ground-level realities and 
complexities in the sector in terms of NNGDO sustainability issues. This helped in the identification of 
important themes for the design of the quantitative survey questionnaire in phase two. 
In phase two, I undertook a quantitative survey with fifty-nine randomly selected NNGDOs operating 
in health, education and agriculture sectors across three regions of Ghana (Greater Accra, Northern and 
Upper West Region). The aim of the quantitative research was to map differences and commonalities in 
the types of NNGDOs with regards to their resource mobilisation, sources of funding and organisational 
characteristics. I analysed the quantitative data using descriptive statistics and income mobility matrix. 
The results informed the selection of thirty-two NNGDOs based on a criterion sampling for the 
qualitative research in phase three.  
I conducted forty-two key informant interviews with NNGDO employees mainly Executive Directors, 
Programmes Directors and Field Officers using semi-structured interviews. The interviews focused on 
resource mobilisation strategies and challenges, donor funding modalities and relationships and 
strategies for ensuring organisational survival and sustainability. In addition, I conducted eleven in-
depth interviews with donor representatives (bilateral, multilateral, international non-governmental 
development organisations (INGDOs) and philanthropic organisations), five government officials, four 
NNGDO networks and coalitions. In total, sixty-two interviews were conducted during the qualitative 
phase of the research.  
The qualitative research took place between January and July 2016. All interviews were conducted face-
to-face in English at respondents’ offices and were recorded with their prior consent which were later 
transcribed. Aside from interviews, I relied on field notes, journals and archival research. The qualitative 
data were inductively and iteratively coded using thematic analysis which involved four levels of coding 
that helped in the identification of themes. Discourse analysis was used in understanding how NNGDOs 
framed and made sense of their operating environment. After the qualitative data analysis, I undertook 
data integration of the quantitative and qualitative research from the different phases in providing a more 
comprehensive analysis of NNGDOs’ behaviour and strategic responses. 
4 
 
1.4 Definition of NNGDOs  
For the purpose of this research, the definition of key terms is outlined below in order to provide 
definitional clarity on the terminologies used throughout this thesis.  
I acknowledge the contested and ambiguous nature of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) due to 
their diversity and heterogeneity (Vakil, 1997). However, for the purpose of this thesis, I draw on the 
definition of Salamon and Anheier (1992:135). From the structural/operational perspective, they defined 
NGOs by five distinct characteristics namely they are: i) formalised or institutionalised organisations; 
ii) private in structure and separate from government control; iii) non-profit-distributing; iv) self-
governed by internal organisational mechanisms; and v) at least partly reliant of voluntary support. 
Hence, I define an NGO as a formalised, self-governed, non-governmental, non-profit distributing and 
at least partly voluntary organisation. In addition, I focus on NGOs with explicit development goals 
(hence NGDOs), including to reduce poverty and inequality, promote democracy and provide social 
services to serve the needs of the wider society. 
This additional qualification reflects Vakil’s (1997:2060) argument for conceptual clarity on the 
definition of NGOs by focusing on organisational attributes rather than types. The usage of NGDO in 
this thesis reflects Vakil’s essentialist descriptors (i.e. orientation and levels of operation) perspective. 
NGDOs exist not to advance the interests of one segment of society but to perform or achieve some 
developmental purposes on behalf of a wider population. In this thesis, the use of NGDO excludes other 
civil society organisations (CSOs), including those that exist to serve the interests of a defined 
membership (e.g. professional associations, religious groups, political parties and community-based 
organisations (CBOs). The existence of NGDOs in development is legitimised by their implementing 
(provide services such as healthcare, poverty reduction and education), catalytic (emphasis on 
development change) and partnership roles (working with donors and governments) (Lewis, 2007:88). 
NGDOs can also be included in the wider category of CSOs, but they are not strictly membership-based 
and have a publicly stated development mission.  
Throughout this thesis, I use NNGDOs to refer to development organisations that have their origin, 
registration status and governance structure within Ghana. These organisations are owned and managed 
by Ghanaians and do not include INGDOs that have acquired local registration status in Ghana (i.e. 
country offices of INGDOs and those created by INGDOs). Although many NNGDOs receive support 
from INGDOs, their governance structures must be legally distinct from them. These organisations often 
label themselves ‘national or local NGOs’ to distinguish themselves from both CBOs and INGDOs. In 
doing so, they attach nationalistic significance to their work to reflect their legal registration status. 
While some CBOs call themselves ‘national NGOs’, they are excluded from this thesis on the grounds 
of not being legally registered. However, NNGDOs can be further differentiated on the basis of their 
spatial coverage, size (large, medium and small), values and more specific objectives (while at the same 
time consistent with promoting ‘development’ by serving the needs of intended beneficiaries in Ghana). 
1.5 Contribution and scope of the study  
This research contributes to understanding NNGDOs behaviour and strategic responses when 
confronted with uncertainty in their operating environment. In doing so, it critically reviews and then 
combines RDT, NIT and Oliver’s strategic response typology into an eight-part framework for 
understanding NNGDOs’ agency. Empirically, the research contributes to knowledge by offering a rich 
account of how NNGDO staff in Ghana perceive their agency in a changing operating environment. In 
doing so, it contributes to knowledge by challenging the tendency of existing literature to understate 




Theoretically, this research contributes to the organisational theory literature by providing a holistic 
strategic response model for understanding NGDOs’ responses to uncertainty. It extends Oliver’s 
typology by adding tactics of integration, rejection and suspension to avoidance strategies. In addition, 
it contributes to organisational theory by empirically testing the applicability of Oliver’s typology in the 
context of NNGDOs in Ghana. In doing so, it highlights that Oliver’s typology is not comprehensive in 
understanding the multiple ways in which NNGDOs strategically behave and respond to uncertainty in 
their operating environment. It also extends RDT by focusing on the role of individual leadership style, 
alongside other organisational characteristics to understand how NNGDOs manage uncertainty in their 
operating environment. It also shows that the role of mergers, acquisitions and inter-locking directorates 
as strategies for managing dependence proposed by RDT remains limited with regards to small and 
medium-sized NNGDOs because of their highly personalised characteristics. Finally, it extends neo-
institutional theory by identifying NNGDOs’ networks, coalitions and development consultants as 
important sources of mimetic isomorphism. 
This research focuses exclusively on the complex and multiple ways in which NNGDOs and their 
leaders have developed strategies in response to changes in their operating environment. It is not 
concerned with NNGDOs’ accountability to intended beneficiaries, effectiveness of their development 
interventions and organisational performance. In addition, it is limited to an assessment of NNGDOs’ 
financial resource mobilisation between 2010 and 2015. 
1.6 Outline of thesis 
The thesis is organised into eight further chapters. Chapter two examines the literature on NGDOs and 
their operating environment. I start with a historical overview of NGDOs by tracing their rise within the 
global aid system. I then move on to review literature on NGDOs and their resource-dependent 
environment, focusing specifically on resource acquisition, relationships with donors and agency. I 
highlight a tendency in the mainstream literature to downplay NGDOs’ agency and autonomy because 
it focuses on dependency in their operating environment. 
In chapter three, I step back from the mainstream NGDO literature to focus on organisational and 
management literature. In doing so, I select and critically review key theories and concepts about 
organisational dependency and agency with the aim of developing a broad theoretical framework for 
analysing and explaining the empirical findings. I start with a review of resource dependency theory in 
order to understand how organisations acquire resources in their operating environment. I then highlight 
the limitations of the theory. Next, I focus on neo-institutional theory specifically the concept of 
isomorphism in understanding how resource dependency results in institutional control. While it offers 
useful insights, it fails to account for organisational agency. I then review the literature on organisational 
agency by focusing on Oliver’s typology of strategic responses. I conclude by highlighting that the 
theories are complementary rather than substitutes. Consequently, I then use a combination of the 
theories as the analytical lens for the empirical findings.  
Chapter four lays out the approach and methods adopted for this research. I begin by outlining its 
scope. This is followed by a detailed description of critical realism as my philosophical and 
methodological stance. I then provide an explanation of the use of mixed methods research and the three 
phases of the research design focusing on sampling, data collection and analysis. I reflect on my 
positionality as a researcher in addition to ethical considerations, validity and reliability of research 
findings. I also reflect on the research challenges and how I navigated them.  
Chapter five presents information on the contextual background of the NGDO sector in Ghana. I start 
by providing general information on Ghana’s socio-economic and political environment. I then turn to 
examine Ghana’s changing aid landscape and its dynamics. This is followed by a historical overview of 
the NGDO and civil society sector to highlight their roles and relationships with governments and donors 
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during different phases of Ghana’s political history. This information serves as a foundation for 
understanding NGDO-donor dependency and its effects on their strategic behaviour and responses. 
Next, I focus on the background information and results of the quantitative research. I explore NNGDO 
funding landscape in order to understand the resource constraints and pressures facing them.  
Chapter six turns to focus on findings from the qualitative research. Specifically, I present the empirical 
findings on resource diversification as a dominant strategy employed by NNGDOs. I develop a three-
part typology of diversification strategies of commercialisation, domestic resource mobilisation and 
holding on to external donor funding through thematic, operational and locational diversification. I also 
provide a detailed account of the challenges and opportunities associated with each strategy and its 
potential for ensuring NNGDOs’ survival and sustainability.  
Chapter seven extends the empirical findings by exploring seven additional strategies employed by 
NNGDOs. These are strategies of networking and partnership formation, cost recovery, brand and 
visibility, conformance to institutional pressures, strategic planning, avoidance and influencing. I then 
examine underlying factors driving the choice of specific strategies, their potential and limitations for 
organisational survival and sustainability.  
Chapter eight analyses the empirical findings and the second research question drawing on the 
theoretical frameworks reviewed in chapter three. My aim in doing so is to examine the extent to which 
resource dependency theory, neo-institutional theory and Oliver’s typology are helpful or otherwise in 
explaining the empirical findings.  
Chapter nine concludes by presenting a summary of research findings. I conclude the thesis by arguing 
that inductively this research has identified eight main strategies employed by NGDOs in responding to 
uncertainty. It has shown that NNGDOs are constantly formulating ideas and strategies in response to 
changes in their external environment. However, some strategies are more potentially transformative 
than others in ensuring their survival and sustainability. NNGDOs focus more on the implementation of 
less risky if also less transformative strategies in ensuring their short-term survival. In this regard, I 
highlight that they have strategically chosen their dependency on donor resources as a mechanism for 
ensuring their survival. Next, I outline the main contributions of this research to the existing knowledge 
of NGDO management and strategic options and reflect on the implications of the research findings for 





Chapter Two: NGDOs striking the balance: Resource dependency and agency 
2.0 Introduction  
This chapter reviews the literature on NGDOs’ management and strategic options. My aim in doing so 
is to frame the research and draw out key ideas to inform the design, data collection, analysis and 
discussion of the research findings. I start by situating the discussion of NGDOs within a wider global 
development system by exploring the global rise of NGDOs in the 1980s and 1990s. This is followed 
by a discussion of criticisms of NGDOs with particular attention to their legitimacy, accountability and 
autonomy. I then review the literature on NGDOs’ resource-dependent environment by examining how 
far the need for resources has created a dependency relationship between NGDOs and donors, and the 
implications of this. The chapter concludes by highlighting that much of the existing literature is inclined 
to understate NGDOs’ agency because of its emphasis on dependency.  
2.1 NGDOs’ conceptualisation and evolution 
In retrospect, the past three decades have seen the proliferation of NGDOs in both development 
discourse and reality. The shifting global political and economic challenges over the various historical 
times have altered the emergence of NGDOs (Bebbington et al., 2008). However, while NGDOs rapidly 
proliferated in the 1980s and 1990s, their formative period especially for INGDOs dates back to the 
nineteenth century (Boli, 2006:333). According to Boli and Thomas (1999), the emergence of NGDOs 
in the late 1800s was in response to factors such as economic expansion, religion and improvement in 
communication systems. During this period, their activities mostly focused on scientific and technical 
issues as part of their engagement in the modernisation and development process aimed at promoting 
economic growth in Third World countries (Landim, 1987). In this regard, the growth of NGDOs was 
in response to the need for welfare programmes such as the distribution of food supply undertaken by 
developed countries (MacDonald, 1994 cited in Brumley, 2010). 
However, this focus on welfare provision as part of the modernisation agenda took a different turn in 
the 1960s and 1970s. During this period, the emergence of NGDOs in Latin America and Asia for 
example, was as a result of the changing socio-political environment which was mainly dominated by 
authoritarian governments. These authoritarian regimes, Brumley (2010) argues, provided little space 
for the operations of NGDOs. In this regard, their activities were confined to social interventions and 
the promotion of alternative development pathways. For instance, Mitlin et al. (2007) noted that some 
new social movements emerged in their attempt to overcome the process of exclusionary development 
and therefore provided an alternative to the social and political order at the time. Similarly, Manji and 
O’Coill (2002) emphasised the rise of many grassroots and popular organisations in Africa after the end 
of the Second World War with the aim of promoting basic rights. Bebbington et al. (2008:11-12) 
described this period as the second phase of NGDOs’ history which signified the early stages of their 
growth. Although NGDOs were relatively small scale, there was a growing awareness for their roles as 
alternative for challenging the relationship between the state and market. 
2.1.1 The rise of NGDOs in development 
The rise of NGDOs in development policy and practice has been extensively documented albeit with 
diverse perspectives (e.g. Edwards and Hulme, 1997; Lewis, 2007; Hershey, 2013). That 
notwithstanding, the consensus is that shifting economic and political conditions of the neoliberal era in 
the 1980s and 1990s led to the rise of NGDOs in many developing countries including Ghana (Gary, 
1996; Alikhan et al., 2007). Some commentators claim this period is known as the NGDO decade 
(Bebbington et al., 2008). However, as Lewis and Opoku-Mensah (2006) argue, the dominant account 
of NGDOs in the literature has been largely normative and lacks contextual and theoretical clarity and 
acuity. This notwithstanding, the rise of NGDOs has been phenomenal given that they have received 
much attention in development policy and practice. 
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Estimating the precise number of NGDOs is daunting because of the absence of a reliable database. 
Nonetheless, the Union of International Organisations (UIA) estimated that there were 58,588 NGDOs 
in 2013 compared to 20,634 in 1985 (UIA, 2014). In many developing countries, the NGDO sector has 
witnessed tremendous growth over the last three decades. In Ghana, data gathered from the Department 
of Social Welfare (DSW) during fieldwork indicates that the number of registered NGDOs (local and 
international) has increased from 80 in the mid-1980s to 6,520 as of May 2016. Similar trends of NGDO 
boom has been reported in Kenya where the number of registered NGDOs increased from about 400 in 
1990 to 6,000 in 2008 (Brass, 2012:209).  
The rise of NGDOs in the 1980s and 1990s is attributed to the availability of donor funding especially 
for southern NGDOs (Bebbington and Riddell, 1995; Alikhan et al., 2007). While accurate data on 
resource flows to and through NGDOs is lacking, Agg (2006:17) using OECD data estimates that 
between 1980 and 2002, official development assistance (ODA) to NGDOs increased from 0.18% to 
6.0% (i.e. from $47.6 million to $4.0 billion). For the United Kingdom, Wallace et al. (2006:55) 
maintained that the Department for International Development (DFID) increased NGDOs’ funding by 
400 per cent (£68.7 million) between 1983 and 1993/94 which subsequently increased to £182.0 million 
in 1998/99. The rise of NGDOs in the 1980s and 1990s as some commentators suggest is linked to 
increased donor preferences for their services during the neoliberal era (Lewis, 2007). During this 
period, policy makers and international development organisations targeted NGDOs, as they became 
‘articles of faith’ for development but this became a legitimisation strategy for the aid industry (Tvedt, 
1998). Tvedt further argues that propaganda and dogmatic underpinning of NGDOs informed the 
articles of faith discourse. Similarly, Lewis and Opoku-Mensah (2006:670) maintain that many research 
on NGDOs in the 1980s and 1990s were donor sponsored and ‘‘written by researchers in cash-strapped 
academic institutions’’ which largely favoured NGDOs. The focus at the time was on organisational 
attributes like their roles in locally driven empowerment programmes to the neglect of their external 
environment (De Graff, 1987).  
For this reason, donor interests in NGDOs were informed by shifting ideological, economic and political 
conditions. Ideologically, donors perceived many governments in developing countries as bureaucratic, 
corrupt and inefficient which led to the failure of state-driven development (Edwards and Hulme, 1996). 
The developmental state at the time was regarded as part of the problems facing many developing 
countries because of its facilitation in capital accumulation processes (Sender and Smith, 1986). Donor 
disillusionment of state-led development was in part due to its failure to demonstrate measurable results 
in areas like poverty reduction. Informed by the disillusionment, NGDOs were perceived as having 
comparative advantage over the state because they were less bureaucratic, cost effective and efficient 
with their programmes targeted at the poor (Bebbington et al., 2008). The perceived comparative 
advantage gained much prominence in development thinking favouring NGDOs as alternative source of 
ideas and practices to the failed state (Mitlin et al., 2007). NGDOs’ comparative advantage led to an 
increased funding for their activities because of the position they occupied as ‘‘new sweethearts of 
development’’ (Banks et al., 2015:708). However, NGDOs’ perceived comparative advantage has been 
criticised for lack of evidence (Tvedt, 1998; Lewis, 2007).  
Although deliberate donor decision contributed to the growth of NGDOs, the role of domestic economic 
and political factors cannot be ruled out especially in many SSA countries. The preference for market-
based world order and liberal democracy promoted the growth of NGDOs because they were envisaged 
to have the capacity to assist people to participate, compete in the market and provide welfare services 
to the marginalised (Copestake, 1996). In addition, their activities were premised to promote good 
governance, democracy and development. The political transformation and liberation of countries like 
Ghana through the introduction of democracy and multi-party systems provided the enabling 
environment for the growth of NGDOs (see Section 5.3).  
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This was part of the New Policy Agenda (NPA) and reflected the ideological preference for market-
based world order and liberal democracy. The NPA combined market-based approaches to development 
and liberal democracy in defining the role and relationship existing between the state, civil society and 
the private sector (Copestake, 1996). The NPA and its associated good governance agenda became the 
institutional orbit of development especially in poverty reduction but as critics argue, it failed to deliver 
on its promise (Grindle, 2010; Hickey, 2012). For instance, Grindle (2010) described the good 
governance agenda as an inflated idea while Hickey (2012) points out that NPA programmes including 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) failed to strengthen institutions and structures because of 
its ideological narrowness. 
While donor preference and funding resulted in the growth of NGDOs, much of the existing literature 
pay attention to what Lewis (2007:39-40) calls ‘‘discovery by outside agencies’’ thereby neglecting how 
NGDOs used their position to rise to prominence. NGDOs increasingly became powerful and important 
political actors in policy arena by expanding their activities and influence through campaigns, activism 
and policy dialogue. For instance, NGDO coalitions played important roles in global activism and 
campaigns like the Make Poverty History (Harrison, 2010). Aside from this, individual NGDOs like 
Oxfam and ActionAid helped in raising awareness about global inequality and poverty. 
2.1.2 Critical voices against NGDOs 
The sense of optimism and celebration for NGDOs’ involvement in development in the 1980s and early 
1990s was short lived. Lewis and Opoku-Mensah (2006:668) argued that after the dominant neoliberal 
era, donors and the general public no longer perceived NGDOs as alternative pathway to development. 
Their role increasingly became questioned within the aid industry and academic circles by critics and 
supporters. Critical voices emerged out of self-reflexivity by practitioners about their roles, relevance 
and future ‘beyond aid’ (Aldaba et al., 2000). For instance, Edwards and Hulme (1996) raised concerns 
about their closeness to donors rather than intended beneficiaries. Echoing similar concern, Fowler 
(2000a) points out that NGDOs became increasingly institutionalised within the global aid system but 
later fell out of favour where funding started declining. The changing aid architecture at the time focused 
on direct transfers from government to government rather than NGDOs. A classic example was donors’ 
interest in the provision of budgetary support and government’s involvement in the PRSPs which 
demoted NGDOs into a peripheral role as watchdogs (Lewis and Opoku-Mensah, 2006).  
The critical literature centres on issues such as NGDOs’ accountability, loss of credibility, legitimacy 
and closeness to donors (Banks et al., 2015). The first set of criticisms relates to NGDOs’ accountability 
and legitimacy1. While the literature on accountability and legitimacy is widespread, they remain highly 
contested (e.g. Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Suchman, 1995; Ebrahim, 2003; Walton, 2013). For example, 
Walton (2013) argues that NGDOs’ legitimacy is influenced by contextual and political factors 
especially in conflict-affected areas. He suggests that such understanding is ignored in the mainstream 
literature because of its narrow emphasis on NGDOs’ qualities including accountability, transparency 
and responsiveness. This notwithstanding, the increased preference for NGDOs has resulted in the 
creation of a ‘development marketplace’ where they sell their services by becoming intermediaries 
between donors and their intended beneficiaries (Lewis and Mosse, 2006; Krause, 2014). The grassroots 
serve as a ‘virtuous location’ where NGDOs can claim their alliance with the ‘poor’ through acts of 
representation which helps them to connect with donor resources. The need for resources often leads to 
                                                          
1 I acknowledge the different types of organisational legitimacy. However, for the purpose of this thesis, I follow 
Suchman (1995:574) and define organisational legitimacy as ‘‘a generalized perception or assumption that the 
actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs, and definitions’’. He identified three main dimensions of organisational legitimacy namely pragmatic, 
moral and cognitive (see Suchman, 1995 for details).   
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NGDOs’ upward accountability to donors rather than downward accountability to intended beneficiaries 
(Ebrahim, 2003; Chahim and Prakash, 2014; Agyemang et al., 2017).  
The increasing emphasis on upward accountability to donors raises questions about NGDOs’ long-term 
legitimacy. Hayman (2016) and Walton et al. (2016) point out that INGDOs are facing an alleged crisis 
of legitimacy caused in part by several interlocking factors such as their aid dependence, shifting global 
power relations and changing operational environments. For example, they are increasingly facing 
backlash in poor and middle-income countries like Ethiopia where government regulatory environment 
is becoming unfavourable because foreign funded NGDOs are accused of serving external interests 
(Dupuy et al., 2015). NGDOs’ crisis of legitimacy is fuelled by negative public perception where they 
are recognised as the ‘creation of donors’ rather than community initiated and fail to be responsive to 
the pressing needs of intended beneficiaries. Implicitly this has negative effects on their ability to 
mobilise domestic resources crucial for their survival and long-term sustainability (Kumi, 2017b)2.  
Directly related to the above is NGDOs’ inability to maintain autonomy. In implementing donor 
projects, the existing literature indicates the loss of autonomy because of resource dependence (Reith, 
2010; Morfit, 2011; Banks et al., 2015). Since donor funding acts as the lifeblood for the survival of 
NGDOs, some commentators claim that they tend to satisfy and fall victim to donor demands and 
priorities. For example, Morfit (2011) and AbouAssi (2013) in their study of NGDOs in Malawi and 
Lebanon found that they shifted their priorities in response to donor funding. For these authors, NGDOs 
had to align with donor interests because they were ‘being controlled’. Although such normative 
arguments are useful in understanding the limitations associated with NGDOs’ political weakness, it  
understates their ability to exercise agency. However, as I will argue in subsequent chapters (six, seven 
and eight), NGDOs’ alignment with donor priorities is a deliberate tactic that serves their interests in 
ensuring their survival.  
A third criticism levelled against NGDOs relates to their inability to demonstrate quantifiable short-term 
impact in the lives of their intended beneficiaries. Bawa (2013) for example, suggests that NGDOs 
inability to bring about the needed change in Ghana has led to lack of trust and a negative public image. 
Other critics further suggests that they are established with the explicit aim of ‘enjoying donor dollars’ 
rather than serving intended beneficiaries (Bano, 2008).Working with NGDOs provide opportunities for 
individuals to tap into the aid chain. In explaining the impact of aid on NGDOs’ performance in Pakistan, 
Bano (2008) noted that NGDO leaders were driven by material motivation which translated into low 
performance because they failed to mobilise membership for their programmes. Reports of corruption 
and NGDO leaders enriching themselves with donor money is widespread (Smith, 2010; Kimemia, 
2014).  
NGDO leaders act as ‘development entrepreneurs’ by combining their localness and expertise with the 
donor landscape to engage in aid business. Morfit (2011) demonstrated how the inflow of donor funds 
led to a proliferation of AIDS NGDOs in Malawi. Olivier de Sardan (2005) suggests that the moral 
economy of corruption works through local development actors. They constitute an important aspect of 
the patronage network in development because of their mediation functions. Development entrepreneurs 
establish briefcase and one-man NGDOs as a way of creating employment for themselves and their 
                                                          
2 In this thesis, I conceptualise sustainability from a holistic and multidimensional perspective. I define 
sustainability as the ability of NNGDOs to continue serving the needs of intended beneficiaries in order to achieve 
their mission and vision over time. I consider sustainability as an on-going and iterative process between ‘‘different 
strategic, organisational, programmatic, social, and financial elements’’ (Haley and Salway, 2016:581). For 
discussion of other dimensions of sustainability, see Devine, 2003; Hailey and Salway, 2016; Hayman, 2016. 
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families. However, as Hilhorst (2003) cautions, the exercise of identifying fake NGDOs is in itself a 
political action.  
Lastly, some critics highlight that although NGDOs serve as transmitters of information on poverty 
reduction, their policies and programmes often distort local level knowledge about poverty which affects 
the impact of their programmes. In her study of NGDOs in poverty reduction in Ghana, Porter (2003) 
argues that they excluded the expertise and knowledge of intended beneficiaries in their poverty 
reduction programmes. As some critics have argued, many NGDOs are administratively separate from 
intended beneficiaries because their offices are located at the regional and district capitals rather than 
the villages where majority of intended beneficiaries live. In using the specific case of Ghana, Osei 
(2017) claims that NGDOs have contributed to the underdevelopment of rural communities because 
their strategies are external expert-driven with little community involvement. In the next section, I 
discuss NGDOs’ external environment with particular attention to resource dependence. 
2.2. NGDOs’ resource-dependent environment 
Organisations operate in complex environments characterised by uncertainty (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978). For this reason, they deal with a number of items simultaneously in their environment which 
creates institutional complexity (Greenwood et al., 2011). Much of the existing literature on NGDOs 
and their external environment has focused on institutional aspects in terms of resource usage rather 
than acquisition. This has led to a proliferation of research on NGDOs’ impact evaluation and 
accountability (e.g. Copestake et al., 2016; Agyemang et al., 2017) to the neglect of their wider external 
environment and its effects on NGDOs. However, organisational external environment plays a crucial 
role in understanding uncertainty, complexity as well as dependence upon resources for survival. For 
this reason, variations in the external environment necessitate the need for adaptive change. In fact, 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978:3) rightly point out that, ‘‘what happens in an organisation is not only a 
function of the organisation, its structure, its leadership, its procedures, or its goals. What happens is 
also a consequence of the environment and the particular contingencies and constraints deriving from 
that environment’’.  
In the strategic management and organisational literature, the environment refers to the social and 
physical conditions outside the organisation that shape and influence decision-making processes 
(Duncan, 1972; Miles and Snow, 2003). Organisational environment consists of the general and the task 
environment (Thompson, 1967). Task environment refers to the elements in which the organisation has 
direct contacts. In the case of NGDOs, their task environment includes donors, intended beneficiaries, 
peer NGDOs and regulatory bodies. The general environment on the other hand, refers to factors that 
affect organisations indirectly. These include the political, socio-cultural, demographic trends and 
economic conditions within which organisations operate (Thompson, 1967). In understanding the 
influence of environment on NGDOs, the work of De Graff (1987) in Zimbabwe offers some useful 
insights. He developed a typology for understanding the impact of external environment on NGDOs. 
The first part is the managed environment where NGDOs have exclusive control. This includes staffing, 
budgeting and organisational planning and structure. The second is the influenced environment where 
NGDOs can alter the environment through persuasion, lobbying, co-optation, patronage and exchange. 
The third is the appreciated environment where conditions are unchangeable irrespective of what 
NGDOs do. This environment exists independent of NGDOs’ control and influence and it includes 
macroeconomic systems, international dimensions and prevailing market systems. 
The environment has a huge influence on organisations because it determines the types of resources that 
can be mobilised. For NGDOs, they mobilise and depend on tangible and intangible resources for their 
survival. A classic example is the work of Bryant (2005) on how environmental NGDOs in the 
Philippines mobilised tangible and intangible resources to ensure their survival. He maintains that the 
generation of moral capital is a key strategic resource for building NGDOs’ legitimacy because it helps 
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them to shape actors’ impression. In a similar vein, Clark (2000) claims that organisations mobilise two 
main intangible resources namely reputation and capabilities. Reputation is concerned with the identity 
and branding of the organisation while capabilities refer to what the organisation ‘can do’ at any given 
time taking into consideration its human resources. Mitchell and Stroup (2017) argue that NGDOs’ 
reputation is a crucial tool for constructing authority and relationships. They further claim that reputation 
determines the ability of NGDOs to influence policy outcomes. In this regard, building reputation is a 
critical resource for creating legitimacy and trust within a resource-scarce environment. However, the 
existing literature has given scant attention to NGDOs’ reputation in terms of branding and visibility 
with the exception of a few (Bryant, 2005; Copestake, 2013; Pallas, 2017). I acknowledge the distinction 
between organisational legitimacy and reputation although they tend to have similarities in terms of their 
socially constructed nature and resource acquisition potentials for organisations. In this research, an 
NGDO’s reputation is understood in terms of its visibility, attributes and favourability that allows for 
comparison with other organisations (Deephouse and Carter, 2005; Lange at al., 2011; Mitchell and 
Stroup, 2017).  
Organisation-environment research has focused on two important aspects: i) environmental uncertainty; 
and ii) environment as stocks of resources (Jogaratnam and Wong, 2009). Uncertainty refers to the gap 
between information required to perform a task and what has already been achieved or obtained. It exists 
in three dimensions namely state, effect and response uncertainty (see Milliken, 1987 for details). 
Uncertainty creates difficulty in predicting event outcomes because organisations deal with factors that 
are constantly changing due to environmental dynamism (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). This creates 
vulnerability for organisations dependent on the environment for resources as they are compelled to 
constantly alter their activities in response to environmental conditions. In the case of NGDOs, changing 
donor priorities creates environmental uncertainty in the sense that they are unable to plan strategically 
and implement their programmes. Environmental uncertainty arising from changing and unreliable 
donor support influences the behaviour of NGDOs (AbouAssi, 2013). Failure to properly perceive and 
interpret changes in the environment has dire consequences on organisational performance. This is 
because organisational environments are ‘‘created through a process of attention and interpretation’’ 
resulting in an interactive relationship between an organisation and its environment (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978:13). 
Measuring environmental uncertainty is a daunting task because of different interpretations and 
measurements (see for example, Buchko, 1994). Environmental uncertainty focuses on the role of 
managerial perception and interpretation of their environment and its influence on adaptation and 
response strategies (Raaijmakers et al., 2015). To this end, organisations respond to things they perceive 
in their environment (Milliken, 1987). According to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), uncertainty facilitates 
actions and choices by management based on how they perceive their external environment. Managerial 
cognition plays a critical role in understanding organisational behaviour. This involves processing of 
information through environmental scanning in order to develop strategies for responding to uncertainty 
(Hambrick, 1982).  
2.3 Donor-NGDO relations: The rise of partnership and dependency  
In this section, I discuss the literature on donor-NGDO relations. In doing so, I frame the discussion 
from three perspectives namely market competition, partnership and hierarchical coordination. 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) highlight that organisations are embedded in a network of interdependencies 
because of resource needs. A typical example is the resource interdependence between donors and 
NGDOs (Ebrahim, 2005). To ensure their survival, donors and NGDOs have to coordinate and make 
use of the resources at their disposal. As Ebrahim (2003:60) points out, interdependence is associated 
with exchanges rather than a unidirectional flow. Donors constitute an important component of NGDOs’ 
task environment for resource provision. Due to their interdependent relationship, donors depend on 
13 
 
NGDOs for results to demonstrate to their funders that their monies have been put to good use which 
legitimatises their claim for more money.  
For this reason, the goals of development are traded in the ‘global aid market place’ where NGDOs (i.e. 
producers) manufacture projects and sell to donors (consumers) and vice versa. A classic example of 
this analogy is provided by Krause (2014:40-41) who suggests that in humanitarian relief assistance, 
intended beneficiaries and projects constitute important ‘commodities’ traded to donors in a quasi-
market. In the case of intended beneficiaries, she demonstrates that some are easier to produce, package 
and sell to donors than others which results in serious competition among humanitarian NGDOs for 
donors. In the case of donors, they manufacture their projects and require the services of NGDOs as 
contractors and sub-contractors for implementation. This is done through competitive tendering process. 
Donor funding chain involves a long list of organisations that ensures that aid money trickles down from 
INGDOs → NNGDOs → CBOs. This has resulted in the proliferation of grantee and sub-grantee 
relationships within NGDOs’ funding environment. The brokering and translating role of NGDOs help 
in tracing and understanding the wider flow of resources within the aid chain (Lewis and Mosse, 2006).   
Another view of donor-NGDO relationship is framed around partnership. Interdependencies result in 
the formation of inter-organisational relationships. In this case, donor-NGDO relationships are framed 
normatively as ‘partnership’ making it one of the buzzwords pervading development lexicon. As Fowler 
(2000b:3) highlights, partnership has become a cornerstone of the new aid agenda and is premised on 
three key assumptions: i) partnership as social contract between the state and society; ii) as a remedy for 
the failure of aid by co-opting alternative notions of development; and iii) as a vehicle for foreign 
penetration. This understanding of partnership helps in unmasking the complexity in relationships in 
terms of dependency, power imbalance and the underlying motives of individual stakeholders 
(Crawford, 2003).  
Partnership between NGDOs and donors within the ecosystem of aid is framed on value-based 
assumptions such as mutual trust, shared goals, balance of power, influence and reciprocity and has led 
to claims that it promotes synergy between stakeholders (Lister, 2000). Elbers and Schulpen (2013) 
identified three key importance of partnership in the NGDO literature. First, an assumption that equality 
in relation promotes ownership of development projects. Second, partnership as a tool for claiming 
legitimacy. Third, partnership is intrinsic in NGDOs’ value and identity. Partnership has therefore 
become the relational mode of thinking between the state, civil society and the market. This, it is 
believed, ensures the success of development projects based on its efficiency and results. However, in 
reality, it is unequal caused in part by the dependence of NGDOs on contract-based partnerships with 
donors which creates difficulty in maintaining authentic partnerships (Elbers and Schulpen, 2011). 
While partnership remains an ambiguous concept (Brinkerhoff, 2002), the dominant understanding is 
one of patron-client relationships involving for example, donors and NGDOs.  
The relationship between donors and NGDOs is volatile caused in part by changing funding 
environment. This includes increasing participation of corporate organisations in development where 
projects are outsourced to private organisations who work behind-the-scenes as contractors and 
consultants (Copestake, 2013). The goals pursued by donors and their funding priorities are constantly 
changing within NGDOs’ operating environment. This directly influences their roles and access to 
resources. For example, in recent years, many bilateral and multilateral donors are engaged in multi-
donor pooled funds as the mechanism for supporting CSOs including NGDOs (Huyse and De Bruyn, 
2015). Moreover, as part of the increasing emphasis on the promotion of business-like norms through 
development management and in response to political attacks on their efficiency, many donors have 
become obsessed with funding mechanisms such as results-based management and value-for-money 
(Natsios, 2010; Eyben, 2013; ODI, 2017).  
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This is informed by demand on donors by their ‘principals’ (i.e. politicians and taxpayers) to achieve 
their goals with minimal transaction costs while ensuring transparency, accountability, efficiency and 
effectiveness. By doing so, donors are able to demonstrate to their principals that ‘aid works’ and are 
able to bring about change in the lives of their imagined beneficiaries (Wallace et al., 2006). However, 
the challenges of evidence generation such as attribution and politics have been documented in the 
literature (Copestake, 2014). The infiltration of ‘‘obsessive measurement disorder’’ caused in part by 
managerial logic among donors has negative effects on NGDOs and development in general as it stifles 
organisational learning (Natsios, 2010:3).   
Since donors wield enormous political power, they are able to control the flow of resources and use their 
power to further their own national and political interests (Barman, 2008; Mawdsley, 2017; Gulrajani, 
2017). Donor interests are crucial to the discussion of NGDOs’ funding. The mainstream literature 
highlights that the need for resources compels NGDOs to align with donor interests. They adjust their 
relationships with donors to guard against resource instability and resultant effect of organisational 
disbanding (Chahim and Prakash, 2014). Nonetheless, this has detrimental effects on NGDOs which 
makes them to ‘follow the money’ rather than their stated goals and objectives especially in a resource-
scarce environment. For instance, Koch et al. (2009) claim that German INGDOs followed the location 
preference of ‘backdonors’ because of funding. Similarly, Fruttero and Gauri (2005) in their study of 
NGDOs in Bangladesh maintained that they used their access to funding as a determinant for geographic 
reach rather than the levels of poverty in intended beneficiary communities. The need for minimising 
risk indirectly affected their ability to reach neediest communities.  
The existing literature on NGDOs gives more weight to their resource dependency rather than the 
interrelationships between agency and dependency (e.g. Reith, 2010; Banks et al., 2015). It is often 
assumed that NGDOs are at the mercies of donors as depicted in the African proverb ‘‘if you have your 
hand in another man’s pocket, you must move when he moves’’ (Van Der Heijden, 1987:106). Similarly, 
AbouAssi (2013:584) claims that NGDOs’ ‘hands are in the pockets of mercurial donors’ and presents 
a bleak account of their agency and autonomy. In doing so, they over-emphasise NGDOs’ dependency 
status rather than room for manoeuvre in their relationships with donors. This stems from their normative 
understanding of NGDO-donor relationship that focuses on their resource dependency. It fails to explore 
the everyday practices and NGDOs’ awareness of the politics they have to grapple with in their wider 
external environment. In addition, it neglects discussion of NGDOs internal decision-making processes 
within their wider external environment which often determines the extent of their agency. They tend to 
focus on the structural constraints mainly because of NGDOs’ dependence on donor resources. In what 
follows, I discuss the issue of NGDOs’ agency. 
2.4. Agency in NGDOs’ environment  
Agency broadly refers to an individual’s capacity to act independently or without being coerced, 
including by institutional pressures (Giddens, 1984; Long, 2001). Thus, actors have capacities and 
motivations to act and behave autonomously of their circumstances. For Giddens (1984:9), ‘‘agency 
refers not to the intentions people have in doing things but to their capability of doing those things in 
the first place…..Agency concerns events of which an individual is the perpetrator, in the sense that the 
individual could, at any phase in a given sequence of conduct, have acted differently’’. Agents act and 
work through organisations in terms of decision-making processes because of their ‘knowledgeability 
and capability’ (Giddens, 1984:3-14). Agency helps in understanding NGDO-environment relationships 
in terms of decision-making processes and relationships with other actors. Conceptually, agency is 
relational and exercised through a network of social relations. In developing his actor-oriented approach 
to agency, Long (2001) acknowledged how external environment constrains agency which gives way to 
multiple realities and interpretation.  
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While the existing NGDO literature is inclined towards their resource dependency, there are a few 
exceptions of studies in the anthropology and human geography literature that have explicitly explored 
NGDOs’ room for manoeuvre. However, they also focused on specific issues such as legitimacy, 
relationship with government and donors without looking at the wide range of strategies available to 
NGDOs when confronted with uncertainty especially in countries that have recently graduated into 
lower-middle-income status (e.g. Bryant, 2005; Elbers and Arts, 2011; Mitchell, 2014). For instance, 
Bryant’s (2005) study on NGDOs in the Philippines focused on their generation of moral capital as a 
legitimisation strategy. Mitchell (2014) also focused on how transnational NGDOs in the United States 
responded to resource dependence. NGDOs have the flexibility to exercise discretion in subverting 
structural constraints by demonstrating their strategic agility. NGDOs as strategic actors respond to 
uncertainty caused by structural barriers including dependency through human actions and 
consciousness (Long, 2001:13). As Cooney (2007:689) argues, organisations are able to ‘‘negotiate the 
rules they act within constantly’’ suggesting that ‘‘inherent in any structural constraint are the tools for 
liberation’’. This helps NGDOs to ‘‘steer or muddle their way through difficult scenarios, turning ‘bad’ 
into ‘less bad’ circumstances’’ which represents their room for manoeuvre (Long, 2001:14).  
2.5  Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the literature on NGDOs and their operating environment. Despite criticisms, 
it has highlighted that NGDOs continue to play an important role in development. The review has 
highlighted that much of the literature is inclined to emphasise NGDOs’ dependency in a resource-
constrained environment to the neglect of their ability to exercise autonomous agency. In the next 
chapter, I step back from the mainstream NGDO literature by selecting and reviewing key theories and 
concepts about organisational dependency and agency. My aim in doing so is to set out frameworks able 





Chapter Three: Theoretical frameworks for understanding NGDOs’ dependency and agency 
3.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the theoretical frameworks used to guide this research. The choice of frameworks 
is informed by the review of the literature discussed in chapter two. In particular, I draw on Resource 
Dependency Theory (RDT) (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, 2003), Neo-Institutional Theory (NIT) (i.e. new 
institutional sociology) (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991) and Oliver’s 
typology of strategic responses to institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991) (Figure 3.1). My aim is to step 
back from the mainstream NGDO literature in order to select and review key theories that are broad 
enough to account for different explanations about NNGDOs’ agency and dependency. My goal is to 
create an integrated framework that allows for a wider range of possible arguments to be developed from 
my empirical findings. I use the theories as the analytical lens for analysing and explaining my empirical 
findings in chapter eight.  
I have been selective in the choice of theories. The rationale for drawing on RDT is that it provides a set 
of analytical tools for examining NNGDOs’ dependency and the use of power in the control of critical 
resources in their operating environment. By doing so, RDT is useful for understanding how resources 
and power are distributed and contested in NNGDOs’ environment. NNGDOs’ dependence on their 
external environment for resources provides a useful starting point for then drawing on NIT, particularly, 
the concept of isomorphism for understanding how they seek approval through conformance to 
institutional pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). NIT complements RDT by adding a theory of 
institutional control to ‘‘focus on those aspects of a field which regulates behaviour on an on-going 
basis, and set the rules of the game’’ (Lawrence, 2008:175). However, while NIT provides useful 
insights into institutional control, it focuses on stability and conformity to institutional pressures rather 
than providing an explanation for organisational change and agency. By doing so, NIT fails to address 
issues of strategic choice, power, agency and interest within NNGDOs. Organisational actors through 
their interest and agency employ a repertoire of strategies in managing institutional pressures (Oliver, 
1991).  
In understanding how organisations respond to institutional pressures, I draw insights from Oliver’s 
(1991) typology of strategic responses rather than replicating it as the underlying framework for this 
research. This is because given my critical realist ontology (see chapter four), it would have been too 
mechanical to design my data collection tools solely around the category of strategies outlined by Oliver. 
My aim in doing so was not just to make this research confirmatory but also more exploratory. For this 
reason, I make modifications to Oliver’s typology because I think it fails to capture the broad range of 
issues raised in this research and strategies employed by NNGDOs. I find Oliver’s typology too 
simplistic because of its narrow focus on institutional processes, to the neglect of both internal (e.g. 
organisational leadership and culture) and external factors (e.g. socio-political environment). In 
addition, her typology is framed around one spectrum of agency (active versus passive) and fails to 
reveal the complexity associated with NNGDOs’ strategic responses. In view of this, I build on Oliver’s 
typology by extending it. I argue that this modified typology offers a better conceptual understanding of 
NNGDOs’ strategic responses within a wider ecosystem. 
The chapter is organised into four sections. Section 3.1 discusses RDT in order to understand how 
NNGDOs obtain critical resources in their external environment. I also highlight organisational 
strategies for managing resource dependence and the criticisms of RDT. Section 3.2 discusses NIT with 
particular emphasis to the concept of isomorphism to illustrate the institutional pressures placed on 
NNGDOs by their external environment. In section 3.3, I discuss Oliver’s typology of strategic 


































Figure 3.1: Theoretical frameworks.  
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3.1 Resource dependency theory 
In their ground breaking work on the importance of environment for organisations, Pfeffer and Salancik 
(1978, 2003: xii) proposed that organisations are dependent on their external environment for resources 
to ensure their survival because they are ‘‘embedded in a network of interdependencies and social 
relationships’’. They argue that to better understand the behaviour of an organisation, it is first necessary 
to understand its interactions with the external environment which is made up of actors responsible for 
regulating interactions. External environmental pressures influence internal organisational decisions and 
strategies. For this reason, the need for resources amidst scarcity creates dependency and uncertainty.  
RDT is a useful framework for understanding organisation-environment relationships because it 
synthesises the gap between organisational change and power dimension associated with inter-
organisational relations and dependence (Hillman et al., 2009). RDT is underpinned by three core ideas: 
i) external environment or social context matters; ii) power is important in explaining organisational 
behaviour; and iii) organisations employ strategies in enhancing their autonomy and interest. From an 
RDT perspective, inter-organisational relationship is a mechanism for managing interdependence and 
uncertainty in the external environment. However, organisations are not very autonomous and are 
constrained by their environment because of resource needs. This makes actors who control resources 
to exert much power over them. Resource control is a reflection of the distribution and use of power in 
inter-organisational relationships. For this reason, RDT positions power at the peak of organisational 
discussion because of its role in controlling critical resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003).  
Exertion of control is greater when dependence on critical resources is high. RDT highlights discussion 
of power imbalances associated with exchange relations between social actors and organisations. Pfeffer 
and Salancik (2003:51) stated that dependence is ‘‘the product of the importance of a given input or 
output to the organisation and the extent to which it is controlled by relatively few organisations’’. 
Dependence arises because organisations are not self-sufficient which makes avoidance of external 
constraints and control an impossibility. Resource dependence creates conflicting demands between 
interdependent organisations which makes them to prioritise and satisfy actors whose demands are 
salient and answerable. Pfeffer and Salancik (2003:44) suggest that compliance with conflicting 
demands is influenced by the following conditions:  
1. The focal organisation is aware of the external demands  
2. The focal organisation obtains resources from the social actor making the demands 
3. The focal organisation is in critical need of the resource 
4. The social actor controls the resource in terms of allocation and access and it is impossible to 
find substitutes 
5. The focal organisation does not control critical resources for social actors 
6. The actions of the focal organisation is visible, accessible and can be judged by social actors  
7. The focal organisation can satisfy multiple social actors’ demands 
8. The demands of social actors are not determined, formulated or expressed by the focal 
organisation 
9. The focal organisation is capable of developing actions to meet social actors’ demands 
10. The desire of the focal organisation is survival. 
 
They further argue that external control is higher when more of the above conditions are met and 
therefore social actors are able to alter such conditions to exert much influence over organisations. 
Although organisations are dependent on external actors for resource, the degree of dependence 
according to Pfeffer and Salancik (2003:46-51) is influenced by: 
1. Resource importance determined by the relative magnitude of the exchange and criticality of 
the input or output. Criticality relates to the ability of an organisation to perform its functions in 
the absence of a resource. In order to survive, organisations have to secure large quantities of 
critical resources. However, such resources vary with changing environmental conditions. 
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2. Actors’ discretion over resource allocation and use. Resource discretion gives actors power in 
times of scarcity and may occur through resource possession, access to, actual use and control 
of resource usage in addition to ability to regulate resource possession, allocation and usage.  
3. Concentration of resource control. This relates to the ability of an organisation to find 
alternative resources. However, access is restricted by rules and regulations. Resource 
concentration is caused by monopoly and collective organisations. An organisation becomes 
less dependent on a resource when it can find alternative source while those with little 
alternative behold on to their resource providers creating a situation known as ‘dependency 
trap’. This decreases the organisation’s power and autonomy. 
Dependency creates power when there are asymmetries in exchange relations. Organisations that control 
critical resources tend to call the shots and ‘‘wield the longer [emphasis] end of the power stick’’ (Elbers 
and Arts, 2011:175). The power imbalances in interdependency apply directly to donor-NGDO 
relationships (Section 2.3). Although RDT highlights power-asymmetry, the critical function of an 
organisation is to manage its dependencies by developing strategies to ensure resource stability. 
According to Pfeffer and Salancik (2003), the need for stability makes organisational leaders behave as 
rational actors seeking to maximise their interests and objectives. For this reason, they employ strategies 
aimed at influencing their demands and flow of resources in order to maintain their autonomy. In what 
follows, I discuss strategies for managing resource dependence. 
3.1.1 Strategies for managing resource dependence 
In managing dependence on critical resources, Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) argue that organisations 
employ adaptation and avoidance strategies aimed at absorbing, diffusing and co-opting external 
constraints in order to manipulate the environment. However, the success of these strategies depends on 
an organisation’s awareness of its external demands. According to Pfeffer and Salancik (2003), problem 
of conflicting demands are solved through sequential attention where one set of demand is attended to 
at a time rather than meeting all the demands simultaneously. This allows organisations enough time to 
seek alternative resources. In addition, broad symbolic strategies such as non-disclosure and restriction 
of information, putting blame on others and shaping the perception of external actors are used. These 
strategies are useful when dealing with less powerful actors. However, for powerful actors controlling 
resources, organisations manage their interdependence by: i) adapting and changing to meet 
environmental demands; and ii) manipulating the external environment to become adaptable.  
Specific adaptation strategies include compliance with the demands of resource providers. Compliance 
involves the loss of discretion and autonomy because organisations are subjected to multiple external 
influences which threaten their long-term survival. Compliance with demands gives actors room for 
making further requests based on their experience of previous acceptance. However, organisations 
influence the demands of resource actors when they perceive that they have a greater chance of success. 
Organisations balance conflicting demands to safeguard autonomy while buffering is used against 
potential resource instability (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). However, buffering exposes organisations to 
vulnerability because of their inability to control exchange relations. A more pragmatic strategy is 
‘‘substitutable exchange and diversification’’ (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003:109). Diversification 
addresses the challenge of resource concentration and increases agency, influence and decision-making 
autonomy (Froelich, 1999). For example, revenue diversification is known to reduce financial volatility 
and vulnerability through the spreading of risk which in turn increases survival prospects (Carroll and 
Stater, 2009; Mayer et al., 2014; Khieng and Dahles, 2015). However, findings from other studies on 
the relationship between revenue diversification and financial volatility has produced inclusive results 
(Frumkin and Keatings, 2011; Despard et al., 2017). 
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Another strategy for managing dependent relationship is through mergers and acquisitions. This helps 
organisations in gaining control over their external environment. Mergers exist in vertical, horizontal 
and conglomerate forms. Horizontal mergers reduce competition and uncertainty through the acquisition 
of competitors while vertical mergers prevent dependency and control (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003:114). 
Organisations could also manage their dependence by bridging ties or forming strategic alliances and 
inter-organisational relationships in order to manipulate the operating environment. However, inter-
organisational relationships serve as partial absorption mechanism for managing uncertainty. A more 
risky strategy to manage dependence is co-option and interlocking directorates. According to Pfeffer 
and Salancik (2003), co-option and other forms of collective action provide an organisation easy access 
to information and legitimacy. However, it leads to loss of organisational autonomy. Organisations 
could also change their environment through political actions. This involves altering government 
regulations through political means to further their interest. Having discussed the strategies used by 
organisations for managing their resource dependence, the next section focuses on the criticisms against 
RDT. 
3.1.2 Criticisms of RDT 
RDT has been criticised at great length on both empirical and conceptual grounds (see Casciaro and 
Piskorski, 2005; Davis and Cobb, 2010). Empirical findings on the formation of inter-organisational 
relationships resulting from resource dependence have produced inconsistent results (Hillman et al., 
2009; Drees and Heugens, 2013). Conceptually, some authors have considered RDT as an ‘appealing 
metaphor’ because of its lack of application for explaining empirical findings (Casciaro and Piskorski, 
2005). For instance Casciaro and Piskorski (2005:168-169) identified four ambiguities associated with 
RDT. First, is the lack of distinction between power imbalance and mutual dependence. Second, 
normative prescriptions are confounded with predictions. Third, scope conditions of RDT are 
ambiguous. Finally, although resource dependence is two-way, empirical research focuses more on 
dependence of one actors rather than reciprocal interdependencies. To this end, the authors suggest that 
focusing on power imbalance and mutual dependence would provide a useful account of power and 
dependence in a dyadic relationship. The above criticisms were iterated by Pfeffer and Salancik (2003: 
xvi) when they lamented that RDT has become a ‘‘metaphorical statement about organizations’’ because 
‘‘there is a limited amount of empirical work explicitly extending and testing resource dependence 
theory and its central tenets’’.   
In the NGDO literature, there is relatively little criticism of RDT as the theoretical basis for research. 
The focus of NGDO studies that drew insights from RDT has been on high-power actors such as donors 
and their control (e.g. Hudock, 1995; Ebrahim, 2005; Elbers and Schulpen, 2011; AbouAssi, 2013). 
These studies present a normative understanding of RDT and ignore how low-power actors employ 
strategies to mitigate resource dependence. Therefore focusing on both high-power and low-power 
actors from an RDT perspective will offer a better understanding of how NGDOs are negotiating their 
complex environment. In the next chapter, I draw on NIT as another theory informing this study. The 
rationale is to understand how resource dependency results in conformance to institutionalised norms 




3.2 Institutions and Isomorphism 
Defining institutions is daunting because of its different meanings (see North, 1990; Hall and Taylor, 
1996; Schmidt, 2010)3. Institutions broadly refer to rules, norms and beliefs that exist independent of 
organisations which seek to regulate social behaviour. Scott (1995:33) argues that institutions ‘‘consist 
of cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to 
social behaviour’’. Regulative elements of institutions work through coercion with rules, laws and 
sanctions as indicators. The normative elements focus on acceptance to values and norms that impose 
constraints but also enable social actors. They determine appropriate behaviour for social actors based 
on moral and obligatory dimensions. Normative institutions exert influence on organisations and 
individuals because compliance with values and norms is considered a social obligation. Lastly, the 
cognitive pillar focuses on subjectively constructed rules. Symbols and meanings play important roles 
because they constitute the medium through which social actors make sense of and interpret their world. 
Social actors’ behaviour is guided by shared meanings and frames which creates difficulty for 
individuals to drift away (Garud et al., 2007).  
3.2.1 Institutional Isomorphism 
Neo-institutional theory has become one of the fundamental theories for understanding organisational 
behaviour (Greenwood et al., 2008). For Dacin (1997:48), institutional framework focuses on: i) 
institutional environment and organisational relationships; ii) how social expectation affects 
organisations; and iii) how such expectation is reflected in organisational characteristics. Since 
organisations operate in institutional context, they are susceptible to influence by internal and external 
pressures. Organisations conform to socially legitimated elements including rules and norms in seeking 
legitimacy because non-compliance is subject to punitive measures (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). For this 
reason, institutional pressures play a crucial role in understanding organisational behaviour and strategic 
action because they seek to engage in practices considered as legitimate by stakeholders. This prevents 
their actions from being questioned (Suchman, 1995; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Conformance to 
institutional pressures results in homogeneity in organisational structure, culture and output because of 
the transmission of social facts. These become institutionalised and serve as templates for organising 
behaviour within particular organisational fields in periods of uncertainty. Institutionalisation ensures 
that organisations internalise norms and values based on societal expectations of acceptable actions 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  
Homogenisation in organisational fields occurs through isomorphism (i.e. where an organisation adopts 
or models the characteristics of dominant organisational forms). DiMaggio and Powell (1983:149) argue 
that diversity in organisational forms is a reflection of environmental variation. For this reason, when 
organisations face similar environmental constraints, they tend to copy one another. Over time, they 
become similar to each other and their operating environment because decision makers are able to learn 
appropriate strategies by adjusting their behaviour in response to environmental changes. Emerging and 
existing organisations adopt socially legitimated elements to be similar to their operating environment 
because institutional pressures affect manager’s cognitive interpretations and organisational resource 
flows (Dacin, 1997).  
According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983), institutional isomorphism focuses on the influence of 
societal and cultural expectations on organisations. These become templates for shaping organisational 
behaviour. They in turn create homogenous organisations based on their ability to motivate 
                                                          
3 For instance, Hall and Taylor (1996) proposed three schools of thought to institutional analysis: historical 
institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism as a way of addressing the 
ambiguities associated with new institutionalism. Schmidt (2010) also introduced discursive institutionalism as an 
addition to the existing forms of institutionalism 
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organisations in adopting perceived socially acceptable practices. However, Dacin (1997) argues that 
the influence of these societal and cultural expectations on organisations change depending on time, 
level of analysis and interplay with other sources of expectation. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) identified 
three drivers of institutional isomorphism that exists in organisational structures, processes and decision-
making. These are: i) coercive isomorphism; ii) normative isomorphism; and iii) mimetic isomorphism. 
They suggest that these pressures have no distinct boundaries empirically because they intermingle with 
each other. 
Coercive Isomorphism 
Coercive isomorphism comes from political influence and the need for legitimacy. It occurs when 
superior organisations impose changes on subordinate organisations in their institutional environment. 
Resource providers exert informal and formal pressures on organisations to conform to certain patterns 
of behaviours because of their dependence. Coercive isomorphism is concerned with direct imposition 
of force, persuasion and invitation from a superior to a subordinate organisation to join in collusion. 
According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983), coercive isomorphism stems from legal and technical 
regulations from governments and social partners within an institutional environment. Another coercive 
mechanism employed by state agencies is in defining the structures of organisations through 
enforcement mechanisms such as codes of conduct. The exertion of coercive isomorphic pressures 
increases when dependence on a critical resource provider is high (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). I believe 
that given NNGDOs’ dependence on donor resources and the role played by government’s agencies in 
regulating the activities of NNGDOs, the concept of coercive isomorphism is applicable to this research 
in understanding NNGDOs’ relationships with donors and government agencies.  
Normative Isomorphism 
Normative isomorphism is concerned with professionalisation of organisations within institutional 
fields. It arises when professional associations impose homogenous norms and values on organisations 
with the aim of ensuring that their operations meet certain standards. These institutionalised norms and 
values about appropriate organisational behaviour are taken-for-granted and serve as prescriptions for 
organising actions. Professional associations garner support and power from their members and 
government regulatory agencies in enforcing these shared understandings (Greenwood et al., 2002). 
Two important aspects of professionalisation driving normative isomorphism are formal education and 
the rise of professional networks (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). This happens through filtering of 
personnel in the recruitment process for organisations based on criteria including educational 
qualification. In this regard, professional networks derive much of their organisational norms from 
universities and training institutes that serve as ‘norms development centres’ (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1991). Professional associations play important roles in legitimising change within organisational fields 
through the endorsement and diffusion of innovations. Their expertise and advice promote normative 
pressures within institutional fields (Greenwood et al., 2002).   
Mimetic Isomorphism 
Mimetic isomorphic processes occur in times of uncertainty. Organisations scan their environment and 
look out for perceived successful and legitimate ones to model themselves around. By doing so, they 
sought to learn from other organisations in addressing their organisational inefficiencies such as goal 
ambiguity and symbolic uncertainty (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983:151). Since uncertainty drives 
isomorphic processes, the desire to imitate perceived successful organisations stems from pressures 
within institutional fields. By adopting successful models, organisations are able to build their 
legitimacy quickly without necessarily having to develop their own from the scratch. This saves time, 
costs and reduces the uncertainty associated with developing new models for coping with changing 
environments. New ideas would have to be justified by aligning them with the prevailing normative 
prescriptions. For this reason, organisations avoid developing them and rather mimic others because of 
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the anticipation of getting similar rewards (Greenwood et al., 2002). Having discussed the key concepts 
of isomorphism, the next section outlines some limitations of NIT in understanding organisational 
behaviour. 
3.2.2 Criticisms of neo-institutional theory 
From an institutional theory perspective, the discussion of isomorphism provides useful insights into the 
role of institutions as power drivers and shapers of uncertainty within organisations. However, 
institutions and their influence are bound to changes through deinstitutionalisation (Oliver, 1992; Dacin 
et al., 2002). A limitation of NIT is that it focuses on stability and conformance to institutionalised norms 
rather than providing explanation of organisational change and the role of agency within organisations 
(Seo and Creed, 2002). As Beckert (1999:777) points out, a major problem associated with earlier neo-
institutional theory is its inability to address questions of interest-driven behaviour and institutional 
change. By doing so, he stressed on the role of strategic choice and agency in the management of 
organisations.  
The issue of power, agency, interest and change have been largely neglected by mainstream new 
institutionalist scholars who tend to focus on mimetic processes to conformity and continuity to 
institutional pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). Moreover, 
institutional theory tends to focus on macro-level analysis to the neglect of micro-level issues at play 
within organisations. For this reason, it fails to explain how change occurs within organisations because 
of its narrow focus on institutional stability. However, some commentators have shown the important 
roles of actors’ agency in shaping and changing institutionalised pressures (Oliver, 1991; Seo and Creed, 
2002; Garud et al., 2007). For this reason, Oliver’s (1991) typology of strategic responses provides a 
useful theoretical framework for addressing the weakness of institutional theory in terms of 
organisational agency.  
3.3 Strategic responses for managing institutional processes 
Another theoretical framework underpinning this research is strategic responses developed by Oliver 
(1991) which seeks to understand organisational responses to institutional pressures. In developing her 
framework, Oliver maintains that when organisations are confronted with institutional pressures, they 
employ five main strategies and fifteen behavioural tactics. These strategies and tactics vary from 
passive conformity to active resistance based on the level of organisational dependence on institutional 
resources, actors’ power and roles and social expectation of their actions. Oliver identified the main 
strategies as acquiesce, compromise, avoid, defy and manipulate (Oliver, 1991:151) (Table 3.1).  
Acquiesce is concerned with organisational conformance to institutional demands to enhance their 
legitimacy. By doing so, they oblige to institutional demands without resistance. Acquiescence is 
exhibited through habit, imitate and compliance tactics. Habit refers to unconscious adherence to 
socially ingrained norms, values and beliefs. These taken-for-granted rules and values have become part 
and parcel of the daily organisational culture, practices and routines. They could be considered as 
habitual organisational ways of thinking. Imitate on the other hand, occurs when organisations 
consciously or unconsciously replicate other existing institutional and organisational ‘best practices’. 
Imitation is employed in periods of uncertainty where organisations seek ‘expert advice’ from other 
perceived successful organisations. It is driven by perceived rewards and prevailing institutional logics 
within a particular organisational field (Greenwood et al., 2002). Compliance is about the deliberate and 
strategic choice often motivated by organisational self-interest in conformance to institutional pressures. 
Among the acquiescence tactics, compliance represents the greatest exertion of agency in decision-
making processes informed by perceived benefits such as gaining legitimacy, increase stability and 
prevent scruitiny by stakeholders (Oliver, 1991:153).  
24 
 
The second strategic response is compromise which is applied in times of conflicting institutional 
demands. By compromise, organisations balance the expectation of multiple stakeholders by partially 
complying with unavoidable institutional demands. Compromise represents an active response relative 
to acquiesce. Specific compromise tactics are balancing, pacifying and bargaining. Balancing is 
employed in meeting the needs and expectations of multiple stakeholders. By doing so, organisations 
strike a suitable balance between their interest and competing institutional demands. Balancing is useful 
when organisations are dependent on and accountable to multiple constituents. Pacifying is used in 
appeasing stakeholders through partial conformity to institutional pressures. This helps organisations to 
meet basic requirements or minimum standards but also resist institutional pressures. Bargaining 
represents an active exertion of agency than all other compromise tactics as it involves constant 
negotiation processes and concessions by organisations in fulfilling their interest. The aim of 
compromise is to achieve the best possible outcome by weighing the pros and cons of meeting multiple 
institutional demands (Shapiro and Matson, 2008).  
Table 3.1: A five-part typology of organisational responses to institutional pressures 
Strategies  Tactics   Examples 
   Habit   Following invisible, taken-for-granted norms 
Acquiesce  Imitate   Mimicking institutional models 
   Comply  Obeying rules and accepting norms 
 
   Balance  Balancing the expectation of multiple constituents 
Compromise  Pacify   Placating and accommodating institutional environment 
   Bargain   Negotiating with institutional stakeholders 
 
   Conceal  Disguising nonconformity 
Avoid   Buffer   Loosening institutional attachments 
   Escape   Changing goals, activities or domains 
 
   Dismiss  Ignoring explicit norms and values 
Defy   Challenge  Contesting rules and requirements 
   Attack   Assaulting the source of institutional pressure 
 
   Co-opt   Importing influential constituents 
Manipulate  Influence  Shaping values and criteria 
   Control   Dominating institutional constituents and processes 
Source: Oliver, 1991:152 
 
The third strategy is avoidance concerned with the ways by which organisations try to prevent the 
imposition of institutional pressures. By doing so, they ignore conformance to external pressures that 
threaten organisational autonomy. Avoidance is an active strategy than compromise and acquiesce. This 
prevents organisations from public scrutiny and inspection. Non-compliance occurs through 
concealment where deliberate pretence becomes a mechanism. Organisations pretend to comply 
superficially with institutional pressures. Concealment is distinguishable from compliance based on 
genuineness of interest (Oliver, 1991). Another avoidance tactic is buffering where organisations protect 
themselves from being scrutinised and evaluated by decoupling daily activities from formal structures. 
However, buffering might be a misguided tactic when organisations depend on the public for support 
and legitimacy. In such case, a more proactive tactic is escape where organisations abandon their domain 
altogether or remodel their goals and programmes to avoid conformance to institutional pressures. 




Fourth, resistance to institutional pressures involves defiance strategy. This represents active agency 
where organisations dismiss institutional pressures because their enforcement is perceived as weak. 
Dismissal is practised when institutional requirements conflict with organisational objectives which 
make managers to perceive such requirements as unimportant. It is influenced in part by managerial 
perception that non-compliance is non-detectable and unpunishable (Shapiro and Matson, 2008). On the 
other hand, challenge involves blatant neglect of institutional pressures. The aim is to contest 
institutionalised norms and values by providing justifications and counter arguments for non-
compliance. Challenge favours organisations that demonstrate their rationale for non-conformance. 
Aside from challenge, organisations employ attack which has more intensity and aggressiveness in 
denouncing, belittling or assaulting institutionalised values especially when organisational reputation is 
at risk. The rationale is to discredit and undermine the source of institutional pressures by questioning 
their legitimacy and credibility (Oliver, 1991).  
Lastly, manipulation is the most active strategic response. Oliver (1991:157) defines manipulation as 
the ‘‘purposeful and opportunistic attempt to co-opt, influence or control institutional pressures and 
evaluations’’. The aim is to change, neutralise and exercise power over the source and content of 
institutional pressures. Specific manipulation tactics include co-opt where influential institutionalised 
constituents are persuaded to join in organisational decision-making processes or become members of 
networks with the aim of neutralising opposition to organisational legitimacy. Organisations may also 
employ influence tactic in shaping the perceptions and belief systems of the public and regulators. This 
strategy is about conformance to institutionalised demands of which the benefits serve wider groups of 
organisations. For example, a professional association may try to influence regulators on behalf of their 
members (Shapiro and Matson, 2008). Controlling tactic is concerned with the exertion of power and 
dominance over the source of institutional pressures. Control is employed in order to dominate rather 
than influence institutional pressures. In this regard, its application is useful in context where 
institutional pressures are localised and weak (Oliver, 1991).  
3.3.1 Predictors of strategic responses 
In attempting to explain the conditions under which organisations would adopt specific strategies, Oliver 
(1991:159) identified five predictive factors that determine the strategy for responding to institutional 
pressures. These are cause, constituents, content, control and environmental context (Table 3.2). She 
claims that these predictive factors correspond to the following questions: ‘‘why these pressures are 
being exerted, who is exerting them, what these pressures are, how or by what means are they exerted, 
and where they occur’’. The adoption of strategic responses varies according to predictive factors. These 
questions provide a nuanced understanding into the choice of strategy by an organisation when 
confronted with institutional pressures. Oliver examined the relationship between institutional pressures 
and organisational strategic response by arguing that the strategies vary according to the predictive factor 
at play (Table 3.2). In what follows, I discuss Oliver’s framework for determining the five predictive 
factors of strategic responses. 
 
Cause 
According to Oliver (1991), cause refers to the motive underlying conformance to institutional 
pressures. She argues that conformance is influenced by social and economic fitness where social fitness 
focuses on social acceptability that enhances legitimacy. Economic fitness on the other hand, is 
concerned with resource efficiency. For this reason, organisations will use little active resistance when 
they anticipate the benefits of conforming to social and economic pressures to be greater. However, she 
suggests that conformance to institutional pressures or otherwise depends on the type of organisation 
and the extent to which it agrees with the underlying reason given by institutionalised constituents for 
its conformance to social and economic pressures. In sum, the predictive factor of cause looks at the 
social and economic benefits of compliance. Oliver argues that there is high possibility for an 
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organisation to adopt acquiescence strategy when its legitimacy and efficiency would be enhanced 
(Table 3.2).  
Constituents 
Oliver (1991) argues that organisations are faced with conflicting demands from multiplicity of actors. 
For this reason, it is impossible to meet the demands of all actors at the same time because of multiplicity. 
Under conditions of high multiplicity, organisations are likely to adopt compromise, avoidance, defiance 
and manipulation because they are driven by underlying mechanisms such as conflict resolution, 
reduction of uncertainty and organisational awareness of existing institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991). 
When dependence on constituents is relatively low, organisations tend to use avoidance, defiance and 
manipulation strategies. She argues that the higher the dependency on constituents, the greater the 
tendency for passive compliance with institutional pressures.  
Content 
Content focuses on the requirements for institutional pressures. Oliver (1991) asserts that content is 
about the degree of consistency between institutional pressures and organisational goals. Organisations 
are more likely to comply with institutional pressures that are in line with their overall objectives and 
vice versa. She predicted that compromise and avoidance would be used when there is moderate 
consistency between organisational goals and institutional pressures while manipulation and defiance 
strategies are useful in periods of inconsistency (Table 3.2). This demonstrates the extent to which 
organisational strategy is influenced in part by factors such as willingness or otherwise to retain control, 
autonomy and discretion in the decision making process. Organisations would therefore comply with 
institutional demands perceived as non-threatening to their autonomy. However, they will move with 
time from compromise to defiance and manipulation where tactics such as challenge, attack and co-opt 
will be used when the level of threat is high. Oliver (1991) suggests that organisations mostly exercise 
less resistance to entrenched legal and regulatory institutional pressures irrespective of the level of 
threat.  
Control 
Control refers to the means of exerting pressure on organisations and takes the form of legal coercion 
and voluntary diffusion (Oliver, 1991). Legal coercion is exercised when prescriptive approaches or 
authority are used by government’s regulatory agencies on organisations. Organisations adopt less active 
strategy of acquiescence in context of high legal coercion given that laws and punitive measures are 
strictly enforced while compromise is preferable when the degree of enforcement is moderate (Table 
3.2). They become opportunistic when mechanisms for legal coercion are lax and therefore apply 
defiance and manipulation tactics. Aside from legal coercion, control is exercised through voluntary 
diffusion which involves the willingness of organisations to accept and work with diffused 
institutionalised pressures and expectation within their institutional fields. Organisations conform to 
widespread institutionalised pressures in safeguarding their legitimacy but will defy or manipulate social 
norms and values that are less popular (Oliver, 1991). 
 
Context 
Context consists of environmental uncertainty and interconnectedness. Environmental uncertainty is 
created when organisations cannot properly predict event outcome due to complexity while 
interconnectedness is about the degree of inter-organisational relationships. Oliver (1991) predicts that 
in an environment of high uncertainty, organisations will acquiesce, compromise and avoid institutional 
pressures while defiance and manipulation are likely to be used in stable and predictable operating 
environments in achieving organisational goals. High interconnectedness among organisations 
necessitates the use of less active strategy of acquiescence to institutional pressures mainly because of 
the need for interdependency. However, defiance and manipulation strategies are useful in environments 
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of intense competition and lack of cooperation among organisations. In such environment, each 
organisation is more concerned about its own survival.  
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed and combined a set of theoretical frameworks to guide this research. In 
particular, it highlights that this research draws on RDT, NIT and Oliver’s typology of strategic 
responses as theories for understanding organisational dependency and agency. It demonstrates that 
RDT is useful in understanding how resource acquisition results in dependency and loss of autonomy. 
Dependency makes organisations conform to institutionalised norms and values within their 
organisational fields. In doing so, I have suggested that NIT focuses on stability to the neglect of 
institutional change, hence its inability to explain how organisations exercise agency. The chapter 
further highlights the use of Oliver’s typology of strategic responses in understanding how organisations 
respond to institutional pressures. The review of the theories highlights that they are complementary 
rather than substitute theories. In particular, while RDT focuses on structures that constrain 
organisations in their environment, it highlights that organisations manage structural forces through the 
adoption of strategies for reducing dependency. Similarly, Oliver’s typology highlights the importance 
of organisational agency in managing institutional pressures from their operating environment. In this 
vein, there are overlaps between RDT and Oliver’s typology and demonstrates the extent to which 
structures and agency interrelate. The theoretical frameworks represent the analytical lens for explaining 
my empirical findings. In addition, they inform the methodological approach and methods used in this 




Table 3.2: Institutional antecedents and predicted strategic responses  
         Strategic Responses to Institutional Pressures 
Source: Oliver, 1991:160.
Predictive Factor Research Question Predictive  Dimensions 
 




Why is the organisation being 
pressured to conform to institutional 
rules and expectations 
 












Efficiency  Efficiency or economic fitness High Low Low Low Low 
        
Constituents        
Multiplicity Who is exerting institutional 
pressures on the organisation? 
Multiplicity of constituent 
demands 
Low High High High High 
Dependence  Dependence on institutional 
constituents 
High High Moderate Low Low 
        
Content        
Consistency To what norms or requirements is 




High Moderate Moderate Low Low 
Constraint  Discretionary constraints 
imposed on the organisation 
Low Moderate High High High 
        
Control        
Coercion How or by what means are the 
institutional pressures being exerted? 
Legal control or enforcement High Moderate Moderate Low Low 
Diffusion  Voluntary diffusion of norms High High Moderate Low Low 
        
Context        
Uncertainty What is the environmental context 
within which institutional pressures 
are being exerted? 









Chapter Four: Research Methodology 
 4.0 Introduction  
The previous chapter presented the theoretical frameworks for analysing and explaining NNGDOs’ 
dependency and agency. This chapter presents and discusses the methodology employed to answer the research 
questions. In doing so, I aim to provide a link between the theoretical and empirical chapters. The chapter is 
organised into six sections. Section 4.1 discusses the scope and the philosophical stance for my research. This 
is followed by the research design, with particular focus on the different phases of the research process, data 
collection and analysis in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 provides a reflexive account of the entire research processes 
taking into consideration my positionality and ethical issues. A discussion of the validity and reliability of 
research findings is presented in Section 4.4. In Section 4.5, I discuss the research challenges, while the last 
section concludes. 
4.1. Research scope 
As I clearly indicated in chapter one, my research is limited to NNGDOs operating in education, health and 
agriculture sub-sectors of the Ghanaian economy. The rationale for the sectoral focus is that these sectors are 
the largest recipients of donor funding and support because they serve as an important target for Ghana’s 
development partners (DPs). For example, between 2005 and 2015, an amount of US$304.8 million, US$161.3 
million and US$183.5 million have been channelled through NGDOs and CSOs in health, education and 
agriculture sectors respectively compared to US$28.3 million and US$32.5 million for humanitarian aid and 
democratic participation respectively (OECD, 2017a). However, as I discussed in chapter one, donor funding 
and relationships with NGDOs is changing in recent years. Within this broader shift, the NNGDO sector is 
particularly important to examine. 
The choice of NNGDOs was informed by the following. First, the existing literature on NGDOs in Ghana has 
focused mostly on INGDOs and well-established NNGDOs to the neglect of small and medium-sized 
organisations operating at the regional and district levels. This is in part a result of donor and academic interest 
in discussion of NNGDOs’ accountability and professionalisation (e.g. Kamstra and Schulpen, 2015; 
Agyemang et al., 2017). Small and medium-sized NNGDOs play important roles in Ghana’s development 
because they claim to be closer and responsive to intended beneficiaries. They act as intermediaries or 
‘‘interface experts’’ between the global (i.e. donors) and the local (i.e. intended beneficiaries) (Hilhorst, 
2003:218).This notwithstanding, research by academics and the wider donor community have under-explored 
these important actors of development in terms of how they behave and respond to their changing operating 
environment. It is therefore important to explore how NNGDOs are adapting or re-inventing themselves to 
ensure their survival. Second, given that NNGDOs act as implementing ‘partners’ of donors (INGDOs, 
bilateral, multilateral and philanthropic organisations), changes in donor policies is likely to trigger shifts in 
their behaviour and response in their external environment because they are often at the receiving end of 
changes in donor policies. This makes them prone to uncertainty and disruptions. However, perspectives on 
how they adapt to uncertainty in their operating environment has received relatively little attention (Buckley 
and Ward, 2015). 
This study is limited to 19 districts in three regions (Greater Accra, Northern and Upper West Region). An 
NNGDO is said to belong to a region or district where the head office was located4. My aim for selecting the 
regions is based on three premises: First, the Northern and Upper West Regions are located in Northern Ghana 
(hereafter, the North), the most marginalised part of the country where poverty is considered most severe. For 
example, according to the Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS) 6, poverty incidence for Upper West, 
                                                          
4 Ghana is divided into 10 administrative regions with 216 Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) 
in 2014. There are 6 Metropolitan Assemblies, 56 Municipal Assemblies and 154 District Assemblies. 
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Northern and Greater Accra region stood at 70.7%, 50.4% and 5.6% respectively (GSS, 2014a:13). The 
concentration and interventions of NNGDOs is highest in the North. This in part is due to high poverty 
incidence and the peculiarities of development challenges confronting the North which has created an 
opportunity for several NNGDOs’ interventions. It gives NNGDOs and their leaders access to donor resources 
because they are contracted to provide services to the ‘poor’. In sum, one could argue that the presence of 
NNGDOs is influenced in part by goal congruence and resource dependency between donors and NNGDOs. 
Second, the Greater Accra Region is included in this research because of its importance as the base of 
government and donors. Moreover, in terms of geographical coverage, the selected regions and districts are 
located in different agro-ecological and climatic zones (Figure 4.2). The North is part of the dry savannah 
region characterised by single rainfall pattern while Greater Accra Region is located in the dry-south east 
coastal plain characterised by double rainy seasons. Different agro-ecological and climatic regions present 
varied challenges and opportunities for NNGDOs in responding to on-going uncertainty. Northern and 
Southern Ghana have different degree of urbanisation and proximity to actors including government, donors 
and corporate organisations.   
This study is limited to assessing NNGDOs’ resource mobilisation between 2010 and 2015. This was 
influenced by reasons of data availability as Ghana lacks a central entity responsible for collecting data on 
NNGDOs’ source and share of funding. A five-year period was considered a feasible duration within which 
selected NNGDOs would be able to provide information on their funding (see Appendix 1). Moreover, 
tracking NNGDOs’ resource mobilisation from 2010 helped in understanding the implications of changing 
donor funding patterns following Ghana’s graduation to LMIC status in 2010. My research is restricted to 
documenting NNGDOs’ strategic responses and does not assess the wider consequences of the strategies on 
organisational performance including their accountability and responsiveness to intended beneficiaries.  
4.1.1 Critical realist orientation of the research 
A researcher’s philosophical assumptions play a crucial role in the choice of beliefs and theories that guides 
his research. Denzin and Lincoln (2011) argue that philosophical assumptions relate to belief systems about 
the nature of reality and its characteristics (ontology), epistemology, axiology and methodology that underpins 
research. For Guba and Lincoln (1994), a researcher’s ontological viewpoint represents the first step in 
defining their attempt to approach a research problem and question. Ontologically, I conceptualise reality from 
a critical realist perspective. Critical realism’s (CR) philosophical assumption is underpinned by 
‘‘transcendental realist ontology, eclectic realist/interpretivist epistemology and emancipatory axiology’’ 
(Easton, 2010:119). For critical realists, an objective world exists independently of beliefs, perceptions, 
theories and constructions. However, the objective world consists of subjective interpretations which influence 
how the world is perceived and experienced. Scientific enquiry is socially embedded, theory laden and fallible 
(Edwards et al., 2014). 
Easton (2010) argues that pragmatically, an important advantage of CR lies in its performative nature. CR 
embraces ontological realism as well as epistemological constructivism where individual subjectivity and the 
meanings they ascribe to actions are crucial in understanding the external world (Maxwell, 2012). However, 
while recognising the importance of subjective interpretations, critical realists highlight the need for critical 
reflection on researchers’ role in knowledge production (e.g. Sayer, 1992). To this end, CR accepts that 
knowledge is imperfect and highly fallible because human knowledge captures only a small proportion of a 
vast reality. It is therefore important to go beyond empirical observations or facts to identify causal 
mechanisms underlying social events (Fletcher, 2017). For this reason, knowledge generated through 
empirical research provides provisional and imperfect explanations of the powers and structures underlying 
them because knowledge is emergent, partial and political (Zachariadis et al., 2013). Knowledge is fallibly 
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perceived because complexity creates uncertainty about a particular phenomenon due to the multiple processes 
underlying events in an open system (Pawson, 2013; Edwards et al., 2014).  
More importantly, the relationship and the modes of engagement between the knower and the known 
comprises of multiple levels and modes. For Bhaskar (1978), there is a stratified and complex account of 
reality situated in three ontological domains: the empirical, the actual and the real. Observable patterns are 
made and experienced in the empirical domain. It consists of human experiences where individual and societal 
perceptions operate. The actual relates to events and outcomes. It includes the empirical and non-observable 
events. The real on the other hand, constitutes underlying factors or causal mechanisms. It combines the 
empirical, actual and generative causal mechanisms that lead to event occurrence. CR focuses on stratified 
ontology in the construction of reality where stratification provides insight into how powers and structures 
relate within particular contexts (Bhaskar, 1978). Critical realist ontology conceptualises reality as complex 
and recognises the role of agential and structural factors in shaping organisational behaviour especially in the 
realm of the real. Social structures are not just abstractions but are real because they contain causal powers 
and liabilities. However, their ability to act on organisations is not deterministic and depends largely on 
context. From a CR perspective, context plays an important role in the construction of reality. In addition, 
while cognising that reality is partly socially constructed and dependent on concepts, critical realists caution 
that reality must not only be reducible to language or discourses (Sayer, 1992; Harré and Bhaskar, 2001).  
Ontologically, CR serves as a middle ground for resolving the ‘paradigm wars’ between positivism and 
constructivism (McEvoy and Richards, 2006; Maxwell and Mittapalli, 2010; Denzin and Lincoln, 2011). It is 
important to clarify that although CR reconciles the dichotomy between positivism and constructivism, this 
does not mean a conflation of CR with mixed methods. In fact, as Maxwell and Mittapalli (2010) argue, CR 
is not an ‘alternative paradigm’ or the ‘preferred stance’ for mixed methods research. Rather, it embraces 
ontological realism and epistemological constructivism which makes it a productive stance for qualitative and 
quantitative research. From a CR perspective, the distinction between positivism and constructivism 
paradigms ‘‘creates a false illusion about the existence of two distinct worlds’’ where positivists focus on facts 
and numbers while constructivists are more concerned with meanings ascribed to social reality (Edwards et 
al., 2014:3). For positivists, reality is limited to empirical observations of events or facts. To this end, 
positivists tend to provide a ‘thin description’ rather than a deep explanation of empirical events because of 
their neglect of the context within which social phenomena take place (Sayer, 1992; 2000). On the other hand, 
Edwards et al. (2014:16) argue that both positivism and constructivism focus on the description of empirical 
data rather than an explanation of the causal mechanisms and contexts within which a given phenomenon 
occurs. This is also not to suggest that constructivists do not make causal explanations from empirical data 
(see Maxwell, 2012). However, as Edwards et al. (2014) maintain, their explanations are ontologically bound 
because they focus on local descriptions rather than the creation of theoretical explanations. 
Given that reality is stratified, critical realists move from empirical descriptions to the realm of the real through 
abduction and retroduction explanatory logics. Retroduction (i.e. logic of inference where mechanisms are 
postulated and identified to explain the underlying structures and mechanisms of events) helps in 
accommodating various methodological approaches underpinned by different paradigms (Bhaskar, 1989; 
Sayer, 1992; McEvoy and Richards 2006). Retroduction helps critical realists to understand how things would 
have been different in the absence of causal mechanisms. In doing so, they develop theoretical explanations 
informed by the empirical observations (Modell, 2009). Initial theories and concepts may be accepted, revised 
or rejected in favour of one that provides better theoretical justifications and explanations to the understudied 
phenomena. For this reason, knowledge formation involves the combination of empirical observations, 
interpretive elements and abstract theorisation (Sayer, 1992). Moreover, while CR is a methodological 
framework, it is not fixated to a particular set of methods or methodological rules to which researchers should 
adhere to because of its methodological eclecticism.  
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This makes critical realists to reject anti-conflationists argument about the incompatibility of qualitative and 
quantitative research (Easton, 2010; Fletcher, 2017). As mentioned earlier, mixed methods should not be 
conflated with CR on the basis that quantitative and qualitative data could be mapped on to the notion of 
stratification in CR. Rather, mixed methods is linked to CR through retroduction because CR extends beyond 
the empirical findings to identify possible explanations (McEvoy and Richards, 2006). Retroduction helps in 
the identification of causal or generative mechanisms in the realm of the real for the production of critical 
knowledge that enables social emancipation.  
4.1.1.1 Justification for CR  
The choice of CR was on the following basis. First, I argue that NNGDOs’ strategic responses are subjectively 
constructed based on their leaders’ perception of the environment. This notwithstanding, I play a key role in 
knowledge production through interactions with NNGDO leaders leading to the creation of intersubjectivity. 
For this reason, I consider myself as part of knowledge creation. Second, I am interested in understanding the 
interplay of structural and agential factors within NNGDOs’ operating environment. The structures serve as 
generative mechanisms that underline NNGDOs’ responses to uncertainty. This creates an interdependent 
relationship between dependency and agency. The use of critical realist perspective is crucial to understanding 
the causal mechanisms driving NNGDOs’ strategic responses. Here, the rationale is to help in developing 
much deeper understanding of the empirical results by relying on existing theories through the process of 
abductive and retroductive inference. In abduction, the empirical findings are interpreted through the lens of 
theoretical frameworks in order to identify ‘surprising’ findings that do not fit into the underlying theoretical 
frameworks. On the other hand, retroduction is useful when the aim is to identify contextual conditions that 
facilitate the occurrence of causal mechanisms. Through critical reflections, retroduction helps in moving the 
discussion beyond the empirical domain (quantitative and qualitative data) in order to gain deeper 
understanding of social reality. In doing so, it provides an avenue for recognising and reflecting on the interests 
and subjectivity of respondents, limitations of my interpretations as a researcher and accepting the existence 
of alternative explanations. 
I acknowledge the existence of other research paradigms such as pragmatism, interpretivism and positivism 
that could have been used in this study. However, CR presents a better alternative for answering the research 
questions because it transcends the monotype data associated with purely positivism and interpretivism by 
adopting methodological eclecticism. While pragmatism has been used extensively in mixed methods research 
(see Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Johnson et al., 2007; Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009), it underestimates 
how philosophical assumptions influence research methods (Maxwell and Mittapalli, 2010:147). I also 
acknowledge that CR ontology aligns with complexity theory because of its emphasis on open-systems which 
in turn creates uncertainty. For this reason, uncertainty opens up space for theorising about the always-partial 





4.2  Research Design  
4.2.1 Mixed methods in NGDO research  
This study adopts mixed methods research involving quantitative and qualitative data collection. Mixed 
methods research involves ‘‘an intellectual and practical synthesis based on qualitative and quantitative 
research’’ (Johnson et al., 2007:129). This includes mixing quantitative and qualitative methods, techniques, 
data collection, analysis and inferences. The rationale here is to build on the strengths and weaknesses of each 
method by providing the most informative, complete and balanced research results (Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004).  
According to Creswell et al. (2003), there are two main classifications of mixed methods research design 
namely sequential and concurrent. Sequential mixed methods design involves collecting and analysing the 
qualitative or quantitative data at the first phase followed by the other at the second phase in a single research 
inquiry. Contrarily, concurrent design focuses on collecting and analysing qualitative and quantitative data at 
the same time. The authors further developed a typology for classifying different designs under each category. 
They maintain that the choice of a specific design is informed by: i) the weight given to the qualitative or 
quantitative data; ii) the process of data analysis and integration; and iii) the theoretical basis of the underlying 
methodology. Based on this typology, they classified mixed methods sequential research into: i) sequential 
explanatory; ii) sequential exploratory; and iii) sequential transformative. 
In accord with this typology, I adopted a mixed methods sequential explanatory design which consists of first 
collecting and analysing quantitative data and later qualitative data in three distinct phases in a unified research 
inquiry. The rationale was to leverage the findings from the quantitative data to inform that of the qualitative 
data in order to add richness. The quantitative data provided a general understanding of the research objectives 
by mapping variations and commonalities in the types of NNGDOs and also generated a sampling frame for 
the qualitative research. On the other hand, the qualitative research provided an in-depth understanding in the 
types of NNGDOs in terms of their strategic behaviour and responses to uncertainty. The research design and 
an explanatory description are presented in Figure 4.1 and Table 4.1 respectively.  
4.2.2 Phase one: Qualitative research 
In this study, the underlying research design is mixed-methods sequential explanatory where the first phase 
involves collecting and analysing quantitative data followed by qualitative data (Creswell et al., 2003). 
However, before starting the quantitative research, I conducted key informant interviews with stakeholders in 
the NNGDO sector in what I call phase one. The rationale was to get a deeper understanding of the dynamics 
and prevailing issues pertaining to the sector. The critical insights from the key informant interviews helped 
in the discovery of important themes for designing my survey questionnaire for the quantitative research. 
During phase one, I conducted interviews with two academics at the University of Ghana, one government 
official at the Department of Social Welfare (DSW), four NNGDO leaders, two networks and coalitions 
regional representatives and one expert on CSOs at the Integrated Social Development Centre (ISODEC). In 
total, 10 key informants were interviewed during phase one (Appendix 3). Phase one also provided me an 
opportunity in finalising the necessary fieldwork preparations and protocols (e.g. establishing contacts, rapport 
and access) before the actual administration of the survey questionnaire in phase two. Phase one took place 













Figure 4.1: Research design    
Source: Author’s construct 
 
Table 4.1: Explanation of the research design 
Activity/Phases                          Phase I (August-September 2015) Phase II (September 2015-January 2016) Phase III (March- July 2016) 
Method Qualitative data collection   Quantitative data collection                                  Qualitative data collection 
and analysis                                     and analysis     and analysis  
           
Sampling technique Purposive sampling                 Stratified random sampling   Criterion sampling to select 32           
                       NNGDOs based on results from           
                       Phase II 
 
Data collection                           Unstructured key informant  Structured questionnaire with               Semi-structured interviews 
                                                     interviews (n=10)                 NNGDO managers (n=59)               with NNGDO managers and field 
           staff (n=42) and key informants (n=20) 
 
Data Analysis                             NVIVO 11 (Thematic                SPSS 22 (Descriptive statistics   NVIVO 11 (Thematic and discourse 
 analysis)                 and income-mobility matrix)               analysis
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4.2.3 Phase two: Quantitative research  
Phase two involved mapping variations and commonalities in the types of NNGDOs. In the section below, I 
provide a detailed description of the sampling frame, sampling selection, survey instruments and data 
collection in addition to data analysis for the quantitative research.  
4.2.3.1 Sampling frame 
This section explains the process used in constructing a sampling frame for this research. Data on NNGDOs 
was compiled from four sources due to the absence of a comprehensive database. The Registrar General’s 
Department (RGD) and the DSW are the official government agencies responsible for the registration and 
regulation of NNGDOs. In this regard, I contacted the two agencies in May 2015 prior to my fieldwork for the 
database of registered NNGDOs. The RGD provided a database of 6,078 organisations. The challenge with 
the RGD’s database was that it did not provide information (e.g. telephone numbers, physical location of 
NNGDOs and their email address) on most of the organisations and therefore it was difficult establishing 
contacts. In addition, activities undertaken by the organisations were outside the scope of this research, hence 
I could not use it. 
For this reason, I consulted the national headquarters of the DSW for the database of NNGDOs operating in 
the selected sectors and regions of interest. Surprisingly, I was given a database of only 95 NGDOs (national 
and international). Database of regional and district level NNGDOs was lacking. Regarding the 95 NGDOs, 
in many instances, the information provided such as their contact details and physical locations were incorrect 
while others lacked contact details at all. This made it impossible to use the database provided. I again 
consulted WACSI for NNGDOs’ directory. Although it contained some information including self-reported 
address and physical location, it was not flawless as some organisational details of many NNGDOs were 
incorrect because they had not been updated at the time of data collection.  
Faced with the challenge of getting an updated NNGDO database coupled with time constraints, I relied on 
three largest institutionalised networks and coalitions for information on their members. The coalitions 
contacted were the Ghana Coalition of NGOs in Health (GCNH), Ghana National Education Campaign 
Coalition (GNECC) and Northern Network for Educational Development (NNED). The regional DSW in the 
Northern and Upper West Regions were also consulted. These different sources were used in creating a 
database from which the NNGDOs were sampled. Thus, the sample was drawn from four (4) population pools 
(Table 4.2). To avoid duplication of names, the lists provided by the various directories were cross-checked. 
Based on this exercise, each organisation was recorded once. In constructing the sampling frame, the various 
directories were synthesised resulting in a database of 145 NNGDOs. Before sampling, I undertook a field 
enumeration to update and verify the actual number operating in each region. Contacts were made by telephone 
calls and physical visits to NNGDOs’ offices. This resulted in the generation of 127 active and 11 dormant 
NNGDOs. In total, 138 NNGDOs were enumerated across 19 districts. Based on this, the sampling frame 






















One source 28 46 37 111 97 35 22 
Two sources  8 13 3 24 22 17 6 
Three sources  5 2 - 7 5 4 1 









   127      59 
(46.4%) 
       32 
      (54.2%) 
  Source: Author’s construct, September 2015 
4.2.3.2 Sampling selection  
The sample was selected from the sampling frame using a stratified random sampling. During the enumeration 
process to ascertain active NNGDOs, core functions and districts of operation, it was found that about 52.1% 
were located at the regional capitals namely Tamale, Wa and Accra. This translated into approximately 72 
while the remaining 66 NNGDOs were spread in 16 other districts (Figure 4.2). In order to ensure precision 
and reliability of the survey results, the sample frame was stratified into two principal strata namely regional 
capitals and the rest of districts. The stratification scheme was based on the findings from the pilot study and 
enumeration conducted in the initial stages of the research. To select NNGDOs for the regional capitals and 
the rest of the districts, organisations were randomly chosen from the enumerated lists using a table of random 
numbers. Random numbers were generated for each NNGDO in the sample according to the district of 
operation. The sample for the district was drawn randomly from a dataset of enumerated NNGDOs. Every 
fifth (5th) organisation on the district and regional capital list was selected for the survey. The sampling exercise 
continued until quotas for each district was reached.  
4.2.3.3 Piloting of quantitative data collection instruments 
Piloting of research instruments helped me to test their feasibility in order to address methodological issues 
that were likely to arise during actual data collection. The piloting exercise involved testing the survey 
questionnaire with five NNGDOs (three in Northern Region, one in Greater Accra and one in Upper West 
Region) between 14th and 22nd September 2015. The choice of NNGDOs was based on access, geographical 
proximity and convenience. The sample size was on the basis that pilot studies are mostly conducted on small 
sample because sample selection is influenced by feasibility factors rather than the need for inferential statistics 
(Leon et al., 2011).  
Piloting provided me guidelines on ways of responding to unanticipated events during data collection. I used 
feedback from piloting to make modifications to the fieldwork strategy and research instruments especially 
where they failed to generate the needed data. For instance, during piloting, some NNGDO leaders indicated 
that the questionnaire was lengthy, hence, the need to make it shorter and less ambiguous. In line with this, I 
reduced the number of questions from 57 to 45 (see Appendix 1). This did not in any way change the content 
of the survey questionnaire but rather reduced the completion time. Again, during piloting, I realised that the 
nature and content of the questionnaire required that it was completed by the executive director or a member 
of the management team rather than a field officer. NNGDOs involved in the piloting phase were excluded 
from the study sample for the quantitative survey. My aim was to avoid potential bias due to their prior 
knowledge of the research instruments. In addition, data collected during piloting were not added to the 
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quantitative research because of potential problems associated with research instruments prior to their 
modification after piloting. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Location of NNGDOs’ headquarters by districts. 
Source: Author, September 2015 
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Table 4.3: Location of NNGDOs’ headquarters by districts  
 Regions/ Districts      NNGDO Directories5    Number of NNGDOs 
Total NNGDOs            Enumerated NNGDOs    Active NNGDOs    Surveyed NNGDOs    Selected NNGDOs  
Greater Accra Region 
Ga-East Municipal   4   4   4   2   0 
La-Dade Kotopon Municipal 5   5   5   3   2   
Ga-South Municipal  3   2   1   1   1 
Ga-West Municipal  6   6   6   3   2 
Tema Metropolitan   8   8   6   2   0 
Accra Metropolitan   28   27   25   11   7 
Northern Region 
Tamale Metropolitan  32   32   31   16   10 
Yendi Municipal  3   3   3   1   0 
East Gonja District  9   6   6   2   1 
West Gonja District  3   2   2   1   1  
Bole District   5   5   5   3   1 
Bunkpurugu-Yonyo District 4   4   4   1   0 
Karaga District   2   2   2   1   1  
East Mamprusi District  3   3   2   2   2 
Sabobba District  4   4   2   1   0 
Upper West Region 
Wa Municipal   12   12   11   4   2 
Nadowli-Kaleo District  3   3   3   3   1 
Sisala East District  7   6   5   1   0  
 Jirapa District   4   4   4   1   1    
 Total    145   138   127   59   32 
Source: Authors’ construct 2016. 
                                                          
5 NNGDO directories refer to the synthesised data from the various lists. The information gathered indicates the regions and districts in which the NNGDOs were located. This was used in 
constructing columns 1 and 2. Enumerated NNGDOs refer to organisations that were visited prior to sampling. Active NNGDOs refer to the organisations that were operational during 
enumeration and indicated their willingness for participation in the research. Surveyed NNGDOs were those that provided responses to the survey questionnaire (Phase II). Selected NNGDOs 
were those that met the criteria for participation in the qualitative research (phase III). 
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4.2.3.4 Survey instrument and data collection 
The use of survey research in this study stems from its ability to produce enormous advantages over other 
forms of inquiry especially when they are properly designed and administered (Berry et al., 2003). In 
selecting the type of survey instrument for this research, careful consideration was taken as it plays an 
important role in the overall survey process and the type of data to be collected and analysed. The survey 
instrument was structured questionnaire.  
4.2.3.5 Design of the survey questionnaire 
The design of a well-constructed survey questionnaire is crucial to a successful research as it constitutes 
the main instrument of data collection. In the quantitative phase, a structured questionnaire was designed 
in line with the emerging themes from the in-depth key informant interviews during phase one. The survey 
questionnaire served the following purposes: i) to map variations and commonalities in NNGDOs’ 
resource mobilisation strategies; ii) to identify variables associated with their ability to seek alternative 
sources of funding; and iii) to identify sample NNGDOs for the qualitative phase. The questionnaire was 
grouped into four sections focusing on information on legal and institutional requirements, financial 
information, human resources, structure and governance and relationship with stakeholders (Appendix 1).  
The survey questionnaire consisted of 45 questions with multiple-choice answers from which responses 
were sought from respondents. Most of the questions were closed-ended with a few being open-ended. 
The rationale for the open-ended questions was to help me understand the diversity in the resource 
mobilisation strategies of NNGDOs. The information on specific donors cannot be measured 
quantitatively. Open-ended questions helped in shaping the questions I asked during the qualitative 
interviews and also map NNGDOs’ sources of funding. The use of survey was informed by its 
methodological appropriateness as it allowed for inclusion of large and diverse sample of NNGDOs. This 
helped in capturing diversity in the sample which formed the basis of the qualitative research. Given that 
some NNGDOs provided sensitive organisational information including sources of funding and annual 
budgets, the use of survey helped in maintaining their anonymity which was a primary concern for 
NNGDO leaders.   
A pre-notification message that introduced my research, the purpose and content of the survey was sent 
to NNGDO leaders through emails. Respondents were informed that their participation was voluntary and 
their confidentiality was assured as I had an ethical approval from the University of Bath. After receiving 
feedback from respondents indicating their willingness for participation, they were given the option of 
completing a paper survey or an electronic version as the selection of a survey mode is critical in research 
(Dillman et al., 2014). For respondents that opted for paper survey, I printed and delivered them personally 
to their offices. Paper surveys consisted of a mixture of self-administration and face-to-face interview 
with Executive Directors or senior management team members in their office. The rationale was that some 
respondents reported that they had limited time due to busy work schedules. For this reason, I had to ask 
the questions for them to answer directly. On the other hand, respondents that requested for an electronic 
survey, I sent them an email containing the questionnaire which was self-administered. These were later 
emailed to me upon weekly reminders by emails and phone calls. The electronic survey reduced the 
burden of physically delivering and collecting the responses as many NNGDOs were scattered across 
several districts.  
Combining different survey modes (face-to-face interviews and self-administration) helped in 
overcoming weaknesses including low response rate and also reducing the financial costs associated with 
face-to-face interviews. Although mixing survey modes is useful, it has its downsides including the 
problem of social desirability (a situation where social norms compel respondents to give culturally 
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acceptable responses in interviews) which results in measurement error. By following the suggestions of 
Dillman et al. (2014:404-408), I designed the surveys in a way that reduced the possibility of generating 
different results by survey modes. The content of the questionnaire was the same for both paper and 
electronic questionnaire and data collection was done simultaneously.  
In total, the questionnaire was sent to 127 NNGDOs. After continuous follow-ups and weekly reminders, 
59 (46.6%) out of the targeted 127 NNGDOs returned their responses (Table 4.3). Response rate were 22 
(37.3 %), 28 (47.5%) and 9 NNGDOs (15.3 %) for the Greater Accra, Northern and Upper West Region 
respectively (Table 4.3). Of the 59 NNGDOs, three were cleansed for missing information. I contacted 
their leaders directly through emails and phone calls for clarification. None of the NNGDOs was dropped 
after the data cleansing exercise. For this reason, the working database for the analysis contained 
information on 59 NNGDOs. Of the 59 NNGDOs, 26 (44.1%) were administered face-to-face while the 
remaining 33 (55.9%) were self-administered. The high response rate (46.6%) experienced in this research 
helped to minimise non-response bias.  
There are diverse perspectives among scholars concerning what constitutes a good response rate (see 
Rogelberg and Stanton, 2007; Fulton, 2016). Despite this, Baruch and Holtom (2008:1153) reviewed 463 
different studies between 2000 and 2005 and found that the average response rate for individual and 
organisational level studies was 52.7% and 37.2% respectively. They maintain that researchers who 
approach organisational leaders for data are faced with the challenge of low response compared to non-
executive members. In this regard, the response rate of 46.6% can be considered as satisfactory since my 
research sought data from NNGDO leaders. This is because in an organisational questionnaire that is not 
coercively administered, it is rare to achieve a 100% response rate (Rogelberg and Stanton, 2007). 
However, having a high response rate helps in increasing the representativeness of the sample. 
Among the reasons that accounted for the respectable return include the timeliness and topical salience of 
my research to NNGDOs. NNGDO leaders were most likely to be attracted to participate in my research 
because it borders on their financial vulnerability and sustainability in a time of changing funding patterns 
and dwindling support for their programmes. Many respondents indicated that my research was timely 
because it focused on their own survival and resource mobilisation issues. Gupta et al. (2000) argue that 
research salience to organisational leaders has a greater tendency of resulting in high response rate from 
survey questionnaire. Research topics that are timely and relates to the internal and external features of 
an organisation increases the likelihood of executives to respond to a given survey questionnaire (Cycyota 
and Harrison, 2006). In addition, the survey questionnaires were designed in a manner that was easier for 
completion. This was informed by the initial findings and suggestions from the pilot survey. In addition, 
sending advance notice, developing personal relationships and follow-ups ensured high response rate.   
In terms of overall non-response rate, the electronic survey was higher (31.5%) than paper survey (22.0%). 
All NNGDOs were contacted at least six times before they were considered as non-respondents. Among 
the reasons that accounted for the high response rate in the paper survey includes the interactive nature of 
the interview process compared to the ‘exam type’ nature of the self-administered questions. For non-
respondent NNGDOs, two indicated that were going through restructuring while three cited their busy 
schedules at the end of the year did not permit them to respond to survey questionnaires. The non-response 
rate was also due to the time this research was conducted (28th September 2015-31st January 2016). This 
was the period many NNGDOs were writing their end of year reports and also planning for the 2016 
financial year. In addition, low incentives and past experience affected the response rate. For example, 
four Executive Directors reported that past researchers did not feedback their research findings. The 
implication of lack of feedback by researchers is that it reduces motivation for participation in subsequent 
academic research. To address this issue, I promised to give my research findings for feedback and also 
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acknowledge participating NNGDOs in the final thesis. For example, respondents provided feedback 
concerning the distinction among volunteers (i.e. local and international). Their feedback was also useful 
in classifying community and stipend volunteers (national service personnel and interns) which initially 
was absent from my analysis and discussion.  
4.2.3.6 Quantitative data analysis  
For the quantitative data, descriptive statistics in the form of central tendencies  (e.g. mean, median and 
mode), frequencies, percentages and pictogrames were used in order to generate trends and patterns in the 
variables (Section 5.4-5.7). Survey data were screened for missing information before the data was 
analysed. Quantitative data were analysed using IBM Statistical Product and Service Solutions (SPSS) 
22.0. Income mobility matrix was used in accounting for changes in NNGDOs’ income level between 
2010 and 2015. The income mobility matrix measured the extent to which NNGDOs had transitioned in 
terms of their income bands between 2010 and 2015. To calculate the income mobility matrix, NNGDOs’ 
income were categorised into six bands for the observation period. A comparison was made between the 
median income bands for 2010-2012 and 2013-2015 after adjusting for inflation using consumer price 
index (CPI) for each year (see Appendix 8). The results from the descriptive statistics and income mobility 
matrix were used to select NNGDOs and also design the interview schedule for the qualitative research 
(Phase III). 
4.2.4. Phase three: Qualitative research  
The qualitative research was aimed at providing an in-depth understanding of the results from phase two. 
It sought to explore the perception and experience of NNGDO employees on issues pertaining to their 
strategic responses to uncertainty and factors that constrain and influence the choice of strategy. 
Onwuegbuzie and Collins (2007:292) point out that in designing and selecting sample in mixed methods 
research, two important factors need consideration namely, time orientation and the relationship between 
the quantitative and qualitative data. Based on these criteria, they maintain that quantitative and qualitative 
data have identical, parallel, multi-level and nested relationships. First, identical relationship involves the 
use of the same sample members for the quantitative and qualitative phases. Second, in parallel 
relationship, different samples are used for the quantitative and qualitative research but are selected from 
the same population. Third, multi-level relationship involves the use of two or more samples drawn from 
different sample population for each phase. Last, nested relationship involves the selected sample of one 
phase represents the subset of participants selected for the next stage. In accord with this typology, I 
employed nested relationship for the qualitative research where NNGDOs that had participated earlier in 
the quantitative research were selected using criteria sampling.  
4.2.4.1 Criteria for selecting NNGDOs  
In selecting NNGDOs for the qualitative phase, I used the following criteria: 
1. Minimum size and age: In terms of size, NNGDOs’ annual budget must not less be than GH₵ 
20,000 (US$5, 263.15) and the number of paid employees (not less than 4 staff) was used6. For 
age, NNGDOs must have been in existence for more than 5 years and must have had experience 
with donor funding. 
2. Indicators of strategic responses: Self-reported coping mechanisms such as engagement in 
income-generating activities and membership of networks were used.  
3. Indicators of resource diversification: This was measured by funding variety and concentration 
ratios in terms of self-reported funding sources. This selection was based on information from the 
                                                          
6 Between September 2015 and January 2016, the average interbank exchange rate was US$1.0 = GH₵3.80. 
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income mobility matrix which helped in the identification of ‘positive and negative deviants’ in 
terms of how their income had changed over a five-year period. 
4. Indicators of financial sustainability: Self- reported NNGDOs’ financial situations (precarious, 
surviving, thriving and sustainable) and measures to mitigate financial vulnerability were used. 
5. Willingness of NNGDO leaders to grant access.  
 
The above criteria ensured the selection of different NNGDOs (e.g. big and small, old and relatively new, 
sustainable and precarious). The rationale was to highlight the effects of organisational characteristics on 
NNGDOs’ resource mobilisation and strategic responses. The criteria ensured the inclusion of ‘positive 
and negative outliers’. The selection of different NNGDOs provided a nuanced understanding in capturing 
dynamics in NNGDOs’ responses to uncertainty.  
4.2.4.2 Selection of NNGDOs for in-depth interview 
Choosing the right sample size in mixed methods research is crucial because it determines the type of 
generalisation to be made. However, for most qualitative studies, emphasis is on meanings rather than 
statistical generalisations which make sample size not an issue (Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 2005). In fact, 
for qualitative researchers and methodologists, the question of how many interviews is enough for 
validation remains debatable. Despite this, there seem to an agreement on the concept of saturation as the 
yardstick for determining sample size but many researchers fail to demonstrate how they reached 
saturation in their study (Guest et al., 2006; Corbin and Strauss, 2015). Generally, in order to achieve 
saturation in qualitative research, sample size should not be too small but also having too large sample 
size is not helpful because of the difficulty involved in conducting an in-depth analysis of the understudied 
phenomena as well data becoming repetitive (Mason, 2010).  
When selecting sample size for a qualitative research, key determinants including heterogeneity of the 
sample, number of selection criteria, multiple sample, research scope and design cannot be underestimated 
(Ritchie and Lewis, 2012). For this reason, Ritchie and Lewis (2012:84) suggest that for individual 
qualitative interviews in a single study, the sample should ‘‘lie under 50’’. Informed by these factors and 
the study criteria, 32 NNGDOs that participated in the quantitative phase were purposively selected for 
in-depth interviews (see Appendix 2 for profile of selected NNGDOs). The use of purposive sampling 
was on the basis that I was not sampling to be representative of the NNGDO sector but rather explore in-
depth through key informant interviews with NNGDOs’ employees to capture diversity of context and 
experience on how they mobilise resources and also adapt to their operating environment. In other words, 
the aim was to have a deeper understanding of a small but increasing dominant subset of NNGDOs. 
4.2.4.3 Choice and selection of research participants  
Respondents for NNGDOs were executive directors, programmes directors/managers and field officers. 
This ensured that staff at different organisational hierarchy were included in the research. Other key 
informants including donor representatives, NNGDO network and coalition representatives and 
government officials were interviewed. In total, 62 interviews were conducted during phase three (see 
Appendix 3).  
Executive Directors and Heads of Programmes 
Given the focus of my research, selected key informant(s) were members of the senior management team 
specifically executive directors and programme directors/managers. These informants were deemed 
appropriate as they were in the best position to provide better and adequate information about their 
organisations (Ritchie et al., 2007; Fulton, 2016). Thus, they are most knowledgeable source of 
organisational level information as they play key roles in decision-making processes. The rationale for 
interviewing executive directors was that I considered them as originators, catalysts and keepers of 
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organisational story and ideas because they shape decision-making processes in their organisations. These 
individuals play an important role in forming, changing and maintaining organisational culture. In 
addition, given that many NNGDOs had highly personalised leadership characteristics, they shape and 
influence resource mobilisation through their personal connections and engagement with stakeholders 
(e.g. politicians, government and donor officials), hence the need to understand their perspectives on 
strategic responses. Moreover, executive directors were custodians of all financial and non-financial 
information. Lastly, the support of executive directors was necessary in getting access. I interviewed 
executive directors in order to understand issues pertaining to their governance structures, resource 
mobilisation, effects of environmental factors on their operations, strategic responses and relationships 
with stakeholders.  
The choice of programmes directors/managers was on the basis that they were responsible for the day-to-
day administration of projects and programmes and had access to organisational information. In cases 
where an executive director was unable to provide some information, I was referred to the programme 
director/manager. In some NNGDOs, I interviewed both executive directors and programme 
directors/managers. There were instances where only programme directors/ managers were interviewed 
because their executive directors were not available at the time of data collection (see Appendix 3).  
Project and field officers  
Project and field officers play vital roles by serving as the link between NNGDOs and their intended 
beneficiaries. These officers are the direct implementers of programmes and projects and have first-hand 
information about NNGDOs’ strategies and their implications on programmes and intended beneficiaries. 
The rationale for interviewing these officers was to get a deeper insight and different perspectives into 
organisational information provided by senior staff members. This helped in understanding internal 
organisational culture and dynamics as well as the flow of ideas, knowledge and information within the 
various NNGDOs.  
Donor representatives  
Donors play important roles with regard to NNGDOs’ operations as they serve as their ‘lifeblood’ through 
the provision of funding and other support. Donor dependency among NNGDOs implies that changes in 
priority areas and funding patterns greatly affect their survival. It was therefore appropriate to seek donors’ 
perspectives by focusing on issues pertaining to funding criteria and selection process, changes in priority 
areas, grant conditionalities and how they framed and understood NNGDOs’ sustainability (Appendix 5). 
Donor agencies and representatives were purposively selected based on the following criteria:  
1. The organisation must be a bilteral, multilateral, INGDO or philanthropic development agency 
that provides resources to support the activities of NNGDOs. 
2. The donor representative must be a key personnel (e.g. Country Director, Programme Director, 
Finance and Administrative Director or Manager, Programme Officer and Grants and Fundraising 
Manager) with formal responsibility for and/or practical knowledge of NNGDO funding 
landscape and be willing to participate in this research.  
3. Sampled NNGDOs must have indicated that they received funding and support from the donor 
between 2010 and 2015. 





Based on the above criteria, I contacted five donor agencies but two (i.e. USAID and AUSAID) could not 
participate in the research because they reported that they were unavailable for interview. For this reason, 
a total of three bilateral and multilateral donor representatives ((Danish International Development 
Agency (DANIDA), European Union (EU) Delegation to Ghana and DFID) were interviewed. In 
addition, I interviewed six representatives of grant-making institutions (2 from African Women’s 
Development Fund (AWDF), 2 from Strengthening Transparency, Accountability and Responsiveness in 
Ghana (STAR-Ghana), 1 from Business Sector and Advocacy Challenge Fund (BUSAC) and 1 from the 
corporate foundation of a telecommunication company. Three representatives of INGDOs (Tree Aid-
Ghana, IBIS-Ghana and ActionAid-Ghana) were also interviewed (see Appendix 3). I interviewed these 
respondents because they managed the grants and their relationships with NNGDOs. In addition, the 
interviews not only helped in supplementing and validating the information provided by NNGDOs, it also 
provided insights into how changes in donor funding and priorities affect organisational survival and 
sustainability.  
Government officials  
Two officials from the national headquarters and Northern Regional Office of the DSW were interviewed 
in relation to issues concerning the registration and regulation process of NNGDOs in Ghana. The 
rationale was to understand the effects of NNGDOs’ institutional environment on their operations. 
Moreover, information on the different categories and the number of NNGDOs operating in Ghana was 
asked. I also wanted to find out about the legal requirements and processes involved in operating social 
enterprise or commercial activities for NNGDOs (Appendix 7). I contacted four government ministries 
(Health, Education, Agriculture and Finance) but I was only granted access to officials at the Ministry of 
Finance. Two representatives from the Aid and Debt Management Division (ADMD) were interviewed 
to understand the implications of Ghana’s LMIC status on the inflows of ODA and other form of 
development assistance on government’s support and relationship with NNGDOs. I was also interested 
in understanding how government’s regulatory environment affected NNGDOs. Since the ADMD deals 
directly with all ODA inflows into Ghana and manages the relationship with Ghana’s DPs, it was 
important to seek their perspectives on NNGDOs’ financing. While it would have been insightful to get 
different perspectives from other ministries, access was denied despite several attempts to use formal and 
informal channels. 
Other key informants: Consultants and network/coalition leaders  
Key informants including consultants, representatives of WACSI and NNGDO networks and coalitions 
with practical and extensive knowledge of the sector were interviewed. The selection of the key 
informants reflected the diversity of thematic areas and NNGDO types used in my research. During 
fieldwork, many NNGDOs reported using the services of development and management consultants to 
write their grant proposals. For this reason, I used snowball sampling in identifying two consultants with 
extensive knowledge on NNGDOs’ resource mobilisation and management. The aim was to understand 
issues pertaining to how NNGDOs sought funding especially through calls for proposals and wider issues 
pertaining to the sector. I also interviewed two staff from WACSI which provides capacity development 
programmes for NNGDOs to explore their perspectives on issues of sustainability and NNGDOs’ 
adaptation mechanisms. I conducted three interviews with three institutionalised coalitions and networks- 
GCNH, NNED and Coalition for Development of Western Corridor of Northern Ghana (NORTHCODE). 
My aim was to understand from a sector perspective, the relationships among NNGDOs and donors and 
how such relationships were managed. In addition, information on the regulatory mechanisms and the 
sustainability of the networks and their members were sought. To validate the information provided by 
the networks and coalitions, a representative of Kasa Initiative-a pooled-funding mechanism for NNGDOs 
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and CSOs in natural resource and environmental governance was interviewed. The rationale was to 
compare the responses provided by the coalitions in health and education with other sectors.  
4.2.4.4 Instruments for qualitative research  
Data for the qualitative phase were collected mainly through semi-structured interviews, field notes and 
archival research. The rationale was to help in triangulating and validating responses provided during the 
interview process in order to secure an in-depth understanding of the understudied phenomena which 
helped in avoiding researcher and respondent bias (Denzin, 2012; Yin, 2014).  
Semi-structured interviews, interview protocol and data collection process  
Maxwell (2012) argues that there are different forms of interviews that can be used in collecting 
qualitative data including structured, semi-structured, un-structured, life history, ethnographic and open-
ended interviews. As part of the data collection process, I employed semi-structured interviews (i.e. 
interview guides) in having an in-depth understanding of NNGDOs’ strategic responses based on 
individual perspectives and beliefs. The in-depth interviews were conducted with the aim of getting 
respondents’ point of view on their experience because knowledge is socially constructed between the 
researcher and the researched. Again, NNGDOs engage in interaction with stakeholders in their operating 
environment, hence the need to have in-depth interviews with the different stakeholders including 
government and donor officials (see Appendix 5-7).  
The semi-structured interviews consisted of open-ended questions as this gave interviewees opportunity 
to express their opinions in details. This follows the advice of Gillham (2005) that elite interviews be 
loosely structured because of the senstivity with the information they provide. In addition, elite interviews 
often raises methodological and ethical issues which requires researchers to be tactiful in the way they 
approach participants in terms of rapport building, asking senstitive questions and negotiating power 
relations. In seeking further clarifications, I used prompts and probes in the interview process which 
ensured that the desired topics were thoroughly investigated. All interviews were conducted face-to face 
and this accorded me the opportunity to understand the issues discussed from participants’ perspectives.  
In collecting the qualitative data, access was relatively easier because I had established relationships and 
built rapport with NNGDO leaders during the quantitative phase. For selected organisations, an email 
informing and requesting for their participation was sent. If the NNGDO was interested in participating, 
appointments were scheduled. These were done in a timely manner which led to a fruitful interview 
process. The Civil Society Sustainability Workshop organised by International Non-Governmental 
Organisations Training and Research Centre (INTRAC) and WACSI on 17th November 2015 in Accra 
gave me the opportunity to meet and build networks with representatives of donor agencies.  
For donor representatives, they were purposively selected and contacted through emails and telephone 
calls. For key informants in the NNGDO sector, I used snowball sampling based on initial discussion with 
a representative from WACSI. The key informant recommended and provided the contact details of other 
informants. For government officials, they were purposively selected based on formal and informal 
contacts I had developed through personal visits during data collection. I wrote an introductory letter 
supported with a letter by my supervisor to all respondents (Appendix 4-7). Once access was granted, I 
arranged for an appropriate time for the interviews.  
In terms of interview protocols and questions, four different interview schedules were prepared for 
respondents. The interview questions started with a brief biography of respondents in terms of their 
position and responsibility within the organisation in addition to brief organisational history. These were 
followed by more complex questions that sought to address the specific issues under each section. I used 
transitional questions in leading interviewees to the key questions.  
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I did not employ the services of research assistants and solely conducted all interviews. In conducting 
interviews, I was adaptive, flexible, sensitive and an active listener.  
In collecting the qualitative data, I conducted 42 in-depth interviews with respondents from 32 NNGDOs. 
In some cases, respondents were interviewed twice over a four-month period with the rationale of seeking 
clarification on information provided earlier. All interviews were conducted in NNGDOs’ offices. I 
conducted 11 and 9 interviews with donor representatives and key informants respectively. All interviews 
were conducted in their offices. All respondents consented to tape recording before the interview with the 
exception of DFID where tape recording was not allowed because of perceived security threats. Hence, I 
relied on field notes as a way of capturing the issues discussed. For NNGDOs, I collected about 3600 
minutes of digital recording with the average length of 85 minutes. Data collection for donor 
representatives started in January 2016 while that of NNGDOs and key informants took place between 
March and July 2016. 
All interviews were conducted face-to-face solely in English.Written and verbal informed consent was 
sought before starting any interview. Respondents were informed that they were free to withdrawal at any 
time if they wish to do so. The audio interviews were tape-recorded and later transcribed verbatim. In 
qualitative research, verbatim transcription is crucial for reliability, veracity and validity of data (MacLean 
et al., 2004). The transcripts were also used in cross-checking and filling gaps in field notes written during 
the interview process. By doing so, it helped in the reduction of interviewer bias as field notes were 
compared with the original data. All interviews were tracked by renaming recorded audio files with 
interviewees’ name, organisation, position and date of interview. Some interviews were transcribed within 
two weeks while majority took place between May and July 2016. The rationale was to ensure that all 
clarifications were sought from respondents.  
 
Field notes and journal 
Aside from interviews, data collection was supplemented by field notes. According to Spradley (2016), 
field notes play important role in research analysis when they are well organised. This can be in the form 
of recordings of events, interactions, thoughts as well as the feelings of participants in their natural 
contexts. In this research, informal conversations were lengthened as extended field notes. These included 
completing sentences and filling gaps expressed by respondents but were not tape-recorded. Extended 
field notes were written when the ideas were fresh in my memory. I kept a field journal of everyday 
activities, impressions and informal observations that I considered to be of relevance to this research 
especially in relation to some emerging themes. For example, I attended workshops and regional network 
meetings in Tamale which helped me in documenting some themes on power imbalance among network 
members. The use of field journal ensured researcher reflexivity. 
Archival research 
Archival research was also used as data collection tool. This helped in getting access to information not 
subjected to personal discourses. Specific archival research included annual and project reports, financial 
statements, policy briefs and grants applications of some NNGDOs. In  addition, I collected data from 
NNGDO and donor websites. For NNGDOs, the analysis of their websites provided me with some 
information on their visibility and branding, programmes, funding partners and networks. This helped me 
in validating some information provided during the interview process. For donors, it gave me insights into 
their their partnership with NNGDOs and available funding opportunities. I also reviewed some  national 
newspapers (e.g. Daily Graphic) with the intention of finding out how calls for proposals were advertised 
and the selection criteria used (Appendix 10-11).This helped in the design of the interview schedule for 
donor representatives.  
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4.2.4.5 Qualitative data analysis 
Qualitative data analysis involves working systematically and grouping of textual data into categories in 
order to establish patterns that emerge out of the data. The data analysis process started with verbatim 
transcription of the interview data. I checked the transcripts against the recorded audio files in order to 
ensure accuracy. As with most qualitative research, approaches to analysing data are diverse without any 
clearly agreed rules due to its complex nature. In this research, thematic analysis method of analysing 
qualitative data was used. This provided flexibility because it was not restricted to a particular set of 
theories. Thus, thematic analysis as reported by Braun and Clarke (2006:81) can be a realist method that 
tends to report on respondents’ experience, meanings and reality in specific contexts. In other words, it is 
a method that ‘‘works both to reflect reality and to unpick or unravel the surface of reality’’. The inductive, 
iterative approach to qualitative analysis informed my analysis.  
Braun and Clarke (2006) identified six stages in conducting thematic analysis: i) familiarisation with the 
data; ii) generation of initial themes; iii) searching for themes; iv) reviewing of themes; v) defining; and 
vi) naming themes and report production. In accord, after transcription, I familiarised myself with the data 
by going through (i.e. reading and re-reading) each interview several times for more meaning and 
understanding. The rationale for data immersion was to help in the identification of emerging themes. 
This process was ‘grounded’ in the sense that the themes emerged out of the data. As part of the 
familiarisation process, the transcripts were first grouped into categories (i.e. NNGDOs, donors and key 
informants) in order to organise the data into meaningful groups in identifying specific theme emerging 
from each group. After data familiarisation, I identified broader themes from the transcripts. The 
identification of the themes was informed by my philosophical stance and the theoretical frameworks 
reviewed in chapter three. This echoes Braun and Clarke’s (2006) argument that researchers employing 
thematic analysis must acknowledge their theoretical positions because although it is data driven, the 
researcher does not analyse data in theoretical and epistemological vacuum.   
At the beginning of the analysis, I identified broad and specific themes emerging out of the data using the 
process of indexing (i.e. labelling the data according to specific thematic framework). It helped in 
identifying and developing main themes (parent nodes) and subthemes (child nodes) in NVivo software. 
Three main themes (resource mobilisation, external environment and strategic responses) were developed 
during the first coding process. Although the coding process was inductive, it was guided by my critical 
realist ontology. For example, the parent node for external environment represented structures while 
resource mobilisation and strategic responses represented agency. As part of the second coding process, 
27 broad child notes were further developed as sub-categories of the three broad themes. A third and 
fourth coding process was used in generating 165 and 32 sub-themes (child notes) respectfully.  
Coding process in NVivo was iterative in the sense that adjustments were made due to the emergence of 
new and modification of old themes. Thus, data analysis took a recursive rather than a linear approach 
which involved movements back and forth with the data and the emerging themes. To this end, all coded 
interviews for each theme was read in checking for coherent pattern at the individual thematic level. A 
similar process of refinement was undertaken in relation to the entire data which allowed for new themes 
that were not initially identified to be coded. The refined themes were read to identify their diversity, 
significance and type of data captured. This process involved moving away from the superficial to 
analytical properties of the extracted data.  
Case classification and attributes in NVivo were used in sorting respondents into different categories. This 
included discussion type, type of NNGDO, region, sector (s) of operation, type of donor and key informant 
were developed. Case categorisation helped in comparing the different interviewee responses. My aim in 
doing so was to identify and understand differences and similarities in responses.  
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After developing the categories, a detailed analysis was written on each theme to identify and capture the 
‘on-going story’ and the relationships between the themes. Coding query in NVivo was used in 
establishing the relationship between the different themes. Framework matrix function helped in 
identifying patterns in the data through cases (respondents) and themes (nodes). This allowed for cross-
cases comparison among NNGDOs. My aim was to avoid over generalisation from a single case. Patterns 
of relationships among themes were analysed. This was followed by a detailed summary and explanation 
of the extracted data. It is worth saying that memos written during fieldwork and coding process were 
useful as they helped in capturing my reflections on the interview data and the coding process. This proved 
very useful in documenting and organising my interpretation of the data which were incorporated into the 
thesis.  
Discourse analysis was also used in analysing the nature and how NNGDOs framed their inter-relations 
with stakeholders. It also offered insights into how NNGDOs made meanings and understood uncertainty 
within their operating environment. In understanding organisational ideas and strategies, different staff 
within organisations had multiple meanings and interpretations and therefore raises important questions: 
do all NNGDO staff speak the same language in terms of their strategic responses? Do the views of senior 
management team differ from that of field officers? Do the views of NNGDOs on their organisational 
sustainability differ from that of donors? Discourse analysis was used in unravelling how NNGDOs and 
donors framed sustainability. This helped in understanding differences and commonalities in meanings 
and interpretations ascribed to the same issue. It was also useful in understanding variations in 
interpretation of transcripts and other organisational documents. These meanings and interpretations are 
socially constructed, context specific and fallible because of their subjective nature and therefore reflect 
a key aspect of critical realist ontology.  
The use of discourse analysis helped in identifying important themes, terms and their frequency of usage. 
For example, on discussions of how structures affected NNGDOs’ survival, the most frequently used 
words included ‘funds’, ‘dependent’ ‘donors’, ‘projects’, ‘overheads’ ‘shifts’, ‘priorities, ‘requirements’, 
‘accountable’, ‘transparent’, ‘legitimate’, ‘approval’ and  ‘capacity’. Words like ‘negotiate’, ‘engage’, 
‘choice’, ‘aggressive’, ‘decide’ ‘challenge’, ‘brand and ‘invest’ were also used to express NNGDOs’ 
agency and room for manoeuvre. Discourse analysis was useful in unravelling the underlying reasons that 
accounts for adoption of certain strategic responses by NNGDOs whether it was shaped by donor actions, 
forethought or leaders’ intentionality.  
4.3 Reflexivity and positionality  
My fieldwork was moulded by my experience in the NGDO sector, nationality and social identities. My 
original interest in this research was based on my experience at the Grants Acquisition and Management 
Team of World Vision International, Ghana (WVG)  between January and August 2014 where I solicited 
funds to support orphans and vulnerable children. Mobilising financial resources was challenging even 
for WVG. I began to question why NGDOs found it difficult in ensuring their survival and sustainability. 
More importantly, if INGDOs were even ‘struggling’ to survive in their changing environment, what will 
happen to small and medium-sized NNGDOs? The need for bringing to light how NNGDOs mobilised 
resources and adapted to changes in their environment was too strong for me to ignore, hence, I developed 
an interest in conducting this research. Given this background, I consider myself an insider because to 
some extent I share knowledge with my respondents based on my prior understanding of the context.  
Nationality is recognised as an important indicator of insiderness (see Matejskova, 2014). My nationality 
as a Ghanaian presented both opportunities and challenges during data collection. I identify as a Ghanaian 
student studying abroad and my educational background gave me some kind of ‘respect and credibility’ 
in the eyes of some respondents. On the other hand, my position as a PhD candidate also made some 
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respondents to consider me as an ‘expert’ and therefore thought that I knew better than them when I asked 
certain questions. In such instances, by being critically reflective, I assumed the position of an observer 
who was interested in having an in-depth understanding from a practitioner’s perspective and experience. 
Revealing my identity as a PhD candidate had it downsides because when I present myself as an ‘expert’, 
it might make my respondents to feel I am challenging their authority or intimidating them. However, not 
showing expertise especially with elite interviewees may also lead to some doubts and control of the 
interview process by interviewees.  
My position as an insider researcher also gave me access to some respondents. For instance, my 
insiderness helped me to establish contact with intermediaries (e.g. former schoolmates) who introduced 
me to government officials. In addition, through my personal contacts, I attended NNGDO workshops 
during my fieldwork which helped me to gain access to some respondents. However, not all key 
informants were contacted through intermediaries. I personally contacted some directly through emails 
and phone calls. This notwithstanding, intermediaries helped in clarifying doubts about my identity and 
intentions to key informants. In addition, it helped in increasing trust from potential respondents because 
of the need for indirect reciprocity. Moreover, as part of social norms, it was difficult for potential 
respondents to ignore the request for participation made by intermediaries.  
As part of indirect reciprocity, there was potential utility of my research to NNGDOs. For this reason, 
many respondents considered me to share their concern about sustainability. I promised to share 
preliminary research findings with NNGDO leaders which benefit myself and my respondents. For 
NNGDOs, getting detailed information on their sources of funding and strategic responses by other 
organisations is crucial. My position as a student in the UK made some NNGDOs to admittedly perceive 
that I could help them secure funding but I explained to them that I don’t have access. The purpose for 
selecting NNGDOs was always made clear to respondents prior to the survey as this was stated in the 
information sheet and iterated prior to and during the interview process.  
In addition, although I considered myself an insider, there were instances where I found it impossible to 
assume this positionality because of my limited knowledge of the NNGDO sector and the desire to have 
multi-faceted perspectives from respondents. In those instances, I identified as an outsider, seeking 
respondents’ first-hand experience; they questioned my position in some instances. During the interview 
process, some respondents regarded me as behaving like a ‘foreigner’ with limited knowledge about 
Ghana. Such instances reflect the challenge of categorising a researcher into an insider or outsider. This 
dichotomy is not helpful especially in areas where ethnic and national belongings are multilayered and it 
becomes impossible for a researcher to assume a particular positionality. As Narayan (1993) points out, 
maintaining an insider or an outsider perspective is complex because our positionality goes beyond culture 
and nationality and are influenced by factors including our education, gender and class.  
A researcher’s positionality could be changed by contextual factors that are beyond his control. 
Contextuality is key to determining insiderness or outsiderness. In my research, I was more fluid in 
shifting positions from an insider or outsider perspective based on prevailing contextual factors.When 
talking to NNGDO leaders, I assumed the position of an outsider because I had limited knowledge of the 
current issues in the sector but with donors, I was an insider especially if the discussion touched on general 
national issues relating to NNGDOs. I therefore exercised both empathy and alienation during my 
fieldwork. According to Collier and Muneri (2016), contextual factors play a key role in any research. 
Against this backdrop, accounts of reflexivity that focuses only on researcher’s reflection to the neglect 
of these contextual factors is not helpful. Informed by this, I acknowledge that religious differences did 
have some effects on my data collection. For example, there were instances especially in Northern Ghana 
where I had to pause interviews to allow respondents to go to the mosque to pray. These occurrences 
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helped me in finding common ground with my respondents. For this reason, I did not feel distant from 
my respondents although I was not emotionally connected during the interview process. 
It is also worth mentioning that in terms of sampling, many NNGDOs were found in the regional and 
district capitals while some were scattered across towns in the districts. In this regard, travelling from the 
regional capitals to the other districts required huge financial and time resources. For example, travelling 
from Accra or Tamale where I was based to some NNGDOs in the the Upper West Region took between 
6 and 16 hours drive depending on the car. However, I had limited financial resources. For this reason, 
although I travelled to the various districts, the amount of time I spent there was limited compared to the 
regional capitals. I had pre-existing contacts in the regional capitals who provided me numerous support 
including accommodation which reduced the financial burden compared to collecting data in the districts 
where I had to lodge in hotels and manoeuver my way throughout my fieldwork. I acknowledge that 
spending much time at the regional capitals gave me easy access but this might have influenced the 
number of NNGDOs that participated in this research. This is not to suggest that the selection process was 
skewed towards NNGDOs at the regional capitals. Both district and regional representation was achieved 
in the sample.  
In reflecting on potential power relations between respondents and myself, I am aware that I directed the 
interviews process in most cases because I was interested in exploring particular sets of questions. 
However, in many instances, since respondents had the power and access to information, they sometimes 
wanted to talk more about general issues including their relationships with donors and issues of perceived 
discrimination. I had the flexibility of spending some interview time for discussion because they provided 
important insights into the sector as a whole. These issues further opened up opportunities to probe more 
questions. Respondents were willing to spend quality time over one and half hours talking to me despite 
their busy work schedules and this helped me to cover all the issues I wanted to discuss. While I was 
aware of the importance of access to a successful research, I ensured that demands placed on them were 
minimised and did not disrupt their core organisational activities.  
I was also aware of the potential role that my social identities like gender and age could have on how I 
was perceived by respondents. Gender roles did not significantly affect my interactions with respondents. 
For female respondents, they did not feel pressured in giving me answers that were socially desirable due 
to gender differences. While many respondents were elderly and would sometimes call me their son 
during the interview process, it did not affect how I related to them. However, when talking to respondents 
in my age bracket, the interviews were more free-flowing because I could relate to them and there were 
instances where respondents would use local jargons like ‘charlie’ (informal way of calling a friend or 
brother) during the interview process. It is important to clarify that since this research is about 
organisational behaviour and strategies and not a detailed account of an individual’s personal life, issues 
concerning my social identity had no significant impact on this research. However, my role as a researcher 
influenced the data collection, selection and analysis. For this reason, while recognising respondents’ 
perspectives, I also acknowledge that my role in the co-construction of knowledge might have influenced 
the analysis and the findings of my research.  
4.3.1 Ethical considerations  
Ethics play a major part in any given research. The mixed methods employed in this research implied that 
I was faced with ethical problems including informed consent and confidentiality during my fieldwork. 
My research was guided by the ethical principles of the ethics committee at the Department of Social and 
Policy Sciences, University of Bath. To address problems of informed consent, I sent out written consent 
to organisations for their participation and explained to them the purpose of the study. Information sheet 
was given to respondents to read before they participated in this study. It contained researcher’s 
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information including contact details, purpose of the research, responsibilities of the researcher and 
respondents, dissemination of research findings in addition to the right of respondents to withdraw from 
the study at any time if they so desire.  
Signed informed consent sheets were kept separate from the data in order to ensure that respondents’ 
anonymity is maintained. Respondents were assured that participation in this research through the 
completion of survey questionnaire and in-depth interview was voluntary (Appendix and 4). They had the 
right to withdraw at any time if they wish to do so. This idea of participation being voluntary was iterated 
through the research process. The rationale was to avoid the potential of being extractive in the data 
gathering process. As part of informed consent strategy, I sought respondents’ oral consent before the 
start of any interview. In ensuring anonymity and confidentiality, organisations and key informants were 
given the option if they wanted their names to be anonymised or maintained in the research. Those desiring 
that their names be anonymised were assigned with codes in the final analysis in order not to disclose 
their identity. For confidentiality reason, I have labelled respondents as NNGDO 1-32; Donor 1-8 and 
Key Informant 1-12 throughout this thesis (see Appendix 3).  
To address the problem of deception, I explained in details the purpose and goals of the research to 
respondents so that they became aware of the reasons for their involvement. Providing clarity on the 
purpose of the research helped in gaining the trust of respondents. Also given the sensitivity of information 
provided (e.g. annual budget), it was vital that the purpose of the research was outlined. To address the 
problem of lying, I explained to respondents that information provided were for academic purposes as a 
partial fulfilment of the requirement for the attainment of a PhD degree. This helped in clarifying any 
false impression such as my association with donor or government agencies and respondent’s expectation 
of perceived beneficial outcomes. Prior to data collection, I established contacts in Ghana with relevant 
stakeholders including academics and NGDO practitioners. This ensured that my research findings 
feedback into Ghanaian research and policy discussions. Establishing contact with a University in Ghana 
again served as a monitoring mechanism for ensuring that the research was conducted in accordance with 
local research requirements. Preliminary research findings were reported to respondents for their response 
and constructive feedback.  
4.4 Validity and reliability  
The use of mixed sampling procedures in this study increased internal validity and reliability. Moreover, 
the quantitaitve research instrument was piloted with NNGDOs while the design of the qualitative 
instrument was informed by results from the quantitative research. To ensure credibility of research 
findings, the use of multiple sources of evidence addressed this concern. The use of an iterative approach 
to data analysis where evidences were tabulated and compared ensured construct validity and reliability. 
The iterative approach involved steps such as identification, coding, verification and comparison of 
emerging themes from the different sources of data collection. In doing so, active reflexivity was required 
which helped in avoiding researcher bias and pre-conceptions. In addition, the detailed description of the 
methods used in this research ensured reliability and since I collected and analysed the data myself, it 
enhanced the authenticity and accuracy of the findings reported in this thesis. I also used member checking 
by sending the transcripts from the recorded interviews to respondents for verification. I also shared 
preliminary findings with respondents for their critical feedback. Against this backdrop, I ensured data 
accuracy where my interpretations reflect the views of respondents. Feedback from respondents were 
incorporated into the final analysis and discussion.  
To ensure that the conclusion from mixed methods sequential design is valid and credible, I followed 
Collins et al. (2007) and Ivankova’s (2014) recommendation on the use of sequential nested sampling for 
the qualitative data. The selection of different NNGDO types ensured interpretive validity and rigour of 
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research findings (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009). In terms of generalisability of research findings, the 
mixed methods sequential sampling design allows for statistical, analytic and case-to-case transfer 
generalisations for the quantitative results (Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 2005). The inclusion of NNGDOs 
and key informants from different sectors enhanced the theoretical and analytical generalisability of the 
research findings taking into consideration contextual factors.  
4.5 Challenges of conducting organisational research  
Politics of access  
Negotiating, gaining and maintaining high-quality access in fieldwork plays an important role towards 
the conduct of a successful research. However, gaining this can be challenging and problematic because 
research is undertaken in complex social situations especially from an organisational perspective. Cunliffe 
and Alcadipani (2016:536) argue that many empirical research studies fail to give a detailed account of 
access because of the assumption that gaining access is contingent on having the right strategies and the 
ability of the researcher to maintain relationships during fieldwork. This linear and neutral assumption 
often lead many researchers to present a ‘‘sanitized and anodyne account of our research’’ by disregarding 
the uncertainties and complexities of conducting empirical research. It oversimplifies the entire research 
experience. Moreover, ignoring issues about access may result in the loss of rich empirical data as the 
experience of gaining and maintaining access is an important indicator of the practices, processes and 
power inherent in the organisations under study. This helps in providing a better understanding of the 
politics of knowledge production. 
Although I could describe myself as an ‘insider’, I had little pre-existing contacts. As explained in Section 
4.2.3.1, in the absence of a comprehensive database of NNGDOs, I found myself at the centre of an 
organisational politics with government officials, NNGDOs and network/coalition leaders. This 
organisational politics resulted in the process of endless bureaucracy. This lasted for about two and half 
months and greatly influenced and delayed the start of my research. I initially planned to start my piloting 
in August 2015 but ended up starting in mid-September 2015. Nonetheless, this was a great experience 
for me as I was able to learn the virtue of being patient especially when dealing with bureaucrats in 
organisational research. It also offered me deeper insights into power dynamics at play within 
organisational research especially between superiors and subordinates. I overcame this challenge by 
developing, nurturing and building relationships and trust with respondents but this proved to be very 
difficult at the initial stages of the research. As mentioned earlier, access to some government ministries 
and donor agencies was denied. In addition, NNGDO leaders were unwilling to disclose their annual 
budgets and audited financial statements despite several requests. Non-disclosure of information raises 
questions about NNGDOs’ accountability and transparency and reflects the chasm between what they 
self-report and ground level realities.  
Difficulty of making appointments  
I encountered challenges in making appointments with interviewees. During my fieldwork, I had to 
arrange meetings with respondents but it was difficult getting their response. I sent several emails and 
followed it up with phone calls but some organisations did not respond. In booking appointments, I had 
to reschedule several interviews on more than three occasions because respondents had to change their 
appointments at the ‘last minute’ due to work and family commitments. Some respondents also never 
showed up for interviews after making the necessary arrangements which was quite frustrating. 
Organisational leaders due to the increasing work pressures have little time for pro-bono activities. For 
this reason, all interviews were organised at the convenient time that was agreed by respondents. This 
notwithstanding, some respondents did not spend the stipulated time with me which led to shortened 
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interviews. In this regard, only salient questions were asked in order to make good use of the precious 
time allocated.  
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has argued the case for a critical realist ontology to mixed methods in NNGDO research. In 
terms of sampling design, I employed a mixed methods sequential explanatory design comprising three 
phases. The first phase explored general issues pertaining to the NNGDO sector with ten key informants. 
Emerging themes were used in developing a survey which was administered to 59 NNGDOs in phase 
two. The aim was to map variations in the different NNGDO types and also select a sample for qualitative 
research in phase three. Criteria sampling was used in selecting 32 NNGDOs  in addition to 20 additional 
key informants including donor representatives, government officials and NNGDO experts for the 
qualitative research which offered an in-depth understanding of the quantitative results. Research 




Chapter Five: Non-governmental development organisations and civil society in Ghana 
5.0 Introduction 
The last chapter presented and discussed the methodology I used in this research. This chapter discusses 
the context in which this study is situated. The chapter has three main aims. First, I provide an 
understanding of the wider context within which NGDOs operate, adapt and survive. This is characterised 
by a modest but significant economic growth, declining levels of poverty but widespread inequality and 
falling external development assistance. Second, I trace the development of NGDOs and CSOs from a 
historical perspective. The rationale is to map the changes that have led to the growth and development 
of NGDOs. Third, I provide an overview of the NNGDOs sampled in this study.  
In tracing the development of the NGDO sector, I do so with the understanding that context, including 
historical context and how it is remembered, play an important role in understanding NNGDOs’ strategic 
behaviour. Central to the argument advanced in this chapter is that Ghana’s aid landscape in terms of 
donor funding patterns and relationships with NNGDOs is changing significantly. This has far-reaching 
implications and has compelled NNGDOs to reposition themselves by adopting strategies to ensure their 
survival. Data are drawn from a review of available secondary literature in addition to survey and 
interviews from my fieldwork. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. It begins with a brief discussion of Ghana’s socio-economic and political 
context in Section 5.1. I examine Ghana’s changing aid landscape in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 provides a 
historical overview of the emergence of NGDOs in pre-structural adjustment, structural adjustment and 
post-structural adjustment eras. In section 5.4, I discuss the current state of NNGDOs including their 
nature and number, structure and governance, funding environment and inter-organisational relationships.  
Section 5.6 concludes. 
5.1 Ghana in Context: Geographic and demographic characteristics 
Ghana is a democratic republic located on the west coast of Africa sharing borders with Burkina Faso to 
the North, Gulf of Guinea and the Atlantic Ocean to the South, Togo to the East and Cote d’ Ivoire to the 
West (Figure 5.1). According to the 2010 Population and Housing Census, Ghana had a total population 
of about 24.6 million with an annual growth rate of 2.5%. However, this figure was estimated to have 
increased to about 28.3 million in 2016 with 50.9% and 49.1% being female and male respectively. In 
terms of population distribution, about 50.9% and 40.1% of Ghanaians are urban and rural dwellers 
respectively (GSS, 2013; 2016).  
5.1.1 Social characteristics 
Ghana suffers from a general infrastructural deficit where limited access to basic social services like 
education and health facilities is more pronounced in rural than urban areas. Moreover, there are relatively 
higher income and employment opportunities in urban than rural areas (Agyei et al., 2016). This 
notwithstanding, Ghana has achieved some remarkable progress with regard to human development over 
the last two decades. Ghana is a lower middle-income country (LMIC) with a medium Human 
Development Index value of 0.579 in 2016. Life expectancy at birth and adult literacy rate (aged 15 years 
and above) in 2015 stood at 61.5 years and 56.3% respectively (NDPC and UNDP, 2015; UNDP, 2016).  
In Ghana, poverty abounds with 24.2% of the population living below the absolute poverty line of 
GH¢1,314.00 in 2012/2013. This figure indicates a further decline by 7.7 percentage points (i.e. from 
31.9% to 24.2% between 2005/2006 and 2012/2013) in the level of national poverty (GSS, 2014a). This 
made Ghana the first SSA country to attain the Millennium Development Goal 1 of reducing extreme 
poverty and hunger (UNDP, 2015). Despite this, about 8.4% of Ghanaians are extremely poor and reflects 
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the regionalised character of the progress made towards poverty reduction. This has resulted in increasing 
levels of persistent inequality and polarisation across and within regions. For instance, McKay and Osei-
Assibey (2017:289) report of an increasing income inequality despite a reduction in incidence of income 
poverty. They maintained that between 1988 and 2013, Ghana’s Gini Index increased from 0.324 to 0.409, 
an indication that Ghana’s economic growth has benefited the rich more than the poor.  
 
Figure 5.1: Political map of Ghana with administrative regions. 




5.1.2 Economic environment 
Economically, in 2016, Ghana recorded a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of GH¢167,315 million with 
an annual GDP growth rate of 3.5% (GSS, 2017a). Economic growth trends in terms  of real GDP recorded 
an increase from 7.9% to 15.0% between 2010 and 2011 compared to that of 4.0% recorded in 2009. This 
growth was backed by increase in export commodities including commercial oil and gas production which 
started in 2010. For example, exports from oil contributed to about 5.6 percentage points to Ghana’s GDP 
in 2011. Oil receipts to government increased from US$44.1 million to about US$1.0 billion in 2014 
(Fosu, 2017:140). However, oil GDP growth rates declined from 2016.4% in 2011 to 4.7% in 2014 
(Aryeetey and Fenny, 2017:60). 
Over the past few years, GDP growth rates have been on the decline from 15.0% to 3.5% between 2011 
and 2016 respectively (GSS, 2017b). The economy’s poor performance has been attributed to 
mismanagement (e.g. increased corruption and public sector inefficiencies), volatility in international 
markets and declining export commodities prices. As of September 2017, year-on-year inflation stood at 
12.2% representing a decline of 5.0 percentage points from the 17.2% recorded in September 2016 (GSS, 
2017b). In terms of sectoral growth, high labour absorption sectors including agriculture and 
manufacturing have witnessed slower growth in recent years. The services sector remains the largest 
contributor (56.5%) to GDP, followed by industrial (24.3%) and agricultural (3.0%) sectors (GSS, 2017a). 
The agriculture sector serves as a major source of livelihood as it employs about 44.3% of the 
economically active population while only 0.2% is currently employed in the NGDO sector (GSS, 2014b). 
In 2013, about 88.0% of Ghana’s workforce were engaged in informal and vulnerable employment while 
the private and public sectors employed only 6.1% and 5.9% respectively (Baah-Boateng, 2017:300).  
5.1.3 Political environment 
Politically, Ghana is the first SSA country to gain independence from British rule in 1957 and 
subsequently became a republic in 1960. At independence, Ghana was better off than many SSA countries 
and the level of economic development at the time was comparable to that of South Korea (Kim, 2015). 
The political landscape is made of up of modern and traditional systems. The traditional system focuses 
on chieftaincy in governance at the community level. In terms of modern governance system, Ghana’s 
political landscape was transformed by the 1992 Constitution and the adoption of multi-party democracy 
in 1993. This led to the establishment of the Fourth Republic (Debrah and Graham, 2015).  
Since then, Ghana has experienced seven successful multi-party democratic elections, albeit dominated 
by two main political parties, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party 
(NPP). The political culture in Ghana, one could argue leans towards ‘winner takes all’ which breeds 
political antagonism. As part of the democratic and decentralisation process, Ghana practices a four-tier 
MMDAs local government system. The political history provides an interesting understanding of the 
emergence of CSOs. CSOs including NGDOs have played key roles in advocacy, service delivery as well 
as acting as watchdogs over the government. This has deepened their involvement in good governance 
and democratic process making the country an example of Africa’s ‘iconic democratisers’. However, at 
the same time, the country is faced with the challenge of improving democratic quality such as 
accountability and transparency to citizens (Gyimah-Boadi, 2015). For instance, corruption is endemic 
among government officials (Nyendu, 2017). I argue that increasing state corruption is due partly to the 
neopatrimonial nature of the Ghanaian state where informality creates opportunities for government 
officials to engage in collusive activities to further their interest. This is reinforced by weak governance 
structures. In the following section, I discuss the changing operating environment of NGDOs in terms of 
ODA landscape. These are caused by complex global and internal factors including Ghana’s graduation 
to lower-middle-income status and subsequent shifts in donor priorities and relationships.   
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5.2 Ghana’s official development assistance (ODA) landscape  
The origin of ODA to Ghana dates back to the pre-independence era. However, ODA was largely in the 
form of loans rather than grant financing but this began to change especially after the 2000s (Kim, 
2015:1340). This notwithstanding, Ghana has over the past 20 years been considered a ‘donor darling’ by 
some commentators making ODA to play significant roles in the country’s development (Hughes, 2005; 
Adams and Atsu, 2014). For example, between 1995 and 2015, Ghana received about US$31.8 billion of 
ODA (OECD, 2017a).  
In terms of the aid architecture, Ghana receives general budget support (GBS), sector budget support 
(SBS) and project aid (Quartey et al., 2010). Traditional and non-traditional donors have historically 
supported Ghana’s development7. Currently, coordination between non-traditional and traditional donors 
is challenging. However, the government through the Ghana Aid Policy and Strategy (2011-2015) is 
pushing for measures to ensure aid harmonisation (MOFEP, 2010). For traditional donors providing aid 
to Ghana, the World Bank remains the biggest contributor with International Development Association 
(IDA) being the country’s single largest donor. ODA inflows to Ghana just like many SSA countries are 
volatile (Kumi et al., 2017). For example, between 2005 and 2009, Ghana experienced a substantial 
increase in ODA from US$1.7 billion to US$2.1 billion in nominal terms. However, it dwindled 
significantly from US$1.8 billion to US$1.1 billion between 2010 and 2014 following the graduation to 
LMIC. Nonetheless, in 2015, the country witnessed a steady increase in ODA inflows making it one of 
the top ten net disbursed ODA recipients in SSA (see Figure 5.2). Among the potential factors that might 
have accounted for an increase in ODA include the 2016 general election. Donor funding allocations tend 
to increase in the year before election (Briggs, 2012, 2015; Annen and Strickland, 2017). Briggs 
(2015:203) argues that changes in aid allocations are mostly driven by donor responses to events including 
elections in recipient countries. For example, prior to the 2012 general election, Ghana witnessed a slight 
increase in ODA from US$1.8 million in 2011 to US$1.9 in 2012 but it declined steadily afterwards until 
2015 (see Figure 5.2). Election years in Ghana are characterised by increased government spending which 
results in expansionary budgets and fiscal deficits (Quartey et al., 2017; Obeng and Sakyi, 2017).  
Composition wise, Ghana’s ODA is categorised into: i) debt relief from Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative 
(MDRI) and the Heavily Indebted  Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative; ii) project support; iii) programme 
aid; and iv) balance of payment support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Quartey et al., 
2010: 20). Between 2003 and 2013, project aid constituted about 50.3% of ODA inflows while the 
percentage of programme aid (excluding debt relief) increased from 26.7% to 36.1% between 2010 and 
2013 (NDPC and UNDP 2015:65). Nominal ODA recorded an average annual increase of 6.4% between 
2006 and 2010 but dropped significantly by 26.0% in 2013. Ghana’s reliance on external donor funding 
is reflected in its contribution to GDP. In 2009, net ODA accounted for about 6.1% of GDP but it declined 
                                                          
7 I acknowledge that the presence of non-traditional donors especially China is rapidly changing Ghana’s aid 
landscape, economy and relationship with government. However, empirical evidence from this research suggests 
that their support and engagement with CSOs including NNGDOs remains limited and have less potential to ensure 
their survival and sustainability. This is because non-traditional donors (e.g. China) deal directly with government. 
During my fieldwork, respondents reported that NNGDO-non-traditional donors’ relationship was non-existent 
because they were not opened to working with them. Respondents explained that they were mostly interested in 
infrastructural development, mining activities and trade deals rather than building a stronger civil society. None of 
the NNGDOs reported having relationship or receiving any form of support from non-traditional donors (see 
Appendix 9). For this reason, I argue that the excitements about non-traditional donors especially China in Ghana 
has if any little opportunities for NNGDOs. The empirical findings indicate that the presence of China has not had 




steadily to 3.0% in 2015 with a further decline projected in the coming years (Brown, 2017; OECD, 
2017b; AfDB, 2017).  
Some commentators argue that Ghana has transitioned from a highly donor dependent to an incipient 
dependency country (NDPC and UNDP, 2015). This has resulted in what I call ‘aid-free Ghana’ or ‘Ghana 
beyond aid’ rhetoric in recent years8. However, I contend that given the country’s poor economic 
performance, aid dependency and rising debt (total public debt to GDP stood at 73.9% in 2016), ODA 
will continue to be a major ‘political actor’ playing key roles in decision-making processes. As will be 
discussed in the next section, some government officials are even sceptical of the frothy talk of ‘aid-free 
Ghana’. 
 
Figure 5.2: Official Development Assistance (Commitments) to Ghana between 1995 and 2015. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on data extracted from OECD Creditor Reporting System in 2017. 
                                                          
8 As part of programmes marking Ghana’s 60th years of independence, the president Nana Addo Dankwa Akuffo-
Addo has been embarking on campaigns to move ‘Ghana beyond aid’ by arguing that ‘‘we need to, and we shall 
move Africa beyond aid. We no longer want to offer the justification for those who want to be rude and abusive 
about Africa and her peoples. It is time to build our economies that are not dependent on charity and handouts…We 
have learnt from long and bitter experience that, no matter how generous the charity, we would, and, indeed, we 
have remained poor’’ (Royal African Society, 2017). Recently, the president has been advocating for ‘‘a Ghana that 
will free itself from a mindset of dependence, of charity, of aid and handouts. The Ghana that is going to mobilise 
its own resources to develop and confront its own problems’’ (Government of Ghana, 2017a: para 1). Against this 
backdrop, ‘Ghana beyond aid’ has generated a lot of attention among policy makers, politicians, academics and 
mainstream media outlets. This has resulted in the drafting of the ‘Ghana beyond aid’ policy strategy and the 
organisation of conferences (e.g. Ghana beyond aid: Moving forward together) between the Government of Ghana 
(GOG) and development partners (DPs) to discuss ways of ensuring Ghana’s transition from aid dependence to 
beyond aid (Government of Ghana, 2017b). This forms part of the government’s commitments towards the Compact 






















5.2.1 Changing aid landscape and its implications  
Ghana’s changing aid landscape and subsequent decline in donor support is partly due to the attainment 
of LMIC status on 5th November 2010 with a per capital income of about US$1,305. This was caused by 
the rebasing of GDP (60% adjustment) which resulted in a GDP of GH₵44.8 billion compared to the 
initial estimate of GH₵25.6 billion (Jerven and Ebo-Duncan, 2012). The LMIC tag has pushed the country 
above the eligibility criteria for concessional loans from IDA. The graduation is associated with 
expectation of a decreasing flow of ODA (Moss and Majerowicz, 2012; Brown, 2017; Kumi, 2017a). 
However, it is worth mentioning that ODA inflow has not ceased completely although in nominal terms, 
there has been a steady decline. The poverty problems in Ghana are the strongest argument for receiving 
ODA. However, donors representatives interviewed argued that in an era of fiscal austerity, supporting a 
LMIC would be a challenge. Factors accounting for this trend include sustained political stability and 
democratic environment, development partner’s confidence in the country and efforts to promote aid 
effectiveness through national ownership (Donor 1, 3, 4). 
In recent years, Ghana’s aid landscape in terms of donor funding and relationship with the central 
government is changing significantly. The landscape is being re-shaped by external and internal factors 
including global economic crises, reduced funding and shifting priorities of donors, presence of new 
development actors especially China in addition to national level events and processes. National level 
factors include the graduation to LMIC status and the Compact signed between the GOG and DPs in 
20129. The Compact is to ensure the effective and strategic use of ODA in supporting medium-term 
development in a time of dwindling ODA. In addition, Ghana becoming an ‘aid-free’ country is a key 
priority. Government is therefore expected to make substantial investments in priority areas including 
poverty reduction, inequality and the provision of strategic infrastructure (GOG, 2012:10-12). However, 
one might argue that government’s commitment to this agreement will become known in a matter of time.  
Another factor responsible for the ‘new’ landscape relates to rising levels of government revenue caused 
by trade with China, debt financing through the issuance of Sovereign Bonds and domestic revenue 
mobilisation especially from commercial oil production which has given much disposable income to 
government  (MOFEP, 2014; Fosu, 2017). This some commentators argue has led to a declining need for 
ODA (Zeith, 2015). However, such an assumption remains questionable given that donor funding 
represents an important source of revenue for government due to the structural imbalances in the economy. 
                                                          
9 The 2012-2022 Compact for Leveraging Partnerships for Shared Growth and Development is an agreement signed 
between the GOG and fifteen DPs on 21st June 2012. The aim of the Compact is to put in place strategies for 
ensuring the effective and strategic use of ODA to promote Ghana’s medium and long-term development priorities 
following its transition into lower-middle-income status. For example, the country is currently preparing a 40-year 
national development plan (2018-2057). Again, the Compact serves as the guiding framework for the relationship 
between the GOG and DPs based largely on the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA) 2010-
2013 and Ghana Aid Policy and Strategy (GAPS) 2011-2015. The Compact is informed by the principles of the Aid 
Effectiveness Agenda as specified in the High Level Forums including the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 
(PDAE) in 2005, the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) in 2008 and the Busan Partnership for Effective Development 
Cooperation in 2011. More importantly, the Compact focuses on the changing context of Ghana’s aid landscape by 
serving as the guiding principle for the disbursement of ODA, other development assistance and cooperation with 
DPs. The objective is to help Ghana transform into an established middle-income country that is less dependent on 
external donor funding (GOG, 2012). Among the strategies for reducing Ghana’s aid dependency include: ‘‘(i) 
gradually assuming full financial responsibility for investing in accelerated development to reduce poverty and 
inequality; (ii) developing a plan for a phased transformation of ODA and other forms of development finance and 
cooperation, specifying the projected volumes of development financing which the country can expect, projected 
time-lines, and outlining the role of ODA  and other sources of financing; iii) promoting diversified trade, investment 
and regional integration; and iv) rightsizing the public sector’’ (GOG, 2012:5).  
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In this regard, government officials at the Ministry of Finance (MOF) interviewed reported the need for 
DPs to still support Ghana because any abrupt withdrawal of ODA is likely to affect progress made 
towards sustained efforts to reduce poverty. One government official stated as follows:  
Donor support is still very relevant because there is a huge social gap that needs to 
be taken care of. In the Compact, donors are saying that by 2020, Ghana should move 
beyond aid. It is definitely not possible. I think we will need a hand to support us if 
we like it or not especially in an economy like ours (Key Informant 10). 
During interview, four donor representatives explained that Ghana’s LMIC was a major factor that 
accounted for the reduction of their support because of the difficulty involved in justifying the provision 
of development assistance to the country. For instance, one representative indicated that ‘‘Donor 3 is more 
poverty inclined so there will not be any strong justification for continuous support when a country 
declares itself as LMIC’’. This statement was confirmed by government officials who argued that Ghana’s 
transition to LMIC status has made it difficult in accessing concessional loans, grants and even technical 
support. Despite Ghana’s attainment of LMIC status, more than half of key informants and NNGDO 
leaders indicated that the noteworthy progress in economic growth has not translated into improved human 
development. However, donors have used the LMIC tag as justification for reducing their support to the 
country and NNGDOs in particular.   
The effect was that several DPs were in the process of exiting to other strategically important countries 
while others were redefining their development cooperation strategies in the country. Donor 1 for example, 
had scaled up its political and commercial cooperation while development cooperation had been 
downscaled after 2014 due to Ghana’s LMIC status. Investment and financial flows was expected to 
outpace development aid. In an interview, a donor representative explained how Ghana’s LMIC status had 
influenced their development cooperation:  
Donor 1 is phasing out of development cooperation in Ghana because of your LMIC 
status. You know, Donor 1 is mainly targeting very poor countries. In addition, we 
are phasing out to go into fully-fledged commercial cooperation, so that is Donor 1’s 
future in Ghana. We are still in governance programme but we are phasing out of 
health this year [2016]. So that means NGOs’ support will also cease (Donor 1).  
Another effect of Ghana’s LMIC status is the decline in multi-donor budget support (MDBS) and general 
budget support (GBS). Data gathered from the MOF indicates that MDBS components of grants and loans 
had decreased significantly between 2010 and 2014 (Table 5.1). Reduced levels of MDBS affect the 
country because donor resources have been a major source of government revenue especially during the 
current period of economic volatility.  
Table 5.1: MDBS to Ghana between 2005 and 2014 (US$ million) 
Year/MDBS 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Grants (MDBS) 109.7 151.7 194.3 213.0 276.9 204.5 163.0 138.0 72.1 42.8 
Loans  (MDBS) 172.1 194.9 148.6 173.8 236.7 183.3 290.4 225.1 14.3 0.4 
Source: Author’s calculation based on information from MOF. 
 
The decline in MDBS is a reflection of donors’ perception of its failure to live up to expectation. During 
interviews, government officials and donor representatives emphasised reduced donor commitment as the 
underlying reason for the decline of MDBS and GBS. Although they recognised that the provision of GBS 
was to ensure aid effectiveness through harmonisation and coordination, Ghana’s LMIC status created 




We have stopped providing GBS for the country. Ghana’s status as a LMIC makes 
it difficult to justify the need for supporting GBS. You cannot justify why you 
will use donor money to support general budget (Donor 3). 
The reduced donor support is raising concerns among government officials that Ghana could become an 
‘aid orphan’ where DPs especially traditional donors could slow down their support, abandon the country 
and also restrict debt relief. This could have dire consequences on the economy. Nonetheless, I 
acknowledge that foreign inflows can have negative effects including an appreciation of real exchange 
rate through domestic inflation and the crowding out of private sector investments (Younger, 1992). In 
the next section, I provide a historical overview of Ghana’s NGDOs and civil society sector in order to 
understand the context of NGDO-donor relationships and their subsequent dependence on donor 
resources. 
5.3 Historical overview of NGDOs and civil society in Ghana  
5.3.1 NGDOs and civil society in pre-structural adjustment 
The emergence of civil society in Ghana is closely linked to the country’s political history including the 
pre-colonial period and the present day democratic era. Ghana’s attainment of independence was partly 
due to pressures mounted by alienated interest groups on the colonial government which resulted in 
political concession. For example, Amoako (2008) argues that, in 1893, the Aborigines Rights Protection 
Society which consisted of chiefs, youth and intelligentsia mobilised and opposed colonial rule and 
policies in pre-independence Gold Coast. The political landscape was characterised by fragmentation of 
power due partly to coup d’états and a deeper characteristics of the evolving political culture at the time. 
For example between 1957 and 1983, nine changes of government and six coup d’états were experienced. 
These authoritarian regimes supressed CSOs and their activities and in some cases turned them into ‘party 
machinery’. By doing so, the government uses co-option of civil society as a weapon for disarming any 
opposition to its dominating powers (Gary, 1996).  
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, Ghana experienced economic recession. This prompted reactions 
by urban elites who formed CSOs to advocate for improvement in socio-economic conditions (Chazan, 
1983). For example, the Ghana Bar Association and other CSOs played an active role in serving as 
counter-hegemonic force against the state in the abolition of the ‘Union Government’ (Unigov) (i.e. power 
sharing government) by the Supreme Military Council (Debrah and Graham, 2015). CSOs through their 
struggle with military and authoritarian regimes were perceived as ‘enemies of the state’. State-civil 
society relationship was characterised by suspicion and mistrust. The political climate at the time was 
repressive towards civil society making them to operate on a narrow space. In spite of this, some pro-
government social groups including para-statal and militia-based organisations (e.g. People's and 
Workers' Defence Committees) emerged during this period (Gyimah-Boadi, 1990). Later, some of these 
groups (e.g. 31st December Women’s Movement) were turned into NGDOs as part of Provisional National 
Defence Council’s (PNDC) propaganda especially in the 1990s.  
5.3.2 NGDOs in structural adjustment era 
The PNDC government inherited an economy that was nearing bankruptcy. This was a result of the wider 
economic crisis experienced in many African countries at the time. Confronted with the challenge (e.g. 
declining export prices) and the failed attempts to secure aid from the eastern bloc, Rawlings turned to 
the IMF and the World Bank for assistance in addressing the economic woes that had engulfed the country. 
Against this backdrop, Ghana adopted the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in mid-1983 with its 
conditionalities. As part of the wider SAP, the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) was implemented. 
According to Gary (1996:155), over US$8.0 billion was disbursed in the first seven years of ERP’s 
implementation. During the era of adjustment, the country became a ‘donor success story’.  
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However, this was short-lived and the austerity measures of ERP had detrimental effects on Ghanaians 
(Hughes, 2005; Opoku, 2010).  
Informed by the hardships at the time, the government in 1987 adopted the Programme of Action to 
Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment (PAMSCAD) to lessen the effects of SAP through the 
implementation of 23 poverty reduction programmes (Gary, 1996; Alikhan et al., 2007). As part of the 
wider ‘adjustment with a human face’, NGDOs were given the mandate to fill in the ‘development void’ 
that had been created by the ERP. Hutchful (2002) suggests that NGDOs’ involvement in service 
provision was initiated by donors rather than the PNDC government. It was on the premise that 
government had limited capacity. Even though NGDOs’ assistance was sought, their involvement was at 
the implementation rather than planning stages. Gary (1996:158) notes that the role of NGDOs in 
PAMSCAD was to serve as ‘‘the 'hands' carrying out charity work, while the 'head' work was the domain 
of the multilateral development banks, international donors and, to some extent, the government’’. For 
this reason, NGDOs played an important service delivery role during PAMSCAD by serving as partners 
of government’s initiatives such as the food-for-work programme implemented in Northern Ghana (Gayi, 
1991). During the neoliberal era, NGDOs became targeted as ‘articles of faith’ for delivering development 
(Bebbington et al., 2008). This is not to suggest that the emergence of Ghanaian NGDOs is restricted to 
the 1980s and 1990s. While acknowledging that NGDOs have existed since the colonial era with strong 
emphasis on missionary and charity roles, their growth was in response to the rolling back of the state 
under SAPs. Donor preference for NGDOs perhaps reached its peak during PAMSCAD.  
5.3.3 NGDOs in post-structural adjustment 
The collaboration between the PNDC administration and Bretton Woods Institutions created space for the 
engagement of civil society. Through such engagement, efforts were made towards the liberalisation of 
the Ghanaian political space through the promotion of democratic reforms such as the adoption of the 
1992 Constitution and subsequent multi-party democracy in 1993. The ‘complete metamorphosis’ of the 
political landscape opened up space for the engagement of civil society. During this period, donor 
agencies supported NGDOs in an effort to stimulate the process of democratisation. This was influenced 
by the view that democracy thrives under vibrant and active civil society. The reasons are that first, it 
serves as a countervailing power to the state. Second, it integrates the poor and marginalised into the 
market. Third, it educates and promotes ideals of democracy and good governance such as human rights 
(Copestake, 1996). This reflects the wider uncritical celebration of NGDOs as bulwarks with the power 
to overcome undemocratic regimes in Africa. 
In the light of this, donor funds were channelled through NGDOs as part of the wider NPA. This created 
an opportunity for political activists who were forced into exile during the military regime to engage in 
the establishment of advocacy and pro-democracy organisations (Yarrow, 2011). Ghanaian NGDOs who 
played peripheral roles became known as ‘instruments of democratisation’ through the promotion of good 
governance. The liberal discourse and its associated democratic dispensation opened an avenue for 
government to engage with NGDOs in economic, social and governance programmes through partnership. 
They began to play advocacy, oversight and service delivery functions in partnership with government 
agencies (Alikhan et al., 2007). Their role especially in service delivery and advocacy in recent years 
complements government’s efforts in promoting development. For instance, CSOs including NGDOs 
have been advocating for transparency and accountability in the management of Ghana’s oil (Debrah and 
Graham, 2015). In what follows, I examine the current nature of the NGDO sector in Ghana in order to 
situate the discussion in a context. In doing so, I provide a quantitative descriptive information on 59 
NNGDOs sampled in this research.  
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5. 4 NNGDO landscape in Ghana 
5.4.1 Nature and numbers  
In Ghana, the current NGDO sector reflects rapid and unprecedented growth in the past three decades. 
This rapid growth is a result of a favourable enabling environment. In general, comprehensive data on the 
precise number of NGDOs in Ghana is lacking. However, data gathered from the DSW as of May 2016 
puts the number of total registered NGDOs at 6,520. Out of this, national and international NGDOs were 
6,370 and 150 respectively. The annual average number of registered NGDOs was 277. Of the 6,520 
registered NGDOs, only 1,952 were considered active on regular basis because they had renewed their 
year-on-year certificate with the DSW. However, during my fieldwork, I found that many NNGDOs had 
not renewed their certificates but were operating.  
Respondents explained that the lack of registration and renewal of certificate was partly due to the 
centralisation of the registration process which creates bureaucracy and makes the process cumbersome. 
According to an official at the DSW, the registration process for NNGDOs takes about four weeks as part 
of their due diligence mechanisms to ascertain organisational information including sources of funding 
and orientation (Key Informant 8). For this reason, the actual number of NNGDOs might be more than 
the official figures reported by DSW. In addition, although a two part-registration process exists, many 
fail to do so by not obtaining a certificate of recognition from the DSW. They only obtain a business 
certificate from the RGD. According to two senior officials at the DSW, they could not do much to ensure 
compliance in the absence of a legal framework for regulating the sector10. The inability of the DSW to 
properly regulate the sector was attributed to inadequate resources and lack of political will by successive 
governments.  
5.4.2 Main sectors of operation 
NNGDOs were active in all sectors of the Ghanaian economy with their activities reflecting specific 
national and community needs. The operational areas include advocacy, public policy analysis and service 
provision and delivery. Table 5.2 presents the distribution of NNGDOs’ programme interventions. About 
23 (39.0%) operated in health, education and agriculture sectors at the same time. Specialists NNGDOs 
in health, education and agricultural sectors represented 6.8%, 8.5% and 6.8% respectively. The results 
revealed that many NNGDOs operated and implemented projects and programmes in multiple sectors 
with their activities reflecting specific community and national needs. There were regional variations 
among sampled NNGDOs. Large NNGDOs especially in Accra focused on thematic areas like advocacy 
with the aim of influencing national policies while regional and district-based NNGDOs had interest in 
service delivery. Although some large NNGDOs engaged in service delivery, it was limited to some 
extent.  
Table 5.2: Programme intervention areas for sampled NNGDOs (n=59) 
Sectors Number of NNGDOs Percentage  
Agriculture only 4 6.8 
Health only 4 6.8 
Education only 5 8.5 
Agriculture and Health 5 8.5 
Agriculture and Education 4 6.8 
Health and Education 9 15.3 
                                                          
10 There have been attempts in the past to regulate NGDOs through the introduction of bills including the Draft NGO 
Bill (1993), the Draft National Policy for Strategic Partnership and the Trust and Non-Profit Making Civil Society 
Organizations Bill 2007. These bills have been met with fierce protest and criticisms by CSOs on grounds of lack 
of involvement and ownership of the regulatory process. 
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Agriculture, Health and Education 23 39.0 
Agriculture and Women’s Empowerment 1 1.7 
Health, Education, Agriculture and Sanitation 1 1.7 
Education and Governance 1 1.7 
Health, Education and Governance 2 3.4 
Total 59 100 
 
Total by Sectors 
  
Agriculture 38 64.5 
Health 44 74.7 
Education 45 76.3 
Governance 3 5.1 
Sanitation 1 1.7 
Women’s Empowerment 1 1.7 
Source: Field survey, 2016 
5.4.3 Geographic location and distribution 
In terms of geographical scope, many NNGDOs were located at the national, regional and district level. 
They focused on strategic national issues and operated across the country. National level NNGDOs tend 
to be urban and elite-based compared to their district and regional-based counterparts. The geographic 
distribution of NNGDOs sampled is presented in Table 5.3. Results indicate that about 26 (44.0 %) 
operated solely in the Northern Region while six (10.1 %) operated in all the ten regions of Ghana. A 
majority (49.2%) were regional-based and had their activities spread between one to five districts. They 
did not restrict their programmes to specific regions or districts. For example, about 13.6% operated in 
more than 20 MMDAs.  
Table 5.3: Regions of programme intervention for sampled NNGDOs (n=59) 
Regions Stated Regions only  Stated Region plus 
other regions 
Total Percentage % 
Northern only 26 - 26 44.0 
Upper West only 6 - 6 10.1 
Greater Accra only 7 - 7 11.8 
Northern and Upper West  8 - 8 13.5 
Northern and  Greater Accra 1 - 1 1.6 
Upper West and  Greater Accra - - - - 
Northern, Upper West and 
Greater Accra 
- - - - 
All ten regions - 6 - 10.1 
Total by Region     
Northern Region 35 -   
Upper West 14 -   
Greater Accra 8 5   
All ten regions 6 -   
Source: Field survey, 2016 
The location decision of more than 60% of NNGDOs was influenced in part by extreme needs, goal 
congruence and resource dependency. The field operation of many NNGDOs took place in Northern 
Ghana due to high poverty and deprivation. For this reason, Tamale, the capital of the Northern Region 
is considered the ‘NGDO headquarters of Ghana’. For instance, it is rare to walk through virtually any 
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street in Gumani and Jisonayili both suburbs of Tamale without finding an NGDO signpost. Their 
presence in these areas can be described as saturated (Figure 5.3). 
  
 
Figure 5.3: High presence of NGDOs on the Gumani Road in Tamale.  
Source: Author, September 2015. 
5.5 Structure and Governance  
5.5.1 Year of establishment 
For NNGDOs’ age, 30 (50.8%) were established between 2003 and 2010 while only 2 (3.4%) were 
established in 1979 or earlier (Figure 5.4). The results show that the majority had been in operation for 
less than 20 years. The oldest organisation was established in 1975 with the youngest dating from 2009. 
The median and average establishment ages were 2002 and 2000 respectively. The results reflect the boom 
in the NNGDO sector experienced in Ghana in recent years.  
 
Figure 5.4: Years of establishment of sampled NNGDOs (n=59) 
5.5.2 Organisational size  
NNGDO staff size 
I measured staff size by the number of self-reported paid staff and volunteers. The rationale for using this 
measure was that about 46 (77.9%) NNGDOs depended on the services of volunteers at the organisational 
and community level. Figure 5.5 presents the result of the distribution of paid staff. About 32.2% of 
NNGDOs operated on a staff strength of between 6-10 employees. The minimum and maximum number 
of paid staff was 2 and 85 employees respectively with an average of 12 employees per organisation. This 
suggests that many were small and medium-sized with a few being large in nature. The total number of 
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Many respondents reported employing staff on project basis with a few management members as core 
staff. Paid staff consisted of senior management, field (e.g. monitoring and evaluation officers) and 
support employees (e.g. secretaries, security personnel and cleaners). Survey results indicated that about 
40.4% (23) had senior management of 3 staff while 7.0% (4) had above 5 management staff. In most 
NNGDOs, the executive director was a member of the management team and board of directors. About 
58 (98.3 %) NNGDOs had at least one paid staff having a university degree.  
 
Figure 5.5: Number of paid staff employed by NNGDOs (n=59) 
5.5.3 Volunteer support 
Survey results indicate that 36 (61.0%) NNGDOs relied on volunteer contributions (Figure 5.6). The 
minimum and maximum number of volunteers was 1 and 250 respectively with an average of 16 
volunteers. They comprised of international, community and stipend volunteers (national service 
personnel and student interns). About eight (13.6 %) NNGDOs had more volunteers than paid staff. 
Survey results suggest that the use of community volunteers who were mostly ‘unprofessional’ was 
common among small and medium-sized NGDOs compared to their well-established counterparts who 
relied more on ‘professional volunteers’ like senior academics and recent graduates in proposal writing 
and research. Professional volunteers undertook organisational management tasks compared to 
community volunteers who served as frontline workers involved in direct project implementation through 
community mobilisation. Organisational membership was framed in citizen participation where 
community members had the right to join any organisation but was dependent on factors including the 
type of NNGDO and their activities. Small and medium-sized NNGDOs at the district levels had open 
membership while well-established and large NNGDOs restricted membership participation.  
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5.5.4 Board of directors  
Board of directors played governance and management roles in terms of NNGDOs’ mission and strategic 
direction. About 58 (98.1%) had board of directors because it was a mandatory requirement under the 
Companies Code 1963 (Act 179). However, about half of the board of directors were non-functional 
although they were supposed to help in governance processes. Board members were mostly set up for 
funding and registration purposes and sometimes acted as cheque signatories. Thirty (51.7%) NNGDOs 
had board of directors with more than 5 members while only 3 NNGDOs had 3 board members.  
The average number of board members was 4 with a range of 3 to 8. Results indicate that 26 (45.6%) 
NNGDOs appointed board members through consultation with stakeholders while 13 (22.8%) relied 
solely on their executive director. Respondents reported that competitive election was discouraged 
because it could result in division and disagreement. More than 80% of NNGDOs had their executive 
director as the chair of the board of directors or trustees. Some family members and close friends of 
executive directors acted as members of the board of directors or trustees. This blurred the extent to which 
these NNGDOs could be considered as ‘family businesses’ because of the difficulty involved in separating 
their governance and management from family affairs.  
About 45.8% and 6.8% of board members met quarterly and annually respectively. Board members were 
appointed based on their level of expertise and status in the communities in which NNGDOs operated. 
More than one-third of NNGDOs indicated that given the changing nature of their operating environment, 
it was crucial for them to appoint knowledgeable board members who understood the terrain and had 
strong personnel connections in helping them raise the needed amount of resources. About 24 (41.4%) 
NNGDOs indicated that their board members performed advisory and decision-making roles while 20 
(34.5%) performed both advisory roles and ensured that efficient management systems were in place. 
Respondents reported that some board members provided valuable support including networking, 
capacity building and funding from their own pocket to support their programmes. In general, internal 
governance structure among NNGDOs could be described as problematic. This was because strategic 
management for leadership planning was poorly understood.  
5.6 NNGDO funding landscape and sources of funding 
The NNGDO funding environment is complex and highly donor dependent. In order to explain and 
understand the funding environment, it is important to sketch its contours and paradoxes. In Ghana, 
NNGDOs can secure funding from any legitimate source without restriction and interference from the 
GOG. There are no restrictions on foreign funded NNGDOs except that they must adhere to the guidelines 
in the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2008 (Act 749). In addition, as mentioned earlier, the rise of non-
traditional donors has not significantly influenced funding structure of NNGDOs. They mobilise external 
and domestic resources. The bulk of NNGDOs’ funding (i.e. between 80-90%) was from traditional 
external donors (Appendix 9). In the following section, I provide an overview of donor funding for 
NNGDOs. 
5.6.1 Donor funding landscape  
Donor-NNGDO relationship in Ghana is supply-led and highly resource dependent. Over the years, 
substantial amount of external donor funds have been channelled to and through NGDOs (national and 
international). For example, between 2005 and 2015, an amount of US$1.26 billion was channelled 
through NGDOs and CSOs (OECD, 2017a). Interestingly, although the amount of ODA at the country 
level as explained in Section 5.2 has been declining more especially since 2010, the aggregate data on 
ODA channelled through NGDOs is somewhat different. Between 2010 and 2015, the amount of ODA 
to NGDOs and CSOs had witnessed a drastic increase on year-to-year basis. For example, ODA increased 
from US$78.0 million to US$216.6 million between 2010 and 2015 respectively (OECD, 2017a). 
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However, the data fails to reveal the distribution of funding going to INGDOs and NNGDOs. It does not 
show whether NNGDOs are receiving more funding indirectly from INGDOs through their sub-
contracting roles or not. The lack of comprehensive database and the non-disclosure of financial 
information make it difficult in understanding patterns in funding allocations. Notwithstanding, key 
informants and NNGDO leaders explained that many INGDOs were increasingly implementing their own 
programmes and projects directly rather than outsourcing them to NNGDOs which had reduced their 
funding levels (Donor 6, 7, 8; Key Informant 8, 9, 10).  
5.6.2 Donor shifting priorities  
This section focuses on changes in donor priorities in NNGDOs’ funding environment following Ghana’s 
graduation to lower-middle-income status. While acknowledging that changing donor priority is not new, 
I argue that a significant shift in the funding landscape took place especially after 2010 following Ghana’s 
graduation to lower-middle income status. Consequently, key bilateral and multilateral donors for 
NNGDOs (e.g. DFID, DANIDA, EU and USAID) have become inclined towards multi-donor pooled 
funding mechanisms, consortia and shifts from service delivery to social accountability or advocacy 
programmes11. This has reshaped NNGDOs’ funding landscape. However, the discussion focuses on 
pooled funding mechanisms rather than consortia and shifts from service delivery to social accountability. 
These issues will be discussed in detail in chapters six and seven (see Section 6.4.2 and 7.2). I 
acknowledge that donor shifting priorities is not specific to Ghana because it is inherent in the broader 
global context of the ‘new aid landscape’. However, I seek to locate the discussion to shifts in donor 
funding arrangements to NNGDOs since 2010 by highlighting that pooled funding mechanisms is part of 
the wider donor agenda for aid effectiveness promises of harmonisation, ownership and co-ordination. I 
suggest that these changes in donors’ funding priorities have created uncertainty in the funding 
environment which is discussed below. 
A recurrent theme during interview was that donors kept revising and changing their priority areas based 
on their own strategic, national and political interests. Changing donor funding patterns was reported by 
respondents as the major threat to their survival because of their over dependency which makes them 
financially vulnerable. During interview, one Executive Director explained how shifting donor priority is 
affecting her organisational survival: 
The main challenge facing NGOs currently is changing donor priority and 
funding mechanisms. The approach used by donors has changed. Due to the 
changing trends we’re experiencing, it is taking local NGOs out of our driving 
seat. Now, donors are in the driving seat and you have to go according to their 
plans, otherwise you will not get funding (NNGDO 8). 
Another respondent added: 
Their areas of concentration are constantly shifting, so it is raising some questions 
about the sustainability of donor funding. Now donors prefer to channel their 
funds directly to INGOs instead of giving it to local NGOs. In addition, they have 
started pooling funds together unlike first where you could approach them 
                                                          
11 It is important to clarify that while Ghana has witnessed the implementation of multi-donor pooled funding 
mechanisms such as BUSAC (2004-2010), Ghana Research and Advocacy Programme (G-RAP) (2005-2011), Kasa 
Initiative (2008-2010), Civil Society Governance Fund (2004-2010) and STAR-Ghana (I and II) (2010-2020), the 





directly. They have changed the board game and that makes it more stringent and 
difficult process (NNGDO 7). 
Changing donor priorities created uncertainty in the operating environment of NNGDOs and had left 
many in tight situation in determining their next line of action. Changing priorities was attributed to 
Ghana’s LMIC status. More than half of respondents in the qualitative research emphasised that Ghana’s 
economic status provided the incentive for donors to shift their focus especially in sectors such as 
education and health. A key informant with expertise in grants acquisition and management offered this 
perspective on shifting donor priorities and how it affected sections of NNGDOs as illustrated by the 
following quotation: 
In general, donors are constantly shifting their priority areas. Now the EU is looking at food security and 
livelihood, so if you don’t belong to some of these sectors, you tend to feel the pressure more. For example, 
education some time ago had some significance but now, funding is mostly one-off (Key Informant 
4).Directly linked to the above is shifts in funding mechanisms. During interviews, three donor 
representatives indicated changing their grants modalities for NNGDOs where direct funding was closely 
ending. The disbursement practices of key donor agencies that had supported NNGDOs for more than two 
decades had shifted towards multi-donor basket funding. Pooled funding mechanisms had become the 
main source of support for NNGDOs where donors combine their financial contributions in supporting 
specific thematic issues. Typical examples mentioned by respondents include Ghana Research and 
Advocacy Programme (G-RAP), Kasa Initiative and STAR-Ghana. However, a major concern raised by 
more than half of NNGDO respondents about multi-donor pooled funding was that the funding criteria 
were stringent. One respondent described it as ‘‘strict eligibility and marking scheme for proposals’’. 
Despite the perceived strict funding criteria, some respondents explained that it brought funding closer 
and made it more accessible. For example, one Executive Director of a medium-sized NNGDO in Tamale 
said that: 
It brings the funds closer to us and the closer it is to you, the easier it becomes 
because it is managed by an in-country team. The guides and documents they 
produce are tailored for the country (NNGDO 28). 
However, pooled funding mechanisms limit the number of organisations that benefitted from donor 
funding because it focuses on specific issues that serves the strategic interests of donors. Changes in 
donors’ own policies reduce their support and commitments to pooled funding mechanisms. For example, 
USAID supported STAR 1 (2010-2015) but withdrew its funding in STAR 2 (2015-2020) due to cuts in 
spending. This affected the level of support given to STAR-Ghana and the number of beneficiary 
NNGDOs. This contrasts sharply with claims by three multilateral and bilateral donor representatives that 
pooled funding promotes equity in the distribution of their resources because it is a national funding 
scheme. In explaining how reduction in donor support affected the grant making ability of STAR-Ghana, 
a donor representative pointed out that in 2012, they committed about US$ 5.0 million to support election 
call but this was reduced to US$ 2.0 million for the 2016 election. Multi-donor pooled funding although 
helped in strengthening NNGDOs’ learning capacity, nonetheless, there was a perceptible feeling among 
more than half of NNGDO respondents that it favoured large and well-established organisations to the 
neglect of small and medium-sized NNGDOs. This was because of perceived lack of institutional capacity 
and inability to meet the ‘‘marking scheme’’.  
The tendency for favouring big NNGDOs was attributed largely to the need for results and also donors’ 
obsession with financial risk. This issue was echoed by donor representatives during interviews. One 
representative described how their emphasis on results and financial risks often consciously or 
unconsciously perpetuated discrimination against small NNGDOs in the application process as follows: 
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We want proposals that at the end of the day can show results and because of that, 
the bigger NGOs may either have qualified personnel or resources to hire a 
consultant whereas the smaller ones don’t. The other thing is that our donors 
indicate that they have a zero appetite for financial risk. So all our systems are 
also geared towards that not even GH₵1 gets misappropriated. So some of the 
requirements do not favour smaller NGOs (Donor 2). 
Another issue raised by respondents concerning pooled-funding mechanisms was the limited nature of 
their thematic areas of funding. Although four donor representatives claimed that their selection of 
thematic priorities was informed by a political economy analysis that involved stakeholder consultation 
as part of efforts to create national ownership, majority of NNGDO respondents constantly emphasised 
that it was largely ‘‘window dressing and cosmetic in nature’’ (NNGDO 21). The reason given was that 
selection of thematic priorities was donor- led rather than addressing specifically the pressing needs of 
NNGDOs and their intended beneficiaries. For this reason, respondents often questioned their ownership 
of sector priorities. In addition, there was also perceived lack of proper monitoring of beneficiary 
NNGDOs because of the lack of needed human resources. A donor representative for example stated that 
‘‘we need additional hands and sometimes we don’t have the money for those things’’ (Donor 3). Many 
beneficiary NNGDOs explained that donors were only interested in checking their documentations. For 
instance, one respondents explained that ‘‘I think we are just polishing information for them because they 
don’t even have the needed staff that can go through our reports and tell us to do the right thing’’ (NNGDO 
30). In sum, shifting donor priorities towards pooled funding mechanisms are aimed at enhancing aid 
effectiveness principles of alignment, harmonisation, ownership, managing for results and mutual 
accountability. For instance, donors aim to avoid duplication of their efforts and also promote national 
ownership by making STAR-Ghana a wholly Ghanaian funding organisation or endowment fund for 
NGDOs and CSOs. However, while pooled funding mechanisms are becoming prevalent in the funding 
landscape, they have created uncertainty for many NNGDOs highly dependent on external donor funding. 
In the next section, I present the findings on income mobility matrix. 
5.7 NNGDO income mobility between 2010 and 2015 
The selected NNGDOs (coded N1-N59) supplied data on their income at current prices for each year 
within five income bands in Ghana Cedis (GH₵) (Appendix 8). These bands are shown in columns 1 and 
2 of Table 5.4. Inflation meant that it was easier for NNGDOs to achieve higher income categories at the 
end of the period than at the beginning. For example, a nominal income of GH₵20,000 in 2011 was 
equivalent to an income of GH₵34,940 in 2015 prices12. Columns 4 and 5 of Table 5.4 show all the 
income boundaries for 2011 inflated to reflect 2015 prices using the Ghana CPI Index. Appendix 8 also 
set out the methodology for deflating the income bands. This indicates that an NNGDO classified in 
income Category 1 in 2011 in nominal terms should be reclassified in real terms as belonging to 
Categories 1 or 2.  
  
                                                          
12 Between September 2015 and January 2016, the average interbank exchange rate was US$1.0= GH₵3.80. 
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Table 5.4: Adjustment of income categories to reflect inflation 
2011 2011 2011 2015    2015 2015 
Lower Upper Original 
Category 
Lower    Upper Adjusted 
category 
  20,000 1 
 
34,940 1,2 
20,000 50,000 2 34,940     87,350 2,3 
50,000 100,000 3 87,350     174,701 3,4,5 
100,000 150,000 4 174,701     262,051 5,6 







To investigate real income mobility within the sample, a comparison was made between (i) the median 
income category each NNGDO was given for 2010, 2011 and 2012 with (ii) the median income category 
each NNGDO was given for 2013, 2014 and 2015 (Appendix 8). Table 5.5 shows this comparison in the 
form of a real income mobility matrix. Rows indicate income categories for the first reference date and 
are adjusted for inflation in accordance with the calculations in Appendix 8. Columns indicate income 
categories for the second reference date (three years later). 
Table 5.5: NNGDOs’ income mobility between 2010 to 2015 (n=59)  
 Income category (median for 2010-2012) 






1 (1/2)  4 5 3 - - - 12 
2 (2/3) 1 1 2 2 - - 6 
3 (3/4/5) - 1 3 3 2 1 10 
4 (5/6) 1 - - - 4 4 9 
5 (6) - 1 - - 3 2 6 
6 (6) - - - - - 16 16 
Total 6 8 8 5 9 23 59 
 
Table 5.5 presents the results on NNGDOs’ income mobility between 2010 and 2015. The cells shaded 
in grey indicate NNGDOs for which the data fails to reveal a change in real income. It is important to 
mention that the result hides the possibility that some of NNGDOs may have experienced significant 
change, particularly the 16 that fell in the highest income category in both periods. The results show that 
there was difference in the income mobility matrix between small and relatively stable NNGDOs (Cells 
1, 1 - 3, 3) and relatively large NNGDOs (cells 5, 5 - 6, 6).  
The results presented in Table 5.5 show that six NNGDOs had experienced real income growth with five 
being in the lowest half of the size distribution and one (N6) had grown from the middle of the range to a 
top income categories. To the left of the shaded area are seven NNGDOs for which the data suggests a 
real income decline. This is particularly evident for N12 (which declined from Category 4 to 1) and N54 
(which moved from Category 5-2) (Appendix 8). An examination of the yearly data reveals some 
interestingly unstable patterns. For example, N11 reported high income in four years and very low income 
in two. Financial statements gathered from one NNGDO for example, indicated that between 2010 and 
2015, annual income increased from GH¢1.6 million to GH¢ 15.0 million. Large NNGDOs commanded 
the highest average budgets while many small NNGDOs operated within a budget range of between 




5.7.1 Funding variety and funding category for NNGDOs 
I measured funding variety based on the number of different sources of funding received by NNGDOs. 
These include external grants and donations, government funding, earned income and corporate funding. 
About 23 (39.0%) NNGDOs had more than five sources of funding while only 4 (6.8%) depended on one 
funding source (Figure 5.7). The funding sources ranged from 1-7 with a mean of about 5 donors. Other 
NNGDOs reported not having a single donor for the past two to three years. These organisations were 
financially vulnerable and were at the verge of collapsing because they had no expectation of funding. 
NNGDOs that operated in Northern Region had large variety of funding sources compared to those in 
Greater Accra and Upper West Region. About (22) 37.3% and (3) 5.1% NNGDOs described their 
financial situation as precarious and sustainable respectively. This raises important concern about 
NNGDOs’ financial vulnerability. A majority (32) 54.2% of NNGDOs reported experiencing a decline in 
their sources of funding between 2010 and 2015 where their income sources had completely disappeared.  
 
Figure 5.7: Number of sources of funding for sampled NNGDOs (n=59) 
Table 5.6 presents the results on trends in the distribution of categories of NNGDOs funding. Survey 
results indicate that majority depended on external grants. In 2010 and 2013, about 86.4% and 91.5% of 
NNGDOs depended on external grants respectively but there was no clear trend of future expectation. 
Earned income through income generating activities represented the second most important source of 
income. The results indicate an upward trend between 2011 and 2014. NNGDOs explored alternative 
income sources which hitherto was not part of their resource mobilisation. Funding from government 
experienced a significant drop from 10.2% to 5.1% between 2010 and 2015 while that of corporate 
funding increased from 3.4% to 10.2% for the same period. This raises important questions about the 
factors that might have accounted for the decline in government funding and an increase in corporate 
funding. This will be explored in the next chapter. 
Table 5.6: Trends in NNGDOs’ type of funding between 2010 and 2015 (n=59) 
Type of funding/ Year 2010 (%) 2011 (%) 2012 (%) 2013 (%) 2014 (%) 2015 (%) 
External grants 86.4 91.5 89.8 91.5 89.8 94.9 
Earned income 27.1 25.4 32.2 42.4 45.8 42.4 
Government funding 10.2 10.2 11.9 11.9 13.6 5.1 
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Although NNGDOs relied heavily on external grants, the number of organisations securing funding from 
more than one source recorded a significant rise (Figure 5.8). For instance, while the percentage of 
organisations that relied on external sources of funding declined from 72.9% to 47.5% between 2010 and 
2015, those securing two sources of funding increased from 27.1% to 52.5% for the same period. The 
implication is that there was a strong indication that NNGDOs were mostly diversifying their funding 
sources. 
 
Figure 5.8: Trends in NNGDOs’ source of funding between 2010 and 2015 (n= 59) 
5.8 Inter-organisational relations 
NNGDOs had developed stronger networks with stakeholders in their operating environment. This was 
manifested in the formation of networks and coalitions which existed at district, regional and national 
levels. About 53 NGDOs (89.8%) belonged to a network and coalition. Of the 53 NNGDOs, 26 (49.0%) 
and 6 (11.3%) were members of GCNH and Ghana Association of Private Voluntary Organisations in 
Development (GAPVOD) respectively. However, many NNGDOs although belonged to district level 
networks and coalitions, these were in most cases regional branches of national level networks and 
coalitions.  
It is important to clarify that especially in Northern Ghana, many NNGDOs had formed regional and 
district-level coalitions and networks where organisations in  particular geographic areas come together 
to promote development with a broader reach. Prominent among such networks and coalitions include 
NNED, Coalition for Development of Western Corridor of Northern Ghana and Northern Ghana Network 
for Development. At the national level, networks were categorised based on their degree of participation 
and permanence. I call them institutionalised, transactional and institution-led coalitions. Institutionalised 
networks and coalitions had formalised governance systems headed by a national secretariat with staffed 
employees. Examples include GAPVOD, GCNH and GNECC. Most of them had large membership base 
guided by a common constitution. During my fieldwork, GCNH had a membership base of 417 NNGDOs 
across the country. Members paid annual dues to the national secretariat. On the other hand, transactional 
networks and coalitions were formed mainly to address specific thematic and development needs. They 
were mostly the creation of donors or sometimes ‘breakaway networks’ (i.e. where some members break 
away from a main coalition to form another network in anticipation of donor funding). Compared to 
institutionalised networks, they were relatively unsustainable in the absence of donor funding despite their 
formalised structures and large membership base. Examples are Ghana HIV and AIDS Network and 
Coalition of NGOs in Malaria Control. The last form of network is institution-led. These were formed to 
address specific cause but attached to a lead NNGDO which reduced their level of visibility. This 
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NNGDOs working on specific issues. Examples include Alliance for Reproductive Health Rights, 
Governance Forum and Food Security Policy Advocacy Network. 
5.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to highlight and situate the discussion of NGDOs in the context of Ghana. In 
doing so, it highlights that NGDOs operated in an environment that has witnessed sustained economic 
growth resulting in graduation to LMIC status. Directly associated with this is the decline in donor funding 
for the country. It further highlights that the development of the NGDO sector is directly linked to the 
Ghana’s political history categorised into pre-structural adjustment, structural adjustment and post-
structural adjustment eras. I have argued that the implementation of PAMSCAD and the liberalisation of 
the country’s political space through the adoption of democracy and multi-party system opened up space 
for NGDOs engagement.   
I have suggested that changing donor funding priorities tend to affect NNGDOs’ survival by limiting their 
access to external donor funding. In particular, pooled donor funding has become the dominant 
mechanism. I have explored the diverse nature of the NGDO sector and highlighted the absence of a 
regulatory framework which has serious implications for accountability and transparency. The 
background information on NNGDOs highlighted that they were diversifying out of reliance on external 
donor funding to seeking alternatives. The next chapter presents empirical findings on resource 
diversification as a dominant strategy employed by NNGDOs in response to their changing operating 
environment. It provides a detailed account of the different diversification strategies focusing on their 




Chapter Six: Resource diversification as a dominant strategic response 
6.0 Introduction  
  ‘‘As an organisation, if we don’t diversify, we will die’’ (NNGDO 1). 
The previous chapter provided background to NGDOs and civil sector in Ghana. The current chapter is 
the first of two that presents empirical findings on how NNGDOs respond to resource dependence. I 
address different ways of thinking and strategies pursued by NNGDOs in response to changes in their 
external environment. The main argument is that although NNGDOs are highly dependent on their 
external environment for resources, they were proactive in exploring options for diversification and room 
for manoeuvre in reducing resource dependence. They employ a repertoire of three discrete resource 
diversification strategies categorised into: (i) commercialisation; (ii) exploring alternative domestic 
resources; and (iii) holding on to external funding through thematic, operational and locational 
diversification. The findings are based on the qualitative data from 32 NNGDOs collected in phase three 
of the research.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. The first section focuses on commercialisation as a revenue 
diversification strategy. I present the empirical findings on NNGDOs’ engagement in self-financing and 
social enterprise. I then move on to examine how NNGDOs are mobilising alternative domestic resources 
as part of their resource diversification portfolio. This is followed by the strategies employed by NNGDOs 
in holding on to external donor funding focusing specifically on thematic, operational and locational 
diversification. The last section concludes and sets the scene for chapter seven which looks at other 
strategies employed by NNGDOs. 
6.1 Commercialisation as resource diversification strategy  
Commercialisation played an important role in serving as a strategy employed by twenty-five NNGDOs. 
The empirical findings suggest that it took the form of self-financing (e.g. income generating activities in 
consultancy services) and establishment of social enterprises. Although self-financing was not new, I 
observed that twenty-five NNGDOs gave it a lot of attention as part of their financial resource 
mobilisation strategies. Ten respondents in the health sector explained that they relied on commercial 
activities from their developed projects in constructing sanitation facilities for hospitals, schools and 
communities as part of their Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) interventions. Intended beneficiaries 
paid fees for these facilities which helped in generating some amount of money as explained by one 
Executive Director:  
Currently, we are into WASH and we usually construct small water systems for 
communities and we don’t do it for free. We also construct latrines for institutions 
and households (NNGDO 31). 
Aside from the income generated, respondents pointed out that making intended beneficiaries pay for 
their services instil in them element of independence and sustainability. According to some respondents, 
given that donor funding is not perpetual, NNGDOs had a responsibility to encourage intended 
beneficiaries to become responsible in meeting their own needs. At the organisational level, more than 
half of NNGDO respondents explained that income-generating activities helped in reducing their 
dependence on donor funding which was perceived as unpredictable and inflexible. This, they believed 
affected their autonomy, independence and ownership of projects. Their rationale for self-financing was 
to ensure that external donor funding did not become the dominant component of their resource 
mobilisation portfolio as illustrated by the following quotation: 
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Well, they [donor funding] are still there but looking into the future, it’s not 
something that you can place your hopes on and it’s part of the reason we have 
created commercial ventures as alternative sources of funding (NNGDO 1). 
As part of self-financing processes, fourteen respondents explained that they actively engaged in 
consultancy services. For most NNGDOs, the addition of consultancy to their revenue diversification 
portfolio was a recent phenomenon where they leveraged their skills and expertise to offer services to 
clients. For this reason, they explained that they were in early stages of developing their strategic plans 
for such engagement. For example, one Executive Director pointed out that he had put in place strategies 
that would help him to generate about 60.0% of his budget from consultancy services in the next three 
years (NNGDO 2). Depending on the quantum of work, consultancy services were found to be short-term 
and one-off contracts lasting between three months and two years. This notwithstanding, seven 
respondents explained that they were able to raise much funds from consultancy compared to direct 
implementation of donor projects as one respondent explained. 
Our new focus is to search for more consultancy services because that is where 
the money is. We recently completed an FAO consultancy which was just for 
three months with a value of $27,000. So when you get a lot of those 
consultancies, you’re able to do proper financial planning (NNGDO 11). 
Engagement in consultancy services was an important long-term sustainability strategy for eight 
NNGDOs where permanent structures had been set up. A typical example was NNGDO 24 that had 
established a Learning Development Centre as a subsidiary enterprise that provided consultancy services 
like training on preparing relevant teaching and learning materials to educational institutes. Given that 
funds generated were unrestricted, respondents explained that it gave them the opportunity to invest in 
their organisational growth and development. During my fieldwork, it was clear that the engagement of 
NNGDOs in consultancy was primarily motivated by sustainability concern rather than a scaling up or an 
influencing strategy. One respondent stressed that: 
Our sustainability is a growing concern for management. Currently as part of our 
sustainability plan, management is working towards taking up consultancy 
assignments aside our normal projects. We particularly want to undertake 
participatory monitoring of government policies on reproductive health (NNGDO 
4). 
More than half of respondents emphasised the importance of organisational capacity and experience as 
major determinants of their ability to effectively engage in consultancy. For this reason, small and 
medium-sized NNGDOs were more concerned about their inability to secure consultancy assignments 
through competitive bidding process. They claimed to be discriminated against in the application process 
given the limited pots of funding and the increasing number of NNGDOs, think tanks and consulting 
firms. The reason given was that some donors had their preferred partners who were always called to 
undertake consultancy assignments making it difficult for small NNGDOs to access such opportunities. 
Directly related to this was the central government’s inability to use NNGDOs’ contracting services. To 
this end, six respondents reported a decline in the contribution of consultancy to annual budget. For 
instance, the Director of Finance and Administration for NNGDO 8 shared his experience where the 
consultancy component of his budget declined from 44.0% to 7.0% between 2005 and 2010. For 2015, it 
had dropped to just 0.5%. This has resulted in the organisation becoming more highly donor dependent 




Aside from consultancy, NNGDOs were engaged in subsidiary enterprises in microcredit, agro-
processing, animal rearing (e.g. rabbits and goats) and vocational skills training (e.g. beads and soap 
making). In terms of microcredit, six NNGDOs supported Village Savings and Loans Associations 
(VSLA) where they played intermediary roles in mobilising, coordinating and educating especially 
women’s associations in shea butter and agro-processing. They also secured loans from financial 
institutions for the associations where they charged interest on loans and in some instances, the women 
paid in-kind through their products. Engagement in VSLA is an example of an integrated hybrid operation 
where NNGDO intended beneficiaries act as customers. Respondents argued that subsidiary enterprises 
supported overheads, project costs and helped them to make investments as explained below:  
We run the VSLA where there is a small negligible interest. So we use the interest 
from the microcredit scheme to buy bonds on the market so that when a situation 
of no project happens, then we quickly rely on the bond (NNGDO 22).  
Another respondent added: 
Currently our coping strategy is to concentrate on the processing of agro-
products. We make our surpluses from such investments and it is helping us to 
take care of some overhead costs due to the absence of core funding (NNGDO 
30). 
For five NNGDOs engaged in agriculture-based enterprises in the North, concerns were raised about 
revenue volatility given that agriculture is rain-fed and seasonal. This creates financial planning 
difficulties. Uncertainty in funding inflows had compelled four NNGDOs to engage in retail shopping in 
charity shops, renting of chairs and canopies for event organising and operating a drinking spot. Charity 
retail shop was an emerging practice among NNGDOs which makes it not well developed because they 
relied on donated items from individuals which were largely unpredictable. The Programmes Manager of 
an NNGDO operating a charity shop in Accra stated: 
We have come up with a charity shop which focuses mainly on donations from 
individuals. We take in people’s nicely used clothes and we sell it at a reasonable 
price and use the proceeds to support our clients at the shelter (NNGDO 2). 
The engagement of NNGDO 2 in charity shop was fuelled largely by the withdrawal of its main donor in 
2013. The donor provided between 70-80% of its annual funding. The organisation had witnessed the 
withdrawal of other potential donors in recent years. The respondent explained that most projects had run-
out resulting in a turnover of paid staff from eighteen to four between 2013 and 2015. The NNGDO 
currently relies on its charity shop as explained by the Programmes Manager: 
For now, from where I sit, we don’t have a single funder supporting the 
organisation. Most of the support from donors was tailored at specific projects. 
So those are one-off, it comes, we run, it’s over and we are done. But now, we 
are depending on commercial activities which are not regular to run the 




6.1.1 Emergence of social enterprise among NNGDOs  
Social enterprise constituted one of the financial diversification strategies employed by fifteen NNGDOs. 
Although it is gaining much attention and has attracted interest globally, eight respondents pointed out 
that it was in its ‘‘thinking process’’. By this, I mean social enterprise remains a highly tentative and 
cognitive idea that is in a deliberative process among NNGDO leaders. These respondents emphasised 
the need to persuade their board of directors that social enterprise is a worthwhile venture given the lack 
of start-up capital, organisational capacity and understanding about the concept among NNGDOs.  
One Executive Director explained:  
We are trying to come up with a plan where we can dive into a full-blown 
business. So for now, we don’t have that but we’re lobbying with our board of 
directors. It’s one of the things we have put on our minds to pursue so that we 
will not be running completely out of funds (NNGDO 29). 
Respondents were of the view that social enterprise was the way to go if they were to remain sustainable. 
It is worthy of note that NNGDOs’ quest for social enterprise was a conscious and deliberate response to 
uncertainty in their external environment. For this reason, fifteen NNGDOs were actively engaged in 
profit making ventures including early childhood schools and poultry farming. These NNGDOs had 
developed and incorporated business models into their activities by making them separated hybrid 
organisations where the customers of NNGDOs’ commercial activities were not direct intended 
beneficiaries of interventions. However, profits from the enterprises were ploughed back to support 
NNGDOs’ activities. More importantly, all the social enterprises were nascent and operated on a small 
scale. The maximum years of operation was four years while others had operated less than one year. Eight 
respondents stressed the need for tying their social enterprise to the immediate needs of intended 
beneficiaries. They claimed that knowing the needs of customers and intended beneficiaries to which the 
social enterprise was going to address is key to its survival. For instance, the Executive Director of 
NNGDO 29 that had established a social enterprise in agribusiness claimed that it would help in 
addressing food security concern facing a number of people in their operational areas. The benefits of 
such ventures to intended beneficiaries will be determined in a matter time given that their operations 
were on a very small scale. This notwithstanding, it was clear that some respondents saw social enterprise 
as a way of meeting the needs of beneficiary communities.  
Another issue raised by respondents was the need for proper understanding of the legal processes involved 
in setting up a social enterprise. More than half of NNGDO respondents had a clear sense of registering 
the social enterprise as different entity from the NNGDO. They explained that the rationale for separating 
the two entities was to avoid mixing up of activities so that intended beneficiaries do not recognise 
NNGDOs as for-profit organisations. This notwithstanding, I observed that respondents had difficulty in 
delinking the social enterprise from the NNGDO. Respondents reported that although NNGDOs and their 
social enterprises shared the same office space, each had different staff but management remained the 
same. For instance, NNGDO 28 in Tamale had a social enterprise that used two office rooms as operating 
space. When asked about the reasons for hosting the social enterprise and the NNGDO in the same office 
space, the Executive Director explained that it was part of their cost reduction and ways of increasing the 
marketability and brand affinity of the social enterprise. Respondents pointed out that although social 
enterprises were in their infancy, there was scepticism about their long-term sustainability. NNGDOs’ 




6.1.2 Issues and challenges of social enterprise 
The empirical findings suggest that although the transformation of NNGDOs into social enterprise is 
gaining prominence in Ghana, they have received little support (e.g. human, technical and financial) from 
the central government, external donors and the private sector. None of the thirty-two NNGDOs reported 
receiving support from any of these stakeholders in developing their social enterprises. During interviews, 
five donor representatives stated categorically that their funding was not meant for supporting NNGDOs 
in social enterprise. There was a clear lack of interest and unwillingness to support NNGDOs because 
donor representatives claimed it was highly unjustifiable as one respondent puts it:  
  The problem lies in justifying every expenditure we incur. If you look at our 
report template, you have the budget, and an explanatory column. So you need 
to justify why you have to spend that amount in supporting the NGO in social 
enterprise and at times, it is not easy to explain (Donor 4). 
About two-thirds of NNGDO respondents concurred with the above assertion in the following statement 
by one respondent: 
To put some money in their budget to support our organisation in social enterprise, 
as for that, they won’t do it. They said it is out of their reach because they can’t 
defend it at their level. How will they justify that? (NNGDO 24). 
Due to donors’ unwillingness to support NNGDOs’ sustainability initiatives, more than half of 
respondents felt donors only preach what one respondent calls ‘‘obsessive sustainability gospel’’ but are 
not interested in making them sustainable. They explained that although donors claim to support 
NNGDOs in terms of funding and capacity, they were only interested in using them to implement their 
projects and achieve results rather than becoming partners who were interested in ensuring their 
sustainability. For example, a donor representative explained the rationale for their interest in NNGDOs 
producing results rather than investing in their long-term sustainability: 
Once you can show results for the work you do, we are willing to fund you 
because we want reports. I don’t think I will be happy with an NGO not giving 
me the results I need to communicate to headquarters that we have achieved so 
much. So for me, their sustainability depends on how well they produce the 
results we want (Donor 4). 
Donors have therefore not made any conscious effort to shift their funding priorities towards building 
the long-term sustainability of NNGDOs. For this reason, twenty-two small and medium-sized NNGDOs 
pointed out that they have been abandoned and left alone in dealing with their sustainability challenges. 
The Executive Director of NNGDO 3 in Accra lamented: 
Donors are more interested in their community interventions rather than NGOs’ 
sustainability. They use NGOs as conduits to achieve their objectives, so the 
question is: Do donors factor the sustainability of NGOs as part of their agenda? 
The answer is certainly not. You see, donors are not making NGOs sustainable at 
all. They don’t make the funding in such a way that you can survive without them 
(NNGDO 3).  
A key informant shared similar sentiments: 
The issue of sustainability is more important when it comes to funding but where 
donors are missing the point is facilitating processes that will enable NGOs to be 




The above statements also show how donors who purport to spearhead NNGDOs’ sustainability can 
ironically cause them to become unsustainable. Through their increased emphasis on projectised funding, 
donors are more interested in perpetuating elements of dependency rather than putting in place support 
mechanisms that will make NNGDOs independent and sustainable in the long-run. Given the high 
dependency on donor resources and the perception of abundance, five key informants and three donor 
representatives explained that many NNGDOs were less concerned about their own sustainability as one 
donor representative noted:  
I think quite a number of NGOs are still in denial. They don’t believe that funding 
is getting finished and the environment too is changing. They know we still have 
projects so some go and continue as if it’s business as usual. The biggest challenge 
is that most NGOs are refusing to accept that things have changed (Donor 2). 
Informed by their inability to get institutional support, twelve NNGDO respondents engaged in social 
enterprise mentioned access to start-up capital as their main challenge. Respondents explained that many 
commercial banks were unwilling to lend them loans because of the risk involved. In instances where 
returnable bank loans were given, the interest rate was described as very high ranging between 20-30% 
as one respondent explained:  
 We started the social enterprise because we got some bank loan. However, the 
loan has over 25% interest on it. So what business will you do to generate the 
needed interest? So in a nutshell, it is not possible to come up with a social 
enterprise managed by a local NGO without donor funding (NNGDO 8).  
The statement suggests that NNGDOs were dependent on donor grants despite their engagement in social 
enterprise. Directly related to this was the fact that more than half of NNGDOs did not have business 
models for supporting their social enterprise. Respondents claimed to rely on non-returnable grants from 
self-financing initiatives and contributions from executive directors and board members for start-up 
capital. However, these unrestricted funding were considered meagre especially when an NNGDO wanted 
to engage in commercially viable social enterprise. Twelve respondents explained that when organisations 
rely solely on self-financing and contributions from their executive directors or board members, there was 
a high tendency for the social enterprise to turn into ‘one-man business’ or be co-opted into family-linked 
businesses where surpluses are never ploughed back to the NNGDO but rather used for personal gains. 
They claimed that some individuals hide under the NNGDO label to establish ‘‘personal businesses’’ in 
social enterprises. For instance, one Executive Director explained that he had established a social 
enterprise in Northern Ghana that sells herbal tea. Interestingly, he mentioned that his wife managed the 
social enterprise but all surpluses were given to the NNGDO (NNGDO 21). This blurs the distinction 
between family business and NNGDOs’ commercial activities. However, the extent to which social 
enterprises became intermingled with family businesses depended on internal governance structures and 
leadership. 
A common experience across respondents was the lack of capacity in terms of leadership and business 
skills. One respondent stated that ‘‘I have seen many NGO businesses collapsing because of leadership 
challenges’’ (NNGDO 17). Eighteen interviewees concurred and reported having little or no business 
management skills that would help them engage in commercially viable social enterprise. This was due, 
in part, to their inability to hire and retain competent staff which affected their ability to develop proposals 
and innovative business models that could attract investors. The following quotation summarises the 
capacity challenges faced by NNGDO: 
The reason why the idea of social enterprise is not viable in our context is that 
NGOs do not have the expertise to go into it. Also, if you want to make a social 
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enterprise big and viable, you need a lot of skills but we have not yet developed 
our capacity to that level (NNGDO 3). 
Directly related to the capacity challenge was the influence of environmental and contextual factors 
especially cognitive dimensions of social enterprise. For this reason, respondents reported the need for 
education and advocacy in changing attitudes, perceptions and culture of intended beneficiaries and 
NGDO employees. This was because given that over the years, intended beneficiaries have enjoyed 
services for free in what one respondent described as ‘‘beneficiary dependency syndrome’’ (NNGDO 6). 
In this regard asking them for payment would be challenging. Moreover, many intended beneficiaries 
were perceived as visibly poor, hence their ability to pay for services remained unknown.  
Further illustrating this challenge was the case of an NGDO that operated a social enterprise in the 
construction industry. It was suggested by the Programmes Manager that clients were unwilling to pay 
market level price for their heavy-duty trucks because they believe NNGDOs are not supposed to make 
profit (NNGDO 25). This affected the ability of the enterprise to break even let alone get surplus to invest 
in social interventions. Some concerns were raised by eight respondents about NNGDOs using their social 
enterprises to deprive intended beneficiaries of services they claim to provide. Speaking about how 
NNGDOs had changed their support, one Programmes Manager stated that:  
We started by doing it for free, but we had problems with funding. We told them 
we are going to charge whatever services we give them. So we provided services 
to only those who could pay because we also need to survive (NNGDO 24). 
6.1.3 Effects of social enterprise on organisational mission  
An aspect of NNGDOs’ transition to commercialisation was its effects on organisational goals and 
mission. As a survival strategy, fourteen respondents suggested revising their mission and objectives to 
engage in social enterprise. Rather than seeing social enterprise as potential distraction to mission and 
objectives, seven respondents felt it was rather a value addition. A respondent argued that: 
The engagement in social enterprise is to achievement of our vision and mission. 
Every fund we generate goes to the beneficiaries. So it helps in achieving every 
goal we’ve set for ourselves as an organisation (NNGDO 6). 
 
NNGDOs’ thematic areas determined the type of commercial activities undertaken, these being aligned 
to the overall organisational mission. For instance, a respondent put forward the view that his organisation 
engaged in VSLA because they wanted to promote financial independence among intended beneficiaries 
of their livelihood empowerment programmes. In this regard, she explained that the interest from the 
VSLA had made it possible to expand the scheme to other beneficiaries, the primary aim of the 
organisation (NNGDO 16). Nonetheless, concerns were also raised about potential negative effects (i.e. 
shifting focus towards becoming a fully blown commercial entity to the neglect of their social 
interventions) of commercialisation on mission especially in organisations that lack strong leadership and 
strategic planning. Given the difficulty and uncertainty of funding, two NNGDOs were contemplating 
closing down to concentrate on their social enterprise. One Executive Director disclosed:   
If supporting communities is not feasible because of funding, then it’s better we 
close the NGO and concentrate on our social enterprise. We are doing our best to 
remain in business but if it becomes too hard for us to bear, we will go and focus 
on the business. That is also diversification (NNGDO 20). 
Given the absence of a legal framework for regulating NNGDOs, individuals could take advantage of this 
and become more profit conscious rather than focusing on social interventions. One Executive Director 
remarked ‘‘next year, I will devote all my attention to the social enterprise and leave the NGO work to 
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the other staff members to manage’’ (NNGDO 20). The increasing turn to social enterprise also created 
tension among staff within some NNGDOs. While some senior management staff were enthusiastic about 
social enterprise, other members of staff like field officers who claimed to be in touch with the grassroots 
were quite sceptical. A field officer argued that:  
Social enterprise in Ghana theoretically sounds romantic. But the truth is, if you 
know the realities on the ground, what kind of profit margin are you going to put 
on your products for the communities to buy? I am not sure social enterprise will 
work and to me it’s just a mirage (NNGDO 17). 
The above statement was a common sentiment shared by eight NNGDOs. The growing scepticism and 
lack of interest was borne out of the limited funds generated. Given that NNGDOs’ commercial activities 
were nascent, their contribution to annual budget was reported to be negligible ‘‘…approximately, we 
get less than 10% of our annual budget from our social enterprise which is very small’’ (NNGDO 8). 
Revenue volatility was also mentioned as a common experience and challenge for NNGDOs because as 
one respondent described it ‘‘revenues are really not regular, it’s once in a while and highly unpredictable 
depending on the business environment. Although it could give you something, it can’t promote your 
sustainability’’ (NNGDO 24).  
6.1.4 Reasons for commercialisation 
Respondents from fifteen NNGDOs operating social enterprises mentioned that their desire to create 
employment and training opportunities for intended beneficiaries was one of the reasons for their 
establishment. They believed that commercial activities had the potential of providing jobs for 
unemployed youth in their operational communities. For instance, one NNGDO in Tamale has created a 
social enterprise where young girls are given on-the- job training as part of an empowerment programme. 
Another reason mentioned was the need to promote organisational independence and ownership of 
programmes. In interviews, respondents suggested that commercial activities would give them financial 
and organisational independence in voicing concern about donor conditions perceived as non-favourable. 
One respondent succinctly explained: 
Gradually we are trying to move ourselves away from donor funding through our 
social enterprise. The reason is that we want to maintain our independence. It 
helps us to tell donors that these are our policies and we have to go by them to 
maintain our integrity (NNGDO 31).  
However, when probed further about the ability of commercial activities to guarantee financial and 
organisational autonomy from donor influence, more than half of respondents indicated that they were 
highly dependent on donor resources and therefore their control was unavoidable. For example, one 
Executive Director stated that ‘‘we have only started these sustainability measures in commercial 
activities not too long ago, just last year. So right now, I think a huge majority of our funding about 96% 
comes from external donors and they have much control over what goes on here’’ (NNGDO 18).  
Another justification for commercial activities was the need for counterpart funding as part of donor 
funding requirements. Twelve respondents mentioned that although income from commercial activities 
was meagre, the ability of the organisation to demonstrate that it was capable of raising counterpart 
funding meant it could support its existence independent of donors. NNGDOs able to raise counterpart 
funding were perceived by donors as committed to ensuring their own sustainability. This also influenced 
donors’ decision to work with them. A donor representative explained the rationale for counterpart 
funding by stating that: ‘‘We have acknowledged that NGOs must continue to survive by running their 
own programmes. So, they have to pay between 10-25% as counterpart funding of the grant. These are 
some of the things we have been doing to ensure their sustainability’’ (Donor 3).  
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It suggests that NNGDOs’ sustainability is seen as a cost from donors’ perspective. NNGDOs unable to 
raise counterpart funds reported having difficulty in securing projects which also affected their survival 
as illustrated by the following quotation: 
It is even more difficult this time that most donors are shifting towards NGOs 
providing counterpart funding. The reason why we are not getting projects is 
we’re unable to tell donors that we will take 20% of the project cost. That is 
posing some challenges to small NGOs in terms of our capacity to raise such 
funds (NNGDO 15).  
6.2 Domestic resource mobilisation (DRM)  
Aside from commercial activities, nineteen NNGDOs had intensified their search for alternative funding 
including corporate philanthropy through Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), individual donations 
and government funding. It is important to emphasise that mobilisation of domestic resources is far from 
new. However, fifteen respondents repeatedly stressed that they had given priority to DRM because it 
could serve as a backup plan against eventualities in external funding as illustrated by the following 
quotation:  
I think currently we are diversifying our funding sources beyond external grants 
to focus more on domestic resources. It’s a strategy to look beyond donor funding 
as part of our new five-year strategic plan (NNGDO 3).  
6.2.1 Corporate philanthropy from the private sector 
Ten respondents reported intensifying their engagement with the private sector through CSR. However, 
they explained that corporate philanthropy in Ghana was nascent and not well developed but remains the 
dominant form of CSR practised by multinational companies. Respondents brought forward a number of 
concerns including potential mismatch of interests which affected their ability to tap into corporate 
funding. They explained that they had not clearly articulated the benefits of NNGDO-corporate 
partnerships in terms of how they could use their experience and grassroots connections to help corporate 
organisations in enhancing their products and reputation. This according to respondents was due to the 
lack of strategic packaging when approaching businesses for partnerships. 
Twenty NNGDO respondents and four key informants described NNGDO-corporate partnership as weak. 
Among the reasons given was NNGDOs’ high dependence on external donor funding which has made 
them pay relatively little attention to mobilising private sector resources. Domestic resources were often 
described as non-existent as no conscious efforts were made to develop and explore them. This according 
to five respondents was because of the perception that donor funding was relatively easier to access, 
predictable and the amount involved was huge compared to donations from corporate organisations which 
were mostly in-kind and focused on one-off issues. Some respondents were of the view that corporate 
funding was geared towards ‘‘one-touch hard infrastructural support’’ (NNGDO 24). 
Again, NNGDOs’ inability to tap into corporate funding was attributed to the lack of organisational 
capacity. Surprisingly, only NNGDO 4 and 16 had a dedicated resource mobilisation officer. In most 
organisations, resource mobilisation was the sole responsibility of the Executive Director or a team of 
staff put together to respond to calls for proposals. The rationale for not having a designated resource 
mobilisation officer was due to the absence of core funding and the uncertainty of the funding 
environment. The absence of core funding was reported to affect resource diversification abilities because 
it was riskier to hire and retain a paid staff. For this reason, many relied on their Executive Director(s) in 
reducing administrative costs. Nonetheless, it affected their ability to write quality proposals and engage 
effectively with corporate organisations.  
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In interviews, a corporate representative confirmed this assertion by suggesting that they prefer to engage 
United Nations (UN) agencies, INGDOs than NNGDOs due to capacity challenges. This is illustrated by 
the following quotation: 
 We’ve built 10 ICT centres in all the regions. We did that with UNDP. We don’t 
deal directly with local NGOs because I think they don’t have the strength 
[capacity] like the international organisations. We have also been doing some 
projects with Plan International (Key Informant 12). 
Aside from capacity challenges, the perceived lack of transparency, accountability and responsiveness to 
community needs by NNGDOs played a key role in their attempt to seek corporate funding. Two key 
informants explained that corporate organisations would want NNGDOs to engage in active advocacy on 
transparency with the view to holding government officials to account but little has been done. This raised 
concern about the relevance of NNGDOs among key informants where one described them as ‘‘just 
noisemakers and attention seekers without any demonstrable impact’’. This directly speaks to their 
legitimacy and the lack of awareness about their roles in society. For this reason, key informants suggested 
the need for them to demonstrate their relevance and the benefits of their partnership as a prerequisite for 
accessing corporate support. There was also lack of information and understanding about corporate 
funding. Interview data suggests that NNGDOs had little knowledge about corporate funding models, 
granting priorities and the intended CSR areas for corporate organisations. 
One particular striking finding relates to the level of scepticism among NNGDOs about the use of 
corporate foundations as mechanism for undertaking CSR. Many multinational companies especially in 
the telecommunication and mining sectors were found to be implementing their CSR independently of 
NNGDOs through their foundations. Interview data suggests that NNGDOs were not partnered or used as 
intermediaries for project implementation and is partly an indication that corporate organisations are 
unwilling to relinquish control of their CSR to NNGDOs. This according to six respondents was due to 
the centralised nature of corporate philanthropy practised in Ghana. For instance, respondents in the North 
complained of not being able to secure corporate funding because all funding decisions were made in 
Accra. To these respondents, their geographic location and other contextual factors played a key role in 
determining the availability of corporate funding they can tap into. One Executive Director, for example 
explained that he submitted his application to a commercial bank in Tamale and was informed that the 
selection process would be decided at Accra so they were unable to provide further information on his 
application. Geographical location was considered a significant threat to resource diversification as 
illustrated in the following quotation: 
All the major decisions are made in Accra. Most organisations are based in Accra, 
they don’t come to the North. So we are at a disadvantage position here because 
nobody will know of your existence. If you only know a sub-office, it doesn’t 
help at all when seeking funds domestically (NNGDO 27).  
Seeking corporate funding is a tough call for NNGDOs given that corporate organisations are more 
interested in sponsoring visible infrastructural projects that enhance their reputation and organisational 
brand rather than supporting policy and advocacy oriented programmes. This is also partly because of the 
depoliticisation of corporate organisations in governance process where they do not want to meddle 
themselves in policy and advocacy arena that challenges government apparatus. For this reason, NNGDOs 
focusing on policy-oriented issues reported having difficulty accessing corporate funding: 
I don’t think that kind of support for development and policy-oriented activities 
currently pervades our private sector because many private sector foundations are 
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more interested in supporting what can be tangibly seen. Their funding is limited 
and meant for specific activities like entertainment shows (NNGDO 5).  
In an interview with a representative of a telecommunication company, the respondent explained that their 
focus on visible projects enhanced their brand affinity. For this reason, he explained that CSR was largely 
driven by commercial expediency where vested interests remained their top priority. This is quite ironic 
given that CSR was touted as an avenue for improving well-being and development. Five key informants 
and eight NNGDO representatives explained that in Ghana, the purpose of CSR was not for promoting 
‘‘real development’’ but an avenue for companies to enhance their profits and image. As one respondent 
noted: ‘‘The corporate organisations are interested in projects that are visible and they can readily paint 
with their colours because they are more interested in the image they will get than the actual social 
returns’’ (NNGDO 2). These respondents claimed CSR is a window-dressing strategy for deceiving the 
public and this helps organisations to gain legitimacy from the public because they are perceived as 
‘‘doing good to the society’’ (Key Informant 4).  
The increasing emphasis on enhancing their brand rather than promoting ‘‘real development’’ was also 
influenced in part by societal perception. For this reason, a corporate interviewee explained that they 
would want to engage in some activities that appeal to the public as part of their CSR. The rationale is to 
manipulate stakeholders’ perception that ‘‘the organisation is a caring brand’’ which enhances their 
organisational reputation (Key Informant 11). In addition, CSR was a mechanism for lobbying 
government’s regulatory activities. For example, the same respondent explained that the government 
wants to declare their organisation as a monopolist player but this would give their competitors an upper 
hand. For this reason, the company is using its CSR to mitigate the situation by lobbying the government.  
Another issue determining the lack of corporate funding and support relates to environmental and 
contextual factors like general economic situation and tax incentives. Respondents were of the view that 
dire economic conditions such as erratic power supply (known as dumsor) and high interest rates affected 
the profit margins of many businesses while others had collapsed. For this reason, businesses were more 
concerned with their own survival than supporting NNGDOs. When corporate organisations face cash 
flow issues, CSR becomes the main area of target for reduction (Key Informant 3). This is largely because, 
for most organisations, their CSR is derived from a percentage of profit after tax. For example, a 
respondent disclosed that they set aside 1% of their profit into CSR but this is reduced in times of financial 
difficulty (Key Informant 11). Moreover, government’s inability to create an enabling environment that 
incentivises corporate organisations to engage in CSR was a major concern raised by respondents.  
Although respondents reported difficulties involved in securing corporate funding, four NNGDOs had 
secured such funding to undertake service delivery activities. The Executive Director of NGDO 6 working 
in the catchment areas of an oil and gas company in the Western Region reported that they secured a grant 
of about GH₵15.0 million (US$3.9 million) from the company as part of their CSR to construct and 
revamp hospitals and also train nurses on maternal health issues (NGDO 6). The NNGDO was able to 
secure the grant because it partnered with the Ghana Health Service. While the discovery of oil and the 
presence of mining companies could open up opportunities for NNGDOs to secure funding from corporate 
organisations as part of their CSR, respondents mentioned that it mostly favours NNGDOs located within 
their catchment areas. Other respondents reported receiving one-off product donations from corporate 
organisations including Nestle Ghana, PZ Cussons and Tigo. The discussion on NGDO-corporate 
partnership is emerging and at an experimental stage. The success of such partnership would be 
determined in a matter of time. However, there are renewed efforts by NNGDOs to actively find ways to 
engage with the private sector.  
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6.2.2 Individual and philanthropic donations 
Individual donations constituted an important domestic resource explored by nineteen NNGDOs. 
Respondents had innovatively embarked on new funding models through face-to-face fundraising in 
shopping malls, online funding mechanisms (e.g. crowd funding), placing donation boxes at vantage 
places such as their offices, banks, churches among many others to raise funds from individuals. The use 
of these approaches was an emerging fundraising model which gave NNGDOs access to unrestricted 
funding opportunities. Respondents explained that they faced a number of challenges in using these new 
approaches, prominent among them include the following. First, limited understanding of domestic 
fundraising strategies. Second, amount of money raised was too little to bring about any meaningful 
change. Third, mobilising private philanthropy requires building strong personal connections. Three 
NNGDOs had explored this avenue by using their executive directors and board members to raise funds 
from churches or individuals who gave monthly or yearly standing orders (NNGDO 2, 9, 29). 
Although Ghanaians have a rich culture of giving, interview data suggests private philanthropic donations 
were ad hoc and unpredictable. In addition, respondents explained there was lack of commitment to 
support the activities of NNGDOs given that individuals tend to give to families, close networks and 
religious groups like churches or mosques. This was informed by the need for familial obligation, 
reciprocity, social network, inclusivity and religious obligations. Majority of respondents felt individual 
giving was largely informal and not mediated through intermediaries like NNGDOs. To this end, when 
giving is made formal, it loses its value. For this reason, they lamented about their inability to mobilise 
enough resources from individuals which was largely attributed to the absence of culture of giving directly 
to NNGDOs. Respondents believed that the attitude of supporting NNGDOs was not cultivated in most 
Ghanaians as noted by one key informant: ‘‘A Ghanaian taking money and giving it to an NGO, it’s 
strange. We haven’t even thought of that because it’s not part of our culture’’ (Key Informant 6). In 
addition, they felt that some individuals were disinterested in giving to NNGDOs but would rather expect 
support from them. Even for intended beneficiaries, giving back was a challenge. One Executive Director 
lamented: ‘‘People don’t have that spirit of giving for NGOs. And even those who benefit from our 
programmes, they don’t have the giving-back attitude’’ (NNGDO 25). This, in turn, feeds into a common 
sentiment about the need for strengthening the spirit of giving in Ghana and the creation of government’s 
incentives towards giving.  
While the need for education was crucial, there was a general perception that individuals give to NNGDOs 
perceived to be accountable, transparent and able to demonstrate impact. However, according to 
respondents, public transparency, accountability and impact of NNGDOs remain highly limited. At the 
same time, there was a negative public perception that NNGDOs were ‘‘financially sound’’ because their 
leaders receive ‘huge’ donor funds which are used in enriching their own lives rather than their intended 
beneficiaries. Even government officials were concerned about the opulence of some NNGDOs who were 
purported to drive in Land Cruisers at the expense of the poor. The Director of NNGDO 31 chastised his 
colleagues by putting it this way: 
They have received a lot of money but have not built their structures. Some 
leaders want to live a luxurious life. They get the funding for their own benefits 
to the detriment of the purpose for which the money has been given. We have a 
few ones that are just a disgrace to the sector (NNGDO 31). 
The above impression has caused apathy where people do not see the urgency in supporting NNGDOs 
because they believe donated resources will not reach their intended beneficiaries. For this reason, four 
respondents suggested that it was a deliberate decision not to mainstream private philanthropy into their 
resource mobilisation portfolio. To these respondents, individual donations were perceived as non-
existing because of the lack of progressive institutionalised philanthropic culture.  
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Interview data indicates that this perception was largely influenced by NNGDOs’ capacity challenges 
which meant they had limited understanding of domestic fundraising. For this reason, mobilising 
individual support for NNGDOs was a tough call and had created some level of doubt about their 
potentials to sustain NNGDOs.  
Notwithstanding the above reservations, some NNGDOs reported mobilising resources from foundations 
that are mostly of African origin. This can be linked to the emergence of the middle class and high net-
worth individuals (HNWIs). However, respondents were concerned about the limited nature of their 
funding for priority areas. For example, the Grants Manager of a foundation explained that they had only 
two grants application windows annually, and these were targeted at specific thematic areas. She further 
stated that given their high donor dependency, only 30-35% of all applications were successful. High 
dependency on donors and inability to generate local base support for their organisation is threatening 
their own sustainability as revealed by the following quote: ‘‘To be honest, should external donors pull 
out right now, we will be in crisis. It will be very difficult for us to stand on our feet’’ (Donor 5).  
6.2.3 Volunteer support 
As part of individual donations, twenty-six NNGDOs were actively engaging the services of community 
and international volunteers. The approach had become necessary given the absence of core funding and 
projectisation of donor support, making it difficult to retain staff in the absence of projects. During such 
periods, respondents explained that some paid staff volunteered in anticipation that when new projects 
were secured, they would be retrained and reassigned. The use of volunteer support constituted an 
important cost reduction strategy. For instance, activities that would have involved elements of costs were 
passed on to volunteers. Engagement with volunteers was a useful mechanism for NNGDO to ensure the 
project sustainability at the community level. For example, the Executive Director of NNGDO 21 
explained that volunteers help sustain their presence in communities even in their absence because they 
had created a sense of ownership which increased organisational legitimacy and credibility.  
In addition, respondents reported that working with community volunteers indicated that NNGDOs were 
accountable to them and therefore it became a strategy for satisfying aggrieved community members. For 
example, some opinion and community leaders were involved in the selection of community volunteers 
for NNGDOs as explained by a respondent: ‘‘we work with the elderly, so we try to involve the chiefs 
and people in the community as part of our self-help initiatives. Everything is volunteerism, sacrificial 
and self-help because we say God helps those who help themselves’’ (NNGDO 19). NNGDOs’ 
engagement with formal local volunteers (e.g. interns) was mostly short-term lasting between three to 
twelve months and was described as episodic, whereas community volunteers mostly focused on long-
term community activities and initiatives such as caring for the elderly, orphans and vulnerable children.  
Aside from this, international volunteers supported in building organisational capacity in report writing, 
proposal development and training in ICT. This served as an important avenue for resource mobilisation 
through the payment of fees, donation of items, setting up online fundraising platforms and linking 
NNGDOs to potential donors in their home countries. In some instance, they played a crucial role in the 
generation of earned income. For example, the Executive Director of an NNGDO in the North reported 
using volunteers to run motorcycle and tricycle businesses as part of their income generating activities. 
However, they face uncertainty due to lack of commitment. Since volunteers are not obliged to abide by 
any contractual agreement, they terminate their engagement without prior notice leading to a high rate of 
volunteer turnover which affected project continuity. Nine respondents explained that the high turnover 
and low commitments among volunteers was due to the lack of remuneration and understanding of 
volunteerism. Motivating volunteers was reported as a big challenge. A respondent lamented: 
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In Ghana, people are highly money conscious, so every little thing they do, they 
want money. Most NGOs do not use the services of volunteers because they think 
they are obliged to pay them and since they don’t have funds to give, then they 
will not open doors to you at all (Key Informant 1). 
Another important issue had to do with the lack of clear-cut policies and programmes for engaging 
volunteers. This originates partly from communication gaps by NNGDOs to clearly articulate their 
engagement with volunteers. What is evident was that in the absence of donor funding, relying on 
volunteer support had the potential to help NNGDOs achieve their goals and objectives. However, the 
benefits of such engagement as some respondents indicated remained uncertain. 
6.2.4 Government funding and support 
The last domestic resource explored by NNGDOs was funding from government institutions, including 
ministries and MMDAs. The GOG does not specifically allocate a percentage of its annual budget targeted 
to support NNGDOs. Although they continue to enjoy good relationship with the central government and 
its agencies, it has not translated into direct financial support. The potential of MMDAs to support 
NNGDOs was questioned because respondents claimed they were resource constrained and heavily 
dependent on central government transfers. Inadequate financial support was reported by respondents as 
one of the major challenges affecting their engagement with MMDAs. Five NNGDOs claimed to provide 
resources to assist some MMDAs. Since MMDAs are themselves struggling to survive, it becomes 
impossible to expect any significant financial support from them. A respondent asserted that: ‘‘if you rely 
on any government agency at the district level, the resources will not come because the agency itself 
doesn’t have the quarterly release to undertake its mandates, let alone helping an NGO’’ (NNGDO 14). 
In addition, respondents explained that the 2016 general election had shifted government’s focus towards 
their political financial needs in campaigns rather than supporting institutions including NNGDOs. In 
periods of election, the focus of ruling elites and coalitions is on their own political survival which in turn 
affects national resource distribution (Key Informant 1, 4).  
This notwithstanding, three donor representatives explained that the majority of their support was 
channelled through government institutions rather than direct funding to NNGDOs as part of new funding 
modalities. They argued that the aim was to build the capacity of government institutions to provide the 
needed social services and governance structures following the country’s transition to LMIC status. The 
expectation was that these institutions would play a major role in Ghana’s development especially when 
DPs withdrew their support. Donor representatives indicated that this this was part of their exit strategies 
in Ghana (Donor 1, 3, 4). In this regard, NNGDO respondents mentioned seeking government funding 
through competitive bidding process and had received contracts from the Ghana AIDS Commission, 
Ghana Health Service and Ministry of Food and Agriculture. Among the programmes mentioned by 
respondents were the Integrated Innovative Community Intervention to reduce HIV New Infections and 
Accountability Loop Budget Advocacy (ALBA) Project.  
Nonetheless, these funding opportunities were reported as very small and unpredictable because 
NNGDOs were sub-recipients of donor funding channelled through government agencies. It was also 
alleged that getting government funding was highly political and depended largely on one’s personal 
connections. One Executive Director shared his experience by stressing that ‘‘…all government 
institutions that are supposed to provide grants are manipulated politically. You must know some political 
party or someone in a higher office before you will be able to get funding’’. The same respondent stressed 
that his personal connections enabled him to acquire funding from a government-sponsored agency by 
stating that:  
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I can tell you I got the loan of GH₵22,000 because the boss was my classmate. I 
went there and told him we need money and immediately he said, come and take 
the forms and submit the application. So at that level, because I knew him, it was 
easier (NNGDO 31). 
The use of personal connections between NNGDO leaders, government officials and politicians blurs the 
distinction between the state and NNGDOs. However, such connections create possibility for government 
officials to channel resources to their own established NNGDOs or those of close friends. It was an 
overarching concern raised by respondents. Five donor representatives and three key informants 
mentioned instances where NNGDOs were deliberately set up in anticipation of upcoming grants. For 
instance, a bilateral donor representative shared her shock at learning that her organisation was unable to 
locate a number of NNGDOs that had received funding during a project’s evaluation process. The 
respondent explained that some organisations set up just to receive funds after which they go into 
hibernation (Donor 3). This was largely attributed to the loose nature of the due diligence process 
undertaken by donor agencies that only focuses on report writing (Key Informant 4).  
While government funding served as an alternative resource, five respondents suggested that they were 
unwilling to accept it for fear of being tagged politically as stated by one respondent: ‘‘we don’t want to 
be tied to the aprons of any particular political party because when you do that, you go out [collapse] with 
the government when a new party is in power’’ (NNGDO 1). The show of political neutrality was a 
deliberate survival strategy. Other NNGDOs engaged in advocacy issues did not accept government 
funding to avoid being co-opted because as one respondent stated ‘‘you cannot bite the hand that feeds 
you’’. Despite these concerns, some respondents spoke about the beneficial impact of their relationship 
with some government institutions. Aside from financial support, ten NNGDOs reported collaborating 
with government agencies to undertake projects and programmes. It is worthy of note that NNGDO-
government partnership took the form of non-material resources including information sharing and 
capacity building. Indeed, there were several instances where NNGDOs reported using the services of 
MMDAs staff and conference halls for programmes. This indirectly helped in reducing administrative 
costs. Three respondents also mentioned the need for approval to operate in some communities and 
villages which required working through MMDAs to make a good community entry.  
6.3 Diversification through holding onto external donor resources 
Another strategy used by twenty-two NNGDOs relates to the manner in which they seek funding and 
support. For these NNGDOs, it was a common experience for them to secure diverse external sources of 
funding. The operating landscape was reported as fast changing and had forced NNGDOs to reposition 
themselves by not putting their ‘‘eggs in one basket’’ but rather seek multiple external donors funding. 
The rationale was to help cushion against uncertainty in financial inflows. The attempt to diversify donor 
funding base was deliberate as explained by one Executive Director in the health sector:  
We are diversifying our funding sources. We have more than 10 donors 
supporting our projects for the FY 2015/2016. Our donors include USAID, 
FHI360, Cross Roads International, Global Fund-ADRA and Global Fund- Stop 
TB (NNGDO 6).  
The above statement suggests that despite the perceived dwindling donor funding, some NNGDOs are 
able to attract several donors and raises important question about the factors accounting for this. Donor 
funding was the dominant resource mobilisation mechanism for many NNGDOs. Although they were 
trying to become financially independent, their survival and sustainability was dependent on availability 
of donor support. For this reason, in their quest for diversified funding, almost all NNGDOs were 
aggressively responding to different grant application processes.  
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The Director of NNGDO 20 explained that on an average, he responds to about 8-10 funding applications 
monthly. In responding to multiple donor applications, ten NNGDOs were engaged in ‘‘donor scouting’’ 
(i.e. NNGDOs are always on the lookout for advertised funding opportunities by subscribing to daily 
newspapers or spending much time on the internet). The aim was to ensure that no funding opportunity 
went unnoticed indicating the extent to which information needs act as a burden for management. One 
Executive Director offered this perspective on donor scouting: 
What I do every morning is when I come to the office, I scout for potential donors. 
That one is constant. At least your first two hours, you should scout for calls for 
proposals by checking the internet or newspapers (NNGDO, 20). 
 
In their attempt to diversify donor funding, small and medium-sized NNGDOs with perceived weak 
organisational capacity reported using the services of consultants in their proposal writing in an attempt 
to impress donors because of ‘‘donors’ preference for catchy proposals which makes NGOs to be too 
ambitious and lose touch with reality’’ (NNGDO 22). Eight NNGDO respondents suggested that those 
able to write catchy proposals were more likely to win grants but sometimes their implementation became 
a challenge. In an attempt to impress donors, one respondent whose organisation uses consultants 
explained that although they wrote a ‘‘nice proposal’’ and won the grant, during project implementation, 
agreed targets were unmet because of some technical issues. This resulted in contract termination and 
refund of project funds which had also affected its reputation with the donor (NNGDO 27). Reports of 
donors terminating contracts were common among NNGDOs.  
Quite surprisingly, eight NNGDOs did not have permanent donors but their ability to secure different 
funding streams ensured that when one donor exited, another was brought in. Diversification of donor 
base ensured the continuous inflow of funds and projects and thus prevented a situation of no projects. It 
is important to stress that diversification of donor base was common among large NNGDOs. One 
respondent disclosed: 
In ensuring that we maintain a diversified funding, we apply to multiple external 
donors. So at any point in time, we have multiple funding coming in. Last year, 
we were running 18 different projects. If one donor is leaving, another one is 
coming (NNGDO 3). 
On the other hand, seven respondents of small and medium-sized NNGDOs reported not receiving funding 
from donors for the last two years despite numerous applications. For NNGDOs that relied on a single 
donor, attempts to diversify resource base were met with fierce resistance. The perception of donors was 
that having multiple funders would result in the division of NNGDOs’ commitments on their projects. 
One respondent stated that:  
At the beginning, Donor 1 didn’t want any rivalry so they didn’t want us to 
diversify our funding by saying that don’t take other donors’ money and add to 
ours (NNGDO 17). 
6.4 Diversification in thematic areas and operations  
6.4.1 Thematic diversification 
Twenty respondents explained that their engagement in thematic diversification was informed by the need 
for funding during the early stages of formation. For most NNGDOs, the decision to engage in thematic 
diversification was influenced by two main factors: discretion of organisational leaders and pressures 
placed on leaders by donors. Respondents explained that it was common to see NNGDOs (small and 
large) shifting their strategic focus in response to changes in donor priorities. For these NNGDOs, the 
need for survival was more important than maintaining a strategic focus because as one respondent puts 
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it: ‘‘we need to survive to be able to tell our story and say that we operate in education or health’’ 
(NNGDO 2). Speaking about how the need for survival drives NNGDOs to engage in thematic 
diversification, a representative of an INGDO working with NNGDOs across the country explained: 
For most NGOs, because they are looking for funds from so many sources to 
survive, when an INGO approaches them that we want you to go into health, 
they need the money and so they will go into health. Oh, I want you to go into 
education, they will take the money and go into that area (Donor 8). 
For this reason, many NNGDOs were found to be following the money and not their strategic focus. As 
one respondent lamented: ‘‘for most small NGOs, funding is their issue so anywhere it is going to come 
from, they are happy to take it. They don’t care if it will change their strategic focus’’ (Donor 7). This 
according to some respondents had negative effects in distorting their strategic focus and orientation. As 
one donor representative lamented: 
I have to be honest with you, a number of local NGOs have been spoilt by external 
donors just because of the money syndrome. As soon as an external body comes 
in, then their orientation and focus areas begin to change. That is why most NGOs 
do not exist for a long time because they are unable to handle the demands placed 
on them due to their weak capacity (Donor 6). 
 
Clearly, respondents criticised NNGDOs engaged in thematic diversification for reasons such as potential 
goal displacement, inability to acquire in-depth knowledge in specific sectors, identity crisis and 
subsequent loss of credibility and donor funding. Accordingly, thematic diversification affected 
performance as NNGDOs tried to meet onerous requirements of different donors. The Country Director 
of an INGDO explained how thematic diversification affects NNGDOs: 
It keeps them under enormous workload and sometimes they can’t cope with the 
workload. They are always under pressure all year round and it affects the quality 
of delivery because they have too much work on the staff. Reports are always 
delaying and this is usually the problem with most local NGOs we partner with 
(Donor 7).  
While some respondents saw thematic diversification as negative, twelve NNGDOs respondents refuted 
such claims by arguing that it rather gave them access to strategic partnerships and also gained experience 
from running different programmes. This helped them to mobilise resources to cater for overheads. 
Majority of donors provided between 5-15% of project funds to cater for administrative expenses. For 
this reason, having  different projects was  crucial as one respondent puts it: ‘‘It’s always good for us to 
try and have more than one project at a time so that while this project is one year, then you enrol another 
for two years, and so in that way, you keep your NGO running’’ (NNGDO 14). For NNGDOs in thematic 
diversification, a common experience was their ability to develop multiple skills in handling different 
projects at a time. The empirical findings suggest that the development of multiple skills was common 
among executive directors and programme managers who play both management, coordinating, 
supervisory and implementing roles at the organisational and project levels. Most field staff did not have 
relatively such multiple skills because they were employed on contract-basis. 
6.4.2 Operational diversification 
Seven respondents pointed out that operational diversification occurred with new activities and 
programmes that complemented their original strategic focus. While NNGDOs stuck to their core thematic 
area, they expanded their operations aimed at meeting the needs of intended beneficiaries and donors. This 
was common among large NNGDOs that have developed a specialised niche within particular sector(s) 
based on their experience. Thus, more programmes were added to their portfolio mix as organisations 
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began to grow. This is also not to suggest that operational diversification was limited to large NNGDOs. 
In fact, eight small and medium-sized NNGDOs engaged in operational diversification. The Programmes 
Manager of a specialist NNGDO in education explained that they started with access to education but 
gradually added quality basic education and were implementing community empowerment in their 
educational programmes. For NNGDO 24, the respondent indicated that they were downscaling access to 
basic education in order to ensure functional specialisation in community empowerment in the long-term. 
It also emerged that donor priorities and community needs were key determinants of operational 
diversification. Respondents felt programme expansion was in response to donor request as explained 
below:  
We got to a point when our donors said introduce something we call educational 
mainstreaming. So we started training teachers to take our methodology to public 
schools. Then gradually we brought in advocacy to get policy makers to accept 
the methodology (NNGDO 24).  
In responding to donor priorities and new funding modalities, more than eight NNGDOs had shifted their 
programmes from service delivery to social accountability issues. For these NNGDOs, service delivery in 
hard infrastructure was no longer a priority because donors were less interested. Additionally, in the 
absence of funding, a pragmatic step was deliberate engagement in social accountability because service 
delivery required huge financial resources. One respondent shared his experience: 
In time past, we were building schools and complementing the efforts of 
government in education. But today, we only engage firmly in advocacy. This is 
also a way of reducing the amount of resources we will need as compared to 
service delivery and it’s a strategy to cope with the dwindling funding support 
(NNGDO 17). 
 
On the part of donor representatives, they explained that service delivery interventions were unsustainable 
and their core mandate was to build governance structures to provide the needed services for citizens. For 
example, one donor representative felt that service delivery was the sole responsibility of government and 
their effort in complementing government had not achieved as much result as expected. In this regard, 
focusing on demand-driven grant by empowering NNGDOs and intended beneficiaries to hold duty 
bearers to account was donors’ priority (Donor 3). However, the challenge with this shift was that funds 
for social accountability issues were reported as relatively small. Interestingly, more than half of 
respondents felt there was a clear mismatch between intended beneficiary communities’ priorities and 
donors’ interests in social accountability. According to NNGDO respondents, intended beneficiaries were 
more interested in service delivery interventions because it met their immediate needs. However, given 
that service delivery is outside donor priorities, NNGDOs were unable to provide such interventions.  
Indeed, although donors were interested in social accountability issues, what was quiet surprising was that 
they hardly paid attention to building the capacity of NNGDOs to transition from service delivery to social 
accountability. NNGDOs that failed to transition into social accountability interventions struggled to 
mobilise the needed financial resources because many funding applications were geared towards it. An 
example was the US$9.3 million USAID sponsored Ghana Strengthening Accountability Mechanisms 
(GSAM) Project. From the above illustrations, it was clear that donor interests and priorities largely 
determined which sectors many NNGDOs engaged in, as one respondent puts it ‘‘We must dance 





While donor interests played a role in operational diversification, the need to meet intended beneficiaries’ 
needs cannot be ruled out. The rationale for operational diversification was summarised by one respondent 
as follows: ‘‘sometimes, you go into a community and the first problem you start dealing with highlights 
others’’ (NNGDO 7). Due to the integrated and interconnected nature of intended beneficiaries’ needs, 
respondents pointed out that they had to expand their activities to meet such needs. For example, NNGDO 
16 in order to achieve its primary goal in sexual and reproductive health, introduced education and 
accountability as other programme components. NNGDO 20 also reported developing water and toilet 
facilities into their educational programme because it affected children’s ability to stay in school. 
Respondents were of the view that organisations unable to meet the needs of intended beneficiaries were 
perceived as having limited impact, which also affected their credibility and legitimacy. Moreover, 
meeting the integrated needs of intended beneficiaries signified elements of accountability. In some 
instances, respondents claimed to have collaborated with other specialist NNGDOs to provide services, 
however, it was reported that intended beneficiaries found it more convenient establishing and building 
trust with one NNGDO in meeting their multiple needs due to the influx of many NGDOs. A respondent 
shared his field experience:  
Sometimes you come to a village and you find CARE, ActionAid, TreeAid and 
other local NGOs and they are all coming to talk to the same villagers. So from 
the communities’ perspective, it is too many NGOs taking their time and 
worrying them. So sometimes, if one strong local NGO is able help them deal 
with different issues, they find it more convenient (Donor 7). 
A common challenge faced by specialist NNGDOs was increased competition for limited funding 
opportunities. Although specialisation enhanced organisational competence, identity and credibility, it 
was also reported to have limited opportunities. In an environment of limited funding and increased 
competition, specialisation can be a dangerous strategy to adopt. Seven specialist NNGDOs explained 
that their sustainability is threatened because of their inability to secure funding in their specific sectors. 
For instance, one specialist NNGDO in Complementary Basic Education (CBE) reported experiencing 
competition with other NNGDOs after it became a popular concept in the education sector. Initially, 
funding was easier because it was the only NNGDO implementing the programme as the respondent puts 
it:  
Now we have as many as ten NGOs implementing the CBE programme in five 
regions of the country. It has become a competition and they [the new NGOs] do 
not say that because you started, pick the districts you want to work in and share 
the rest among us. Donors open bid for proposals and we all compete. So you see 
that we are risking our chances of survival (NNGDO 24). 
6.4.3 Locational diversification  
A more subtle form of diversification practised by NNGDOs was locational diversification. In their quest 
to upscale programmes and projects, NNGDOs engaged in locational diversification by expanding their 
operations to new geographic areas. Locational diversification involved expanding reach of activities in 
order to secure different streams of funding. Twenty NNGDOs were operating in more than five MMDAs 
within the same region while others increased their reach by having a national coverage. Three NNGDOs 
reported operating in more than 80 MMDAs across seven regions indicating the sheer level of locational 
diversification. It was influenced by increased community needs, organisational visibility and desire by 
donors to upscale their success in order to promote demonstrable impact of their interventions. NNGDOs 
upscaled their operations to other communities when they grew in size and performance, illustrated in the 
case of one organisation that started as a small NNGDO but had grown to increase its operational areas 
to eleven districts in the North. According to the Executive Director, the organisation serves between 
1000 and 4500 intended beneficiaries in education, agriculture and WASH (NNGDO 32).  
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It is important to stress that given the relatively scattered nature of most rural communities especially in 
the North, the settlement pattern sometimes compels NNGDOs to engage in locational diversification.  
A striking observation was that NNGDOs deliberately embarked on locational diversification as a way of 
increasing their visibility to access donor funding. To some respondents, the impact of NNGDOs 
operating at the district and regional levels are localised and not felt nationally because of limited scale 
of influence. This affected their reputation at the national level which determined the extent of funding 
opportunities they could tap into. This is because NNGDOs’ reputation (i.e. brand and visibility) was 
reported to be a major determinant of its authority. Donor representatives concurred with this proposition 
where one suggested that her outfit had difficulty funding regional and district-based NNGDOs because 
their impact and reputation had limited reach. For this reason, they were investing in mechanisms that 
would ensure the uptake of successful regional and district level projects to have national coverage (Donor 
3).  
At the time of data collection, it was clear that the locational diversification strategy adopted by NNGDOs 
was fuelled in part by donor demands to upscale operations. Speaking about how they expanded their 
WASH activities into other districts in the North, one respondent stated that: ‘‘….when the donors studied 
our WASH programme and saw how it worked, they didn’t relax at all. They made every effort for us to 
scale up our activities in order to cover other districts’’ (NNGDO 20). It is important to stress that since 
many NNGDOs’ interventions are projectised, engaging in locational diversification did not necessarily 
require establishing physical presence (i.e. offices) in all their operating districts. NNGDOs with national 
character were found to have regional offices that coordinated their activities at the district and community 
levels through field officers. Respondents explained that they had downscaled their operations in other 
regions and districts. This was common in areas where funding for particular projects had ended. By doing 
so, NNGDOs diversified into other geographic areas that were perceived to have potential in attracting 
funding.  
6.5 Conclusion  
This chapter has provided a detailed examination of how NNGDOs employed resource diversification as 
a dominant survival strategy. The chapter highlights that three main forms of resource diversification are 
used. First, financial diversification through an increasing turn to commercialisation in self-financing and 
social enterprise. Second, NNGDOs’ engagement with alternative domestic resources, comprising 
corporate philanthropy, volunteering and government funding. Third, NNGDOs seek to retain external 
donor funding through thematic, operational, locational, and non-material diversification. The analysis in 
this chapter has demonstrated that NNGDOs’ engagement in commercialisation is far from new. 
However, in particular, social enterprise is an emerging phenomenon, but its potential to ensure long-term 
sustainability is unknown. The chapter further highlighted that although donors are repeatedly calling 
NNGDOs to become sustainable, they offered little support to them specifically to transition from their 
dependency. Ironically, the empirical findings suggest that donors were more interested in promoting and 
perpetuating NNGDOs’ dependency rather than their sustainability. This chapter has again shown that by 
subjugating themselves to donors, NNGDOs were able to diversify their thematic, operational and 
locational areas. It demonstrates their proactiveness in managing their institutional and environmental 
challenges. In the following chapter, I turn to explore other seven strategies employed by NGDOs in 
responding to uncertainty in their operating environment. 
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Chapter Seven: Other strategic responses  
7.0 Introduction  
The previous chapter examined resource diversification as a dominant strategy employed by NNGDOs. 
This current chapter builds on this by exploring seven other strategies employed by NNGDOs, identified 
through thematic analysis. These are: i) networking and partnership; ii) cost recovery; iii) branding and 
visibility enhancing strategies; iv) conformance to institutional pressures; v) strategic planning; vi) 
avoidance; and vii) influencing. 
7.1. Typology of NNGDOs’ networks and coalitions  
The engagement of NNGDOs in networks and coalitions is far from new. However, I observed that 
twenty-eight NNGDOs gave it a lot of attention as part of their survival strategies. Networking among 
NNGDOs occurred at four different levels. First, large-to-small NNGDOs’ consortia and sub-grantee 
relations. Second, INGDO-to-small NNGDOs’ sub-grantee relations. Third, INGDO-to-large NNGDOs’ 
consortia and sub-grantee relations. Last, NNGDOs networking at the national level (Figure 7.1).  
7.2 The emergence of consortia  
7.2.1 Large to-small NNGDO consortia and sub-grantee relations 
A common strategy used by nine large NNGDOs was the development of ties and networks with like-
minded small NNGDOs. This took the form of consortium where they came together and wrote joint 
proposals for funding and project implementation. There was a growing interest and desire for partnership 
through consortia among NNGDOs. For example, in the health sector, the Executive Director of NNGDO 
3 explained that her organisation in consortium with NNGDO 21 were implementing a UKAID sponsored 
programme on behaviour change communication campaign on Malaria, Cholera and Ebola prevention 
across ten regions of Ghana. NNGDO 3 was the lead applicant and signed a teaming agreement with other 
small NNGDOs as co-applicants. Although these NNGDOs worked together on funding applications, 
each maintained its identity and autonomy. However, in many instances, individual autonomy was 
compromised for the benefit of collective interests. Partnership through consortia was sporadic because 
its existence depended on the availability of calls for proposals. In the absence of donor projects, their 
relationships took place only during training workshops and meetings rather than day-to-day engagement 
with one another.  
Among the factors that fuelled large-to-small NNGDO consortia was shifts in donor funding modalities 
from direct individual funding towards consortia. During interview, six donor representatives explained 
that working in consortia had the greatest impact compared to funding individual NNGDOs as stated by 
one respondent: ‘‘For the purpose of impact making, we want them to work together because if they come 
together, they build on each other’s strength. Now working together is part of the guidelines for grants 
application’’ (Donor 3). This was a common experience across all funding application windows for 
NNGDOs. For instance, the eligibility criteria for prospective NNGDOs seeking funding was stated as 
follows: ‘‘organisations should have linkages with other civil society organisations at district and local 
levels to leverage additional capacities’’ (Appendix 10). For this reason, working in consortia or 
belonging to a network of NNGDOs conferred some amount of credibility and also indicated compliance 
with donor requirements. However, since NNGDOs formed such networks to comply with donor 
requirements, it was regarded in the words of one respondent as ‘‘artificial marriages’’ because ‘‘many 
NGOs will just rush to form consortia when they see there is a funding opportunity coming’’ (NNGDO 
31). Similarly, a donor representative indicated that bringing NNGDOs to work together does not lead to 
‘‘true partnership but rather breeds problems for them’’. Accordingly, she maintained that although they 
recognised the inherent problems associated with asking NNGDOs to work together, their aim was to 




Figure 7.1: Typology of NNGDOs’ networking  
Source: Authors’ construct 
A critical enabling factor for donors’ insistence on consortia was the lack of perceived organisational 
capacity especially among small NNGDOs. Speaking about how their capacity compelled them to join 
bigger NNGDOs in consortia, the Executive Director of NNGDO 23 explained that his organisational 
capacity made it impossible to secure funding independently. For this reason, the formation of ties with 
other big NNGDOs was a conscious and opportunistic strategy for meeting donor funding requirements. 
A typical funding requirement reported by thirty-three NNGDO respondents was their ability to 
demonstrate that they had handled a certain amount of grants portfolio (see Appendix 11). However, since 
many small and medium-sized NNGDOs had no experience of handling huge donor grants, the pragmatic 
step was to pool individual budgets together in meeting such requirements. The Executive Director of 
NNGDO 27 explained:  
Some funding requirements are such that one organisation cannot 
meet it. So sometimes, a donor will say, for this grant, the organisation 
will have to hold at least an amount of US$500,000 a year. The small 
NGOs like us, there is no way anybody can meet that requirement but 
if we pool our accounts together or join the bigger NGOs, we are able 
to meet that (NNGDO 27).  
Aside from helping especially small NNGDOs meet donor funding requirements, consortium was an 
important mechanism through which they sought to upscale their activities and influence where they built 
on the strength and experience of other organisations. By doing so, they leveraged their experience 
together and served as a useful way of demonstrating their impact and having access to funding 
opportunities. Twelve respondents mentioned that consortia had resulted in an increase in their annual 
budget compared to when they applied for funding independently as illustrated below: 
Our financial situation is improving over the last five years as a result 
of strategic partnership in consortium. On yearly basis, we’ve not 
managed less than GH₵6 million (US$1.6 million). The last grant we 
are managing now is getting roughly to about GH₵10 million (US$2.6 





































































A recurrent theme was donors’ interest and desire to channel funds through large and well-established 
NNGDOs. These organisations were perceived as having technical and organisational capacity, had gone 
through due diligence processes and would be able to deliver on projects. The rationale according to donor 
representatives was to ensure that their ‘‘system is robust enough to fight against corruption and 
malfeasance’’ (Donor 4). In funding applications, lead NNGDOs were responsible for meeting measurable 
project targets,  direct reporting to donors and took full responsibility for project outcomes. They played 
an intermediary role and small NNGDOs had no relationship with donors. During interviews, five donor 
representatives concurred with this assertion and argued that they did not have direct contact with co-
applicants but rather expected lead NNGDOs to coordinate and monitor small NNGDOs. One respondent 
puts it this way:  ‘‘so it is the bigger NGO’s responsibility to have a close monitoring because they are 
closer to them [small NGOs]’’ (Donor 3).  
Given the risk and uncertainty involved, respondents of large NNGDOs explained that they had high 
preference for organisations they had partnered before that they could trust. However, in instances where 
new co-applicants were recruited, strict eligibility criteria were used (NNGDO 8). Although consortia 
partners’ inputs were required in writing grant proposals, lead NNGDOs mainly decided on how much 
funding was allocated and disbursed based on organisational capacity and agreed targets to be achieved. 
This was outlined in teaming agreements between partners. However, thirty NNGDO respondents 
reported that signing of formal partnership agreement was not a common practice mainly because of the 
informal nature of their relationships. For this reason, they relied mostly on informal accountability 
mechanisms built around trust and personal networks because the NNGDO sector was more of ‘‘friends 
within friends or friends within organisations’’ (NNGDO 19). Although partnership was built on inter-
personal connections, project targets had to be achieved on professional grounds. Eight big NNGDO 
respondents expressed concern that the inability of their small counterparts to meet project targets had 
dire consequences. For example, a donor representative described how they severed relationships with 
NNGDOs whose performance were considered poor by stating that: ‘‘we sign an MOU with the lead NGO 
but if at the end of the day their performance is very bad or when we find some irregularities, then we 
severe our contract and relationship with them’’ (Donor 8). The donor retained the right to terminate 
projects if an NNGDO breached the terms and conditions but NNGDOs could not do otherwise.  
It was therefore not surprising that five NNGDOs indicated that their relationships with some donors were 
ad hoc. While severing relationships and project termination helped in distinguishing performing and non-
performing NNGDOs, it affected opportunities for subsequent funding because blacklisted NNGDOs 
were ineligible to apply for donor grants (see Appendix 10 and 11 for details). For instance, the Executive 
Director of NNGDO 27 explained that he had not applied for funding from Donor 2 because his 
organisation was blacklisted for misappropriation of funds by a project officer. The reputation and 
credibility of blacklisted NNGDOs became a challenge for management because donor representatives 
with experience of misappropriation communicated among themselves to warn others. Representatives of 
large NNGDOs that had experienced project termination explained that in some instances, it was caused 
by the inability of small NNGDOs to meet agreed targets. For instance, the Executive Director of NNGDO 
22 shared his experience by disclosing that: 
We the bigger NGOs have problems because we give funding to the small 
NGOs and at the end of the day, we are chasing them for reports. Also, 
because donors don’t know that small NGO and it’s you they know, you 




Such failures were attributed in part to the verbal or gentleman’s agreement nature of their engagement 
with small NNGDOs which made it challenging to take legal actions. Informal accountability based on 
personal relations gave NNGDOs access to material and symbolic resources. For this reason, respondents 
were cautious not to damage such relations, as one respondent puts it: ‘‘because we don’t want to hang 
out our dirty clothes in public, we keep quiet’’ (NNGDO 3). Contrary to such assertions, a representative 
of a small NNGDO explained that attempts to sign legal binding agreements were often rejected because 
‘‘bigger NGOs will vehemently insist that signing teaming agreements is not necessary because they have 
used their organisations’ brand, name and goodwill in attracting the funds’’ (NNGDO 19). The above 
comment shows the extent to which inter-personal relations can serve as a double-edged sword that 
promotes and constrains cooperation among NNGDOs.  
In their quest for visibility and access to funding opportunities, small NNGDOs were less concerned about 
signing binding agreements. The effect was that it affected their performance on projects because it was 
reported that large NNGDOs often gave them little funds, but were expected to achieve much results. The 
Executive Director of a small NNGDO explained why he did not sign partnership agreements: 
In most consortia, there is no signing of agreement because the small NGOs 
would even run to the big NGOs to pull them along. A case in point is my 
organisation. I am trying to create visibility, so any NGO who wants to 
partner me, I will go and will not even think of signing an agreement. 
Because of this, when they give you any funding, you can’t say much 
(NNGDO 23). 
 
The use of small NNGDOs as co-applicants of big NNGDOs was a deliberate donor strategy to reduce 
transaction costs and demands placed on their limited staff. For example, a donor representative explained 
that they require big NNGDOs to work with small NNGDOs because ‘‘we don’t have the capacity to 
monitor several grants to different NGOs at the same time’’ (Donor 3). In addition, according to three 
donor representatives, using big NNGDOs as intermediaries was a strategy for building their own 
reputation because it helped them to reach out to many small NNGDOs. For instance, one donor 
representative stated that ‘‘if you have ten grants and seven NGOs [one intermediary, six grantees) are 
handling one grant, it means in total, we have supported seventy NGOs’’ (NGDO 4). He argued that 
without the use of co-applicants, only ten big NNGDOs would have benefited from their grants and this 
would have affected their reputation and efforts to maintain their brand as the ‘‘lead of all donors’’ (Donor 
4). For this reason, all efforts were made to ensure that their reputation was not questioned. By supporting 
several small NNGDOs, the donor took credit as a legitimate sponsor while NNGDOs also got the funds 
for project implementation suggesting an interdependent relationship. It also indicates that the use of 
symbolic resources for reputation building was not limited to NNGDOs.  
 
7.2.2 INGDO-NNGDO consortia and project implementation 
INGDO-NNGDO relationships occurred at two levels: i) joint proposal writing through consortia; and ii) 
project implementation. The formation of loose consortia between INGDOs and NNGDOs was a recurrent 
theme. Having an INGDO as a consortium partner increased the chances of NNGDOs securing funding 
due to changes in donor funding modalities as described by one Executive Director:  
Now a lot of the work is consortia with INGOs. Currently, we are working 
on the Ghana Strengthening Accountability Mechanism. It is a consortium 
between IBIS, CARE and ISODEC. In 2015, we had about 3-4 types of 




Another respondent also added:  
We are also part of a consortium on Social Public Expenditure and 
Financial Accountability. SNV is leading the consortia of NGOs. We have 
been given some roles to play and that means getting additional funding 
(NNGDO 11). 
Other examples of INGDO-NNGDO consortia mentioned by respondents include Northern Ghana 
Government Activity Project, Food and Agriculture Recovery Management Project (FARM Plus), 
Communicate for Health (C4H) and Ghana Partnership for Education. The growing interests in consortia 
had created competition among INGDOs for national partners. This presented tough decision-making 
challenges for NNGDOs in choosing which INGDOs to partner with, due to the risks involved. Three 
respondents recalled instances where they left their long-standing funders to join other INGDOs in 
consortia but were unsuccessful. One Executive Director shared his experience about making a tough 
decision to join IBIS and had to forgo ActionAid which was the main donor in applying for consortia 
funding (NNGDO 22). Interestingly, ten respondents reported that in some instances, although the names 
of NNGDOs were used in writing project proposals, upon grant approval, INGDOs engaged in open 
competitive bidding. NNGDO respondents explained that donors’ inflexibility and close-mindedness 
often created tension and mistrust in their relationships with INGDOs as explained by a failed applicant: 
The INGDOs will use the profile of the local NGOs because sometimes it 
is a requirement that they need a Ghanaian NGO. But when the grant is 
ready, they will find excuses and push you to the wall. They say we have 
to do a competitive bidding. You see, it’s just bullying because they’re big. 
It’s very difficult to fight for your rights (NNGDO 27). 
In responding to such concerns, two INGDO representatives explained that after proposal submission, 
donors micromanaged projects by undertaking the selection process for NNGDOs of which they had 
relatively limited discretion. One respondent stated that: ‘‘for projects, the donors will have specific 
guidelines for the selection of local NGOs and how the funds should be used’’ (Donor 8). During 
interview, three INGDO representatives explained that in recent years, although they supported NNGDOs, 
they had become directly engaged in the implementation of their projects. They played coordinating roles 
like capacity building (e.g. training partners on financial management and report writing) and monitoring 
and evaluation of projects through their national headquarters and regional offices. The Project 
Coordinator of an INGDO explained: 
So you look around for dependable, reliable and capable partners on the field 
and they become our foot soldiers. So because of that, depending on the 
nature of the work, we go out there doing head-hunting of local NGOs and 
our responsibility is to coordinate all their activities (Donor 6).  
Project conceptualisation was largely INGDO driven although there were instances where three NNGDOs 
claimed they were involved in setting project targets, indicators and objectives. This occurred at project 
design stages where they collected baseline information but the final decision about which components 
to fund, project locations and targets were determined by INGDOs.  
Additionally, in ensuring that they adhered to funding requirements, INGDOs insisted on mechanisms 
such as corporate governance and operational management principles including having credible board of 
directors, proper annual auditing, following standardised reporting, transaction format and 
documentations. The rationale according to INGDO respondents was to promote sound management 
principles, accountability and transparency which they perceived as key determinants of organisational 
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sustainability (Donor 6, 7, 8)13. Due to the increasing emphasis on outsourcing and direct project 
implementation, project ideas that did not originate from INGDOs were rarely funded. However, if such 
projects were funded, modifications were made to meet INGDOs’ preference. The Country Director of 
INGDO 7 described the shift from unsolicited proposals as follows: 
Currently, we are more involved in the implementation. We have moved 
away from unsolicited proposals where people sent applications, you wait 
for them to work and send reports. Now we have moved to a point where we 
are technically involved in the work at the grassroots (Donor 7). 
As part of the outsourcing mechanisms, solicited proposals became the dominant mechanism through 
which NNGDOs were supported. A key informant describing the recent donor funding modalities in 
Ghana lamented that: ‘‘major development partners like the USAID, DANIDA, UKAID and even 
INGDOs don’t fund unsolicited proposals. They think that all funding should be channelled through 
pooled-funding mechanism or be implemented directly by their country offices and INGOs’’ (Key 
Informant 2). As part of the funding application process, many donors had shifted towards template-based 
applications where NNGDOs responded to specific questions under strict word count (Appendix 11). The 
rationale was to ensure standardisation of results which limit appraisal costs. These templates according 
to three donor representatives were used as ‘‘marking schemes’’ for selecting their implementing partners. 
Speaking about donor obsession for template applications, the Executive Director of NNGDO 31 had this 
to say: 
These days they’ve got some templates and yours is just to download and 
provide the answers. The donors will develop a template to match what they 
want and this generic template cuts across. Sometimes you struggle to even 
understand it (NNGDO 31). 
Selection of implementing partners was the sole responsibility of INGDOs. Mechanisms such as 
INGDOs’ knowledge in the field, personal contacts and recommendations by other NNGDOs were used 
in selecting implementing partners. However, in some instances, INGDOs directly contacted NNGDOs 
that had implemented their projects in the past. The Executive Director of NNGDO 20 explained that 
INGDOs including WaterAid and SNV often contacted and pre-informed him of upcoming funding 
opportunities and also acted as referees when applying for funding. Although it indicated some level of 
credibility, experience and good reporting systems, it did not guarantee automatic selection. 
Recommended NNGDOs still went through due diligence process. This was regarded by respondents as 
‘‘quite strict’’ but strengthened their governance systems.  
Competition for limited resources between INGDOs and NNGDOs was a major concern raised by 
respondents. According to two key informants and three donor representatives, many INGDOs’ country 
offices in Ghana were faced with financial difficulties and had been charged by their headquarters to 
become financially self-sufficient. For example, it was reported that INGDOs like World Vision Ghana 
had embarked on restructuring of its Area Development Programmes with the view to improving financial 
and organisational efficiency while IBIS had merged fully with Oxfam to become Oxfam-IBIS due in part 
                                                          
13 Respondents explained that organisational sustainability is about their ability to make substantial investments into 
their governance systems and structures in order to ensure their continual survival. It focuses on building their own 
capacity and leadership over time. In doing so, they are able to stay focused to their mission, organisational 
principles, build reputation, develop relationships with stakeholders and continue to remain relevant within their 





to financial challenges. Other INGDOs had also laid off staff and downscaled their operations (Key 
Informant 2, 4, Donor 3, 5, 6). For this reason, INGDOs had acquired local registration status which gave 
them the opportunity to mobilise funds domestically in Ghana (Key Informant 4, 8; NNGDO 12). It was 
reported that funding opportunities for NNGDOs had become limited given that INGDOs use their brand 
and capacity in overshadowing them. A respondent lamented:  
Now they [INGDOs] source for the same funding as local NGOs and 
because they have the credibility and experience, they always win when 
competing with us (NNGDO 8). 
Another respondent expressed similar view by stressing that: 
INGOs like CARE and Plan International, they already have established 
systems and qualified staff. It makes it easy for them to win grants than we 
the local NGOs coming together to do it. You just have to partner them so 
that when they win, they give you something small because if you apply 
against them, you cannot win (NNGDO 27). 
Direct funding especially from American and European donors was channelled through INGDOs 
originating from those countries rather than NNGDOs. Four key informants pointed out that many USAID 
and UKAID sponsored projects were usually given to INGDOs like CARE International, FHI360, World 
Vision International, ACDI-VOCA and international consultants (e.g. Palladium and Chemonics) as direct 
implementers. Typical examples were the UKAID sponsored Ghana Adolescent Reproductive Health 
Programme implemented by Palladium and USAID sponsored projects like Agricultural Development 
and Value Chain Enhancement (ADVANCE II and I), Resiliency in Northern Ghana (RING) and 
Agriculture Policy Support Programme implemented in Northern Ghana by ACDI-VOCA, Global 
Communities and Chemonics respectively. Respondents lamented that although a number of projects were 
taking place in Ghana, these were given to INGDOs to the neglect of NNGDOs. Accordingly, this had 
accounted for the increasing phenomenon of  ‘‘foreign NGOs setting up in Ghana and something that a 
local NGO could have done easily, they [donors] will say we don’t have the capacity and skills to do that’’ 
(NNGDO 11).  
During key informant interviews, donor representatives confirmed directly that they thought many 
NNGDOs lack the ‘‘absorptive capacity to handle huge grant portfolios’’, where absorptive capacity was 
equated to NNGDOs’ financial position and track records (i.e. annual turnover and projects managed). 
The implication is that it fuelled donors’ disposition towards INGDOs rather than helping NNGDOs to 
grow. According to a donor representative, channelling funds through INGDOs was a useful way for 
NNGDOs to learn from INGDOs because they had robust governance structures. A respondent affirmed 
this assertion as follows:  
Donors are now in the driving seat and when a donor gives you funding, they 
need an international NGO to partner with the national NGO to ensure proper 
reporting and accountability mechanisms. So if you don’t have that foreign 
partner, there is no way you can apply for that project (NNGDO 8). 
Although donor representatives claimed to support NNGDOs’ organisational growth and development, it 
did not go beyond training in proposal writing and recommendation letters. During interviews, all donor 
representatives openly admitted that their support for NNGDOs’ organisational sustainability was limited. 
This was on the basis of past experience where funds meant for building capacity were used for personal 
gains. Two donor representatives mentioned that G-RAP provided funding meant for building the capacity 
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of NNGDOs but at the end ‘‘the NGOs collected money in the name of increasing their operational 
capacities, but there was nothing to show. So based on the experience of G-RAP, it is prudent not to give 
out resources that we can’t account for’’ (Donor 3). 
7.2.3 National level networks and coalitions  
The joining of networks and coalitions at the national level was a common strategy employed by twenty-
nine NNGDOs. Interviews with NNGDO respondents and senior members of networks and coalitions 
revealed that they served as important source of information on potential funding opportunities. 
Information on calls for proposals was passed on from the national secretariats to regional executives and 
their members. One coalition member explained that: 
 
Now resource mobilisation is more about coalitions and networks. So if you 
are there, the information they are sharing, you can also tap into them to 
move forward. That is what I now use to be able to fill the funding gaps 
(NNGDO 18). 
However, concerns were raised about the unwillingness of some members to share their funding 
information but attended network meetings ‘‘just to gather information to build their organisation’’ 
(NNGDO 19). Joining networks and coalitions also provided access to symbolic resources like 
organisational visibility, reputation and marketability. The Programmes Director of a small NNGDO said 
that being a member of a network ‘‘put you out in the world for other people to see you’’ especially when 
they joined coalitions with high reputation and visibility. Networks and coalitions also served as avenues 
for learning from other successful organisations. The Executive Director of NNGDO 6 who is a member 
of ten different networks and coalitions mentioned that her engagement was on the basis that ‘‘in networks, 
we to do certain things together which helps us to learn from other NGOs’’ (NNGDO 6).  
Respondents of big NNGDOs reported nurturing other small NNGDOs to improve their capacity. During 
interview, the Executive Director of an NNGDO disclosed that they had nurtured a number of NNGDOs 
on best practices because ‘‘they [small NNGDOs] always want to be like us’’. This respondent further 
indicated that ‘‘we also want to be like other international NGOs so that we can all compete for the same 
level of funding’’ (NNGDO 3). At meetings, NNGDO respondents reported sharing experience in terms 
of their achievements and challenges when implementing specific projects. By doing so, they educated 
each other and complemented their efforts. This signified mutual dependence and drew on collective 
strengths. The sharing of procedural knowledge was common among the majority of NNGDOs because 
of duplication of efforts. For this reason, working through networks and coalitions according to donor 
representatives would create synergy in activities and help small NNGDOs to improve their governance 
systems on perceived best practices (Donor 3, 4). 
However, although NNGDO respondents were concerned about duplication and potential loss of 
autonomy in networks, many felt that the need for survival was more important. Survival was linked to 
their ability to achieve impact especially for advocacy-based NNGDOs. Respondents emphasised that 
there were strength in numbers especially when embarking on campaigns and advocacy. Speaking about 
the connection between advocacy and networks, the respondent explained that in policy advocacy, having 
large numbers from the membership of coalitions was crucial in achieving results (NNGDO 8). Donors 
had bought into this assertion and were paying more attention to coalitions and networks in their funding 
disbursements. During interview, a senior member of a national NGO coalition disclosed that donors were 
focusing more on national level networks and coalitions: 
They [donors] withdrew NGOs’ direct projects into more rights-based and 
advocacy programmes. So funding is now being channelled through the 
103 
 
networks and coalitions and they are beginning to gain prominence because 
of their strength in numbers and regional presence. So they [donors] tend to 
support those networks and coalitions so that they can make the impact (Key 
informant 5). 
7.2.4 Power in networks  
A particularly interesting observation was that although network secretariats were not supposed to become 
implementing bodies, the need for organisational survival caused largely by the non-payment of 
membership dues forced them to. Respondents explained that many secretariats had turned themselves 
into ‘‘quasi-NGOs’’ and directly implemented projects. This had created intense competition for 
resources between the secretariats and their members. For this reason, one regional executive of a network 
stated that:  
They use our names to secure the grants and the moment the money comes, 
the secretariat becomes an NGO itself. They implement the big 
programmes and later come and give small projects to the members in 
order for them to get the reports to send to the donor on behalf of the 
members. That is what is happening (NNGDO 31). 
Another respondent commented: 
I see them more as another NGO competing with me and I don’t expect 
them to run and implement projects just as we do. And they end up getting 
the attention from the donors. This usually crowds out emerging and small 
NGOs like us (NNGDO 1).  
Network and coalition members felt that there was lack of openness and transparency about the 
implementing roles of secretariats. For example, respondents raised concerns about how the majority of 
funds ended up at the secretariats without trickling down to members. However, a senior coalition official 
maintained that they only implemented projects that were national in nature. This notwithstanding, 
members emphasised that secretariats should only play coordinating and supervisory roles rather than 
implementation. More importantly, the capturing or hijacking of projects by powerful individuals within 
networks to fulfil their own self-interests was a recurrent theme. The motive of many NNGDOs for joining 
networks centred on what they could get from the networks rather than their contributions. Respondents 
spoke candidly about how some coalition executives directed projects to their own organisations by 
stressing that: 
The biggest challenge is that the coalitions use the membership to get funding. But when 
the funding comes, those at the secretariat direct it to their own NGOs. Our partnership 
is unequal, so people always want to take the lion share of the grants (NNGDO 19). 
A senior member of a coalition attributed this problem to the lack of leadership. He explained that some 
coalition leaders handled their secretariats ‘‘the way they managed their small NGOs’’ and often 
considered it as their ‘‘bona fide property’’ (Key informant 5). There were no clear-cut policies on the 
responsibilities and funding mandates of network secretariats which greatly affected the flow of ideas and 
information. In their struggle for resources, twenty-five respondents openly spoke about competing with 
colleagues. Competition for funding and intended beneficiaries was regarded as a serious impediment to 
networking because it limited information sharing. When asked about why NNGDOs concealed 
information from others, one respondent replied: 
We’re competing for limited donors and possibly for beneficiaries. So 
people would want to grab everything. They will take the ideas you have 
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but will not share theirs with you. They think by sharing, they’re giving 
away their secrets to funding (NNGDO 6). 
While most respondents openly acknowledged competition among NNGDOs, five respondents 
downplayed it and stressed on the need for tapping into the benefits of collaboration rather than dwelling 
on the negatives. Some organisations unable to cope with the challenges associated with networks and 
coalitions fell out. There was lack of a cohesive platform that brought NNGDOs together to voice key 
issues of concern. Although GAPVOD was the largest umbrella body, respondents indicated that not all 
NNGDOs were members. The reason given was that there was no value addition in belonging to a national 
body while some respondents suggested that GAPVOD was defunct and could not represent the interests 
of the sector. This was considered a major concern by two key informants who argued that since many 
NNGDOs were interested in their own thematic networks and coalitions, government and donors found it 
difficult engaging with the sector as a whole because of their ideological differences and interests (Key 
Informant 1, 2). Network and coalition members were required to adhere to self-regulatory mechanisms 
like constitutions and governance policies. However, enforcement was described by respondents as weak 
because of the non-binding and voluntary nature of membership (Key Informant 5, 7). In the next section, 
I present the findings on cost recovery strategies employed by NNGDOs. 
7.3 Cost recovery mechanisms  
Respondents identified three main cost recovery mechanisms: i) squeezing out to create organisational 
reserves; ii) cost recovery through building and moving of office space; and iii) reducing administrative 
expenses by downsizing staff and field operations. 
7.3.1 Operating organisational reserves 
Creation of reserves was a strategy used by twenty-three NNGDOs in cushioning themselves against 
financial uncertainty. These reserves were created based on savings from projects implemented. 
Respondents described how they put budget lines on overhead costs to prevent them from spending above 
a certain threshold. The rationale was to ‘squeeze out’ resources from administrative overheads during 
project implementation for use in period of financial leanness. For example, four NNGDOs reported that 
it was easy to make much savings from advocacy programmes given that they were mostly short-term but 
involved huge grants. A respondent who implemented an Agricultural Policy Support Programme in 
Northern Ghana stated: ‘‘…we want to always minimise costs and maximise our surplus. So we’ve done 
savings that can equally take us even up to the end of the year’’. Although the programme was 
implemented for three months, it involved about US$20,000 and the respondent indicated being able to 
make some savings (NNGDO 31). Another respondent mentioned that he had created reserves which 
could help cater for overheads for only six months in the absence of donor projects (NNGDO 12).  
Five respondents explained that their engagement in thematic diversification allowed them to create 
reserves from running different programmes concurrently. Respondents emphasised that donors required 
them to spend 85-95% of project funds on implementation: ‘‘they want to see the projects taking more 
money but not staff ’’ (NNGDO 23). Project funds meant to support payment of staff salaries provided a 
perfect opportunity to squeeze out and create reserves. A respondent mentioned that a donor allocated 
GH₵5,000 (US$1,315.78) to cater for the monthly salary of the staff on their project but he ended up 
paying GH₵3,000 (US$789.47) and saved the rest as a reserve. This respondent and other Executive 
Directors further explained their approach to creating reserves by stating that: 
When a donor gives me US$10,000 to implement a project, you expect me 
to spend all the US$10,000 and fold my arms? When another funding 
doesn’t come, what will I do? So on paper, that is how donors expect us to 
do it but in practice, for sustainability reasons, I can’t do it their way so that 
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I can still have something even when the donor support is not there. It’s 
like robbing Peter to pay Paul (NNGDO 11).  
A donor representative concurred by stating that: 
Some NGOs may be smart enough to make savings from the projects. 
When we give our contribution, that does not mean that because we put 
GH₵5,000 (US$1,315.78) into administrative costs, you need to use all the 
money. In reality, the NGO may be paying something less, so even when 
the project ends, they can still operate because they have been able to make 
some margins to keep them until another project comes on board (Donor 
7). 
When respondents created reserves by squeezing out from projects, disclosures were not made to donors 
because of the tendency for them to request for unused project funds and resources. In addition, 
underspending project funds sent a wrong signal and influenced donors’ future decisions because it was 
perceived as poor planning by management. The empirical findings suggest that NNGDOs were unwilling 
to report unspent funds because of pressure from donors to provide justifications as one respondent puts 
it: ‘if it’s more, they will say explain where you got the money from and if it is less too, explain the reason 
for the variance. So you also report to them, no less, no more’’ (NGDO 17). Respondents emphasised that 
donors were only interested in results and were less concerned about the mechanisms for achieving them 
as explained below: 
In reporting on the results, I will do it as their template requires. So it is up 
to us to be efficient in the use of the resources. I cannot make the disclosure 
to the donor that I squeezed the funds to create some reserves. What is 
important for the donor is that I have achieved the results and that is what 
they are interested in (NNGDO 14). 
 
However, donor representatives mentioned that they undertook expenditure verification to ensure that 
allocated funds had been used judiciously on projects. In explaining the phenomenon of non-disclosure of 
financial information, an INGDO representative shared his experience with implementing partners by 
stating that ‘‘smart and clever local NGOs’’ implementing their projects always made some savings. The 
mechanism through which such acts were detected was that some resorted to ‘‘massaging budget lines’’ 
where for every activity, ‘‘ they will virtually put in costs elements like travel, snack, per diem, and it’s 
done in such a way that the activity can generate enough funds for the organisation’’. When asked whether 
his organisation confronted such partners, he replied, ‘‘we will normally not begrudge them because they 
have all kinds of excuses to give for those details’’ (Donor 7). Two other donor representatives described 
such acts as informal mechanisms through which NGOs made their savings. It was common knowledge, 
but donor representatives never openly criticised NNGDOs for engaging in such acts (Donor 2, 6, 7). This 
practice had unintentionally become institutionalised, embedded and maintained as part of the structure 
and culture of donor-NNGDO relationships. NNGDOs’ ability to practice squeezing out therefore 
depended largely on the availability of donor funds and projects. However, relying on donor projects to 
create reserves was considered a treacherous endeavour.  
Another reserve creation strategy was the introduction of management fees on projects. This ranged 
between 2% and 9% of project cost. Six respondents pointed out that initially, senior managers like 
Executive Directors spent much time on projects by providing oversight responsibilities but were not paid 
because of the availability of core funding which catered for their salaries. However, given donors’ 
unwillingness to provide core funding in recent years, management had to cost or value their time on 
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projects. For example, the Executive Director of an NNGDO in the education sector working with two 
INGDOs disclosed:  
For the VSO project, they are asking me to charge for my time on the 
project. So when I combine my time spent on different projects from WVG, 
VSO and other donors, it adds up to some amount that I can use as savings. 
That is the kind of mathematics we do in most of the projects nowadays 
(NNGDO 1). 
Another respondent added: 
At first, we will just itemise all our projects and there was nothing called 
management fee. But now, we are looking at how we can get funding and 
save it. So in our proposals, we are putting a percentage of management 
fees. Some donors are buying the idea and others are not, so there is a lot 
of advocacy on our part (NNGDO 3). 
Willingness to provide management fees depended on factors including the nature of NNGDO-donor 
relationships, perceived credibility and the level of negotiation undertaken. Leadership experience was a 
key determinant of NNGDOs’ ability to create reserves. Nine NNGDO respondents mentioned that their 
decision to charge management fees was based on their leaders’ ability to evaluate and forecast their 
financial situation and develop appropriate contingency measures. For instance, the Programmes Director 
of NNGDO 16 mentioned that her experience of going through difficult financial situations in the absence 
of projects has taught her to ‘‘make hay while the sun shines’’ (i.e. to create reserves when there is 
abundance of donor funds). Another eight respondents suggested drawing on their experience to manage 
difficult financial situations as one respondent described: ‘‘we have learnt our lessons and are putting so 
many strategies in place’’ (NNGDO 9). In the absence of donor funding, eleven respondents explained 
that they relied on their internally generated funds and donations as capital for investment because they 
were unrestricted. The Executive Director of NNGDO 10 pointed out he had invested profits from 
income-generating activities and donations at a bank which earned him an interest of GH₵10,000 
(US$2,631.57) every three months. These investments served as an important resource that NNGDOs 
relied on in periods of fiscal leanness.  
Although squeezing out was a useful strategy for creating reserves, it came with challenges such as 
inability to recruit qualified staff. Four respondents pointed out that by creating reserves, they sacrificed 
recruiting well-qualified staff because ‘‘too much squeezing’’ coupled with the absence of core funding 
made it impossible to pay enticing salaries (NNGDO 31). Fourteen NNGDOs did not create reserves 
although they had considered embarking on some savings but were unable to overcome the difficulty of 
the funding environment. A respondent therefore described his organisational survival as ‘‘it’s kind of a 
hand-to-mouth thing and when you’re within the hand-to-mouth kind of operation, how can you have 
enough to save or even invest?’’ (NNGDO 9). A key informant concurred with NNGDOs’ hand-to-mouth 
existence by arguing that many were surviving because their existence was tied to project implementation 
which made them financially vulnerable. For this reason, he described the life cycle of NNGDOs as ‘‘they 
receive, they implement, they report and wait for another funding opportunity’’. This according to him 
accounted for their inability to create reserves. In addition, he suggested that many NNGDO leaders had 
not made conscious efforts in creating reserves or contingency plans to guard against fiscal shocks and 




7.3.2 Building and moving of office space  
Fourteen respondents reported building their own office space (see for example, Figure 7.2). According 
to these respondents, owning an office space had become necessary given the high cost of property rental 
where prices were charged in foreign currencies especially the US$ leading to a phenomena one 
respondent called ‘‘dollarisation of rent’’. It was common for NNGDOs in Accra’s affluent 
neighbourhoods like Cantonments, Roman Ridge and East Legon to pay the GH₵ equivalent of dollar-
rated rents. For example, the Executive Director of NNGDO 3 pointed out that, her office space was the 
most expensive component of her overhead cost. This respondent mentioned that she had to pay rent 
advance of at least two years and given that donors were unwilling to support overheads, it became a huge 
burden to their administrative expenses. For this reason, the organisation had invested in the building of 
its own office space.  
Respondents pointed out that their engagement in real estate (i.e. building office space) was a mechanism 
for reducing overheads and promoting organisational sustainability. In addition, it helped in the creation 
of reserves which was used in expanding programmes to intended beneficiaries. A Programme Director 
of an NNGDO in Tamale that had recently built its own ultra-modern office space explained: ‘‘This is 
our own structure, so we don’t pay rent again and the money meant for rent will be used to expand other 
programmes’’ (NNGDO 16). Owning an office space was an avenue for generating income. For instance, 
NNGDO 3 and 12 mentioned that they had built multi-functional office space that included conference 
halls. These were hired to other organisations and donors when using their facilities for meetings and 
programmes. The Executive Director of NNGDO 12 in Tamale explained: 
In pursuing our cost recovery initiatives, we have a big office complex. We 
have already given part of it to other organisations, and we are earning rents 
from it. There are resources like conference halls when we use them for 
donor projects, they are charged against the projects (NNGDO 12). 
The Executive Director of NNGDO 31 reported building a warehouse for storing agricultural products 
like sheanuts and groundnuts produced by the organisation as part of their income generating activities. 
Aside from this, the building of office space was a strategy for demonstrating credibility, visibility and 
enhancing organisational brand to donors. Five respondents emphasised that donors were more interested 
in working with organisations that were already established (i.e. having permanent office building) and 
perceived as efficient and sustainable. In explaining why NNGDOs were increasingly acquiring fixed 
assets, a key informant suggested that: ‘‘….they want to see themselves working in the next ten years and 
if you want to be in existence, why would you want to remain in rental housing. Many NGOs are building 
just to help them save a lot of money meant for renting from their administrative expenses’’ (Key 
Informant 2).  
Eight NNGDOs reported moving office space to reduce administrative overheads. The cost of operating 
a business especially in Accra was reported as very high. For example, a respondent mentioned paying 
US$13,000.00 annually for an office space. Another respondent of a small NNGDO in Accra explained 
that his property owner had served him with an eviction notice because he was unable to pay his rent 
advance. He lamented: ‘‘the challenge is if another person brings money right now, he will give out the 
office space. I tried two donors and they said we can’t support you. Our funding is not for utilities’’ 
(NNGDO 9). Rental payment often had detrimental effects on organisations in terms of their visibility. 
The Executive Director of NNGDO 5 reported that due to his inability to pay a dollar-rated rent, he had 
considered moving office space to a cheaper neighbourhood as a cost recovery strategy. He pointed out 
that initially, it was a requirement to be within 1-2 km2 radius of his main donor for easy access. This 
compelled him to rent an office complex closer to the donor in an affluent neighbourhood but was 




Figure 7.2 A newly built office space by an NNGDO in Accra. 
Source: Author, May 2016. 
Since many NNGDOs were project driven, the absence of projects threatened their very existence. In this 
regard, it was a deliberate management decision for organisations to relocate office space when there were 
no active projects. When a respondent was asked about the reasons for relocating, he replied, ‘‘why would 
we be living comfortably in an expensive office just for writing proposals and not implementing any 
project? It’s better to move to a cheaper location’’ (NNGDO 1). Eight NNGDOs also reported that they 
had acquired lands meant for building office space and other forms of investments like guesthouses. For 
example, NNGDO 31 had begun constructing a guesthouse that would be used for renting and hosting 
their partners during training workshops and meetings. Respondents indicated that the challenge was for 
them to raise the needed amount of money for these investments. 
7.3.3 Reducing administrative expenses by downsizing  
With perceived decreasing funding, twenty-three NNGDO respondents reported that they had ‘‘tightened 
their belts’’ by adopting measures such as freezing salary increments and benefits, reducing number of 
paid staff and control in stationery and office supplies. In addition, three respondents reported giving 
training to staff to put up good behavioural attitudes to health, creating more flexible leave periods for 
staff with the aim of reducing the medical bills to be incurred by the organisation (NNGDO 4, 16, 28). 
Organisations safeguarded their survival by rapidly cutting down costs and avoided waste in their 
operations to promote administrative efficiencies. In terms of salary and demands for benefits, eight 
NNGDO respondents explained that salary increments had been on hold for the past two to three years. 
The decision was based on financial planning and forecasting that management undertook aimed at 
reducing administrative expenses. One Executive Director stated as follows: 
I keep on stressing this to my staff that we shouldn’t expect increment in 
salary so that we will be able to reduce our operational costs. Otherwise, if 
we say we are having enough funding and therefore we need to pay 
ourselves so much, we will not be in existence for a long time (NNGDO 
20).   
Restriction of salary increments and staff benefits to some extent helped reduced costs, it also affected 
human resource development because respondents explained that staff would want better conditions of 
service. The inability of NNGDOs to meet such demands had detrimental effects on their ability to retain 
staff. Two NNGDOs reported experiencing a drastic reduction in the number of their paid staff from 18 
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to 4 and 10 to 3 within two years when they froze salary increments and staff benefits (NNGDO 2, 20). 
This was also linked to the absence of donor projects and core funding. As part of their strategic choice 
to cost recovery, five Executive Directors reported that some management members had fallen out of 
payroll. The rationale was to support their organisations in reducing overheads in order to expand their 
programmes to intended beneficiaries. One respondent explained that his engagement in NNGDOs’ work 
was purely out of altruistic motives rather than an avenue for amassing wealth because he wanted to 
support his community members in need. However, some respondents emphasised that their engagement 
in NNGDO work tends to provide some personal privileges including social status and legitimacy that 
gives them access to powerful individuals like chiefs and opinion leaders at the community level. In 
explaining the fallout of management from payroll, he stressed that: ‘‘one critical coping strategy is that 
management members have fallen out of the payroll. We were four management members on payroll but 
now, it is left with only one. It’s a bit difficult time for us’’ (NNGDO 30). 
Aside from this, eighteen NNGDOs mentioned that they had resorted to contract-based hiring and 
performance-based payment for staff as pragmatic steps for reducing administrative expenses. All 
programmes and field staff were tied to specific projects. In this regard, in the absence of projects, nearly 
all staff were laid off with the exception of Executive Directors and Project Directors/Managers as a way 
of maintaining institutional memory. Respondents explained that having temporary paid staff was not a 
transformative strategy for building organisational capacity and learning. However, given the absence of 
projects, it was considered a pragmatic step because in having permanent employees, organisations had 
to pay social security contributions which became a financial hurdle. The Executive Director of NNGDO 
3 shared her experience by stating that:  
All my 85 staff are on projects, so when the project ends, you lay them 
off. When we give them an appointment letter, the appointment is based 
on project. If the project ends, you are also going and there is no 
guarantee. This is our coping strategy (NNGDO 3). 
Another Executive Director iterated:  
You hire field staff and contract them for the project period. They finish 
and they go away otherwise you can’t keep them because you don’t know 
when the next project is coming (NNGDO 27). 
Contract-based appointments had also led to the introduction of performance-based payment for staff. In 
this regard, staff were given specific targets to achieve when implementing projects and failure to do so 
resulted in the ‘‘non-payment of salary’’ in some instances. Performance-based payment was aimed at 
ensuring the efficient use of scarce resources that would help avoid leakages and waste. According to the 
Executive Director of a large NNGDO, staff performance reviews and appraisals were instituted to 
demand results: 
Now in this organisation, we pay people based on performance. So staff 
are given targets and based on those targets, whatever you achieve, we 
pay you according to that (NNGDO 6).   
Another Executive Director added: 
Currently, we are also looking at sustainability, so we employ contract 
staff under rigid and strict outcomes. They have output indicators which 




Although performance-based payment was aimed at ensuring efficiency, three project staff felt it was 
rather used as a punitive mechanism where they were penalised for their inability to achieve set targets. 
In addition, two respondents suggested that it did not give them the opportunity to learn because they 
were required to follow some set guidelines rather than promoting their innovativeness. These respondents 
consistently mentioned that sometimes they were unable to achieve ‘‘unrealistic targets’’ because of the 
complexities and unpredictability involved especially when dealing with intended beneficiaries (NNGDO 
3, 17). 
Performance-based payment was not limited to employees but also at the organisational level as part of 
donors’ changing funding patterns. Eight NNGDOs reported that result-based financing (RBF) was a 
common strategy used by donors where they were paid based on the amount of measurable results 
achieved. For NNGDOs engaged in RBF projects, pre-financing was a burden and also put a lot of work 
pressures on field officers which make them overwork in their attempt to achieve results. Usually a 
consultant recruited by the donor independently verified project outcomes or results. For this reason, 
respondents explained that they were under constant pressure to produce results before their rendered 
services were paid. The Executive Director of NNGDO 20 shared his experience when he implemented a 
WASH programme by stating that: 
We did an RBF with SNV and we lost about 5% of our budget in one 
activity and 40% in another project. We did the programme in five 
communities and out of this, two didn’t achieve open-defecation free 
status. They said we have failed so they didn’t pay us. This is the kind of 
punishment they are given us (NNGDO 20). 
Twelve respondents reported that their organisations restructured and merged departments in order to 
reduce the number of paid staff. By doing so, they sought to make efficient use of personnel where they 
practised cross-functional operations, with redefinition of job responsibilities to allow staff to undertake 
multiple tasks. There was a general perception that NNGDOs were increasingly turning towards the 
production of generalist rather than specialist staff. In addressing the issue of restructuring, two key 
informants emphasised that the operations of many small NNGDOs seemed unrealistic because ‘‘they 
just cut their coat too big. You can see a small NGO having about five departments, it doesn’t make 
sense’’ (Key Informant, 2, 4). For instance, NNGDO 32 had six departments but decided to merge three 
in order to make efficient use of the available limited resources. For NNGDO 2, restructuring involved 
total transitioning of organisational mission from human rights and advocacy to the promotion of 
Christian values. The ‘rebranding’ of the NNGDO was a deliberate management strategy to change its 
mandates and identity after the decline and withdrawal of several donors in human rights. However, 
restructuring came with limited financial opportunities as stated by the respondent: ‘‘now there are open 
calls but because most of the calls do not fall in line with what we are focusing on now, we don’t even 
apply’’ (NNGDO 2). 
A majority of respondents explained that contract-based hiring and restructuring had resulted in high staff 
turnover. For example, between October 2015 and April 2016, NNGDO 17 downsized its employees from 
51 to 33 employees because two projects ended concurrently creating uncertainty among employees. 
When asked about how this affected staff, a field officer replied: 
There are uncertainties and individually we feel insecure because you can sleep, 
wake up and come to work and find out that there is a mail that you have to go 
home because there are no projects. We can be unemployed at any time so we 
think about it a lot (NNGDO 17).  
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To safeguard themselves against eventualities, respondents on projects reported taking up strategies such 
as diversifying their knowledge base by taking up professional courses. The Executive Director of 
NNGDO 22 explained that: ‘‘When the person is on contract, from the onset, he is not comfortable because 
he’s not able to tell when he would be laid off. So when opportunities come, the person leaves and you 
have to go through another recruitment process’’. Respondents accused donors of ‘poaching’ their staff. 
This was a common challenge faced by small and medium-sized NNGDOs as illustrated by the following 
quotes: ‘‘NNGDO 6 has a lot of staff poached by our donors such as USAID, Marie Stopes, FHI360 and 
many others’’. In addressing the capacity challenge of the poached organisations, respondents pointed out 
that they were advocating with donors that poached their staff to assist in building the capacity of their 
remaining staff as compensatory package because they had invested in them. 
Programme reduction was also reported as a common cost recovery strategy. Twenty NNGDOs had 
reduced at least one programme or service initially provided. Out of this, thirteen suggested that cutting 
down on projects became necessary given that their own organisational survival was at stake. For 
example, the Executive Director of NNGDO 1 described how he cut out his programmes: 
We are always cutting down. I have an excel sheet that I always look at 
and I mark where to cut all the time. This year, I have cut up to about 
US$10,000 off my budget. All activities like organising workshops and 
programmes for teachers are currently on hold because we want to reduce 
costs (NNGDO 1). 
Cutting down programmes involved deliberately reducing the number of intended beneficiaries targeted. 
According to the Executive Director of NNGDO 25, her organisation provided scholarships to girls in 
Senior High Schools in the North but with  limited amount of funding, she was constantly ‘‘shifting things 
around’’ to be able to cut down on programmes and intended beneficiaries. She suggested that curtailing 
programmes meant ‘‘we don’t do it comfortably, we are always stressed because of its effects on the 
girls’’ (NNGDO 25). By respondents’ admission, cutting down on programmes affected their intended 
beneficiaries negatively because of the withdrawal of their services. For example, the Executive Director 
of NNGDO 1 explained that by cutting down on costs, he had to forgo monitoring visits for almost two 
years to some schools that had benefited from their interventions. He further explained that in the absence 
of funds, he would rather use the money meant for monitoring schools to pay salaries to sustain his 
organisation. 
Contrarily, although seven NNGDOs had scaled down their programmes, respondents explained that they 
were always in touch with community leaders through informal visits as a way of maintaining their 
relationship. However, visits were done selectively to communities that were closer to reduce costs. 
Scaling down programmes like workshops and trainings came with reduction and in some instances 
cancellation of expenses meant for per diems, snacks and transport costs regarded as premiums for 
participation in NNGDOs activities but this was sometimes met with fierce resistance from intended 
beneficiaries. NNGDO respondents and key informants explained that in time past many intended 
beneficiaries had become accustomed to taking premiums. As part of cost-reduction strategies, 
community members were being educated to change their attitudes and perceptions about NNGDOs. To 
this end, thirteen respondents emphasised that it was essential that they had good community entry and 
created a sense of community ownership of their projects. Respondents often asserted that practising 
downward accountability to intended beneficiaries was a useful cost-sharing strategy where community 
members provided resources for project implementation. In what follows, I present the empirical findings 
on branding and visibility strategies. 
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7.4. Brand and visibility enhancing strategies 
Branding and visibility enhancing strategies were used by twenty-two NNGDOs to manipulate the 
perception of stakeholders. In doing so, they had intensified efforts aimed at building organisational 
brands. Organisational visibility, speciality and public perception were considered as key determinants of 
NNGDOs’ reputation. For this reason, the need for enhancing these dimensions was a recurrent theme. A 
critical issue raised by twelve respondents was their engagement in brand image and identity promotion. 
They described branding as a crucial ingredient for organisational survival given that positive image was 
associated with easy access to resources. The Programmes Manager of NNGDO 24 explained that its 
organisational brand was ‘‘the name’’ it had carved in the education sector. This he suggested, had made 
it possible for their work to be recognised internationally which had resulted in the continuous inflows of 
funds: 
The image of NNGDO 24 in particular has actually helped us. We are 
easily recognised by many donors. The name we have built for ourselves 
is a sustainability strategy in itself because whoever wants to come to 
Ghana to talk about CBE, you will be directed to NNGDO 24 whether 
you like it or not. Our name is the main attractor of donors and it has gone 
far (NNGDO 24).  
The cultivation of organisational reputation through branding was a strategy used by twelve NNGDOs in 
differentiating themselves from others in their external environment. The aim was to make them more 
resource deserving than their counterparts. For example, the respondent for NNGDO 8 explained that his 
organisation was ‘‘a brand in itself’’ and that ‘‘we’ve put a brand to our programmes and it’s the brand 
that gives us the money’’. He further mentioned that the NNGDO had dwelt on its experience of 
implementing programmes in social services and advocacy for over three decades. This had made the 
organisation to assert its uniqueness in the eyes of stakeholders. During interviews, three donor 
representatives and two key informants emphasised the need for all NNGDOs to emulate NNGDO 8 
because it was perceived as a model of success (Donor 2, 3, 8; Key Informant 2, 3). 
Specific visibility enhancing tactics included the publication of success/impact stories and fact sheets, 
magazines, newsletters and flyers. These were meant to market NNGDOs’ achievements to stakeholders. 
The Executive Director of NNGDO 3 explained that when engaging donors for funding, she resorted to 
success stories as an ‘‘evidence-based approach to grant seeking’’ (i.e. a situation where NNGDOs use 
their achievements as a way of convincing donors for support). Using success stories sent a credibility 
signal to donors that their funds would not be misappropriated. By doing so, they sought to promote their 
own self-accountability and transparency. Although the decision to fund an NNGDO using success stories 
rested with the donor, respondents explained that donors were willing to work with organisations 
perceived as trustworthy. While success stories could be regarded as a marketing strategy, respondents 
were quick to add that, the aim was not to use their intended beneficiaries as fund-raising tools.  
Aside from success stories, thirteen respondents mentioned that they relied heavily on media coverage for 
public awareness of their programmes. Engagement with mainstream media was increasingly becoming 
an influential part of NNGDOs’ management. Among the specific media approaches included having 
radio discussions about their programmes, holding of press conferences and issuing of press releases on 
national issues pertaining to their sector(s) of operation, serving as experts on television and radio 
discussions, profiled in national newspapers and making documentaries about their programmes. The 
rationale was to communicate ideas and information about their organisations and programmes. This 
approach was common among health and education focused NNGDOs. Clearly, respondents suggested 
that NNGDOs were becoming more media-savvy. For instance, the respondent for NNGDO 8 explained 
that his organisation made a televised documentary of an educational programme (i.e. CBE) on national 
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television as a way of demonstrating their achievement to their stakeholders. Their approach had been 
adopted as a national policy. Another respondent shared his experience of working with a media outlet by 
stating that, ‘‘we have explored partnership with TV3 [television station], so we do our development work 
and they showcase it’’ (NNGDO 5). According to respondents, NNGDO-related documentaries also 
served as a channel for advocacy and identity building. These documentaries were mostly posted on social 
networking platforms like YouTube, Facebook and organisational websites for wider dissemination. 
Twenty-two NNGDOs described their increasing engagement with social networking platforms such as 
Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and weblogs. Facebook was the commonly used social media platform. For 
instance, the Executive Director of NNGDO 28 pointed out that his organisation was active on nine 
different social media platforms. Reasons for using social media were answers that, ‘‘we use social media 
to market our programmes and ourselves’’ (NNGDO 24); ‘‘this [social media] will help us to raise funding 
locally’’ (NNGDO 32); ‘‘this [social media] is making us to be seen by many people’’ (NNGDO 18); and 
‘‘it gives us the numbers’’ (NNGDO 5). The use of social media platforms were mainly for marketing 
programmes and fundraising purposes, where dedicated personnel and departments managed these 
platforms. However, in organisations without such facilities, social media platforms were managed by 
Executive Directors who often played public relations roles.  
Managing organisational information had resulted in the need for personnel with expertise in knowledge 
production and management. For instance, NNGDO 3 had recently employed a research officer who 
managed all organisational information. To this end, twenty-seven NNGDOs had functional 
organisational websites while the rest resorted to weblogs. One theme that cut across respondents was 
that, organisational websites served as important branding, identity, fundraising platform and mechanism 
for acknowledging donors and partners. Seven NNGDOs had redesigned their websites to make it more 
user-friendly by adding information about their programmes, donors and partners. In addition, donation 
buttons were included for fundraising purposes. Speaking about the relationship between organisational 
websites and visibility, the Programmes Manager of NNGDO 3 stated as follows: 
For most of our funding, donors made the first point of call. For instance, 
DFID and UNFPA went to our website and contacted us. We had never 
done anything for them but based on previous programmes on our 
website, they contacted us directly. Our website is an evidence-based way 
of marketing and branding (NNGDO 3). 
Despite the increasing use of internet-based platforms, respondent shared a consensus that many 
employees of small NNGDOs lacked the capacity for making use of information technology as tools for 
dialogue and information sharing. For example, a donor representative explained that for rural-based 
NNGDOs, because they lacked access to internet and basic computer skills, they preferred submitting 
hand-written funding applications rather than using online platforms like the Potential Applicant Data 
On-Line Registration (PADOR).  
A more subtle visibility enhancing strategy was by organising events such as project opening and closure 
sessions where invitations were sent out to stakeholders. Such events provided an avenue for NNGDOs 
to advertise their organisational goals, mission and values. Other mechanisms included having billboards, 
organisational logos, designed office clothes, T-shirts and banners for projects implemented. When 
implementing donor-sponsored projects, specific guidelines were applied to the branding of T-shirts and 
banners as part of donors’ branding strategies for claiming credit for their support which helps in 
improving their own image. Four NNGDOs had also established partnerships with academic institutions 
as a way of promoting their visibility and programmes where they were invited to attend both national 
and international conferences to share their experiences on specific issues (NNGDO 1, 4, 9 19).  
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For instance, the Head of Research of NNGDO 4 described how academic institutions called her 
organisation to offer insights into NNGDOs’ perspective on reproductive health issues during 
conferences. This according to her had increased the visibility of the organisation which had resulted in 
donors contacting them directly for partnerships. In addition, NNGDOs’ collaboration with academic 
institutions was a useful legitimacy and capacity building strategy which helped in advancing their 
mission.  
Although maintaining visibility at the donor level was important, it did not guarantee operational 
sustainability14. Three respondents emphasised that visibility at the donor level was temporary because 
they were subject to changing priorities. However, ‘‘visibility forever’’ as described by one respondent 
was only achieved at the community level based on development initiatives undertaken. In particular, the 
Executive Director of NNGDO 19 indicated that his organisation had visibility in intended beneficiaries’ 
communities after ten years of implementing projects in supporting the aged and women accused of 
witchcraft in Northern Ghana. He suggested that the impact created by his organisation somewhat gave 
him visibility and credibility with community members. By doing so, the NNGDO sought to dwell on its 
moral legitimacy of helping to protect the interests of the aged and abused women.  
Interestingly, nine NNGDOs drew on the reputation of their charismatic leaders. Respondents indicated 
that their founding leaders had strong local ties with beneficiary communities because they hailed from 
there. For this reason, they were mostly accepted and considered legitimate NNGDOs by local level 
structures such as chiefs and opinion leaders given that their leaders were perceived as trustworthy. This 
made it easier for building organisational legitimacy and collaboration with stakeholders. The Programme 
Manager of NNGDO 2 described her Executive Director as the ‘‘brand ambassador’’ because of her 
perceived expertise and earned reputation in women’s rights issues. She became the brand personality and 
her perceived expertise positively influenced public perception about the NNGDO. 
7.5 Conforming to institutional pressures 
In maintaining their legitimacy, NNGDOs instituted practices that helped them conform to institutional 
pressures and norms. The first tactic was trust building with stakeholders through accountable and 
transparent systems and having good track records in project implementation. According to twenty-five 
NNGDOs, this enhanced their reputation in the eyes of donors. Having good reputation provided 
opportunities for accessing grants. The Executive Director of NNGDO 20 described how his track records 
had made his organisation ‘‘a house name’’ with WaterAid-Ghana by stating that: ‘‘anytime a donor is 
coming to visit WaterAid, they choose our organisation. Now if they have any funding opportunity, they 
call us to come for it’’ suggesting that NNGDO 20 through its track records had created a perceptual 
representation in the minds of the leaders of WaterAid that it was reputable and trustworthy. In interview, 
a donor representative confirmed that all donors wanted NNGDOs with good track records (Donor 4). 
In their quest for trustworthiness, respondents explained that they had embarked on accountable and 
transparent measures by strengthening their governance systems in fulfilment of donor requirements. 
Speaking about donors’ insistence on transparent systems, the Country Director of an INGDO said, ‘‘we 
insist on specific reporting formats, following certain financial and procurement procedures.  
                                                          
14 Operational sustainability is about NNGDOs’ ability to sustain their programmes and projects at the community 
level in the absence of external donor support. It focuses on the impact of programmes, involvement and ownership 
of intended beneficiaries in project implementation. It is about NNGDOs’ acceptance by intended beneficiaries in 




All these things ensure that they operate by sound management principles which promote accountability 
and transparency’’ (Donor 7). In responding to such institutional pressures, eighteen NNGDOs 
emphasised that they had embarked on internal reforms such as following documentation guidelines (e.g. 
keeping receipts of all financial transactions) and submission of periodic narrative and project reports. 
The aim was to build their governance structures by becoming more accountable to donors. The 
assumption was that a linear relationship existed between accountability and conforming to donor 
guidelines. Donor representatives had created a perception among NNGDOs that unless they followed 
their guidelines, they remained illegitimate. Although these accountability measures were meant to 
support NNGDOs’ growth and development, it indirectly promoted upward accountability. For example, 
in many instances, respondents asserted that they were accountable to their donors. As one Executive 
Director said:  
We try as much as possible to work very well and be accountable to them 
[donors] to the best of our ability. So if we are working with an 
organisation like IBIS, there shouldn’t be a situation where they will find 
something wrong with our system (NNGDO 22). 
A related mechanism through which NNGDOs sought to meet donor requirements was through 
investments in internal structures in terms of human resource development. Nearly two-third of NNGDOs 
indicated adding value to their services by employing professional staff. One respondent stated, ‘‘it 
determined how you are viewed by donors’’. Interestingly, thirty NNGDOs had at least one employee 
with a university degree and sought to improve their organisational capacity by employing individuals 
‘‘who can also speak donor language’’ and have better understanding of the terrain as one respondent 
described (NNGDO 32). Two key informants explained that in the past, the NNGDO sector was 
‘‘preparatory ground and a launch pad’’ for individuals with little or no practical experience. Many small 
NNGDOs therefore had poor structures where good management and accountability practices were mostly 
absent. This led to the mismanagement of donor funds (Key Informant 1, 4).  
However, given the changing dynamics in NNGDOs’ funding landscape, donors were unwilling to 
support organisations with loose structures. The need for professionals had become a necessary strategy 
for meeting donor requirements. The Executive Director of NNGDO 27 described an instance where a 
donor asked him to advertise for the position of a Monitoring and Evaluation Officer on their project but 
the donor was unwilling to pay for the cost associated with it. Professionalisation was a means for gaining 
legitimacy from donors. For this reason, having professional staff had become an established norm among 
NNGDOs. The growing professionalisation reflected donors’ normative outlook of how an NNGDO 
should look like. From donors’ perspective, NNGDOs’ legitimacy was equated to their perceived level of 
professionalism. One Programme Director described how donors perceived her organisation by stating 
that: ‘‘donors look at the organisation in terms of its governance structures like staffing, policies and 
internal controls. So without these things, you will definitely not get funding’’ (NNGDO 16). The need 
for hiring professionals had led to an increased competition for the recruitment of individuals with specific 
expertise into the sector. For this reason, NNGDOs mostly relied on the services of development 
consultants to impress donors in what one respondent calls ‘‘consultancy craze’’ (NNGDO 3). These 
consultants were individuals in the NNGDO sector, academics and researchers with technical expertise 
on specific issues such as resource mobilisation.  
The aim of NNGDOs’ conformance to donors’ institutional pressures of upward accountability as 
explicitly stated by one respondent was that ‘‘it will boost their confidence and they will continue to give 
us funding’’ (NNGDO 12). By conforming to set guidelines, NNGDOs sought to obtain ‘favour’ from 
donors. However, in interviews, eight respondents pointed out that their upward accountability to donors 
affected domestic resource mobilisation efforts.  
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Key informants suggested that many NNGDOs had over the years played on the ignorance of intended 
beneficiaries who were supposed to demand accountability. For example, in many NNGDOs’ 
interventions, it was reported that intended beneficiaries were often not engaged and empowered to 
demand accountability. Even in communities where NNGDOs undertook governance and empowerment 
programmes, a key informant stated that accountability to intended beneficiaries was often ‘‘cosmetic in 
nature’’ and limited to the disclosure of information such as project reports (Key Informant 5). This was 
a common concern raised by two government officials who argued that NNGDOs needed to improve their 
downward accountability mechanisms (Key Informant 8, 10). The lack of NNGDOs’ downward 
accountability was also blamed on the inability of the DSW to properly play its regulatory and supervisory 
roles.  
7.6 Strategic planning  
Respondents reported that they had put in place measures aimed at improving their professional 
competence and the long-term future of their organisations. The rationale for the adoption of strategic 
planning was to position NNGDOs to achieve their mission. Strategic planning involved the following. 
First, twenty-five respondents reported that they had developed strategic plans and policies which served 
as the ‘‘game plan’’ that guided their operations. When asked about how management planned to ensure 
their long-term sustainability, the Programmes Manager of NNGDO 24 for example, disclosed, ‘‘we have 
come up with a five-year strategic plan’’. That is one aspect we have developed recently to sustain our 
organisation’’ (NNGDO 24). In ensuring the effective implementation of a strategic plan, the role of 
management and staff in terms of coordination was crucial. This involved the delegation of responsibility 
and authority to employees. Five Executive Directors explained that they were seeking to empower and 
create a sense of ownership for employees. Involving and consulting employees in decision-making was 
a recurrent theme as described by a co-founder who doubled as the Programmes Director of NNGDO 16. 
She stated as follows: 
 
I don’t show myself that I am the boss. We call ourselves a learning 
organisation so everyone learns even if you’re the boss. For instance, the 
Executive Director’s decision is not ultimate likewise that of the 
Programmes Director. We have to sit down and discuss and we take the 
final decision based on what the whole house says (NNGDO 16).  
The delegation of authority and power according to respondents promoted learning and innovation among 
employees. Giving them the opportunity to express their views in decision-making was vital for the 
development of NNGDOs’ sustainability plans as described by one respondent: ‘‘our current strategic 
plan came about after management solicited views of staff and also encouraged us to support issues about 
organisational sustainability’’ (NNGDO 6). According to this respondent, the opening up to diverse 
perspectives resulted in innovation and creativity in the development of the sustainability plan which 
initially was absent.  
Second, nine NNGDOs had embarked on implementing an organisational leadership plan. The need for 
leadership succession had become necessary given that over the years, the operations of many NNGDOs 
had centred on ‘‘one charismatic founding leader’’ who served as the face of the organisation. In 
interviews, respondents explained that in the past, no systematic plans were made for succession. 
However, given the changing dynamics in their operating environment and the need for sustainability, 
this was considered as key. A donor representative described the recent engagement of NNGDOs with 
succession plan as follows: ‘‘now, most NGO leaders are stepping back to allow new group of leaders to 
take issues on and it’s part of the sustainability measures’’ (Donor 2). A key informant shared this 
sentiment by arguing that NNGDOs were developing succession plans because they had built their 
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organisations around their Executive Directors and therefore in their absence, there was high tendency for 
them to collapse (Key Informant 4). Although three NNGDOs claimed they had leadership succession 
plans, these were not documented. The decision to select a replacement was the responsibility of the 
Executive Director in consultation with board members.  
Interviews suggest that in the absence of the Executive Director or founding leader, a family member (i.e. 
progeny) was likely to become a successor, making leadership succession to be restricted to family 
members. This was because many NNGDOs were established by individuals and were considered as 
‘‘family property’’ (Key Informant 1). For example, during data collection, I encountered a situation 
where an NNGDO had become defunct mainly because the founder was too old to manage her 
organisation. In an interview, she revealed that she handed over the organisation to her daughter but was 
facing some management challenges. Although NNGDOs had measures to develop succession plans, they 
were in their early stages. More importantly, the empirical evidence suggests that most Executive 
Directors were reluctant to discuss matters relating to their succession because it was a ‘‘sensitive 
organisational issue’’ as one respondent puts it (NNGDO 31).  
7.7 Avoidance strategies 
Respondents indicated that their organisational mission and values served as the foundational blocks. In 
their attempt to safeguard against institutional demands and pressures, eight NNGDOs deliberately 
avoided funding from specific donors whose goals and values were inconsistent with theirs. For such 
organisations, it was reported that they had mission-centred organisational culture and leadership that 
drove their operations and engagements with stakeholders. The following quotation indicates the use 
of avoidance strategy by mission-centred organisations: 
In selecting our donors, what is key is that their values should be in line with ours. 
If there are conflicting values, then we advise ourselves….We don’t allow donors 
to dictate to us. It’s all about impact, integrity and not the money. For instance, 
these days, many donors are supporting men who sleep with men. When they 
approach us, we clearly tell them that no because it is out of our organisational 
values. Sometimes, we become aggressive in that regard. We’ve done that to a 
number of donors. For such donors, we don’t even accept their funding in the first 
place (NNGDO 15). 
The rationale was to mitigate the effects of goal displacement and donor-driven initiatives. In doing so, 
respondents sought to maintain their mission-centred organisational culture rather than ‘‘following the 
money’’. Respondents reported that donors did not impose programmes on NNGDOs. The decision to 
become donor-driven was based on the discretion of organisational leaders who evaluated the pros and 
cons of their potential engagement with donors. If developing such relationships was perceived as 
beneficial and aligned with the interests and values of NNGDOs, then mutual agreements were signed 
and vice versa. The aim of avoidance was to maintain organisational credibility and integrity with 
intended beneficiaries rather than donors because donor funding was not perpetual. Quite instructively, 
NNGDOs strove to enhance their legitimacy at the community level with the aim of changing public 
perception that NNGDOs were the creation of donors. A Programmes Director of a small NNGDO in the 
North spoke about how he had been particularly persuaded by the need for maintaining organisational 
integrity by saying: ‘‘If you have integrity with community members, you have everything and that is 




Avoidance strategy was common among well-established NNGDOs that had built a good amount of 
reputation in the eyes of donors although there were some small NNGDOs that adhered to their 
organisational values. It is worth noting that avoidance occurred at two levels. First, outright donor 
rejection occurred prior to establishing a relationship. Second, suspending a relationship occurred when 
NNGDOs became dissatisfied especially when they perceived that they had been treated unfairly, harshly 
or could not cope with donor requirements. Suspension was aimed at preventing future occurrence of a 
dissatisfied relationship. One respondent whose organisation had challenges in implementing an RBF 
programme stated: ‘‘The donor was too harsh so we have decided that we will never apply for funding 
from them because of the way they treated us in the RBF project’’ (NNGDO 20). This suggests that the 
respondent had consciously decided to suspend his relationship and had no plans of applying for funding 
from the same donor no matter the cost. It also indicates that suspension of relationship was a deliberate 
NNGDO decision not based on economic interests but rather donors’ actions and how they treated 
NNGDOs. This made avoidance strategy the co-creation of NNGDOs’ conscious decision and donors’ 
unconscious actions.  
Three respondents indicated that although they severed their relationships with donors, this occurred after 
project completion which gave them an opportunity to seek alternative funding perceived as more 
favourable. The use of avoidance strategy came with uncertainty. A small NNGDO had consciously 
rejected funding from its main donor because funding conditionality limited organisational autonomy. 
The effect as the Executive Director explained was that ‘‘for the last one and half years, we have not 
received funding from any organisation’’. The inability to get funding from an external donor affected his 
ability to secure alternative funding. The respondent explicitly stated, ‘‘we had a proposal we sent to the 
African Initiative but their problem was that if you’re unable to get funding for the last two years from an 
external donor, you don’t qualify’’ (NNGDO 19).  
Another reason that accounted for avoidance strategy relates to past experience and perception of a donor. 
Based on past experience, blacklisted NNGDOs automatically suspended any relationship they had. For 
instance, one respondent whose NNGDO was blacklisted was asked whether he had applied for funding 
from the same donor in recent years. The respondent puts it plainly by stating that: ‘‘I have not really 
applied for funding from them because we are a bit cautious’’ suggesting that the use of avoidance strategy 
by NNGDOs was initiated by the donor. In addition, NNGDOs’ perception about donors served as an 
incentive for avoidance. Twelve respondents had decided not to apply for government and corporate 
funding because they perceived that submitted proposals were judged not on merit but rather favouritism. 
For this reason, spending time to complete proposals was regarded as ‘‘a complete waste of resources’’. 
The Programmes Manager of NNGDO 28 explained how his past experience and perception about a 
specific donor had made him to use avoidance strategy:  
I have submitted proposals to them in the past but we have taken a 
decision not to do it again. We will not waste our time because they 
haven’t proven that when they put out a call, the process they are using is 
transparent (NNGDO 28). 
7.8 Influencing strategies 
In complying with institutional pressures, fourteen respondents explained that they were able to strike a 
balance by negotiating unfavourable funding conditions. Since donors relied on NNGDOs’ perceived 
expertise to reach their intended beneficiaries in achieving the needed results, NNGDOs used their unique 
position like local knowledge and embeddedness to influence donor conditionality. The Executive 
Director of NNGDO 32 explained how he used ‘‘head-to-head discussion’’ with donor representatives 




Donors set big targets for NGOs and meanwhile they don’t even know 
the conditions that local NGOs are working in. If such targets come, we 
tell them that we cannot meet these targets. If the donor also thinks aloud, 
then they negotiate with us to work around targets that can be achieved 
(NNGDO 32) 
The use of influencing was more common especially among established NNGDOs irrespective of the 
sector(s) of operation. Given that these organisations had gained reputation, trustworthiness and 
credibility in the eyes of donors, negotiating donor conditionality was ‘‘easy and simple’’. The 
Programmes Director of NNGDO 16 shared her experience of negotiating with donors on project 
indicators and outcomes by saying that: ‘‘I think we are able to negotiate with donors because of our 
credibility and the brand we have carved for ourselves. I can say our credibility attract donors to come to 
us when even when we don’t call them’’.  
Moreover, interpersonal relations between NNGDOs and donor representatives also played a crucial role 
in that regard where complaints about strict donor requirements were informally reported for adjustments 
to be made. This was largely through face-to-face interactions during project meetings and field visits 
where NNGDOs explained ground-level realities to donor representatives. Having face-to-face interaction 
was perceived as faster and better than formal reporting. A donor representative indicated that they 
provided omnibus feedback to organisations (Donor 4). Interestingly, eight respondents reported that 
since donor representatives often visited them during project implementation, it creates opportunities for 
informal engagements that helped in influencing their agenda: 
The last meeting we attended in Accra, they said they would visit us as 
part of their monitoring and due diligence processes. So they come and 
do field and office evaluation. They sometimes spend over a week here 
talking to community level structures and the beneficiaries. When they 
are here, we get the opportunity to interact with them and explain things 
better (NNGDO 19). 
Although informal reporting did not change the status quo significantly, respondents pointed out that 
sometimes donor representatives ‘‘brushed over’’ by becoming more lenient in how they dealt with 
NNGDOs not meeting standard procedures. For this reason, thirteen respondents indicated that their 
relationship with donors was not master-recipient but mutual where they worked together in decision-
making. In this regard, whenever donors set unachievable targets and conditions, they negotiated. This 
was possible because NNGDOs had alternative sources of funding and provided counterpart funding. 
Three donor representatives concurred to this assertion and argued that they sometimes had to negotiate 
project indicators with NNGDOs, but it was always a challenge especially when they gave NNGDOs 
leeway. A donor representative explained that in most instances, NNGDOs would want to do things their 
way which often resulted in the production of different measurable indicators and targets. In order to 
achieve balance of interests, they had to negotiate (Donor 7).  
Similarly, two representatives from Donor 2 explained that by virtue of their Ghanaian identity, they 
understood ground-level realities and therefore adjusted unachievable targets. However, one respondent 
indicated that ‘‘under programme X, we had four different donors and in addition to the audits. You are 
here today, then Donor X has sent people to come and do their checks. So we are also under a lot of 
pressure from the donors’’. According to him, this had made adjustments increasingly difficult mainly 
because their funders were interested in the calculability of results. The above statement suggests that 
both donors and NNGDOs made conscious decisions to adjust indicators and targets in order to maintain 
their relationship, albeit with potential trade-offs in what one respondent described as ‘‘swallowing our 
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pride’’ (NNGDO 1). NNGDOs’ expertise and the number of years it had operated were key determinants 
of how likely donors could control them during negotiation. During interviews, respondents of three 
NNGDOs asserted their authority by referring to more powerful donors who they believed could not 
control them mainly because of their experience and knowledge of the donor landscape. One respondent 
asserted: 
Because you’re giving us funds doesn’t mean you can control us. We’ve 
been working with perhaps more powerful institutions like USAID. But 
there is no way USAID can control us. I think we’ve grown over that 
because we have been in existence for almost two decades and they know 
us (NNGDO 8). 
An important aspect of NNGDOs’ influencing strategies relates to the development of informal 
relationships. Respondents harnessed their social capital when they attended professional events like 
workshops and conferences. Others also dwelt on relationships developed through former schools, 
religious meetings, professional backgrounds and ethnic/tribal affiliations. For instance, the Executive 
Director of NNGDO 23 explained that ‘‘I worked with CRS, a consultancy firm and a district assembly. 
So I still have colleagues who are in big-big places but I wouldn’t like to mention names’’. NNGDO 
leaders sought to use their personal connections in deepening relations and also lobby government and 
donor representatives. These informal relationships served as an ‘‘invisible strategy’’ for advancing their 
interests.  
Although the relationship between NNGDOs, donors and government officials was largely formal, eleven 
respondents explained that over time, it developed into informality. More importantly, formal relations 
evolved out of informal conversations. Thus, formal and informal relationships interlocked and served as 
an important avenue for information and resource exchange. Respondents explained that the NNGDO 
sector survived on a mixture of formal and informal relationships. In initiating informal relationships, 
individual charismatic NNGDO leaders and their board members played a crucial role. To this end, ‘‘who 
you know’’ was a recurrent theme in funding applications. For instance, the Executive Director of 
NNGDO 28 described the role of personal connections in influencing funding decisions by stating that: 
Who you know matters so much. If you don’t have strong connections, 
it’s difficult getting funding. When funding adverts come out, they 
already know which NGOs to give to, they are just deceiving the public 
because they just want a formality (NNGDO 28). 
Informal relationships also served as an important avenue for building and sustaining trust in addition to 
getting information on upcoming funding opportunities. One Programmes Director for example, shared 
his experience when I asked him: ‘‘where are you coming from?’’ by replying:  
I went for an informal meeting this morning at FAO. Some projects are 
on the horizon, so I went to position myself well. My responsibility goes 
beyond programmes administration to include building informal 
relationships with donors (NNGDO 11). 
In deepening relationships with government and donor officials, respondents resorted to tactics such as 
invitation to lunch breaks, dinner programmes, investing resources (e.g. time) to visit them in their offices, 
sending souvenirs and Christmas or birthday cards. One important mechanism for strengthening informal 
relations was showing solidarity through social programmes (e.g. marriage, naming ceremonies and 
funerals). For instance, during data collection, I accompanied one Executive Director to attend the funeral 
of a brother of an INGDO representative. Respondents also indicated that they had changed their approach 
121 
 
to funding by not only relying on their proposals but also engaged donors directly through word-of-mouth 
to have discussion with them about their programmes.  
Our approach to funders has changed significantly. This time, we engage 
donors face-to-face to discuss about our organisation. When you do that 
and you put in the proposals, sometimes, it helps a lot. By doing that 
we’re seeing some results (NNGDO 23). 
 
Informality had become an established norm when dealing with donor and government officials. The 
rationale was to strengthen and sustain their relationships beyond the formal realm which helped them in 
influencing stakeholders. Respondents further suggested that informal relations with donor 
representatives did not guarantee automatic funding opportunities due to potential conflict of interest 
concerns. However, having an insider acted as a catalyst to push their applications and agenda through: 
‘‘you really need to have some contacts internally to be able to push your proposals for you’’ (NNGDO 
17).  
7.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored other strategies aside from resource diversification employed by NNGDOs. It 
highlights that NNGDOs engaged in networks and partnerships which took the form of consortia and 
project implementation. It has shown that this turn to consortia was in direct response to donor funding 
requirements. The chapter also highlights how the need for organisational survival has resulted in 
competition between network secretariats and their members, with secretariats having turned themselves 
into quasi-NNGDOs. This chapter has also shown that NNGDOs employed cost-recovery mechanisms 
such as operating reserves, investment in fixed assets and downsizing. It further highlights that NNGDOs 
used branding and visibility as legitimisation and differentiation strategies.  
To protect their credibility, NNGDOs also sought to strengthen their governance structures through the 
institutionalisation of accountable and transparent systems, hiring of professionals and compliance with 
formal reporting guidelines. NNGDOs’ engagement in strategic thinking and planning, in delegation of 
authority and the implementation of succession planning also contribute to survival strategies. However, 
the emphasis on funding had led to some neglect of critical leadership issues. Although NNGDOs 
conformed to institutional pressures, the use of avoidance and influencing strategies demonstrated that 
they exercised a degree of agency in managing their resource dependence. In the next chapter, I analyse 







Chapter Eight: NNGDOs’ strategic responses: Analysis and Discussion 
8.0 Introduction  
The three previous chapters presented the empirical findings of this research. In doing so, in chapter five, 
I described the context in which NNGDOs operated and provided a general background of case study 
organisations. This was followed by a review of the eight strategies employed by NNGDOs in ensuring 
their short-term survival and long-term sustainability. This chapter analyses the empirical findings in 
relation to the three theoretical frameworks presented in chapter three. The aim is to examine how far the 
empirical findings are consistent with, can be attributed to and explained by RDT, NIT and Oliver’s 
typology of strategic responses. My aim in doing so is to address the second research question. The chapter 
is structured into nine sections, one for each of the eight strategies identified plus a conclusion.  
8.1 Theoretical explanations for resource diversification  
8.1.1 Self-financing  
In safeguarding financial autonomy, this study observes that NNGDOs generate income through self-
financing activities as part of their diversification strategies. From a resource dependency perspective, 
diversification is an organisational strategy for overcoming problems of resource concentration and loss 
of autonomy in decision-making processes associated with dependence on a sole supplier of critical 
resources. The aim of diversification is avoidance of control associated with dependence (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 2003). However, the empirical evidence suggests that although NNGDOs have diversified their 
funding through self-financing, it somewhat gives them relatively little financial autonomy. While a few 
NNGDOs demonstrate some degree of autonomy and independence, the majority have not weaned 
themselves off donor funding because it constitutes between 80% and 90% of their annual budget. 
Donors’ influence and control is prevalent because self-financing revenues remain unpredictable and 
contribute minimally to annual budget. To this end, although NNGDOs are exploring alternative revenue 
streams, their potential for autonomy and independence from donor dependency and influence remains 
limited.  
The empirical findings contradict resource dependency arguments that diversification in self-financing 
activities helps in managing resource concentration problems because it enhances NNGDOs’ financial 
autonomy and independence from donor influence (Khieng and Dahles, 2015; Hailey and Salway, 2016). 
Self-financing activities among NNGDOs is a recent phenomenon where many are in early stages of their 
development and have not reached medium-sized enterprises for their presence to be felt within their 
localities or even nationally. For this reason, it is difficult to generate the needed revenue that will propel 
organisational autonomy and independence. Financial and organisational autonomy from self-financing 
depends on the extent of their development and contributions to annual budget. As the empirical findings 
demonstrate, self-financing provides NNGDOs some degree of resource criticality to be able to perform 
their activities by covering overheads and project costs in the absence of donor funding (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 2003). Nonetheless, their inability to generate enough revenue makes them highly dependent on 
donor resources.  
More importantly, the precarious financial situation of many NNGDOs is an indication of their short-term 
financial capacity (Section 5.7.1). This makes them highly vulnerable to external influences. The 
empirical findings raise important debates about the relationship between NNGDOs’ financial autonomy 
and self-financing initiatives. In the mainstream NGDO literature, it is suggested that self-financing 
guarantees automatic independence and minimises threats to donor control. However, as the empirical 
findings suggest, this assumption is problematic especially in contexts like Ghana where most NNGDOs’ 
self-financing initiatives are in their early stages.  
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Self-financing is a deliberate management attempt to avoid the effects of revenue volatility associated 
with donor dependence. Given the volatility of donor funding, maintaining a diversified funding base is 
useful for promoting revenue stability (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003; Carroll and Stater, 2009). For this 
reason, self-financing has become a major preoccupation of NNGDOs where many seem to be imitating 
the practices of others in generating internal funds. This is akin to mimetic isomorphism where in periods 
of uncertainty, organisations model themselves around perceived successful organisations (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983). The implication is the homogenisation of NNGDOs’ self-financing activities where similar 
income generating models are implemented. Homogenisation of self-financing activities has made social 
enterprise a trendy terminology among NNGDOs.  
Revenue volatility from self-financing activities remains high and results from organisation specific (e.g. 
lack of financial and managerial capacity) and systematic sources (e.g. unfavourable business 
environment and public perception about self-financing activities). Given that NNGDOs rely on savings 
from projectised donor grants as start-up capital for self-financing initiatives, volatility in donor funding 
has direct effects on NNGDOs. This affects planning process and increases insolvency risk. The empirical 
findings are consistent with Bielefeld’s (1992) observation that small non-profit organisations dependent 
on internally generated funds are subject to uncertainty. However, it contradicts Froelich (1999) and 
Khieng and Dahles’ (2015) argument that self-financing activities by non-profit organisations and 
NNGDOs are associated with moderate and low volatility respectively. In fact, as the empirical findings 
demonstrate, revenues generated from social enterprise are highly volatile. In this regard, it questions the 
assumption that self-financing activities act as an insurance mechanism against NNGDOs’ revenue 
volatility. It highlights the context and time-specific nature of self-financing activities because they are in 
their early stages of development.  
8.1.1.1 Self-financing and sustainability rhetoric 
Given that self-financing is fuelled by the sustainability discourse spearheaded by donors, NNGDOs are 
under constant coercive pressures from donors to ensure their own sustainability. For this reason, 
demonstrating elements of sustainability through the provision of counterpart funding has become a 
prerequisite for donor funding requirements (Section 6.1.5). Informed by the need for securing resources, 
NNGDOs acquiesce by complying with and habiting to donor pressures to raise the required counterpart 
funding (Oliver, 1991). While Oliver considers acquiescence as a passive strategy, the empirical finding 
suggests that it is rather an active strategy especially when compliance with institutional demands gives 
NNGDOs access to donor resources. Acquiescence is therefore a strategic tactic informed largely by self-
serving interests. For instance, raising the required counterpart funding confers legitimacy on NNGDOs 
in the eyes of donors.  
Pfeffer and Salancik (2003:44) argue that compliance with institutional demands occurs when the focal 
organisation depends on the social actor for critical resources, the social actor controls resources and the 
desire of the focal organisation is survival (Section 3.1). NNGDOs comply with counterpart funding 
requirements because donors control the needed financial resources. In addition, the degree of dependence 
on donors is determined by resource importance, actor’s discretion over resource allocation and use in 
addition to concentration of resource control. While NNGDOs consider self-financing as an avoidance 
strategy for escaping donor influences, it involves elements of acquiescence. For this reason, self-
financing is both an acquiescence and avoidance strategy. Escape represents an active strategy because it 
involves NNGDOs remodelling their goals and programmes to prevent conformance to donor influences. 
The aim here is to avoid restrictions associated with dependence on donor resources (Oliver, 1991). The 




A defining characteristic of social enterprise is the pursuit of financial sustainability and social purposes. 
Nonetheless, the empirical findings suggest that NNGDOs’ engagement in social enterprise is motivated 
largely by their own organisational and financial sustainability rather than the creation of social benefits 
and values to intended beneficiaries. Although some NNGDOs claim to prioritise the needs of intended 
beneficiaries, it is a façade for building on their comparative advantage of being closer to intended 
beneficiaries to further their own financial sustainability motives. To this end, self-financing meant being 
more market driven and self-sufficient but not beneficiary driven. This study finds no evidence to suggest 
that self-financing helps NNGDOs to achieve financial sustainability in the short-term. In addition, self-
financing activities involve trade-offs where the burden of sustainability especially in the case of 
integrated hybrid is pushed to intended beneficiaries. The discussion thus far indicates that the outcome 
of self-financing has been organisational financial sustainability rather than ‘beneficiary sustainability’. 
Similar observations have been made by Devine (2003) who observed among NGDOs in Bangladesh that 
in their pursuit of sustainability, their members became benefactors rather than beneficiaries of 
microcredit schemes. He maintains that while sustainability interventions helped NGDOs to reduce 
dependence on donor resources, it undermined their relationship with intended beneficiaries. Moreover, 
organisational survival was prioritised over the needs of intended beneficiaries thereby creating a 
sustainability paradox.  
A plausible explanation is the lack of financial, human and technical support for NNGDOs’ sustainability 
programmes. Although NNGDOs’ sustainability is a co-responsibility of stakeholders (donors, 
government, NNGDO leaders and intended beneficiaries), the data collected demonstrates that NNGDOs 
have been left alone to carry their ‘sustainability burden’. Although in theory, donors seem to be 
spearheading NNGDOs’ sustainability discourse, in reality, it remains a myth. Their commitment to 
sustainability does not extend beyond the rhetoric of capacity building in proposal writing and offering 
letters of recommendation rather than long-term investment in organisational structures. Donors only pay 
lip service to NNGDOs’ sustainability without making substantial investments into sustainability 
mechanisms. An unintended consequence is the reinforcement of NNGDOs’ dependency on their 
resources. Indeed, it can be argued that the assumption that partnership between donors especially 
INGDOs and NNGDOs would ensure the long-term viability of the latter is difficult to achieve. This is 
because the sustainability of INGDOs is not guaranteed let alone supporting NNGDOs. As discussed in 
Section 7.2.2, some INGDOs are struggling financially to survive, therefore their commitment towards 
the sustainability of NNGDOs’ is doubtful. Donor funding modalities and patterns also do not allow for 
investments in sustainability initiatives because of their emphasis on delivering results in the short-term 
rather than long-term. This creates challenges for NNGDOs in their attempt to ensure their sustainability. 
In what follows, I discuss the effects of self-financing on NNGDOs’ organisational mission change. 
8.1.1.2 Self-financing and NNGDOs’ mission change 
Mission-driven NNGDOs align their commercial initiatives towards social goals by balancing demands 
for organisational sustainability and beneficiary needs through the strategy of integration where separated 
hybrid social enterprises combine their commercial and social or developmental goals. This is directly 
influenced by organisational culture which helps in reducing tension associated with the pursuit of 
commercial needs for survival. The strategy of integration is contrary to Oliver’s (1991) avoidance tactic 
of buffering/decoupling where organisations detach their technical activities from main operations. In 
addition, it differs from Pache and Santos’ (2013) strategy of selective coupling where organisations faced 
with competing logics selectively chose elements from each logic. Integration of social and commercial 
goals results in the creation of multiple and conflicting logics such as dual mission and change in 
organisational identity.  
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In light of this, when NNGDOs are faced with conflicting demands because of high multiplicity of actors, 
they employ strategies including compromise. The aim is to meet the expectation of different stakeholders. 
Compromise tactic of balancing helps NNGDOs to address the problem of mission change and goal 
displacement associated with self-financing initiatives. However, as discussed in the preceding section, 
although NNGDOs balanced their survival and beneficiary needs, their survival was a priority. The 
empirical findings partly align with Oliver’s (1991) hypothesised antecedent about the use of one or more 
compromise tactics of balancing, pacifying and bargaining (Table 3.2). However, the study finds no 
evidence regarding the use of avoidance and defiance strategies when confronted with multiple conflicting 
demands as predicted by Oliver.  
What might account for the limited evidence of mission change is NNGDOs’ engagement in peripheral 
self-financing activities. To this end, the extent of mission change depends on the nature of self-financing 
activities undertaken and the role played by organisational governing boards. Board of directors and 
trustees play a crucial role in determining NNGDOs’ self-financing activities through active deliberations 
on their feasibility. They also serve as custodians of NNGDOs’ mission and values and also help identify, 
interpret and formulate organisational strategies (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). The empirical evidence 
further suggests that in some instances, because board members supported in raising start-up capital, they 
are able to properly ensure that NNGDOs adhere to organisational mission and values. By doing so, they 
shape organisational culture through internal governance and control. This demonstrates the importance 
of organisational governance in striking a balance between social and commercial missions. In fact, 
NNGDOs’ leadership ability to balance conflicting demands from their institutional and resource 
environment is a critical determinant of their quality. The finding therefore lends support to resource 
dependency arguments about the role of organisational leadership in addressing uncertainty (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 2003).  
In sum, the effects of NNGDOs’ self-financing mechanisms on mission change remains inconclusive. 
However, what is clearly event is that self-financing is not a panacea to NNGDOs’ sustainability 
predicaments because the needed institutional and organisational mechanisms that would ensure the 
operation of viable self-financing entities to generate the needed resources is lacking. In the next section, 
I focus on relating the findings on domestic resource mobilisation in terms of volunteer support, corporate 
philanthropy and government funding to the theoretical frameworks.  
8.1.2 Domestic resource mobilisation 
8.1.2.1 Volunteer support 
In overcoming challenges associated with dependence on a single funding source, NNGDOs have 
diversified their funding base into restricted and unrestricted funds. The rationale is to ‘‘preclude the 
necessity of conformity’’ to institutional pressures from donors (Oliver, 1991:154). Volunteer support 
serves as a buffer against eventualities in external donor funding. Buffering is used by NNGDOs in 
insulating themselves against negative impact and unavoidable consequence of resource dependence. For 
example, using volunteer labour is a buffering tactic given the projectisation of donor support and the 
absence of core funding which results in high staff turnover. Reliance on volunteer labour therefore 
compensates for the shortfalls in paid staff. The understanding of buffering as used in this thesis is 
different from Oliver who maintains that buffering is used as a mechanism for preventing the activities 
and actions of organisations from being scrutinised.  
This study finds no evidence of the interchangeability of paid staff with volunteers due partly to the 
increased institutional pressures from donors for NNGDOs’ professionalisation (Townsend et al., 2004; 
Kamstra and Schulpen, 2015). Professionalisation helps NNGDOs to properly communicate with donors 
where staff are able to write, speak and understand donor jargon. This enhances their chances of securing 
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resources because it increases donors’ confidence and trust. Moreover, reliance on volunteers helps in the 
creation of organisational reserves as they are only given allowances and non-monetary incentives (e.g. 
soaps and food items for community volunteers). This notwithstanding, an interdependent relationship 
exists between NNGDOs and volunteers. This relationship is sustained by resource exchange which 
creates a sense of mutual dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003).  
While NNGDOs depend on volunteers to undertake their programmes, some volunteers get material 
incentives. For example, for most local volunteers, their engagement with NNGDOs becomes a survivalist 
strategy as it serves as an avenue for getting into the NNGDO job market or a means for securing temporal 
employment. This finding collaborates previous research outcomes on volunteering in other African 
countries (Butcher and Einolf, 2017). Although reliance on volunteer labour signifies an ‘emerging trend’ 
in domestic resource mobilisation, it raises questions about the sustainability of such initiatives given the 
lack of a progressive philanthropic culture and commitment by volunteers. Moreover, it might affect 
organisational performance because volunteers might not have the requisite skills, training and 
commitment compared to paid staff. High turnover associated with volunteers makes strategic 
organisational planning a difficult task for management. Although uncertainty in donor funding is forcing 
NNGDOs to rely on volunteer labour, it remains an unpredictable and ad hoc source of support that cannot 
guarantee their long-term organisational sustainability.  
This notwithstanding, volunteer engagement is a useful strategy for gaining organisational legitimacy and 
credibility demonstrated in its ability to create downward accountability to intended beneficiaries. Given 
that NNGDOs in Ghana are perceived as the creation of donors due to their resource dependence, the 
mobilisation of volunteer support is a strategy for balancing the expectation of community members 
through involvement in NNGDOs’ programmes at the community level. This helps in fending off 
criticisms by pacifying community members (Oliver, 1991). This finding is consistent with Awuah-
Werekoh (2015) who found that an NNGDO (i.e. KKP) in Ghana was able to appease aggrieved 
community members by their involvement in the selection of volunteers. However, reliance on volunteers 
also involves NNGDOs manipulating their operating environment by shaping values aimed at influencing 
public perception (Oliver, 1991). NNGDOs use the involvement of community volunteers in programmes 
to create the perception of instilling some sense of community ownership. The aim here is to help them 
maintain their presence and influence at the community level at all times, thus demonstrating an element 
of sustainability from NNGDOs and donors’ perspective. It is also an indication that intended beneficiaries 
are ‘responsible citizens’ able to promote their own development independent of external support which 
reflects the wider sustainability rhetoric promoted by donors.  
The empirical findings point to a lack of understanding of volunteerism among intended beneficiaries. 
This is caused in part by NNGDOs’ inability to properly communicate their activities and programmes to 
wider audiences. Volunteer management practices are poorly understood by NNGDOs. For example, 
NNGDOs do not have a clearly spelt out procedure for selecting formal volunteers. Selection is mainly 
through informal conversations and personal connections with management. However, for community-
led volunteers, selection is done in consultation with community leaders. It is important to mention that 
while the study findings point to a lack of volunteer management practices, it contradicts Kamstra and 
Schulpen’s (2015) observation that volunteer engagement by NNGDOs in Ghana is limited because they 
are professionalised and highly dominated by academic elites. While such assertions might be true for 




8.1.2.2 Corporate philanthropy  
Although corporate organisations claim to undertake CSR, there is a clear lack of engagement with 
NNGDOs in project implementation. A plausible explanation is that, for fear of complying with 
conflicting demands and pressures from corporate organisations, avoidance tactic of outright rejection is 
employed by mission-driven NNGDOs. In doing so, they avoid interactions with corporate organisations 
perceived as problematic to the attainment of NNGDOs’ organisational values. Rejection is used when 
there is divergence of interests and serves as a long-term rather than a short-term strategy for safeguarding 
organisational values. The rationale is to help NNGDOs circumvent conditions that reinforce conformity 
to institutional pressures. Of particular interest to the discussion of rejection is that it is used largely by 
well-established NNGDOs with alternative sources of funding. This demonstrates the extent to which the 
level of resource dependence influences NNGDOs’ rejection of corporate funding (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
2003). Rejection is also informed by specific organisational characteristics including leadership who are 
committed to safeguarding organisational values. Rejection is similar to Oliver’s (1991) tactic of escape 
where organisations change goals and domains to avoid conformance to institutional pressures. However, 
as this research demonstrates, NNGDOs practising rejection do not change their goals or domains but 
rather adhere to their core organisational values. For this reason, using escape here would imply that 
NNGDOs are passive agents who change or exit their domains because of institutional pressures from 
corporate organisations. For this reason, the application of escape in NNGDO-corporate relationships 
remains limited.  
While rejection is not a widespread tactic in relation to corporate funding, NNGDOs employed bargaining 
tactic. Bargaining is necessitated by interdependency between corporate organisations and NNGDOs 
(Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). In fact, as Oliver points out, bargaining involves an active 
exertion of agency because it involves negotiations and concessions. From a resource dependency 
perspective, while NNGDOs depend on corporate organisations for resources, it provides the latter an 
opportunity to enhance their credibility and legitimacy with stakeholders as they are perceived as ‘more 
caring’ to the needs of people. Corporate organisations use their CSR as a public relations tool for gaining 
legitimacy where the aim is to manipulate public perception. The main driver of CSR is the need for brand 
enhancement and the creation of awareness about their products. CSR is used to gain legitimacy so that 
they can continue to secure resources from the public through the marketing of their products (Suchman, 
1995; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). It is important to mention that the development of strong network ties 
between NNGDO leaders and corporate representatives facilitates compromise (Oliver, 1991). Most 
decisions concerning CSR are also discretionary, with senior corporate managers solely deciding which 
projects or NNGDOs to support. The voluntary nature of CSR creates more room for NNGDOs to 
negotiate with corporate officials in order to balance their expectations given the strong social ties some 
NNGDO leaders enjoy.  
8.1.2.3 Corporate philanthropy and INGDO-NNGDO power imbalance 
NNGDOs’ engagement with corporate organisations signals a move towards reduced dependency on 
external funding. Nonetheless, it raises questions about potential power dynamics, reinforcement of 
alternative dependency and the risk of damaging their reputation and credibility that is likely to come into 
play. In terms of power dynamics, the lack of perceived organisational capacity for NNGDOs has resulted 
in a higher preference for INGDOs by corporate organisations (Section 6.2.1). Implicitly, this has the 
potential to relegate NNGDOs to the background while INGDOs take centre-stage in their dealings with 
corporate organisations as part of their domestic resource mobilisation strategies given that their own 
sustainability is at stake. This finding on the sustainability challenges faced by INGDOs is similar to what 
other scholars have observed in the literature (e.g. Walton et al., 2016; Hayman and Lewis, 2017).  
128 
 
Informed by the strong competition for limited domestic resources, it is plausible to suggest that NNGDOs 
will continue to play sub-contracting role to INGDOs given their sophisticated branding and marketing 
strategies, established systems and strong connections with corporate organisations which make it easier 
for them to secure corporate funding. This reflects the inequality and power asymmetries associated with 
resource exchange and inter-organisational relationships captured in resource dependency theory (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 2003). The overshadowing of NNGDOs by INGDOs in their quest for survival is part of a 
long-standing discussion of power imbalance in INGDO-NNGDO relations. For example, the point raised 
by Cooley and Ron (2002) about increased competition for resources between INGDOs and local NGDOs 
has resonance here. Similarly, Fowler (2016) echoes many of these points where he argues that INGDO-
corporate partnership could lead to the overshadowing of local NGDOs especially in countries like Kenya 
where some INGDOs are acquiring local registration status to become ‘dual citizens’ within the aid 
ecosystem. The situation in Ghana is similar. Nonetheless, there can be cooperation amidst competition 
for scarce resources. 
INGDOs’ actions and practices further ‘cripple’ NNGDOs’ organisational growth and capacity. This is 
manifested through the poaching of staff given the inability of NNGDOs to retain staff and offer lucrative 
salaries. The empirical evidence suggests that INGDOs and their masters (i.e. bilateral and multilateral 
donors) are equally culpable for the capacity challenges faced by NNGDOs because of their predatory 
behaviours. As mentioned earlier, the lack of organisational capacity in retaining staff relates to donor 
funding modalities and its associated restrictions of core funding. It demonstrates the negative impact 
donor funding modalities is having on the staffing patterns of small and medium-sized NNGDOs. Similar 
concerns about how donor funding modalities disrupts southern NGDOs through staff turnover have been 
reported in the literature (Wallace et al., 2006; Elbers and Arts, 2011; Buckley and Ward, 2015). Despite 
the increasing concerns raised about how donors’ actions affect small and medium-sized NNGDOs, they 
are unwilling to have a rethink of their actions and practices. 
Absence of core funding threatens the sustainability of many small NNGDOs because those without the 
needed human resource capacity struggle in seeking funding. Organisational size is therefore a major 
factor that influences perceived capacity and ability to receive funding. For this reason, small and medium-
sized NNGDOs find themselves in a vicious circle of low organisational and financial capacity where 
their inability to get core funding affects their ability to retain competent staff. This in turn influences the 
quality of proposals submitted to donors and their ability to mobilise alternative funding streams. Given 
their weak capacity, donors are unwilling to deal with them directly because of the lack of perceived trust. 
This compels them to become sub-grantees to INGDOs. The high preference for INGDOs demonstrates 
the extent to which NNGDOs’ size influences resource mobilisation and survival prospects. In the next 
section, I analyse the potential of government funding as a domestic resource for NNGDOs. 
8.1.2.4 Government funding and support  
For government funding, whereas previous literature suggests that it constitutes an important source of 
NGDO funding (Hailey and Salway, 2016; Suárez and Gugerty, 2016), the results from this study indicates 
otherwise. The prospects of government funding to promote a vibrant and sustainable NNGDO sector 
remain questionable because of its unpredictability. Nonetheless, the recent years have seen the redirection 
of donor funding to government institutions as part of their exit strategies following Ghana’s transition to 
LMIC status. As discussed in Section 5.2, Ghana aims to become an ‘aid-free country’ as part of its 
commitment to the Compact signed with DPs in 2012. For this reason, changing donor funding modalities 
has resulted in increased funds through central government institutions for project implementation where 
they are urged by DPs to work in collaboration with NNGDOs as subcontractors (Section 6.2.4). However, 
the empirical evidence indicates that the dominant support given to NNGDOs by government institutions 
at the regional and district level is in-kind (e.g. collaboration, capacity building, information sharing and 
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joint proposal writing) rather than in-cash. The contribution of the central government to NNGDOs’ 
funding is therefore modest. In instances where direct funding is given, it is one-off and depends largely 
on the extent of NNGDO leaders’ personal connections with government officials.  
This study’s finding therefore raises questions about NNGDOs’ roles in public service provision given 
that government support is relatively small. Moreover, in the absence of external funding, the study finds 
little evidence to suggest that the government could continue to fill the service provision gap by supporting 
NNGDOs. In this regard, for direct government funding to NNGDOs to succeed, it requires conscious 
effort such as the establishment of an independent national funding agency that will oversee such 
disbursement. This reflects Booth’s (2013) idea of ‘arms-length’ facilitation involving the use of semi-
autonomous change agents in development processes. For Ghana, there is the need for an institutional 
change in terms of government attitudes and relationship towards NNGDOs and CSOs. However, this will 
also greatly depend on NNGDOs’ ability to prove their worth in terms of the value addition their presence 
brings to society. At present, this remains a herculean task as most stakeholders consider NNGDOs as just 
noisemakers and attention seekers without any demonstrable impact (Section 6.2.1). This also raises 
interesting questions about NNGDOs’ transparency, accountability and responsiveness to their domestic 
constituents. 
8.1.3 Thematic, operational and locational diversification  
8.1.3.1 Thematic diversification 
Thematic diversification occurs because of NNGDOs’ acquiescence to donor request for project 
implementation. The rationale for acquiescence is organisational survival amidst uncertainty in funding 
opportunities. In doing so, NNGDOs employ tactics of compliance, habitation and imitation (Oliver, 
1991). Compliance occurs when NNGDOs become attached to donors’ priorities by adjusting their 
programme portfolios to be in alignment. The aim here is to ensure resource stability and reduction of 
threats to disbandment. NNGDOs’ compliance can be interpreted as loyalty to donors where they habit to 
their funding priorities through taken-for-granted requests for programme expansion (Oliver, 1991). This 
has become part of their organisational routine and culture. However, the aim for such strong attachment 
is NNGDOs’ own vested interests of acquiring resources for survival. The need for survival is therefore 
much more important to NNGDOs than sticking to organisational values and principles amidst 
difficulties.  
It is worth noting that although NNGDOs are in total compliance with donor requests and funding 
priorities, it involves manipulative and opportunistic acts. Their compliance with donor requests is a 
strategic choice depicting NNGDOs as active actors in their own right. Opportunistic acts occur when 
they deliberately and voluntarily adjust organisational portfolios to meet donor demands. In doing so, they 
manipulate different donors to their advantage. This demonstrates an exertion of agency and affirms 
Oliver’s (1991) observation that compliance is motivated largely by organisational self-interest for 
resource mobilisation. Leaders of well-established NNGDOs usually do not encourage thematic 
diversification because it results in loss of credibility. However, for small and medium-sized NNGDOs, 
it is a privilege to be called by donors for participation in upcoming projects because it is a demonstration 
of legitimacy. The empirical findings suggest that NNGDOs’ legitimacy is internally generated and 
socially conferred by stakeholders. Internal generation of legitimacy refers to how NNGDOs perceive 
themselves and it is largely within their control because it is influenced by organisational culture. On the 
other hand, a socially conferred legitimacy is about how NNGDOs are perceived by outsiders (Suchman, 
1995; Lister, 2003). Due to the socially constructed nature of legitimacy, donors encourage them to 
upscale their interventions by increasing programme portfolios.  
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An interestingly observation is that thematic diversification is practised by all NNGDOs irrespective of 
size and age (small, medium and large). The findings highlight the problematic nature of classifying 
NNGDOs as generalists and specialists based on organisational characteristics. For example, Uvin et al. 
(2000) assert that small NNGDOs are prone to becoming generalists than their established counterparts. 
However, the empirical findings demonstrate that small NNGDOs often mimic the behaviour of 
successful large NNGDOs engaged in thematic diversification to reduce uncertainty (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983). While many small NNGDOs are generalists, the same applies to large NNGDOs. The 
emergence of generalist NNGDOs is driven largely by the need for survival and being responsive to 
community needs. Mimicking behaviour of small generalist NNGDOs happens when leaders of large 
NNGDOs with organisational capacity relay information on upcoming funding opportunities to engage 
in consortia application. The study’s finding is consistent with Oliver’s (1991) and Meyer and Powell’s 
(1983) tactic of imitation and mimetic isomorphism of perceived best practices and organisational 
behaviours from trusted partners in periods of uncertainty. Generalist NNGDOs mimic their perceived 
successful organisations that have secured funding from different donors in ensuring their survival in a 
resource-constrained environment.  
8.1.3.2 Operational and locational diversification 
Operational diversification is employed by NNGDOs to avoid unnecessary donor pressures. It involves 
the application of diverse strategies including acquiesce, compromise and defiance (Oliver, 1991). By 
acquiescing to donor demands, NNGDOs add new programmes at their request. For instance, NNGDO 
24, a specialist organisation in CBE complied with the demands of its main donor to add new programmes 
in educational mainstreaming which hitherto was not part of its overall organisational programmes. 
However, the same organisation became defiant by dismissing calls from other donors to add agricultural 
interventions to its educational programmes. The empirical finding demonstrates that the extent of 
compliance or dismissal of an institutional pressure is determined by the degree of resource dependence 
(Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). NNGDOs highly dependent on donors tend to comply with 
their demands because withdrawal of support increases threat to organisational survival. While 
acquiescing to donor requests is an indication of power imbalance in NNGDO-donor relations, NNGDOs 
leaders are reluctant to admit that they are ‘donor stooges’. This affirms earlier arguments that 
acquiescence is both a passive and active strategy employed by NNGDOs.  
Contrary to previous literature that suggests that specialisation guides against goal displacement and 
mission change (e.g. Mitchell, 2014), the empirical findings seem to suggest that this might not always be 
case. Although specialist NNGDOs concentrate on a narrow set of programmes, they shift focus from 
their main organisational goals which also in turn makes them multi-mandate organisations within the 
same sector. For instance, even within the same sector, many specialists NNGDOs in education and health 
have shifted focus from service delivery to social accountability issues in response to changing donor 
priorities (Section 6.4.2). This indicates that in an environment of high donor dependency, specialists 
NNGDOs are prone to goal displacement just like generalists. Although specialists NNGDOs have a 
narrowly defined goals and programmes, the need for survival amidst intense competition with others is 
compelling them to become ‘pro-generalist’ in a subtle way. The findings suggest that specialists 
NNGDOs rebrand their programmes like generalists in response to changing funding priorities but it 
occurs within the same sector. This blurs the distinction between generalists and specialist NNGDOs.  
Nonetheless, for some specialists NNGDOs, their low dependence on donor resources allows for the 
exercise of active agency by dismissing conflicting donor pressures. A key driver of dismissal strategy is 
organisational culture and leadership. In their analysis of strategies for addressing resource dependence, 
Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) underscored the role of organisational leadership in resource acquisition. The 
findings indicate that some NNGDOs are strongly informed by the need to maintain organisational 
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credibility, hence they contest and dismiss donor pressures irrespective of the cost (Oliver, 1991). This is 
influenced by leaders’ ability to adhere to organisational values rather than following donor demands. 
Dismissal is risky for organisational survival especially when alternative sources of funding are limited. 
Defiance and its associated tactic of dismissal demonstrate a higher exertion of agency compared to 
acquiescence and compromise. Defiance by NNGDOs differs from the observation made by Elbers and 
Arts (2011) and Awuah-Werekoh (2015) who found that some NNGDOs in Ghana were unable to defy 
donor institutional pressures because of their dependence. NNGDOs employ defiance when they perceive 
a threat to organisational values arising from conflicting institutional pressures. Defiance occurs when the 
degree of consistency between organisational goals and institutional pressures is low (Table 3.2) (Oliver, 
1991).   
When faced with difficulty in dismissing donor demands, NNGDOs compromise by balancing their values 
with that of donors or negotiate conditions of the demands. Balancing is used when specialist NNGDOs 
seek to meet the integrated needs of intended beneficiaries and donors. By doing so, the aim is to generate 
organisational legitimacy by becoming responsive to stakeholder demands while at the same time ensuring 
their survival through dependence on donor resources. The application of specialisation in ensuring 
organisational sustainability is difficult in a resource-constrained environment. While specialisation 
enhances credibility because it prevents ‘jack-of-all-trades syndrome’ that confronts generalist NNGDOs, 
it exposes organisations to increased competition for scarce resources within their specific sectors of 
operation. This in turn affects prospects for sustainability. Notwithstanding the survival threats, 
competition promotes organisational legitimacy by way of increased accountability to stakeholders on 
whom NNGDOs depend for support.  
On the other hand, the empirical findings indicate that donors’ preference for funding big NNGDOs with 
national presence in addition to NNGDOs’ desire to support unserved communities fuels locational 
diversification. Expansion of operating communities is a legitimacy building strategy by NNGDOs. In 
addition, it helps them secure different funding streams for organisational survival while at the same time 
increasing their presence and visibility. Arguably, the decision to engage in locational diversification 
involves an element of manipulation where NNGDOs seek to shape values and criteria by becoming more 
visible. Aside from manipulation, they compromise by balancing the demands of donors and community 
members (Oliver, 1991). When faced with multiplicity of constituent demands, NNGDOs tend to 
compromise mainly because of the need to meet different expectations. In doing so, tactics ranging from 
balance, pacify and bargain are employed to ensure organisational survival.  
In the next section, I discuss networks and partnership as a tactical survival strategy. In doing so, the aim 
is to analyse the influence of institutional and resource dependency pressures on inter-organisational 
cooperation. The analytical lens of RDT, NIT and Oliver’s typology are applied to explain the empirical 
findings.  
8.2 Networking and partnerships 
NNGDOs employ networking to influence and manipulate their operating environment. Although it is far 
from new, the study finds that uncertainty, coercive institutional pressures from donors and resource 
interdependency (e.g. funding, information and legitimacy) has compelled NNGDOs to increase their 
cooperation through consortia (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). The formation 
of complex networks is in compliance with donor directives requiring NNGDOs to work in groups. 
Networking through consortia therefore serves as a tactical coping strategy. Consortia create 
interdependencies driven largely by uncertainty in the operating environment. Survival in such an 
environment is determined by ability to work with others. This affirms Pfeffer and Salancik’s (2003) 
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observation that organisations are embedded in a network of interdependencies in a resource-scarce 
environment where they engage in coordination to reduce uncertainty.  
It is noteworthy that a defining feature of consortia is the need for better access to financial resources and 
mutual dependence. This helps in maintaining organisational autonomy because high mutual dependence 
creates room for negotiation. Mutual dependence is manifested in the need for bilateral dependencies. For 
instance, small district and regional-based NNGDOs due to capacity challenges are unable to 
independently apply for donor funding while large NNGDOs are required to work in consortia with small 
NNGDOs as part of donor funding requirements. The formation of consortia arises out of necessity rather 
than self-motivation of NNGDO leaders for collaboration. In this regard, small NNGDOs depend on large 
NNGDOs and vice versa which creates a sense of joint dependence through the exchange of resources 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003).  
Moreover, given the criticality of resources and the difficulty associated with finding trusted alternative 
NNGDOs to engage in consortia, organisational leaders are able to negotiate over excessive demands 
placed on them by their peers. When there are diverse interests between NNGDOs, negotiation is applied 
because each organisation is motivated by self-interest. Against this backdrop, negotiation is possible 
because of mutual accountability and reciprocity between interdependent NNGDOs. Mutual 
accountability is due to power-balance in exchange relations between small and large NNGDOs. On the 
other hand, reciprocal exchanges occur when small and large NNGDOs offer attractive and critical 
resources in their relationships which allows for loss of autonomy by both partners. Resource exchange 
between NNGDOs is critical for their survival and therefore challenges the argument that in Ghana 
‘‘NGOs do not depend upon each other for survival’’ and ‘‘collaboration for survival is also not as 
necessary’’ (Kamstra and Schulpen, 2015:340). I argue that such statements remain highly contested 
because of its broad generalisation which does not reflect ground-level reality. In contrast, the empirical 
findings highlight that for NNGDOs, inter-organisational cooperation is a critical survival strategy.  
Dependency is reciprocal and reflects Pfeffer and Salancik’s (2003:53) idea of countervailing resources 
which makes it possible for organisations to compromise their autonomy for mutual benefits. Arguing 
along similar lines, Oliver (1990:244) maintains that reciprocity promotes inter-organisational relations 
because it is underpinned by cooperation, collaboration and coordination rather than domination and 
power asymmetry. This idea will be challenged in Section 8.2.3 because inter-NNGDO relations are not 
egalitarian. It is important to note that in a mutually dependent environment, NNGDOs negotiate with one 
another to avoid risk of losing benefits from exchange relations. In doing so, they engage in long-term 
inter-organisational cooperation to stabilise their negotiated exchanges. However, this study finds limited 
evidence to suggests that NNGDOs engage in constraint absorption (i.e. mergers and acquisitions) as 
suggested by resource dependency theorists (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003; Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005; 
Davis and Cobb, 2010). I argue that mergers and acquisitions among especially small district and regional-
based NNGDOs are unlikely to happen because they are highly personalised and influenced by deep 
ideological values. For many of these NNGDOs, their leaders serve as the key source of organisational 
dependence for financial and non-financial resources. Against this backdrop, they tend to serve the interest 
of their founders; hence merging with others might lead to perceived loss of autonomy, control and 
organisational values. This is also influenced by fears that a merger might reduce future revenue 
opportunities and leadership challenges such as claims of ownership in addition to complete erosion of 
sovereignty of decision-making processes. While Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) suggest that competitive 
interdependence is reduced through horizontal expansion, it is rare for it to happen among NNGDOs 
mainly because of non-distributing constraints associated with their operations. This is not to suggest that 
mergers among NGDOs are uncommon. For example, as mentioned in Section 7.2.2, IBIS has merged 
with Oxfam to become Oxfam IBIS in Ghana due in part to efficiency reasons, financial difficulties and 
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quest for greater influence. However, for NNGDOs, it is impossible to acquire their competitors through 
horizontal mergers in order to reduce uncertainty, increase dominance and organisational power. The 
inability of NNGDOs to practice mergers demonstrates the difficulty associated with some of the 
strategies outlined by Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) for reducing dependency.  
From a resource dependency perspective, competition reduces cooperation and information sharing. The 
structure of donor funding system is an important driving factor. For instance, donor funding modalities 
of short-term projects and measurable results produce intense competition for limited resources, hence 
reducing cooperation. Resource scarcity has made NNGDOs to become self-interested and strategic actors 
whose preoccupation is the mobilisation of resources for their own survival. In fact, market-based 
structure of donor funding has compelled NNGDOs to prioritise and respond to material incentives for 
furthering their self-interests (Cooley and Ron, 2002). Intense competition is therefore caused in part by 
donors’ systemic influence on the funding landscape and limited opportunities for mobilising domestic 
resources. Aside from donor influences, limited cooperation is fuelled by perception of getting less credit, 
recognition and reduced visibility for individual NNGDOs when they cooperate. NNGDO leaders are 
more interested in individual recognition and glory claims that put their organisations at an advantaged 
position. Surprisingly, some NNGDOs leaders backbite and report their colleagues to donors in order to 
gain favour. This is based on the assumption that it will give them legitimacy in the eyes of donors which 
creates opportunity for accessing donor funding. Competition compels NNGDOs to differentiate 
themselves by claiming to be more resource deserving than their counterparts through ‘‘claim-bearing 
label’’ where they portray themselves as ‘‘doing good’’ by serving the interest of the poor (Hilhorst, 
2003:7).  
Although donor funding regimes produce competition, they also reinforce cooperation where NNGDOs 
leverage on their collective expertise to achieve project results. Resource scarcity promotes cooperation 
as NNGDOs seek to reduce overhead costs by relying on the strength of others. Arguably, the relationship 
between competition and inter-organisational cooperation remains inconclusive because competition 
tends to promote and stifle cooperation among NNGDOs at the same time. As the empirical evidence 
points out, there can be cooperation amidst intense competition. This seems paradoxical and challenges 
previous literature about the impossibility of competition to exist in tandem with co-operation (e.g. Cooley 
and Ron, 2002). Most discussions of inter-NNGDO relationships treat competition and cooperation as 
separate organisational processes. However, I contend that such analysis is problematic and unhelpful 
because despite increased competition for scarce resources, interdependency ensures collaboration. The 
above evidence lends support to neo-institutional and resource dependency arguments that institutional 
pressures within an environment can necessitate both competition and cooperation (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; Oliver, 1990; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003).  
8.2.1 Isomorphic pressures in inter-organisational collaboration 
Networking among NNGDOs is fuelled by donors’ coercive isomorphic pressures where funds are 
channelled through groups of NNGDOs rather than direct funding to individual organisations. NNGDOs 
acquiesce to donor pressures when the benefits of social legitimacy for organisational survival are high. 
Given that belonging to a network is a prerequisite for funding application, NNGDOs comply because of 
their dependence on donor resources. This finding seems to have resonance with Oliver’s (1990) critical 
contingency factor of ‘necessity’ in inter-organisational relationship where the aim of collaboration is to 
meet legal or regulatory requirements. As discussed in Section 3.2.1, imposition of coercive isomorphism 




Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) maintain that organisations are reluctant to enter into collaborations when 
threats to compromising their autonomy and independence are high. However, as the empirical findings 
demonstrate, given donors’ coercive pressures and the need for critical resources, many NNGDOs 
compromise organisational autonomy when there is mutuality in relationship. This study further reveals 
that because of the informal and inter-personal nature of cooperation agreements and accountability, it is 
difficult to hold small non-performing NNGDOs to account through legal sanctions. This is influenced 
by the tendency for NNGDO leaders to maintain personal ties even when there is no probability of future 
collaboration for funding. In light of this, interpersonal ties and mutual dependence makes it rare for 
partnership termination. While RDT is relatively silent on the role of inter-personal connections in 
networking, the study findings show that inter-personal connections is a tactical resource mobilisation 
and network formation strategy. Inter-personal connections promote trust among NNGDO leaders which 
gives them the confidence that all partners will honour cooperative arrangements. Thus, informal 
accountability is facilitated by informal expectations and behaviours among NNGDO leaders which create 
a sense of collective accountability through norms of trust. The development of trust among network 
members helps NNGDO leaders to build their reputation which in turn increases access to resources 
including funding information and partnership.  
Organisations secure legitimacy through inter-organisational cooperation with prominent partners. For 
example, the evidence points out that small district and regional-based NNGDOs develop relationships 
with well-established NNGDOs to enhance their visibility, image and reputation. This provides them 
access to critical resources (Suchman, 1995; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). For small NNGDOs, networking 
with established NNGDOs is a privilege. This is also not to suggest that small NNGDOs are weak, 
powerless and do not exercise agency. Of course, they seek to shape the processes that embed power 
structures although they are limited to an extent. As the empirical findings demonstrate, NNGDOs allow 
their dependency to co-exist with agency. For resource-based reasons, small NNGDOs to some extent are 
willing to trade their autonomy if it is not detrimental to organisational survival. In what follows, I analyse 
the drivers of institutional pressures on NNGDOs.  
8.2.2 Drivers of institutional pressures on networks and coalitions  
Institutional pressures on NNGDOs exist in mimetic, coercive, and normative forms (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983). For mimetic pressures, it is reinforced through networks and coalitions where established 
NNGDOs are instructed by donors to nurture their emerging counterparts on ‘perceived best practices’. 
Donors’ insistence on learning from other NNGDOs is to ensure harmonisation of project results where 
common yardstick and indicators could be used in assessing performance. Harmonisation helps donors in 
meeting their measurable targets while reducing transaction cost, fiduciary risk, duplication and burden 
placed on their limited staff.  
In addition, ‘learning from others’ is part of the wider donor rhetoric of ensuring NNGDOs’ sustainability 
through capacity building. For this reason, when small NNGDOs collaborate with and learn from big 
NNGDOs as part of donors’ capacity building rhetoric, it becomes a lip-service mechanism demonstrating 
their commitment towards sustainability. Donors use sustainability discourse to manage uncertainty 
associated with their own funding where they shed responsibility for their long-term commitments to 
NNGDOs. By emphasising capacity building from project onset, they are able to put pressures on 
NNGDOs to improve their governance and management structures in order to ensure better delivery of 
their aid projects. In this regard, capacity building has become a mechanism for donors in identifying their 
perceived competent and legitimate NNGDOs that would ensure the efficient and effective use of their 
limited resources. Capacity building acts as a rationalised myth within the institutional fields of NNGDOs 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1991). Donors have reconstructed NNGDOs’ organisational field by 
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making capacity building the dominant institutional logics. However, donors’ capacity building 
mechanisms are largely tokenistic. As the empirical findings reveal, donors’ capacity building for 
NNGDOs is not purposely targeted at ensuring sustainability but a means for achieving project results 
and reinforcement of dependency. To this end, the promotion of capacity building and its resultant 
mimetic isomorphism among NNGDOs is to donors’ advantage and demonstrates the extent of their 
opportunistic behaviours.  
For NNGDOs, mimetic isomorphism is as a result of indirect acquiescence to donor pressures. 
Acquiescence is driven by prevailing institutional logics in terms of appropriate style which guarantees 
organisational legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991). In this regard, mimetic 
isomorphism is in direct response to changes in donor funding policies and spreads through self-regulation 
mechanisms by networks and coalitions. In particular, self-regulation has become necessary given the 
absence of a regulatory framework and serves as a substitute for government’s failure to regulate 
NNGDOs. In ensuring collective legitimacy, networks and coalitions set standards and rules of conduct 
for members to prevent their actions from being questioned. This helps them to redeem their negative 
public perception and distrusted image of non-accountability. Collective self-regulation also curbs free-
riding problems within NNGDO networks and coalitions. For instance, the Ghana Coalition of NGOs in 
Health claims to self-regulate its members through initiatives such as written constitution and code of 
conduct that spells out members’ rights and responsibilities. The constitution has a sanctions clause that 
allows them to expel non-complaint members. From an institutional standpoint, self-regulatory 
mechanisms have become the common standards to which all members must adhere to. This in turn 
promotes peer learning and mimicking of common practices (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  
Ensuring effective compliance of common standards is a strong mechanism for sending reputational signal 
to stakeholders. However, compliance is determined by factors including NNGDOs’ self-interest of 
securing resources (e.g. funding, visibility, reputation and legitimacy) and the sharing of perceived best 
practices. Shared norms and values influence compliance with self-regulation mechanisms because non-
compliance with rightful conduct is subject to punitive measures. Compliance is therefore an important 
sector-wide legitimisation tool for networks and coalitions. However, it is influenced by resource 
dependence and isomorphic factors (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer and Salancik, 
2003). The study finds limited evidence of the use of coercive pressures by networks and coalitions with 
regards to self-regulation where formal sanctions are applied to non-compliant NNGDOs. This is due to 
the voluntary and weak nature of their enforcement. For example, due to financial and capacity 
constraints, the networks and coalitions are unable to conduct proper enforcement of self-regulatory 
mechanisms such as annual field monitoring and evaluation of members.  
Networks and coalitions are also reluctant to strictly enforce self-regulation for fear of losing members 
which indirectly affects revenue performance, status and legitimacy. Since their strength depends on 
having large membership base, it is in their interest to regulate members with a ‘soft touch’ rather than an 
‘iron hand’ which makes under-regulation very common. Similar occurrences of the weak nature of self-
regulation among NGDOs have been reported in the literature (Alikhan et al., 2007; Gugerty, 2010; 
Burger, 2012). Self-regulation is also influenced by institutional capacity and professional norms of the 
sector. Due to weak and voluntary enforcement, self-regulation produces selection bias and reinforces 
structures of asymmetrical power relations where well-established and vocal NNGDOs are able to 
circumvent punishment (e.g. expulsion and refusal for third party endorsement) for non-compliance. The 
personalised nature of NNGDOs makes it possible for leaders to use their strong connections in capturing 
and influencing networks and coalitions to serve their interests. Organisational characteristics including 
size, age and leadership style is crucial in determining NNGDOs’ position within networks and coalitions.  
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Although networks and coalitions are assumed as a level-playing ground for members, the empirical 
finding suggests that this is not the case because of weak regulatory mechanisms. This study finds no 
evidence of NNGDOs’ use of certification clubs in the absence of self-regulatory mechanisms. In fact, 
none of the networks and coalitions reported engaging in voluntary clubs and certification. In light of this, 
NNGDOs have resorted to sector-specific standards and voluntary codes of conduct albeit their 
enforcement remains lax. This tends to reinforce power imbalance among NNGDOs. This is explained in 
detail in the section below. 
8.2.3 Power imbalance in NNGDOs’ institutional field  
Power imbalance occurs at two levels: i) between donors and NNGDOs and ii) within NNGDOs (i.e. 
between large and small). For donor-NNGDO relationships, differential access to resources results in 
power imbalance (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). NNGDOs’ dependence on donors for critical resources 
gives the later power to exercise control over the former. For example, some INGDOs are able to impose 
conditions that side-line NNGDOs whose organisational documents have been used in writing grant 
proposals in consortia upon approval (Section 7.2.2). This is due to NNGDOs’ dependence on INGDOs 
for critical resources. Power differential is also reinforced through project implementation where decision 
making on project conceptualisation, objectives and performance indicators are mostly INGDO driven. 
Moreover, project outsourcing by INGDOs indirectly supresses NNGDOs’ creativity and innovativeness 
because they are compelled to implement projects designed by INGDOs with relatively little input by 
NNGDOs. By doing so, it promotes mimetic isomorphism because NNGDOs are required to learn from 
the perceived robust governance structures of INGDOs. In addition, the unwillingness of donors to fund 
unsolicited proposals demonstrates the extent of power imbalance. This shows the extent to which donors 
exercise power over NNGDOs because of their resource discretion. They tend to regulate resource 
allocation through their funding modalities (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003).  
For NNGDOs, power imbalance also is exercised through consortia and coalitions. Power exists whenever 
an actor control resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). For example, through sub-grantee relationships, 
large NNGDOs who are members of coalitions act as ‘donors’ to small NNGDOs in project 
implementation. For this reason, their access to resources and ability to dictate terms of partnership makes 
them to wield enormous political power and control. Moreover, the findings point out that established 
NNGDOs are more willing to enter into relationships with small and weaker counterparts in order to 
control resources. The informal nature of partnership agreements makes it possible for large NNGDOs to 
reinforce their dominance over small NNGDOs in project implementation. This finding contradicts 
Casciaro and Piskorski’s (2005) argument that powerful organisations are less reluctant to cooperate with 
dependent organisations for fear of losing their powerful position as they may be forced to compromise 
on their autonomy. Discussion of power imbalance among NNGDOs in networks and consortia has 
received little critical attention in the NGDO literature. However, findings from this study indicate that 
power imbalance is a defining characteristic of NNGDOs’ networks and coalitions in terms of structural 
positions occupied by members and their resource endowments. The governance system of networks and 
coalitions also serves as an important mechanism for sustaining power imbalance because it determines 
the extent of autonomy and use of agency.  
Although NNGDOs are embedded in power structures, they are not without agency which helps them to 
negotiate unequal relationships. For example, when it is difficult for NNGDOs in networks and coalitions 
to negotiate unequal power relations, they employ the tactic of escape by changing domains where they 
fall out from the networks and coalitions to set up transactional networks (Section 5.8.3). Breakaway 
results from unequal power relations, exploitation, lack of perceived benefits and personal differences. 
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This demonstrates the agentic ability of NNGDOs and their freedom to decide and strategically respond 
to conditions of unequal power relations.  
8.3 Cost recovery 
Cost recovery involves the combination of strategies and tactics ranging from defiance to avoidance of 
donor control. In particular, it highlights that NNGDOs create reserves by dismissing donor financial 
procedures. They dismiss donor financial guidelines because it conflicts with their organisational quest 
for survival. Dismissal represents an active exertion of NNGDOs’ agency. NNGDOs deliberately ignore 
explicit norms and values about financial management through concealment where they disguise their 
non-conformance in order to be recognised as legitimate actors by donors and other stakeholders. As the 
empirical findings highlight, concealment occurs when savings are made from projects without disclosure 
to donor representatives.  
Given the challenge of not having overheads covered, NNGDOs conceal their financial information to 
cater for overheads. By doing so, on paper, they pretend to be following donors’ budget lines but in reality, 
inaccurate financial information is presented. They disguise their nonconformity because making a 
disclosure has repercussions on subsequent fund disbursement. The creation of reserves through 
concealment ensures their survival in the absence of donor funding. Similar accounts of concealment has 
been reported in the literature (Townsend et al., 2004; Wallace et al., 2006; Elbers and Arts, 2011; Awuah-
Werekoh, 2015). For example, Elbers and Arts (2011) suggest that NNGDOs in Ghana and India 
employed the tactic of misrepresenting information to donors especially when disclosure is perceived as 
a threat to organisational survival. Similarly, Ebrahim (2002) reports of NNGDOs’ ability to divert funds 
for projects donors are unwilling to support through buffering strategies.  
The empirical findings point to a lack of clear distinction between concealment and buffering tactics as 
suggested by Oliver (1991). This is because NNGDOs use their conformance to accounting procedures 
as a window dressing approach in order present a desired image of themselves to donors which helps in 
securing legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). I contend that most NNGDOs conceal savings from donor 
resources to create buffer as a mechanism for ensuring resource stability and organisational survival in 
the absence of donor projects. The empirical findings suggest that the use of informality and personal 
connections between NNGDOs and donor representatives to some extent facilitates concealment. 
Personal connections create opportunities for extending NNGDO-donor relationships beyond formal 
bureaucratic and professionalised processes and paper work. The creation of reserves through 
concealment points to NNGDOs’ ingenuity and creativity and it is an unintended consequence of donors’ 
coercive pressures and increased interest for short-term results. However, it raises questions about the 
extent to which donors’ behaviour and practices indirectly perpetuate the use of concealment by 
NNGDOs. Thus, NNGDOs exercise agency by engaging in subtle resistance strategies not open to public 
scrutiny.  
Projectised donor funding has created a mentality of generating reserves in periods of abundance. This is 
reinforced by elements of mimetic isomorphism where NNGDOs copy other successful organisations able 
to build their own office space through reserves from projects (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Despite the 
heightened financial accountability mechanisms and the release of funds in tranches aimed at curving 
perceived negative financial practices, NNGDOs are able to circumvent such complex donor processes. 
The creation of reserves through concealment highlights the chasm between donors’ quest for financial 
transparency and ground-level realities. This is not to suggest that NNGDOs engaged in corrupt practices, 
rather it demonstrates the extent to which funding challenges compel NNGDOs to make active choices to 
circumvent stringent donor financial systems by becoming more efficient in the usage of resources.  
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In the next section, I discuss NNGDOs’ strategy of branding and visibility to illustrate how they 
manipulate their operating environment.  
8.4 Brand and visibility  
In manipulating their operating environment, NNGDOs constantly engage in the construction of 
organisational identity to influence the perception of stakeholders. Given the socially constructed nature 
of reputation, NNGDOs build their organisational brand by becoming more visible in order to influence 
stakeholders. When NNGDOs are perceived as legitimate, it increases their chances for resource 
mobilisation (Suchman, 1995; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). In contrast to Oliver’s (1991) prediction that 
organisations employ manipulation strategy when the need for legitimacy is low (Table 3.2), the empirical 
findings indicate that for NNGDOs, branding as a manipulation strategy is employed when the need for 
legitimacy is high. What might account for the differences in the predictive factors between the empirical 
findings and Oliver’s prediction is that her typology is not exhaustive in capturing all the strategic 
responses employed by NNGDOs because it only explains institutional processes rather than wider 
environmental dynamics.  
Branding as a legitimacy seeking strategy reflects institutionalist arguments that organisations are 
embedded in institutional contexts where their actions are judged based on conformance to acceptable 
guidelines which they gives them legitimating rights (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983). NNGDOs are perceived as legitimate based on their expert capacity and speciality within a 
particular operating field. Their expert capacity is akin to pragmatic legitimacy because of the assumption 
that it serves the interests and needs of stakeholders. At the same time, for NNGDOs with high cognitive 
legitimacy, there is no need for justifying their actions because they have become taken-for-granted 
(Suchman, 1995). Organisational branding reflects both institutional and strategic approach to legitimacy. 
Strategically, NNGDOs initiate tactics to enhance their visibility and legitimacy such as publication of 
impact stories with the aim of marketing their achievements when engaging stakeholders. Largely, it 
demonstrates the use of managerial agency in the construction of legitimacy where evidence-based 
approach aimed at furthering the interests of the organisation is employed. 
However, as institutionalists would argue, legitimacy is socially constructed by stakeholders independent 
of managerial agency. For this reason, stakeholders confer legitimacy on NNGDOs (Meyer and Rowan; 
1977; Meyer et al., 2013). I contend that NNGDOs’ legitimacy is both socially conferred and internally 
generated because they tend to have control over their internal legitimacy based on management decisions. 
From a socially constructed understanding, branding and evidence-based approach is aimed at seeking 
passive rather than active legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). A plausible explanation for the use of passive 
legitimacy by NNGDOs is because of their upward accountability to donors where they seek to achieve 
moral legitimacy (i.e. procedural and structural). For procedural legitimacy, NNGDOs embrace socially 
accepted procedures such as reporting to donors and government agencies through the submission of 
financial statements and project reports. It can be argued that NNGDOs’ procedural legitimacy is fuelled 
in part by regulative elements of institutions which results in coercive isomorphism (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995). On the other hand, the use of evidence-based approach represents structural 
legitimacy because NNGDOs present themselves to donors as ‘right organisations for the job’ based on 
their previous experience. In doing so, organisational technical capacity and identity becomes 
mechanisms for attaining structural legitimacy because it is an indication of perceived effectiveness.  
NNGDOs’ identity is a useful differentiation strategy for gaining competitive advantage over peers 
(Barman, 2002). As the empirical findings demonstrate, image is key to promoting differentiation because 
it determines the legitimacy NNGDOs garner from stakeholders. To this end, the assumption is that 
‘image is everything’ but this is always not the case because in many instances, NNGDOs’ authority and 
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reputation depend on the extent of their socially constructed legitimacy. Reputation is influenced in part 
by organisational visibility which can be a useful impression-creating tactic. In projecting a desired image 
of themselves, NNGDOs constantly engage with the media in order to share information about their 
programmes. 
8.4.1 NNGDO-Media engagement 
Aside from its legitimacy enhancing capabilities, branding through mainstream media is a useful 
marketing and publicity strategy. Media engagement has become an emerging trend of NNGDOs’ 
advertising mainly because of the lack of awareness about their operations. Against this backdrop, they 
use publicity strategies to increase their presence and promote organisational awareness within 
mainstream media outlets. The aim is to influence key stakeholders to support them and it is part of the 
communication practices employed by NNGDOs to ensure their sustainability. Many NNGDOs are 
increasingly becoming obsessed with advertising their programmes by employing sophisticated 
technologies used by private business companies. NNGDOs are building strong alliances and 
collaborative networks with media outlets to enhance their brand and bolster legitimacy because increased 
media engagement results in brand acceptance. Since the media is an important source of normative 
pressures, NNGDOs are cautious not to have negative media coverage because credibility is precarious 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995).  
NNGDO leaders use their personal connections to get publicity in mainstream media. Personal 
connections extend beyond NNGDO and donor circles to wider stakeholders. However, the distinction 
between media and NNGDOs is blurred because of their media-savviness. Through their personal 
connections, they are able to bargain with media outlets for getting coverage of their programmes while 
media outlets rely on them for expert views on policy discussions and development issues. Resource 
interdependency between NNGDOs and media outlets manifests in NNGDOs’ need for awareness 
creation about their programmes, demonstrate impact and build organisational brand while media outlets 
rely on news generated by NNGDOs to garner readers which increases their revenue potentials. Despite 
their interdependent relationships, media outlets wield much power because they decide their reporting 
priorities. Media engagement presents conflicting demands for NNGDO managers because of the need to 
balance organisational goals and increased media attention (Oliver, 1991:152). In addition, investing in 
organisational visibility as an impression creating tactic demands financial resources especially where 
NNGDOs are required to pay money before placing advertisements. Striking a balance between using 
resources for media coverage and supporting intended beneficiaries is a challenge because donors are 
unwilling to invest in NNGDOs visibility.  
Of interest to the discussion of NNGDOs’ visibility is the role played by charismatic leaders in garnering 
moral legitimacy from constituents. Suchman (1995:579) argues that moral legitimacy is assessed based 
on four criteria: i) output and consequences (is the NNGDO doing the right things for intended 
beneficiaries); ii) techniques and procedures (is the NNGDO doing things right by following procedures); 
iii) categories and structures (is the NNGDO the right organisation for the job); and iv) leaders and 
representatives (is there a right leader for the job). Concerning leaders and representatives, the personal 
legitimacy of powerful charismatic leaders helps NNGDOs to maintain their reputation with stakeholders 
through the protection of organisational culture to ensure avoidance of mission drift. Moreover, they shape 
legitimatisation processes by the adoption of consummate manipulative skills and strategies including 
‘personal branding’ (i.e. strategies used by NNGDOs leaders to promote themselves both online and 
offline). These individuals become the ‘face of the organisation’ and help in managing their public image 
through the building of inter-personal relations and moral authority within their fields of operations. While 
leaders’ personal branding is useful for enhancing visibility, it indirectly overshadows NNGDOs.  
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In the following section, I discuss how NNGDOs are becoming engaged with alternative channels in 
digital media to enhance their organisational visibility. 
8.4.2 Digital media and NNGDOs’ visibility  
In maintaining visibility, NNGDOs resort to digital media. This is on the basis that the way they present 
themselves determines their visibility, recognition and overall influence. NNGDOs rely on digital media 
including social networking platforms to get their information into the public domain by adopting 
journalistic values and practices into their communication strategies. Other scholars have reported of the 
increasing use of digital media by INGDOs in recent years (Powers, 2016; Walton, 2017; Jones, 2017). 
NNGDOs use digital media-centred publicities partly because their activities are localised at the regional 
and district levels which makes it difficult for uptake at the national level. Digital media has 
‘revolutionised’ NNGDOs’ knowledge management practices by reinforcing elements of professionalism. 
This is based on the need to professionalise their news making and knowledge generation strategies by 
hiring ‘knowledge experts’. Knowledge management is also driven by the evidence-based agenda of 
donors. In light of this, having a well-developed knowledge management system fits perfectly well into 
donors’ demands for transparent and accountable systems. Sharing of knowledge through digital media 
is therefore informed not only by legitimacy concerns but also by organisational learning processes. 
Implicitly, NNGDOs’ knowledge sharing is informed by extrinsic and intrinsic factors in the sense that 
organisational learning has been driven by uncertainty in their operating environment.  
Given the power and influence of social media in recent years, it is imperative for NNGDOs to learn by 
exploiting the opportunities it presents in garnering supports from the public. In this regard, managerial 
perception is crucial in processing information within their environment through scanning (Hambrick, 
1982; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). Managerial perception influences how change within the external 
environment is communicated to other members. Social media platforms play a crucial role in NNGDOs’ 
resource mobilisation and information dissemination practices because of its easy-to-use interactive 
platforms that enable organisations to communicate, narrate their story, disclose information and 
acknowledge donors. The study findings suggest that NNGDOs use social media for marketing activities 
and the mobilisation of resources rather than active engagement of stakeholders. In this regard, social 
media is one-way communication with little stakeholder engagement. Although it is useful for 
communicating to the general public because it provides greater access to information, it is somewhat an 
ineffective means for engaging wider audiences compared to mainstream media because its use is mostly 
restricted to targeted audience.  
This is also due to capacity challenges which make it impossible for small NNGDOs to engage in 
meaningful online dialogue. Although social media has the ability to promote accountability and 
transparency to stakeholders because of its dialogic and information sharing capacity, the lack of core 
knowledge capabilities and competencies is a challenge. While the use of social media platforms reflects 
the increasing diffusion of technological innovation, it is largely mediated and influenced by 
organisational capabilities. It appears that although many NNGDOs have recognised the benefits of social 
media for organisational sustainability by investing in digital communication strategies, there is the need 
for them to think strategically about ways of using it to engage key stakeholders. In the section that 




8.5 Conformance to institutional pressures through accountability  
NNGDOs’ multiple accountabilities relate to intended beneficiaries, peer organisations and donors with 
different expectations and demands. Faced with this dilemma, they respond to stakeholders whose 
demands are salient through sequential attention (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). An institutional 
understanding of NNGDOs’ accountability relates to the need for legitimacy which results in the 
promotion of isomorphic pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  
8.5.1 Coercive pressures and NNGDOs’ accountability systems 
In gaining organisational legitimacy, NNGDOs in conformance to institutional pressures have instituted 
accountability mechanisms by strengthening their governance and administrative systems. Enforcement 
of accountability mechanisms is exercised through two main coercive forces: government regulations and 
donor requirements. For government regulations, although the DSW exert some coercive influence over 
NNGDOs, this is relatively weak in the absence of a regulatory framework. NNGDOs are required by law 
to follow acceptable practices and standards such as the submission of annual financial statements and 
reports to the DSW for renewal of certificate of operation. However, many fail to do so because of the 
weak institutional regulatory capacity of the DSW. Institutions with weaker structures exert limited 
control over subordinates and this explains why the DSW is not able to properly regulate NNGDOs 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995).  
Coercive isomorphism occurs when resource providers exert formal and informal pressures on 
organisations to behave in certain acceptable ways exercised through the imposition of force, persuasion, 
invitation and co-optation. However, as mentioned previously, the use of force by the DSW is limited. 
Notwithstanding, there exists some degree of coercive pressures from MMDAs during the registration 
process. NNGDOs acquire an introductory letter from the MMDAs in which they in turn to operate in 
addition to a social enquiry report and recommendation by the DSW Officer prior to registration. Before 
such documents are issued, they have to meet requirements including certificates to commerce business, 
incorporation and recognition, board members and their ability to pay for registration fees15. The empirical 
findings suggest that although the central government exercises limited coercive pressures on NNGDOs, 
the role of decentralised local government agencies in promoting coercive pressures cannot be 
underestimated.  
The use of registration requirements reflects regulative element of institutions as suggested by 
institutionalists (e.g. Scott, 1995). Coercive isomorphism is also manifested through government’s ability 
to influence how NNGDOs mobilise funding and also to close down supposedly non-compliant 
organisations. However, due to the weak capacity of the DSW, there have been limited attempts to de-
register or close down non-compliant NNGDOs. The limited use of coercive pressures is due partly to 
NNGDOs’ low dependence on government resources. Compliance with coercive pressures occurs when 
dependence and resource criticality are high (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). 
However, given NNGDOs’ low dependence on government resources, some are able to flout government 
regulatory requirements because the degree of legal coercion is perceived as low. This is in line with 
Oliver’s (1991) prediction that when enforcement of regulatory mechanism is weak or applied 
infrequently, it provides incentives for organisations to resist compliance because the anticipated 
consequence of non-compliance is minimal. In an interesting contrast, recent studies report of excessive 
coercive government pressures on NGDOs which is leading to shrinking operational space (e.g. Dupuy et 
al., 2015; Wood, 2016).  
                                                          
15 The DSW charges US$1,500 for INGDOs while national, regional and district level NNGDOs pay US$500, 
US$200 and US$100 respectively as of May 2016. 
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What might account for differences in findings is the lack of a regulatory environment for the activities 
of NNGDOs in Ghana and the enjoyment of strong relationship with the government following the 
adoption of democracy. In relative terms, democratic governments tend to welcome NNGDOs’ 
involvement in development and political processes compared to authoritarian regimes. 
NNGDOs’ dependence on donors for resources gives them much power to exert coercive pressures by 
imposing conditionalities and demanding adherence to certain managerial practices. This includes the 
standardisation of project-based reporting formats, submission of registration certificates, monthly and 
quarterly review reports and following procurement procedures among many others (Appendix 10 and 
11). In enforcing stricter monitoring and reporting of financial requirements, NNGDOs produce receipts 
of all itemised expenses and transactions. While the implementation of such accountability mechanisms 
is invariably stringent, some NNGDOs are able to bargain and influence conditions perceived as 
unattainable and threat to organisational survival. NNGDOs’ ability to negotiate and influence donors 
depends on the degree of resource dependence and other organisational characteristics including 
reputation and leadership qualities. NNGDOs solely dependent on donors often habit and comply with 
transparent and accountable reporting systems (Oliver, 1991). The aim is to ensure the continual inflows 
of resources. In contrast, NNGDOs with diversified funding streams defy donor conditions. This finding 
complements prior studies of NNGDOs ability to negotiate with donors on their reporting requirements 
(see Ebrahim, 2003; Wallace et al., 2006). However, it contradicts Awuah-Werekoh’s (2015:221) finding 
that an NNGDO in Ghana was at the ‘‘mercy of donors’’, hence its inability to negotiate or dismiss donor 
conditionalities for fear of being replaced. While the finding may be valid because it demonstrates 
NNGDOs’ political weakness and dependence, it paints a bleak picture of their inability to exercise 
agency. Such assertion focuses on constraints by external forces and ignore low-power actors agency 
which represents a weakness in the mainstream NGDO literature.  
8.5.2 Mimetic and normative pressures from compliance 
An unintended consequence of NNGDOs’ compliance with donor requirements is the promotion of 
upward accountability and its associated professionalisation. Donors’ onerous reporting requirements 
involve the use of financial and accounting management software like QuickBooks that helps NNGDOs 
to manage their internal accounting procedures, budget planning and improve the quality of financial 
reports to donors. In addition, the use of online application and submission platforms such as PADOR 
and PROSPECT seek to promote transparency and accountability in the application process and also 
monitor how project funds are managed. This has resulted in changes in the submission processes where 
NNGDOs are required to submit comprehensive project proposals involving the use of budget templates 
(Appendix 11). Donor requirement for transparency and accountability has caused NNGDOs to ‘upgrade’ 
their governance systems and structures by hiring more professionals. This is on the basis that having 
loose organisational structures and systems could result in withdrawal of funding, cutting of existing ties 
and disqualification from applying for future funding. Improvement in organisational governance system 
is symbolically used in maintaining legitimacy. This has become necessary because of the absence of 
good management practices which in the past resulted in the mismanagement of donor funds.  
Another mechanism for promoting professionalisation is the use of development consultants in the writing 
of grant proposals. They have become an impression creating strategy because they bring ‘external 
blessings’ through professional legitimacy. This is due to their ability to assure donor confidence through 
ceremonial conformity which helps NNGDOs’ governance and reporting systems from being questioned 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Suchman, 1995). Nonetheless, it raises concerns about the implications of the 
increasing use of consultants. It leads to the neglect of NNGDOs’ own human resource development. 
Development consultants promote mimetic and normative isomorphism among NNGDOs.  
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Mimetic isomorphism occurs when NNGDOs incorporate institutionalised best practices and procedures 
from other organisations (e.g. hiring consultants) within their institutional fields. For example, many small 
and medium-sized NNGDOs faced with capacity challenges and uncertainty of securing donor funding 
imitate successful NNGDOs by using consultants who have secured funding in writing their grant 
proposals. Imitation has become the norm and illustrates how the emphasis on consultants is fuelling the 
promotion of homogenisation of institutional fields. For instance, the majority of NNGDO leaders 
reported that ‘‘money-making consultants’’ only do ‘‘cut and paste job’’ where they tweak proposals of 
NNGDOs because of template-based applications which results in accusations of stolen project ideas. 
Consultants therefore promote mimetic isomorphism among NNGDOs.  
In addition, they reinforce normative pressures by serving as knowledge brokers between NNGDOs and 
donors. This is informed by their ability to properly communicate, write, speak and understand donor 
jargon. Normative isomorphism influences the language used by consultants because of their shared 
norms and beliefs acquired through their education and experience. Based on expert knowledge, they act 
as boundary spanners who help NNGDOs to negotiate challenges associated with complex donor 
application processes. Normative isomorphism is reinforced through trainings, workshops and 
conferences organised by donors and consultants during project implementation. As part of donors’ 
sustainability rhetoric, organising training programmes and workshops on proposal writing has become a 
taken-for-granted norm, hence promoting normative isomorphism. From a donor perspective, the extent 
to which an NNGDO becomes professionalised is an indicator of its perceived technical and 
organisational capacity. Such normative assumptions tend to favour well-established NNGDOs to the 
neglect of small NNGDOs.  
Aside from development consultants, donors’ emphasis on performance-based payment and payment-by-
results through external verification agencies put normative pressures on NNGDOs. The study’s findings 
show that NNGDOs are expected to undertake their programmes and activities based on standardised 
guidelines set by external verification agencies. They claim to provide an ‘objective and reliable’ 
assessment of project outcomes through ‘arms-length facilitation’ based on their specialised knowledge 
and expert advice. The rationale is to exercise control over their area of expertise. This indicates that 
although professional associations do not have the coercive powers of the state, they shape and influence 
organisational behaviour through the imposition of ‘soft rules’ derived from the support and power 
granted them by donors (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991). In this regard, NNGDOs seek 
endorsement of professional agencies to generate legitimacy. In this respect, they play an important role 
in NNGDOs’ internal decision-making processes as they transmit donor perspectives into NNGDOs’ 
daily operations. In promoting corporate-governance and operational management principles, NNGDOs 
use auditing and accounting firms as part of donors’ auditing culture. This reinforces what I call ‘straight-
jacket managerialism’ where they are compelled to follow a predetermined auditing format. The 
homogenising tendency is part of the wider aid architecture that relies mostly on prototypes. Design of 
standard auditing templates put mimetic pressures on NNGDOs as they become similar in their reporting.  
8.6 Strategic planning 
As part of their rationalisation processes, NNGDOs have adopted strategic planning and restructuring of 
organisational performance as strategies for dealing with uncertainty. By doing so, the aim is to promote 
efficiency and effectiveness in their operations. The empirical findings suggest that in periods of resource 
abundance, NNGDOs ignore discussion of strategic planning in decision-making and management 
processes. In addition, they are ill-prepared for strategic planning. However, on-going uncertainty in their 
operating environment is compelling them to engage in rational management in resource allocation and 
usage to ensure sustainability through organisational change.  
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As the empirical findings demonstrate, organisational change is driven by external forces which require 
NNGDOs to adapt to their changing environments. However, adaptation can be exciting but also terrifying 
because managing successful organisational change depends on key characteristics including leadership 
and management. For NNGDOs, strategic planning is both a management and leadership tool. Against 
this backdrop, effective implementation of strategic planning depends on leadership capacity and 
coordination between staff. Organisational leadership capacity is crucial in overcoming managerial 
challenges.  
Strategic planning is not a rational decision-making process because it involves coordination and 
negotiation between leadership and staff. Since NNGDOs operate in open and complex environments, it 
creates bounded rationality in decision-making processes due to lack of knowledge about alternative 
decisions (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). Rational decision-making for strategy formulation remains limited 
because of bounded rationality which creates effect uncertainty (Milliken, 1987). It therefore requires 
interaction and learning from stakeholders including NNGDOs staff due to the ‘wisdom of the crowd 
mentality’. In this regard, strategic planning involves team-decision making (top-down and bottom-up 
elements where the views of all employees are consulted). This promotes decentralisation of decision-
making through delegation of responsibility which ensures downward inflow of power in decision-making 
processes. However, the extent of decentralisation is context specific and depends on leadership style. In 
most NNGDOs, although consultation of staff and organisational strategising is more inclusive, 
identification of strategic priorities is left to senior management. Nonetheless, a shared understanding of 
organisational culture among staff and board minimises potential tensions. Strategic planning creates 
space for superiors and subordinates to discuss and deliberate reasons for their existence and in doing so, 
ensures better communication and teamwork. Organisational culture also helps in managing tensions 
through iterative process of negotiation among employees and reflects the argument that institutions are 
created through shared and collective understanding of acceptable norms (Scott, 1995; Garud et al., 2007).  
An aspect of rationalisation relates to leadership succession. Clearly, NNGDOs are faced with 
management and leadership deficit because the operations of many revolve around one charismatic leader. 
Leadership transition management and succession planning although is important for organisational 
sustainability, there is little awareness and its implementation is poorly understood. This raises questions 
about NNGDOs’ organisational change and culture. Quite instructively, uncertainty in projectised funding 
and contract hiring make it difficult for NNGDOs to engage in dialogue with younger professionals to be 
mentored because of insecure employment conditions. Lack of mentorship is also fuelled by the practice 
where succession revolves around family members rather than grooming and identifying employees as 
successors. This is due to the highly` personalised nature of most small NNGDOs and the difficulty of 
separating family involvement in organisational management. Family involvement in NNGDOs presents 
a challenge for organisational leaders because succession largely occurs infrequently. This study finds 
limited evidence to suggest that NNGDO leaders are planning to resign, retire or leave their organisations 
(i.e. executive turnover) partly because many small NNGDOs are managed as ‘sole proprietorship and 
family business’. NNGDO leaders would want to protect their interests which make retirement and 
succession infrequent. Thus, the presence of charismatic leaders hinders the emergence and development 
of succession planning.  
I acknowledge that leadership succession in NNGDOs is organisation specific. However, the empirical 
findings indicate that familial succession and internal successors are the dominant form of succession 
planning practised. In this type of succession, ‘insiders’ who are family members or close allies of the 
founders are likely to serve as replacement in their absence. In this regard, familial succession is based on 
relational contracts and requires balancing family and organisational priorities. This research finds that 
although insider succession takes the form of internal promotion, final decision for replacement depends 
145 
 
mostly on family members who are part of the board of directors. They play roles in planning and 
recruiting potential leaders in the succession processes. The aim is to maintain family organisational 
culture. Involvement of insiders in succession planning ensures transmission and continuity of 
organisational values which is crucial for building credibility and legitimacy. Moreover, they help in 
maintaining social capital developed between the founders and their stakeholders. Nonetheless, too much 
family involvement is detrimental for effective leadership, innovations and creates tensions for 
organisational credibility and legitimacy. The empirical finding is in line with the argument that most 
small NNGDOs in countries like India have high family involvement in their leadership and governance 
structures (Jakimow, 2011; Harrison, 2017).  
Although inside succession is the most preferred form of executive succession reported by NNGDOs, the 
lack of resources to groom potential successors is a prominent concern. For instance, only two NNGDOs 
have the position of a deputy executive director, an indication of the absence of an internal successor to 
the founder. Consequently, this has dire implications when there is an abrupt departure. This is also not 
to suggest that the presence of deputies guarantees automatic succession. In the event of sudden departure, 
the dominant form of informal emergency succession planning strategy is the appointment of interim 
executive directors. However, emergency succession planning is shrouded in secrecy where NNGDOs 
leaders are unwilling to speak openly about their succession.  
The study’s finding is consistent with Pfeffer and Salancik’s (2003) argument that one internal strategy 
for dealing with uncertainty and dependency is executive succession. They maintain that administrators 
controlling organisations influence their structures, operations and practices. In this regard, when leaders 
are not performing, replacement becomes an inevitable survival strategy. Replacement of executives is 
likely to occur when incumbents’ power is relatively weak. However, it is difficult to replace NNGDOs’ 
leaders mainly because of the centrality of the founder. This makes it challenging for them to ‘let go’ in 
order to see leadership changes. They tend to promote their own personality and values in the day-to-day 
management of the organisation, hence creating difficulty for their values to be passed to ‘outsiders’. 
Founders’ syndrome is an important barrier to leadership succession. The empirical evidence 
demonstrates that founders’ syndrome is not restricted to younger and smaller organisations as highlighted 
in the literature (see Block and Rosenberg, 2002).  
The analysis highlights that both neo-institutional theory and Oliver’s typology fail to sufficiently provide 
an explanation of the underlying factors driving organisational change and how NNGDOs adapt to such 
changes. In particular, neo-institutional focuses on stability through conformance to institutional pressures 
rather than organisational change. On the other hand, while resource dependency theory highlights the 
role played by organisational leadership in managing uncertainty, it is relatively silent on strategic 
planning. In doing so, the existing theories fail to account for all the strategies employed by NNGDOs in 
ensuring their short-term survival and long-term sustainability. In the following section, I analyse 
NNGDOs’ avoidance and influencing strategies in order to demonstrate how NNGDOs exert relatively 
higher levels of agency when confronted with conflicting demands in their operational environment.  
8.7 Avoidance strategies  
Avoidance involves the use of two main tactics: i) outright donor rejection; and ii) suspension of 
relationship. Avoidance is mostly used by NNGDOs confronted with incompatible demands and 
dissatisfaction with existing relationships. NNGDOs using outright rejection are more selective in their 
choice of donors by accepting funding from those with goal congruence and whose demands are not 
burdensome. Outright rejection is possible because of the availability of multiple donors which results in 
low resource concentration. When dependency is moderate, NNGDOs use avoidance strategies to prevent 
exposure to donor demands (Oliver, 1991).  
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While acknowledging that avoidance is determined by the degree of resource dependence, its applicability 
is context specific. As the empirical findings indicate, although NNGDOs are highly dependent on donor 
resources, they reject their funding based on value incompatibility. In this vein, maintaining organisational 
legitimacy with intended beneficiaries rather than donors is a key driver of avoidance. This finding calls 
into question the assumption that NNGDOs’ legitimacy depends largely on the extent to which donors 
perceive them. For NNGDOs practising avoidance, legitimacy is equated to their ability to stick to their 
organisational principles and values without compromising it for donor resources. For this reason, they 
employ outright rejection when generating internal and moral legitimacy. In fact, since NNGDOs are 
located in an institutional environment, they strive to maintain legitimacy by conforming to institutional 
norms and external expectations (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1990; Suchman, 1995).  
NNGDOs seldomly use rejection when efforts to negotiate, persuade and balance donor demands fail. 
Outright rejection becomes the last resort. By engaging in processes of negotiation, persuasion and 
balancing, NNGDOs seek to buy time to look for alternative resources and put in place strategies for 
mitigating potential consequences. This approach is similar to Pfeffer and Salancik’s (2003) idea of 
sequential attention. Implicitly, NNGDOs do not make a hasty decision when using outright rejection. It 
involves deliberative organisational decision-making processes where the positives and negatives of 
rejection are weighed before a final decision is taken. If expected costs outweigh benefits to organisational 
long-term survival, then NNGDOs reject the funding because of commitments to organisational values. 
While NNGDOs reject donors, its application to intended beneficiaries is limited because of the need for 
legitimacy derived from claims of representation. Since NNGDOs’ existence depends on their 
representation of intended beneficiaries, it is impossible to reject them because they use claims of 
representation in seeking organisational legitimacy. Avoidance is not applicable to intended beneficiaries 
because it is impossible for NNGDOs to conceal and decouple their actions from public scrutiny since 
they live and work with the same constituents. Against this backdrop, they seek to cultivate good public 
image to prevent their actions and claims of representation from being questioned. It is plausible to argue 
that outright donor rejection is somewhat a reactive tactic and demonstrates high exertion of agency. At 
the initial stages, NNGDOs act as rational actors in accommodating donor interests. The empirical 
findings reveal that it is possible for an NNGDO to practice outright rejection with one donor, while 
acquiescing to the demands of another depending on the nature of their relationship, the extent of the 
demand and type of resources exchanged.  
Aside from outright donor rejection, NNGDOs suspend existing relationships with donors. By doing so, 
they complain by indicating their dissatisfaction to donors. After complaining, they negotiate to resolve 
their differences. However, if such negotiations fail, the available option is to suspend the relationship. In 
other words, a normal suspension tactic moves along a continuum: complain → negotiation → 
suspension. Negotiation helps NNGDOs and donors to address their differences. For example, although 
some NNGDOs reported being dissatisfied with donors, the need for resources compels them to come to 
the negotiating table. While negotiation may be an ideal strategy, some NNGDOs do not have the luxury 
of time to go through such gradual processes but might decide to directly suspend their relationship. Direct 
suspension occurs when: i) donors question NNGDOs’ action; ii) concealment is detected; and iii) a donor 
deliberately terminates a contract because of non-performance. In instances where concealment is 
detected, NNGDOs suspend their relationship as a face-saving strategy. In doing so, they seek to protect 
their already damage reputation as a way of regaining loss of legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
Suchman, 1995). Suspension allows NNGDOs to be reintegrated back into their institutional environment. 
This can be considered a manipulation strategy of shaping values aimed at influencing the perception of 
stakeholders (Oliver, 1991). In the following section, I analyse and discuss how NNGDOs influence 
stakeholders within their operating environment based on informality and personal connections.  
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The aim here is to highlight the role of informal networks, connections and personal contacts as part of 
NNGDOs strategic options for managing uncertainty. 
8.8 Influencing strategies  
Influencing strategies are aimed at shaping the agenda of donors and other stakeholders. The rationale is 
to alter their institutional environment in order to make it more adaptable (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). In 
doing so, NNGDOs employ a combination of tactics ranging from compromise to manipulation. These 
tactics indicate that NNGDOs exercise a higher degree of agency by moving from passivity to active 
resistance of institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991). Influencing is both an active and passive strategy in 
the sense that by negotiating, NNGDOs become ‘active recipients’ while succumbing to donor demands 
as ‘passive recipients’. However, this does not imply loss of agency but rather an opportunistic act to 
further their survival interest because they act as rational and active agents. A common compromise tactic 
is bargain where NNGDOs negotiate with donors and other stakeholders about unfavourable conditions 
and policies that threaten their survival. This is influenced by existing resource interdependency.  
Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) and Oliver (1991) argue that interdependency results in high 
interconnectedness between organisations. In such contexts, organisations employ less active strategies 
of acquiesce and compromise. For this reason, given the high interdependency between NNGDOs and 
donors, reaching a consensus on unachievable project targets is easier. However, the ability to negotiate 
depends on key organisational characteristics such as leadership style and reputation. Organisational 
reputation is a key determinant of its authority and ability to influence actors within its environment. This 
resonates with resource dependency and institutionalist arguments that resources exist in both tangible 
and intangible forms (Suchman, 1995; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). Unlike Elbers and Arts (2011) who 
found in Ghana that the use of influencing strategy is limited to well-established NNGDOs, this study’s 
finding indicates that influencing is used irrespective of organisational size. Small NNGDOs are able to 
influence unfavourable donor conditions because of intra-organisational dynamics including leadership 
and the extent of one’s personal connections. NNGDO leaders act as ‘boundary spanners’ who forged 
personal relations with donor representatives. They use their personal networks and connections to 
influence donor and government officials by ‘‘going behind to cut corners’’ and in many instances engage 
them personally to discuss ground level realities.  
I contend that since most donor representatives and government officials have Ghanaian social identities 
and are embedded in relations of ‘family and friends’, it is difficult for them to escape the local cultures 
within which they are situated which resolves mostly around informality. The findings question the 
assumptions of a formalised patron-client relationship between NNGDOs and donors by indicating that 
their relationship is sometimes framed around informal networks and personal contacts. Similar finding 
has been reported in the literature about how NNGDOs in Ghana use their personal networks when 
engaging with government officials (Alikhan et al., 2007). This points to the need to look beyond formal 
requirements and processes in discussion of NNGDO-donor relations. NNGDOs’ ability to influence 
donor and government officials is determined by the extent to which their leaders are perceived as ‘big 
men’ and ‘well-connected’. The use of personal connections within the NNGDO sector is a normal 
practice for circumventing complex processes. They are essential resources for NNGDO leaders but the 
study finds no evidence to suggest that personal connections are used for engaging in corrupt practices 
that damages organisational reputation. Thus, there is limited use of co-optation tactics by NNGDOs as 
they tried to manipulate their environment. This is in contrast to the argument by Oliver (1991) and Pfeffer 
and Salancik (2003) that organisations could manipulate their external environment by co-opting the 
source of institutional pressures and uncertainty.  
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Although it is possible for NNGDOs to co-opt donor and government officials through the appointments 
on NNGDOs’ board, there is limited evidence from this research to back such claims. This is also not to 
deny that co-optation is not employed by NNGDOs. 
In terms of specific manipulative practices, NNGDOs explain and educate donor and government officials 
to understand ground level difficulties associated with the implementation of projects. In doing so, they 
dwell on their field level experience and achievements through evidence-based advocacy to make 
persuasive arguments. However, its success depends on positive trust developed with stakeholders over 
time. In addition, the national identities of donor representatives who served as ‘national development 
experts’ played a role in allowing for the use of influencing strategies because it helps to better understand 
the conditions within which NNGDOs operate. Oliver (1991) hypothesised that in a resource-constrained 
environment, organisations employ acquiescence because of their dependence. However, findings from 
this study indicate that, even in context of high dependency, NNGDOs are proactive in using active 
strategy of manipulation to ensure organisational survival. This finding questions and exposes limitations 
associated with Oliver’s (1991) typology in explaining the diverse strategies employed by NNGDOs. NIT 
and RDT are silent on the discussion of personal connections and the role they play in NNGDOs’ survival 
strategies. In short, the findings presented in this chapter raises questions about the way in which 
NNGDOs’ survival and sustainability in a resource-constrained is framed in the existing literature because 
of their narrow focus on institutional control rather than the broad range of strategies available to 
NNGDOs in managing organisational change. 
8.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a detailed analysis and discussion of the strategies developed by NNGDOs and 
their leaders in responding to uncertainty in their operating environment. The analysis and discussion of 
the findings have been informed by the literature on NNGDOs’ management and strategic options and 
the theoretical frameworks developed which drew insights from RDT, NIT and Oliver’s typology of 
strategic responses. This chapter has clearly demonstrated that although NNGDOs are constrained in their 
institutional and resource-dependent environment, they actively engage in devising active strategies, 
categorised into: i) resource diversification; ii) networking and partnerships; iii) cost recovery; iv) 
branding and visibility; v) conformance to institutional pressures; vi) strategic planning; vii) avoidance; 
and viii) influencing that guarantees their autonomy, independence and long-term sustainability.  
The chapter has clearly demonstrated that the ability of NNGDOs to pursue new strategies is influenced 
by their external environment. In particular, it highlights that while NNGDOs are seeking alternative 
resources in their external environment, its potential for ensuring their sustainability remains limited. In 
addition, the chapter has argued that although donors seem to be spearheading the NNGDOs’ 
sustainability discourse, they are not proactive in helping NNGDOs to develop strategies for reducing 
their resource dependency. This demonstrates the difficulty faced by NNGDOs in their attempt to 
circumvent uncertainty in their operating environment. The chapter has highlighted the centrality of 
NNGDOs’ agency, despite dependency. The findings in this chapter point to some broader conclusions 
and implications about NNGDOs’ strategic responses for ensuring their sustainability which will be 




Chapter Nine: Conclusion 
9.0 Introduction 
This thesis has explored how national non-governmental development organisations (NNGDOs) in Ghana 
respond to on-going changes and uncertainty in their operating environment. Sources of uncertainty 
include shifts in donor funding modalities and priorities, Ghana’s transition to lower-middle-income status 
and the subsequent decline in external funding. This thesis sought to understand how NNGDOs reacted 
to protect their long-term sustainability. This research has demonstrated that although NNGDOs are 
constrained by resource dependence and institutional pressures in their external environment, they are 
active agents, deploying a wide range of strategies to ensure their long-term sustainability.  
In particular, this research has demonstrated that NNGDOs’ pursuit of donor resources is a strategic 
choice: NNGDOs are willing to accept dependency on donor resources as long as it furthers their quest 
for survival. The exercise of dependency and agency at the same time leads to what I call a ‘dependent 
agency’ situation where NNGDOs subjugate themselves to structures within their operating environment 
as a mechanism for survival. In doing so, they strategically sacrifice their autonomy and independence in 
exchange for donor resources. NNGDOs’ dependent agency is akin to the idea of Faustian bargain where 
the poor becomes loyal to exploitative institutions and organisations to ensure their present survival no 
matter the long-term cost (Wood, 2003:468). This research has demonstrated that by becoming dependent 
agents, NNGDOs trade their autonomy in meeting their survival needs which implies an affirmation of 
dependency. However, I have argued that being a dependent agent does not imply NNGDOs are without 
agency. Rather, they opportunistically choose to be dependent in exchange for enhanced survival 
prospects. In this regard, by choosing to become dependent, NNGDOs exercised agency because their 
leaders were fully aware of their actions and its long-term implications. For this reason, I highlight that 
dependency does not preclude the exercise of agency especially when NNGDOs are able to make strategic 
choices in their operating environment. By highlighting the ‘dependent agency’ characteristics of 
NNGDOs, this thesis aim to be a corrective to the wider NGDO literature that conflates dependency with 
lack of proactivity. In an ever-changing and uncertain operating environment like Ghana, choosing to 
become dependent is an active strategy for survival. NNGDOs’ decision to become dependent agents is 
more complex than it is often assumed.  
The chapter is structured into five sections. First, it presents an overview of the research. This is followed 
by a summary of answers to the research questions. Section 9.3 sets out the original theoretical, empirical 
and methodological contributions of this research, and is followed by a discussion of the research 
limitations. An agenda for further research is discussed in the last section. 
9.1 Overview of the research 
This research adopts a critical realist ontology and relies on a mixed methods sequential explanatory 
design to understand NNGDOs’ strategic responses to uncertainty. In chapter one, I proposed two 
interrelated questions for understanding how NNGDOs react to uncertainty in their external environment: 
a) What different ideas and strategies have NNGDOs in Ghana developed in response to the changing 
opportunities and constraints arising from their uncertain external environment? 
b) To what extent do resource dependency theory, neo-institutional theory and Oliver’s typology of 




In chapter two, I examined the operating environment of NGDOs by focusing specifically on their 
conceptualisation and evolution within the global aid ecosystem. The next chapter presented and reviewed 
three frameworks for understanding NNGDOs’ strategic behaviour: RDT, NIT and Oliver’s typology of 
strategic responses. These frameworks were used in analysing my empirical findings. Chapter four then 
focused on the approach and the methods used in collecting and analysing the research data. I then 
presented empirical findings, starting with the context within which the study is situated. It also provided 
background information about the sampled NNGDOs. In chapter six, I presented the empirical findings 
on diversification as a dominant strategy employed by NNGDOs, while chapter seven explored other 
strategies for responding to uncertainty. In chapter eight, I analysed and discussed the findings from the 
empirical chapters through the lens of the three theoretical frameworks. 
9.2 Summary of research findings  
This section summarises the main findings of this research in order to address research questions outlined 
in chapter one.  
9.2.1 What different ideas and strategies have NNGDOs in Ghana developed in response to the 
changing opportunities and constraints arising from their uncertain external environment? 
My analysis suggests that NNGDOs and their leaders in Ghana have developed eight main strategies and 
nineteen tactics in response to their changing external environment to secure their short-term survival and 
long-term sustainability. Table 9.1 summarises the ideas and strategies developed by NNGDOs and how 
widely respondents referred to them as part of their response to uncertainty in their operating environment. 
Table 9.1 Summary of NNGDOs’ strategic responses and their prevalence 
Strategy Prevalence16 Section 
1. Diversification 
1.1 Commercialisation 25 6.1 
1.2 Domestic resource mobilisation 19 6.2 
1.3 Thematic diversification  20 6.4.1 
1.4 Operational diversification 7 6.4.2 
1.5 Locational diversification 23 6.4.3 
2. Networking and Partnership   
2.1 Consortia 17 7.2.1 
2.2 Network and coalitions 29 7.2.3 
3.   Cost Recovery   
3.1 Operating reserves 23 7.3.1 
3.2 Building and moving office space 14 7.3.2 
3.3 Downsizing staff and operations 23 7.3.3 
3.4 Restructuring of operations 12 7.3.3 
  
                                                          
16 Prevalence here refers to the number of times the strategies were discussed and coded across interviews about a 
sample of 32 NNGDOs. It enumerates the number of NNGDOs that were described as having in one way or the 




4.   Branding and Visibility   
4.1 NNGDO-media engagement 22 7.4 
  5.  Conformance to institutional  pressures   
  5.1 Strengthening governance systems  30 7.5 
  6.   Strategic planning   
6.1 Strategic plans and policies 25 7.6 
6.2 Succession planning 9 7.6 
7.   Avoidance strategies   
7.1 Outright rejection 8 7.7 
7.2 Suspension of relationship 12 7.7 
8.   Influencing strategies   
8.1 Negotiating 14 7.8 
8.2 Interpersonal relations 26 7.8 
Source: Authors’ construct 2017 
The analysis in this thesis has highlighted that some strategies are potentially more transformative in 
promoting NNGDOs’ short-term survival and longer-term sustainability than others. In particular, I have 
shown that while resource diversification in commercialisation is the most prevalent strategy, its potential 
for guaranteeing NNGDOs’ financial autonomy remains limited. This is because many NNGDOs’ 
commercial initiatives are in their experimentation stages. In addition, the analysis has demonstrated that 
self-financing activities are associated with high revenue volatility especially in contexts where NNGDOs 
depend on donor resources as start-up capital. This research has questioned the assumption prevalent in 
wider mainstream literature that self-financing activities guarantee organisational autonomy and reduces 
revenue volatility among NNGDOs.  
This thesis further highlights the prevalence of thematic and locational diversification among NNGDOs. 
The analysis suggests that NNGDOs engage in these strategies because they are perceived as the most 
viable options for ensuring their short-term survival by becoming dependent on donor resources. As the 
analysis demonstrates, while dependency might not be a potentially transformative strategy in the short-
term, it often remains the best or least worst option for ensuring NNGDOs’ survival long-enough to 
maintain organisational autonomy and independence, and hence long-term sustainability prospects also. 
Although the mobilisation of domestic resources is more potentially transformative in ensuring the long-
term sustainability of NNGDOs, it is also highly risky, and has been given relatively little attention by 
NNGDOs. This is an indication that while NNGDOs act as rational and active agents in pursuing their 
sustainability, donors’ emphasis on achieving short-term results rather than investment in long-term 
sustainability compels them to make active choices by being dependent on donor resources. However, 
this does not imply NNGDOs’ passivity in their dependency. 
The evidence collected indicates that the implementation of strategies varied widely among NNGDOs. It 
highlights that joining wider networks and coalitions at the national level was perceived by most to be 
potentially more transformative in ensuring their sustainability. However, I have contended that inter-
organisational cooperation did not occur through self-organisation or NNGDOs’ own deliberate initiative 
but rather it was a product of their reaction to external donor pressures. In doing so, I have shown the 
extent to which donor funding modalities has reconstructed NNGDOs’ organisational field. Given that 
inter-organisational cooperation is often not NNGDOs’ own initiative but rather donor driven, 
relationships are often episodic, superficial and dependent on donor funding. The empirical evidence 
demonstrates that although NNGDOs are structurally dependent on donor resources for survival, they are 
more proactive in strategising their dependency. NNGDOs’ dependency is an opportunistic strategy that 
ensures their survival. Dependency creates opportunity for NNGDOs to engage in ingenious practices by 
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manipulating existing donor financial accountability systems to their advantage. This helps them to create 
reserves in order to operate in periods of uncertainty. 
In concluding on the first research question, this thesis has shown that although NNGDOs are faced with 
uncertainty in their operating environment, they are active agents who are full of ideas and constantly 
formulating new strategies for ensuring their survival. However, some strategies tend to be potentially 
more transformative than others. In addition, implementation of the broad range of strategies at NNGDOs’ 
disposal is variable and dependent on contextual factors. In this regard, NNGDOs focus largely on the 
implementation of potentially less transformative strategies to ensure their short-term survival, even to 
the neglect of strategies that might enhance long-term sustainability prospects.   
9.2.2 To what extent do resource dependency theory, neo-institutional theory and Oliver’s 
typology explain NNGDOs’ dependency in Ghana?  
In answering this question, the aim is to understand the extent to which RDT, NIT and Oliver’s typology 
of strategic responses explain NNGDOs’ organisational behaviour in dealing with uncertainty in their 
external environment. It focuses on evaluating the usefulness of the theoretical frameworks in explaining 
the ideas and strategies employed by NNGDOs. 
To what extent does resource dependency theory (RDT) explain NNGDOs’ dependency? 
The research has demonstrated that NNGDOs’ external environment directly influences their strategic 
responses for dealing with uncertainty. In particular, RDT highlights NNGDOs’ dependence on 
stakeholders for critical resources. While the acquisition of resources bolsters survival chances, it exposes 
NNGDOs to external control. As the research has demonstrated in chapters five to seven, donors keep 
changing their funding priorities and modalities. In addition, domestic resource mobilisation remains 
limited in scope and unpredictable. Although RDT suggests that organisations engage in mergers and 
acquisitions to increase their dominance and power, the evidence gathered indicates that its applicability 
to small and medium-sized NNGDOs is limited because of their highly personalised nature and the 
difficulty of separating family businesses from organisational structures.  
This research has argued that RDT is useful for understanding power imbalance between INGDOs and 
NNGDOs in mobilising corporate funding and their engagement in consortia. The power imbalance is not 
limited to NNGDO-donor relations but also important within networks and coalitions where large 
NNGDOs due to their access to critical resources control small NNGDOs. The power imbalance is fuelled 
by donors’ policies that tend to sideline small NNGDOs with perceived capacity challenges. This is due 
to donors’ appetite for results where development management is framed through a technocratic lens. 
Moreover, power imbalance in resource exchange allows donors to exert a high influence over NNGDOs. 
However, this is not to suggest that NNGDOs are without agency. NNGDOs use compliance as a 
mechanism for accessing donor resources, and this is determined by the degree of dependence and 
availability of alternative resources. For example, NNGDOs in operational diversification dismissed 
donor demands for adding new programmes to their existing programme portfolios due to their low 
dependence. Moreover, avoidance is used because of their limited dependence on donor resources. From 
the perspective of RDT, it is plausible to suggest that NNGDOs employ influencing strategies to 
manipulate the external environment to their advantage. 
While the observations made in this research have resonance with RDT, it fails to account for the 
underlying factors that drive NNGDOs to adopt specific strategies. For example, this research has 
highlighted the importance of organisational leadership in the adoption of strategic responses through the 
forging of relationships with stakeholders in securing resources (e.g. funding, information, seeking 
support of intended beneficiaries and using personal brands to create reputation and legitimacy).  
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In sum, although RDT helps in explaining NNGDOs’ dependency, it does not offer a framework for 
understanding the underlying reasons that drive NNGDOs to employ different strategies in their external 
environment.   
To what extent does neo-institutional theory (NIT) explain NNGDOs’ dependency? 
The research has shown that NNGDOs’ dependency is influenced by coercive, normative and mimetic 
pressures in their institutional environment. It has revealed that donors and government agencies exercise 
coercive pressures in demanding accountability and transparency from NNGDOs. However, the 
Government of Ghana exercises limited coercive pressures on NNGDOs due to the weak capacity of the 
DSW and the absence of a regulatory framework. The government’s limited use of coercive pressure is 
due to NNGDOs’ low resource dependence. While networks and coalitions play important roles in 
NNGDOs’ operating environment, I have argued that they exercise limited coercive pressures on 
members due to their weak self-regulatory mechanisms. Although they have power of influencing funding 
opportunities for members especially when they are channelled through the secretariats, this did not imply 
the use of coercion.  
Given NNGDOs’ high dependence on donor resources, they exert a high degree of coercive pressure, 
exercised through informal and formal mechanisms linked to their funding requirements (e.g. counterpart 
funding, consortia and renewal of year-on-year certificates). In addition, donors exercise coercive 
pressures by demanding disclosure reports (e.g. submission of financial statements, interim and annual 
reports), performance evaluations (project, narrative and evaluation reports) and the strengthening of 
organisational governance and accountability structures as a condition for further funding. This is part of 
wider donor control over NNGDOs aimed at ensuring resource effectiveness and efficiency in order to 
achieve needed project results. NNGDOs tactically adhere to these coercive pressures due to their resource 
dependence because failure to comply with accountability requirements is detrimental to organisational 
survival. On the other hand, stronger NNGDOs, less dependent on one or a few donors are able to dismiss 
and negotiate the imposition of coercive pressures. 
Directly related to the above is donors’ ability to impose normative pressures on NNGDOs through 
professionalisation aimed at strengthening NNGDOs’ governance structures. As the research findings 
demonstrate, consultants and professional bodies put normative pressures on NNGDOs through the 
rhetoric of capacity building. Aside from this, the media subtly exercises normative pressures by ensuring 
NNGDOs’ accountability to stakeholders, because conforming to normative pressures from the media and 
general public is necessary to protect their credibility and legitimacy. Normative pressures also explain 
why NNGDOs give attention to their branding and visibility. However, the extent of this influence in 
promoting NNGDOs’ downward accountability remains limited. 
An unintended consequence of coercive and normative pressures is NNGDOs’ mimicry behaviour. This 
research has argued that mimetic isomorphism is driven by donors’ coercive pressures rather than 
uncertainty. For instance, consultants employed by donors to evaluate NNGDOs focus on standardised 
reporting formats while donor funding applications require NNGDOs to adhere to prescribed templates. 
In addition, NNGDOs mimic their counterparts by employing consultants in writing funding applications. 
As discussed in chapter six, donor funding requirements for counterpart funding has also led NNGDOs 
to mimic their peers in generating self-income. This thesis has again demonstrated that NNGDOs’ 
networks and coalitions act as an important mechanism for mimicking peers as members with perceived 
organisational capacity nurture their weak counterparts through best practices and benchmarking at the 
request of donors. I have argued that while network leaders have the power to initiate processes for 
benchmarking, their motivation is borne out of external donor pressures because of the need for structural 
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legitimacy. Benchmarking helps them to develop and protect their internal structures and corporate 
reputation from damage which increases their competiveness in resource acquisition. 
In sum, NIT provides insight into how NNGDOs’ institutional environment influences their strategic 
behaviour. It helps in understanding how and why the need for resources including organisational 
legitimacy compels NNGDOs to adhere to donors’ coercive and normative pressures. It also explains the 
mimicking behaviour of NNGDOs. However, this research highlights that NNGDOs mimic their peers 
not because of uncertainty in their operating environment but in response to coercive pressures exerted 
by donors. To this end, mimicking becomes a legitimisation tactic in response to donor demands. 
Moreover, neo-institutional theory fails to provide an explanation of other strategies, such as the use of 
volunteers, creation of reserves, strategic planning and influencing. 
How useful is Oliver’s typology in understanding NNGDOs’ dependency? 
The research has argued that Oliver’s typology is useful for explaining NNGDOs’ strategic responses to 
some extent. In particular, it highlights the use of acquiescence, compromise, defiance, avoidance and 
manipulation strategies by NNGDOs. NNGDOs acquiesce by complying with donor pressures to raise 
counterpart funding through self-financing. In doing so, they imitate peers within their external 
environment. I also introduced the idea of integration to explain how hybrid NNGDOs combine social 
and commercial missions together in dealing with institutional complexity arising from different 
institutional logics. Moreover, compromise and its associated tactics of pacifying and balancing are used 
in understanding how NNGDOs engage community volunteers and manage tensions associated with the 
mobilisation of domestic resources and mission change. 
This study further revealed that institutional and resource pressures compel NNGDOs to engage in 
avoidance strategies in safeguarding organisational values and principles. As analysed in chapter eight, I 
introduced outright rejection and suspension of relationships as avoidance tactics. I argued that outright 
donor rejection is used as last resort when efforts to negotiate, persuade and balance differences fail and 
its application is limited to donors rather than intended beneficiaries. On the other hand, suspension of 
relationship occurs when NNGDOs become dissatisfied with their engagement with donors. Suspension 
tactic moves along a continuum from complain-to-negotiation-to suspension. The study further highlights 
NNGDOs’ use of subtle resistance through concealment of financial information in creating reserves. In 
doing so, I have argued that the distinction between concealment and buffering tactics proposed by Oliver 
is blurred because when NNGDOs engaged in concealment, they decouple/buffer their practices through 
‘window dressing’. It also highlights the unintended effects of donors’ coercive pressures on NNGDOs’ 
management systems. NNGDOs manipulate their external environment by influencing stakeholder 
perception to gain resources.  
While RDT, NIT and Oliver’s typology offer insights, none of them provides a complete and coherent 
understanding of NNGDOs’ strategic behaviour and responses. While useful in explaining NNGDOs’ 
dependency, they fail to explain strategic planning and cost-recovery strategies identified in this research, 
for example. This thesis therefore points towards scope for both integrating and extending the insights 




9.3 Research contributions to knowledge 
9.3.1 Theoretical contributions  
While RDT, NIT and Oliver’s typology have been used to study NGDOs, this is the first comprehensive 
research to draw insights from all three theories in explaining NNGDOs’ strategic behaviour and 
responses. Theoretically, this research contributes to the NGDO literature by moving away from the 
structuralist focus on NNGDOs’ external environment to combine this with a fuller analysis of their 
agency and its determinants. In doing so, the integration of RDT, NIT and Oliver’s typology has provided 
a perspective for understanding the structural processes that constrain NGDOs, and also how they in turn 
use agency to circumvent such processes to secure short-term survival and long-term sustainability.  
This research has shown the interrelations between NNGDOs’ dependency and agency. For instance, 
donors’ increasing demand for results-based management represents a structural constraint on NNGDOs, 
it has also fostered an avenue for proactive response in the form of concealment of funds from donor 
projects. On the other hand, the exercise of agency through operational diversification, branding and 
visibility and donor influencing entail succumbing in part to structural forces of dependency. This study 
offers important theoretical insights into NNGDOs’ organisational behaviour by arguing that although 
they are embedded within deep institutional and resource dependency structures, they are not without 
agency. While the research has demonstrated the usefulness of applying RDT, NIT and Oliver’s typology 
together to the study of NNGDOs, it also reveals that none of the theories fully capture and explain all the 
strategies employed by NNGDOs in this research. In particular, I have expanded Oliver’s typology by 
adding tactics of integration, rejection and suspension of relationships as avoidance strategies. Moreover, 
while Oliver’s typology has been used to study organisational behaviour in management studies and non-
profit organisations, it has narrowly focused on NGDOs’ accountability and relationship with donors to 
the neglect of their wider external and internal environments. This research has used Oliver’s typology to 
understand NNGDOs’ survival and sustainability from an open-system perspective by examining the 
broad range of strategies available at their disposal. In doing so, it contributes to the literature on 
organisational theory by testing its applicability in understanding NNGDOs’ strategic behaviour. In this 
regard, I have argued that Oliver’s typology does not provide a complete understanding of strategies at 
the disposal of NNGDOs when confronted with uncertainty because it narrowly focuses on institutional 
processes. Theoretically, I have shown that the applicability of Oliver’s typology to understanding 
NNGDOs’ organisational behaviour in their external environment remains limited because it is static and 
does not take into account how NNGDOs respond to changes in their environment through their own 
internal structures and processes.  
For RDT, its application has helped in understanding how NNGDOs mobilise resources in their external 
environment to ensure their survival. It also explains the effect of NNGDOs’ resource dependence in 
exposing them to vulnerability, control and power imbalance. Moreover, RDT has shed light into how 
NNGDOs are able to manage their agency despite being dependent on donor resources through the 
application of avoidance strategies and strong leadership style. The co-existence of dependency and 
agency presents a paradox which I call ‘dependent agency’. The analysis has shown that RDT’s discussion 
of power imbalance focuses on macro rather than meso and micro-level dynamics. However, I have 
argued that power imbalance is not only limited to donor-NGDO relations but also among NNGDOs 
through networks and consortia.  
Following from this, while RDT emphasise the role of board of directors in managing uncertainty, it 
neglects the role of individual leaders. However, this research has shown that NNGDOs’ leadership vary 
in the choice of strategic responses and the role of individual charismatic leaders in ensuring 
organisational sustainability extends beyond board members. I argue that the role of board of directors as 
indicated by RDT is less relevant to the NNGDOs in this research because the boards are defunct and the 
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day-to-day decision-making processes are largely left to the founders. In this vein, I suggest that although 
organisational characteristics (including charismatic leadership style) is important to NNGDOs’ survival, 
RDT is silent on how it influences NNGDOs’ ability to acquire resources and manage uncertainty. In this 
regard, I argue that RDT needs to be extended beyond the role of the board to incorporate personal 
qualities of individual leaders. In addition, strategies such as mergers and acquisitions suggested by RDT 
are less applicable to NNGDOs given their highly personalised leadership and management structures. 
Hence, my research has shown the empirical limitations associated with RDT because of its failure to take 
into account NNGDOs’ organisational characteristics and governance structures. The incorporation of 
these factors into RDT would help provide a better understanding of NNGDO organisational behaviour 
under environmental uncertainty.  
In terms of NIT, I have indicated that it is useful for understanding how coercive, normative and mimetic 
pressures affect NNGDOs’ organisational behaviour and strategic responses. In particular, NIT sheds light 
into how donors’ coercive pressures promote inter-organisational cooperation among NNGDOs as a 
strategic response. In addition, this research extends NIT especially coercive isomorphism by highlighting 
the unintended consequences it promotes within the NNGDO sector. While NIT suggests that government 
exercise coercive pressures over NNGDOs through legal and technical regulations, this research argues 
that it not always the case in contexts of weak regulatory systems. In addition, I extend normative and 
mimetic isomorphism by identifying the media, networks and coalitions and development consultants as 
important sources of pressures for NNGDOs. More importantly, it highlights consultants as channels of 
NNGDOs’ mimetic behaviours because they act as knowledge entrepreneurs bridging the gap between 
NNGDOs and donors.  
While the existing theories are useful, I have highlighted the importance of drawing insights from the 
different theories in providing rich and complete understanding of NNGDOs’ strategic behaviour and 
responses. Conceptually, I have provided a holistic strategic response model for understanding NNGDOs 
behaviour and their adaptability to turbulent environments. In doing so, I have provided a comprehensive 
analysis of the different ways in which NNGDOs are currently responding and ensuring their 
sustainability amidst uncertainty. This research has therefore argued for an approach that integrates RDT, 
NIT and Oliver’s typology. In doing so, it has contributed to the organisational theory and NNGDO 
management literature. 
9.3.2 Empirical contributions 
This thesis makes five empirical contributions. First, it contributes to the emerging literature on the effects 
of changing aid landscape on wider civil society organisations including NNGDOs’ in countries that have 
transitioned into lower-middle-income category in recent years. In doing so, this research provides 
empirical evidence on how NNGDOs are responding to the on-going changes and uncertainty in their 
operating environment. While the existing literature provide anecdotal evidence of changing aid 
landscape, they focus mostly on countries in Asia and Latin America (Dubochet, 2012; Pallas and 
Nguyen, 2017; Appe, 2017). To the best of my knowledge, this research is the first to document 
NNGDOs’ strategic responses to their changing operating environment from a sub-Saharan African 
perspective.  
In particular, findings in this research provide rich empirical insights into how NNGDOs are coping and 
ensuring their survival at the country level. More importantly, most NNGDO research mainly focuses on 
INGDOs and established NNGDOs at the national level to the neglect of smaller and medium-sized 
NNGDOs at the district and regional levels. This has made them ‘invisible’ in the literature.  The aim of 
this research was to focus on grassroots level realities from the perspectives of NNGDO workers, donor 
representatives, key informants and government officials to explain their experiences of the changing aid 
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landscape and its effects on small and medium-sized NNGDOs. For this reason, the research findings will 
help expand the literature on NNGDOs since it has resonance with existing situation in other developing 
countries. 
Second, the thesis contributes to literature by providing a conceptualisation of strategies employed by 
NNGDOs in ensuring their survival and sustainability amidst growing uncertainty. As part of the 
empirical contributions, I have conceptualised an eight-part typology of strategic responses to 
organisational sustainability categorised into: i) resource diversification; ii) networking and partnerships; 
iii) cost recovery; iv) brand and visibility strategies; v) conformance to institutional pressures; vi) strategic 
planning; vii) avoidance and viii) influence. This typology provides a rich conceptual perspective to the 
discussion of environmental uncertainty and NNGDOs’ sustainability. Again, it serves as an avenue for 
the creation of a testable typology in other contexts experiencing similar conditions. 
The third contribution is the provision of evidence that challenges mainstream literature that resource 
diversification guarantees organisational autonomy, independence and sustainability. As this research has 
illustrated, the relationship between self-financing activities and organisational financial autonomy and 
independence is paradoxical. While previous literature suggests that revenue diversification reduce 
dependence, empirical findings from this research suggest otherwise. In fact, it has shown that although 
NNGDOs engaged in several financial diversification strategies, their prospects for guaranteeing financial 
autonomy remains limited. The findings provide a different perspective for thinking about the relationship 
between resource diversification and organisational autonomy. Moreover, it demonstrates that self-
financing activities does not necessarily promote financial sustainability. In doing so, this research 
contributes to our understanding that self-financing initiatives may not be a panacea for NNGDOs’ 
sustainability in context where institutional investment and organisational capacity are lacking. 
Fourth, this thesis has demonstrated the importance of informality, personal connections and the role of 
personalised leadership in discussion of NNGDOs survival and sustainability. The evidence presented 
provides better insights into our understanding of how NNGDOs use informality and personal connections 
in their relationship with donors and other stakeholders in ensuring their sustainability. I have argued that 
the role of informal processes and relationships in ensuring NNGDOs’ survival and sustainability cannot 
be underestimated and therefore deserves much attention. There is the need to look beyond formally 
structured relations to that of informality because they might be as important as the formal relationships. 
The incorporation of personal connections into discussions of NNGDOs’ sustainability is key to 
understanding how they mobilise resources from stakeholders in their operating environment. Moreover, 
it has the potential to change our perception of NGDOs-stakeholder relations as it opens up space for 
discussion of informal accountability mechanisms. This will provide a balanced perspective on NGDOs’ 
accountability mechanisms because mainstream literature focus on formal accountability practices. 
Focusing on informal accountability by exploring the perceptions of NGDOs, donors and their intended 
beneficiaries has the potential to offer a complete understanding of NGDOs’ accountability systems.  
Finally, the research provides empirical evidence on how donor funding modalities result in unintended 
consequences and casualties for NGDOs. The analysis in this thesis suggests that donor practices and 
policy decisions of favouring large and established NNGDOs to the neglect of small and medium-sized 
NNGDOs harms the promotion of diversity within the NGDO sector. For instance, this research provides 
insight into how multi-donor pooled funding mechanisms restrict funding access to a limited number of 
NNGDOs and hinder aid effectiveness efforts due to the lack of interactions between donors and 
NNGDOs. The evidence presented in this thesis has the potential to open up space for discussing the best 
funding mechanisms for NNGDOs.  
158 
 
9.3.3 Methodological contributions  
The originality of this thesis is strengthened by the uniqueness in the methodology used in understanding 
NNGDOs’ organisational behaviour and strategic responses. In particular, while the majority of NGDO 
research in Ghana and other developing countries focus on ethnographic, case study and quantitative 
approach, I adopt a critical realist ontology to mixed methods research. In doing so, this research sheds 
light on different ways of researching NGDOs. In particular, the use of mixed methods sequential 
explanatory design informed by a critical realist perspective to studying NNGDOs’ strategic responses to 
uncertainty demonstrates the methodological originality of this thesis. This thesis therefore advances our 
understanding of the methodologies for studying NGDOs rather than using qualitative and quantitative 
methods in isolation. In doing so, I have demonstrated the importance of methodological pluralism in 
NGDO research.  
In addition, the thesis adds to the literature on methodological options for the study of NGDOs through 
the adoption of critical realism in a way that explicitly links analysis of agency and structure in seeking 
to understand their behaviour. I have also sought to affirm the importance of understanding both the reality 
of NGDO strategic behaviour and responses, and the beliefs and constructions of their leaders, in the quest 
to understand causal mechanisms influencing their external environment and strategic responses that are 
often directly unobservable. Respondents’ socially constructed understanding of such reality provides 
useful insights into their strategic organisational behaviour but they only represent partial reality due to 
the existence of multiple interpretations shaped by the multiple contexts (individual, organisational and 
sectoral) within which they are located. This research therefore argues for the application of critical 
realism in NGDO research. 
At a more practical level, the detailed methodological approach discussed in chapter four has shed light 
on ways of accessing information and researching NNGDOs in contexts where accurate and reliable data 
is missing. This research has highlighted that in the absence of a comprehensive database on NNGDOs, 
it is possible to rely on networks and coalitions as important sources of information in the identification 
and mapping of NNGDOs. An important methodological contribution of this research is the ability to map 
NNGDOs operating in health, education and agriculture sectors and collect a panel financial data from 
2010-2015 for three regions of Ghana. Mapping the types and variations in NNGDOs operating within a 
specific geographical area is rare in most NGDO studies. For this reason, the data collected provides a 
useful source for information that can aid future research.  
9.4 Research implications for NGDO management and policy 
The findings from this thesis have implications for both donors and NGDO leaders. In particular, donors’ 
preference for large NNGDOs and INGDOs rather than small and medium-sized NNGDOs points to a 
worrying situation that threatens the dynamic nature of the NGDO sector because favouring large 
NNGDOs might result in the collapse of small NNGDOs with perceived close connection with intended 
beneficiaries. The demise of these organisations raises questions about their future intermediary and 
brokering roles. Addressing questions on the future roles of small and medium-sized NNGDOs is crucial. 
More importantly, it will help in raising two critical questions: i) what is the impact of small and medium-
sized NNGDOs?; and ii) what are the justifications for ensuring their sustainability in the absence of a 
strong bottom up credential and social mobilisation? These questions point to a wider discussion of 
whether there is the need to support and nurture the growth of socially rooted organisations rather than 
NNGDOs.  
Moreover, the research findings suggest the need for donors and their masters (i.e. politicians) to rethink 
their funding modalities by acknowledging that not all NNGDOs have the same organisational capacities 
and competencies. For this reason, there is the need for funding arrangements directed at specific 
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NNGDOs rather than using blanket organisational capacity criteria to determine eligibility for funding. 
The creation of separate funding schemes and grant mechanisms for small NNGDOs is a constructive step 
towards addressing the perceived discrimination in the sector given that currently proper support 
structures for them remains limited.  
Third, the research has implications for the mobilisation of domestic resources as alternative funding for 
NNGDOs. The potential for building NNGDOs’ sustainability in this way remains limited and points to 
the need for creating a more supportive policy environment for promoting domestic resource mobilisation. 
More specifically, it suggests there is a case for government commitment to setting up of an independent 
national funding agency for NNGDOs. The agency could serve as a funding pot from which individuals 
and corporate organisations could donate resources to support NNGDOs. While, the effective 
implementation of such an idea depends on NNGDOs’ ability to add value to their activities and provide 
justification for their survival its formation would also be spur to this, and a counter to the undue influence 
of external donors in this regard.  
Fourth, the thesis has demonstrated the need for self-reflexivity and learning by NNGDOs and their 
leaders. In particular, it requires conscious efforts in making substantial investments into their own 
organisational capacity development rather than expecting donors to do so. As discussed in chapter six, 
the sustainability of NNGDOs has never being a priority for donors although they claim to spearhead the 
sustainability discourse. Organisational survival beyond donor resources should become a preoccupation 
of NNGDOs. However, changing pockets of dependency thinking amidst weak organisational capacities 
is a challenge. For this reason, NNGDOs need to constantly engage in organisational learning and 
environmental scanning to identify challenges and opportunities that will help them address their capacity 
challenges. In particular, it requires leaders to examine their internal governance structures, identify 
weaknesses and formulate appropriate strategies in mitigating them. Environmental scanning would help 
NNGDOs with a sophisticated understanding and knowledge of the prevailing dynamics, potential and 
changes in the internal and external environments and how their own actions might be causing challenges 
for their organisations.  
Finally, given that NNGDOs’ leadership is shaped by prevailing contextual, cultural and environmental 
factors, having an appreciation of these critical issues is key to organisational survival. NNGDO leaders 
are important actors driving change within their organisations, however, their capacity remains limited 
and has resulted in leadership and management deficit. In this regard, an important aspect of the self-
reflectivity and learning is investment in organisational leadership capacity and management. This 
includes the willingness of not only leaders but also staff to forgo their pride, learn and become creative 
in their changing operating environment. Shared understanding of organisational learning and culture is 
required in building organisational leadership and management. 
9.5. Limitations of the study  
The first limitation relates to the methodology adopted. As mentioned in chapters four and five, this 
research faced challenges in accessing financial statements because respondents withheld them and in 
some instances were unavailable. The lack of disclosure of financial information by NNGDOs points to 
discrepancy in their financial transparency. For this reason, the quantitative analysis on income mobility 
matrix used income bands rather than exact financial figures for the period 2010-2015. While this helped 
in accounting for how far NNGDOs’ income levels had changed over a five-year period, I was unable to 
ascertain the extent of their financial vulnerability using specific indicators (e.g. revenue concentration, 
surplus margins and equity) that would have provided useful insights. For this reason, I was unable to 
assess the relationship between revenue diversification and financial vulnerability.  
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Rather, I relied on income mobility matrix as a way of summarising my quantitative data, as well as being 
forced to rely more heavily on the qualitative components of the research.  
Directly related to the above is the fact that the qualitative phase of the research drew on data from a large 
number of NNGDOs which made it difficult in accounting for variations and commonalities in the 
strategies. Using an ethnographic approach would have helped in understanding issues not captured 
through the in-depth interview process because it would have provided insights into NNGDOs’ daily 
activities. However, as mentioned earlier, the aim of this research was to depart from the normal tradition 
of NGDO research that focuses on case studies and ethnographic approaches. The research findings affirm 
theoretical and analytical generalisation. In this regard, I argue that relevance or transferability of the 
research findings to other NNGDOs in Ghana was enhanced. 
A third limitation relates to my focus on NNGDOs as the unit of analysis in this research. While this 
approach is useful, I acknowledge that NNGDOs are embedded in network of interactions with intended 
beneficiaries who have the potential of influencing their strategic responses. However, the explanations 
in this research did not focus on the perspectives of intended beneficiaries (i.e. perceptions and 
expectations of NNGDOs) and how that influences strategic responses. Greater representation of intended 
beneficiaries could have provided different insights into understanding the impact on them of strategies 
such as cost recovery. However, this does not in any way affect the findings reported in this research 
because its aim was not to address the accountability and effectiveness of NNGDOs interventions to 
intended beneficiaries. Rather, the perspectives provided by different respondents in this research have 
provided useful insights into understanding NNGDOs strategic behaviour and responses to their uncertain 
operating environment. The limitations outlined above open up scope for further research but I strongly 
belief that it does not in any way affect the validity and credibility of the research findings.  
9.6 Scope for future research 
While this research has provided valuable insights from Ghana, expanding the scope to other transitional 
economies experiencing similar changes in their aid landscape would provide a broader comparative 
perspective for understanding NNGDOs’ responses. It would also serve as a useful ground for examining 
the wider applicability of the typology of strategies identified. A country comparative research would 
again provide an understanding into the underlying factors driving the choice of NNGDOs strategic 
behaviour and responses in specific contexts. 
Second, while the mixed methods sequential explanatory design is innovative, the quantitative study is 
based on a small sample size. For this reason, future research could expand the size to other sectors, 
regions and INGDOs. Moreover, it could focus on assessing the relationship between resource 
diversification and financial vulnerability of NNGDOs. This will help in accounting for variations and 
commonalities and provide a bigger picture of the dynamics associated with the effects of changing aid 
landscape. 
Third, future research that explores the extent to which NNGDOs have succeeded or otherwise in putting 
the identified strategies into effect and their wider consequences on organisational performance would be 
useful. For example, the adoption of cost-recovery strategies (e.g. downsizing staff and programmes) 
could trigger the decision by a donor to withdraw funding because of NNGDOs’ inability to reach out to 
more intended beneficiaries. 
Fourth, the application of other theoretical perspectives (e.g. population ecology) to study NNGDOs’ 
behaviour will provide additional insights for future research. In particular, population ecology could shed 
insights into why some organisations survive and others collapse, why some are generalists and others 
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specialist organisations. It would also be interesting to explore further questions about governance issues 
of networks, coalition secretariats and their relationship with members and donors.  
Finally, another area of research worth exploring further is NNGDOs’ internal management and 
leadership. At present, discussion of succession planning in the non-profit literature has focused on 
organisations in the developed rather than developing countries with the exception of a few (Smillie and 
Hailey, 2001; Hailey and James, 2004). For this reason, there is the need for a deeper understanding of 
these internal governance and management issues. Directly associated with this is the need for further 
research to explore the extent to which NNGDOs are managed as ‘family businesses’. Future research on 
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Appendix 1: Information sheet and questionnaire 
 
Mr. Emmanuel Kumi 
Department of Social and Policy Sciences 
University of Bath 
Bath, BA2 7AY, United Kingdom 
 
Information sheet for participants 
 
The Response of Ghanaian Non-Government Development Organisations (NGDOs) to a 
Changing Aid Landscape. 
This study examines the response of Ghanaian non-governmental development organisations (NGDOs) 
to a changing development aid landscape. This research explores how NGDOs frame their response to an 
uncertain operating environment in terms of donor funding and relationship with other stakeholders. In 
addition, the study is interested in examining the factors that constrain or promote NGDOs’ ability to 
secure alternative sources of  income. 
Your organisation is invited to participate in this study by answering a questionnaire to help us gain insight 
from your experience. Your participation will contribute towards a better understanding of how Ghanaian 
NGDOs are responding to changes in their operating environment. Information provided will be used for 
academic purposes as a partial fulfilment for the attainment of my PhD degree. Findings may also be 
discussed and published with the wider research community through conferences, journal articles and 
books. There are no benefits attached to the completion of this questionnaire, however your organisation 
will be acknowledged in the final thesis. 
Your participation is voluntary and you are free to withdraw from the study at any time. In addition, you 
are free not to complete any questions you do not wish to answer. Information provided will be strictly 
confidential and will not be disclosed or shared with third parties without your permission. In addition, it 
will be stored safely. I will also be happy to share research findings with your organisation. This research 
has received ethical approval from the University, according to the procedures specified by the University 
Social Sciences Ethics Committee.  
In case you have further questions or need clarifications about researcher’s identity or participant’s 
confidentiality and rights, please feel free to contact the following: Professor James Copestake (PhD 
Supervisor), Department of Social and Policy Sciences, University of Bath. Email: 
j.g.copestake@bath.ac.uk. Telephone: +44 (0) 1225 38 3859. In Ghana, you may contact Dr. Akosua K. 
Darkwah, Centre for Gender Studies and Advocacy, University of Ghana, P.O. Box LG 57, Legon, Accra, 
Ghana, Email: keseboa@ug.edu.gh or  Dr. Louis Boakye-Yiadom, Department of Economics, University 
of Ghana, P.O. Box LG 57, Legon, Accra, Ghana, Email: lboakye-yiadom@ug.edu.gh 
 





You are making a decision whether or not to participate in this study. Your signature indicates that having 
read the attached Information Sheet, you understand the purpose of the study, your responsibilities, agree 
to all arrangements in the Information Sheet and have received copies of the Information Sheet and 
Consent form. You have therefore decided to take part in this study. 
 
 
……………………                     …………………………………   …………………….                                     




………………………………………………                  ………………………………………… 
   
Signature of Researcher              Date of signing consent  
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Survey Questionnaire on the Response of Ghanaian Non-Governmental Development Organisations to a Changing Aid Landscape 
GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE ORGANISATION 
Name of representative filling the 
questionnaire 
 
Position in organisation and contact 
details 
 
Name of the NGO  
Acronym of the NGO  
Sector (s) of operation 
Please tick ALL that apply. 
(a) Health                              [          ]     ( b)  Education   [          ]            
(c) Agriculture                       [          ]     (d) Other, please 
specify……………………………………………………………….  
Region(s) of operation (a) Nation-wide                     [          ]    (b) Upper West Region        [          ]         
 (c) Northern Region               [          ]    (d) Greater Accra  Region    [          ]     
 (e) Other, please specify…………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………… 
District (s) of operation (a) 1-5 Districts                       [          ]    (b) 6-10 Districts                   [          ]         
(c) 11-15 Districts                   [          ]     (d) 16-20 Districts                [          ]     
(e) Above 20 Districts             [          ]     
LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
Q1. In which year was your organisation 
established? 
 
Q2a. Is the organisation legally registered? (a) Yes    [          ]        Please answer Q2b      (b) No     [          ]        Skip to Q5. 
Q2b. If Yes, which of the following applies 
to your organisation? 
(a) Legally registered with a certificate   [          ]     (b) Legally registered but without a certificate  [          ]          
Q3. When was your organisation 
registered? 
 
Q4. Which of the following government 
institutions have you legally registered 
your organisation with? Please tick ALL 
that apply. 
(a) Registrar General’s Department                          [          ]    (b) Department of Social Welfare    [          ]  
(c) Metropolitan/Municipal/ District Assembly        [          ]    (d)  NGO Desk in Parliament           [          ]  





Q5. If your organisation is not registered, 
which of the following reasons account for 
that? 
Please tick ALL that apply. 
(a) The registration process is cumbersome                                                          [          ]         
(b) The NGO is newly established. We will register later                                     [          ]         
(c) There is no information on the registration process                                         [          ]         
(d) The organisation does not meet the requirements for registration                   [          ]                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
(e) The registration is not important                                                                       [          ]         
(f) Other, please specify………………………………………............................. 
Q6a. Does your organisation have a 
certificate for operation? 
(a) Yes        [          ]       (b) No         [          ] 
Q6b. If YES, when was the last time you 
renewed your certificate? 
 
Q7a. Have you ever submitted your 
annual financial report to the Department 
of Social Welfare? 
(a) Yes [          ]         Please answer Q7b.      (b) No  [          ]         Skip to Q9 
Q7b. If YES, when did you submit the 
report? 
 
Q18a. Is the financial report available to 
the public? 
(a) Yes  [          ]       (b) No  [          ]                   
Q8b. If YES, how do you publish it? (a) Through NGO website                                                            [          ]        
(b) Through NGO hard copy publications                                    [          ]        
(c) Upon request from individuals                                                [          ] 
(d) Other, please specify…………………………………………………………………… 
Q9. If NO, why are you not submitting the 
report? 
 
HUMAN RESOURCES, STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE 
Q10a. What is the number of current staff of your 
organisation 
 
Male Female Total 
   
How many of them are:    
Full time paid employees    
Part time paid employees    
National Service Personnel    
Interns    
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International Volunteers    
Community Volunteers    
Q10b. How many of your staff has a University Degree?    
11a. Does your organisation have departments? (a) Yes     [          ]                        (b) No [          ]         
11b. If YES, what are the departments?  
11c. If NO, what do you have?  
Q12a. Do you have a senior management team? (a) Yes     [          ] Please answer Q12b                   (b) No      [          ]  Skip to Q13     
 
Q12b. If YES, how many people constitute the 
management team? 
(a) 2                       [          ]          (b) 3                        [          ]           
(c) 4                       [          ]           (d)  5                      [          ] 
(e) Above 5           [          ] 
Q13. If No, what is the main decision making body of 
your organisation? 
 
Q14a. Does your organisation have board of directors? (a) Yes [          ]     Please answer Q14b                 (b) No [          ]    Skip to Q17 
Q14b. How many members constitute the board of 
directors? 
(a) 2                       [          ]         (b) 3                       [          ]           
(c) 4                       [          ]          (d) 5                      [          ]    
(e) Above 5            [          ] 
 
Q15a. How are the board of directors appointed? 
(a) They are appointed solely by the Executive Director/President/Founder            [       ]                 
(b) They are appointed in consultation with stakeholders                                         [       ]         
(c) They apply for vacant positions                                                                           [       ]         
(d) They are elected                                                                                                   [       ]         




Q15b. What are the functions of the board of directors? 
(a) For advisory and decision-making purposes                                                         [       ]                 
(b) For efficient management, accountability and transparency purposes                  [       ]         
(c) For fulfilling government regulatory requirements                                               [       ]                 
(d) For fulfilling donor funding requirements                                                             [       ]                 




Q16. How often do they hold meetings? Monthly Quarterly Semi-
annually 
Annually Biannual During 
Emergency 
Other 
       
Q17. What is your organisational mission?  
Q18. What is your organisational vision?  
Q19. What factors influence decision-making process in 
your organisation? 
Please rate the following factors in order of importance  
1= Not important; 3= moderately important; 5= Extremely important. 
Organisational mission  1 [           ]                                      3 [           ]                                     5[           ]                
Organisational values 1 [           ]                                      3 [           ]                                     5[           ]                
Organisational leadership 1 [           ]                                      3 [           ]                                     5[           ]                
Recommendations of the board of directors                                          1 [           ]                                      3 [           ]                                     5[           ]                
Community needs 1 [           ]                                      3 [           ]                                     5[           ]                
Donor requirements for funding  1 [           ]                                      3 [           ]                                     5[           ]                
Organisational strategies   1 [           ]                                      3 [           ]                                     5[           ]                
Collective decision between NGOs and donors  1 [           ]                                      3 [           ]                                     5[           ]                





FINANCIAL INFORMATION/SOURCES OF FUNDING 
                       
Q21a. Approximately what were the total operational budgets (in GH¢) of your organisation for the following financial years? 
Total Annual Budget in  GH¢* Years 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Less than GH¢ 20,000       
GH¢ 20,000- GH¢ 49,000        
GH¢50,000 - GH¢99,000       
GH¢100,000 - GH¢ 149,000       
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GH¢150,000 - GH¢ 199,000       
Above GH¢ 200,000       
Q21b. How many organisations did you receive financial 
support from between 2014/2015 financial year? 
  
(a) None          [          ]            (b) 1           [          ]          (c) 2     [          ]                       
(d) 3                 [          ]            (e) 4           [          ]          ( f)  5   [          ] 
(h) Above 5     [          ]                       
Q21c. If No, why do you not receive any support from other 
organisations? 
 
           * Please attach copies of accounts and annual reports if available. 
Q22a. Please list the sources of financial (income) and non-financial support for your organisation for the following years? Tick all that apply 
 Year Sources of support 
2010 (a) External grants and donations          [          ]             (b) Earned income         [          ]           
(c) Government funding and support    [          ]             (d) Corporate funding    [          ]             
(e) Individual donations                         [          ]             (f) Other source, please specify…………   
2011 (a) External grants and donations          [          ]             (b) Earned income         [          ]           
(c) Government funding and support    [          ]             (d) Corporate funding    [          ]             
(e) Individual donations                        [          ]             (f) Other source, please specify………………….      
2012 (a) External grants and donations         [          ]             (b) Earned income          [          ]           
(c) Government funding and support   [          ]             (d) Corporate funding     [          ]             
(e) Individual donations                       [          ]             (f) Other source, please specify………………….      
2013 (a) External grants and donations         [          ]             (b) Earned income          [          ]           
(c) Government funding and support    [          ]             (d) Corporate funding    [          ]             
(e) Individual donations                        [          ]             (f) Other source, please specify………………….      
2014 (a) External grants and donations         [          ]             (b) Earned income         [          ]           
(c) Government funding and support   [          ]             (d) Corporate funding    [          ]             
(e) Individual donations                       [          ]             (f) Other source, please specify………………….      
2015 (a) External grants and donations        [          ]             (b) Earned income          [          ]           
(c) Government funding and support   [          ]             (d) Corporate funding    [          ]             
(e) Individual donations                       [          ]             (f) Other source, please specify………………….      
Q22b. What is your expectation of the 






Sources of funding Increase                      Stay the same                  Decrease            Don’t Know                 Not Applicable   
External grants and donations                     [           ]                        [           ]                              [           ]               [           ]                  [           ]                
Earned income          [           ]                        [           ]                              [           ]               [           ]                  [           ]                
Government funding and support    [           ]                        [           ]                              [           ]               [           ]                  [           ]                
Corporate funding   [           ]                        [           ]                              [           ]               [           ]                  [           ]                
Individual donations                            [           ]                        [           ]                              [           ]               [           ]                  [           ]                
Other source, please specify  [           ]                        [           ]                              [           ]               [           ]                  [           ]                
Q23a. How would you describe your 
organisational financial situation 
(a) Stable             [          ]                                   (b) Precarious            [          ]           
(c) Surviving       [          ]                                   (d) Thriving               [          ]             
(e) Sustainable     [          ]                                  (f) Other source, please specify…………………………….   
 Q23b. Have there been any changes in your 
organisation’s sources of income over the last 
five years? 
(a) Yes [          ]            (b) No  [          ]   
Q23c. If YES, list the THREE most important 
sources of change? 
 
 
Q24a. Are there any new sources of income 
for your organisation in the last five years? 
(a) Yes [          ]         (b) No  [          ]   
Q24b. What are these new sources?  
Q25a. Are there new sources of income you 
have heard of but do not have funding from? 
(a) Yes  [          ]         (b) No   [          ]   
Q25b. If Yes, what are these sources?  
Q26a. Are there any important sources of 
funding that have disappeared completely in 
the last five years? 
(a) Yes  [           ]         (b) No   [           ]   
 Q26b. Are there any potential sources of 
income you anticipate for your organisation 
in the next three years? 
(a) Yes  [          ]         (b) No   [          ]   
Q27. If Yes, what are these sources?  
Q28. List THREE factors that constrain your 





Q29a. How have you considered funding 
diversification for your organisation? 
 
Please rate the following factors in order of importance  
1= Not important; 3= Moderately important; 5= Extremely important. 
1 [          ]                                              3 [          ]                                        5 [          ]                        
Q29b.Explain the reasons for the choice of 
your answer above. 
 
Q30a. Apart from external donor funding, do 
you know of any alternative sources of 
income for your organisation? 
(a) Yes [          ]   Please answer Q30b               (b) No  [          ]   Skip to Q31a 
 
  
Q30b. What are these sources of funding? 
(a) Private company investment in your organisation                             [          ]   
(b) Corporate social responsibility (i.e. gifts from companies)               [          ]    
(c) Foundations and philanthropy                                                            [          ]  
(d) Income generating activities (social enterprise)                                 [          ]  
(e) Government funding and support                                                       [          ] 
(f) Crowd-funding and online fund-raising                                              [          ] 
(f) Other, please specify……………………………………………… 
Q31a. Does your organisation engage in any 
income-generating activities (IGA)? 
(a) Yes    [          ]     Please answer Q31b              (b) No     [          ]      Skip to Q34 












Q33a. Do you think IGA are a viable source 
of funding for your organisation? 
(a) Yes    [          ]                  (b) No     [          ]         
Q33b. Do you think engaging in IGA will 
affect your organisational goal or mission? 
(a) Yes     [          ]                   (b) No      [          ]         
 
Q34. Explain the reasons for the choice of 
your answer above. 
 
 
Q35a. Do you provide funds to support the 
activities of other organisations? 
(a) Yes [          ]         Please answer Q35b                  (b) No  [          ]         Skip to Q38 
Q35b. How many organisations do you 
support? 
(a) 1-2                         [          ]        (b) 3-4                   [          ]         
(c) 5-6                         [          ]        (d) 5-6                   [          ]         
(e) Above 6                 [          ]         
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Q36. Which of the organisations do you 
support? 
(Please choose all applicable) 
(a) Local NGOs           [          ]                   (b) Community-Based Organisations (CBOs)     [          ]         
(c) Both local NGOs, CBOs/ Associations [          ]        (d) Other specify……………………………… 
Q37. What are the reasons why you choose to 
fund and support the activities of 
organisations in general? 
 Please rate the following factors in order of importance  
1= Not important; 3= Moderately important; 5= Extremely important. 
Achieve shared goals 1 [           ]                                         3 [           ]                                     5[           ]                
Joint learning and understanding 1 [           ]                                         3 [           ]                                     5[           ]                
Strengthen our presence in communities 1 [           ]                                         3 [           ]                                     5[           ]                
Establish relationship with other organisations 1 [           ]                                         3 [           ]                                     5[           ]                
Increase capacity 1 [           ]                                         3 [           ]                                     5[           ]                
Promote specialist skills 1 [           ]                                         3 [           ]                                     5[           ]                
Other, specify 1 [           ]                                         3 [           ]                                     5[           ]                
ORGANISATIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH STAKEHOLDERS 
Q38. What forms of cooperation currently exist between your organisation and your top five stakeholders/ partners? 
 YES 




 Partnership Other, specify  
1.       
2.       
3.       
4.       
5.       
Q39. On a scale of 1-5, how 
would you score your 
relationship with your top five 
stakeholders/partners? 
 
1 = Terrible and 5= Excellent 
Name of stakeholder/ partner 1-5 1-5 1-5 1-5 1-5 1-5 1-5 
1.         
2.         
189 
 
3.         
4.         
5.         
Q40. List the THREE most 
important changes that have 





Q41. Is your organisation a 
member of any NGO umbrella 
organisation? 
(a) Yes  [          ]        Please answer Q42         
 (b) No  [          ]        Skip to 44 
 
Q42. Which umbrella 
organisation(s) does your 
organisation belong? 
(a) Ghana Association of Private Voluntary Organizations in Development (GAPVOD)                              [         ] 
(b) Ghana Coalition of NGOs in Health                                                                                                           [         ]  
(c) Northern Network for Education Development  (NNED)                                                                          [         ] 
(d) Ghana National Education Campaign Coalition  (GNECC)                                                                      [         ]                                                                                                      
(e) Ghana HIV and AIDS Network  (GHANET)                                                                                             [         ] 
(f) Other, please 
specify………………………………………………………………….......................................................... 
  
Q43.What are the reasons for 
joining umbrella organisations? 
 
 
(a) For transparency, accountability, credibility and legitimacy purposes                                                       [         ] 
(b) As a requirement for accessing donor funding (quality and professionalism)                                            [         ]  
(c) To get technical and training support  from member organisations                                                            [         ]  
(d) To build public trust                                                                                                                                    [         ] 
(e) To promote shared identity, better collaboration and enhanced performance                                             [         ] 
(f) To share information on good practices among member organisations                                                       [         ] 
(g) Other, please specify…………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Q44. Explain the reasons for not 
joining an umbrella organisation. 
 
 
Q45. What do you think are the 
challenges facing NGOs in this 
district?  
TICK ALL THAT APPLY. 
(a) Dwindling sources of funding from donors and corporate institutions                                         [         ] 
(b) Changing donor priorities and programmes                                                                                  [         ] 
(c) Competition between foreign and local NGOs for donor funding                                                [         ] 
(d)    Difficulty of  hiring and retaining qualified staff                                                                         [         ] 
(d) Government bureaucracy                                                                                                               [         ] 
(e) Others, please specify………………………………………………………………………… 
Thank you for your contribution to this study on the response of Ghanaian NGDOS to a changing aid landscape. 
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Region (s) of 
operation 
Core  focus area Number 
of paid 
staff 
NNGDO funding  Description of 
financial 
situation** 
NNGDO 1 2008 Greater Accra, Eastern, 
Volta  and Brong-
Ahafo  
Promotion of quality 
basic education 
through technology 
5 Receives multiple funding from external 
donors, engage in income generating 
activities 
Precarious 
NNGDO 2 1995 Greater Accra, Eastern, 





10 Used to receive multiple donor funding 
but currently has no external donor 
funding; Established a social enterprise 
and relies more on individual and 
corporate donations; Social enterprise 
and income generating activities 
Surviving 
NNGDO 3 2002 Greater Accra,  
Eastern, Western, 
Central, Volta, Ashanti,  
Brong-Ahafo, Northern 
Gender-based 
advocacy with focus 
on the promotion of 
health , education and 
women’s economic 
empowerment 
85 Funded 90% by 26 donors; Contracted 
by the Ministry of Health and the Ghana 
AIDS Commission, planning to engage 
in income generating activities 
Surviving 
NNGDO 4 2004 Northern, Upper East, 
Ashanti, Brong-Ahafo, 
Volta, Eastern, Central, 
Greater Accra and 
Western 
Promotion of right-
based approach to 
health (maternal , 
child, reproductive) 
8 Funded 80% by external donors through  
multiple INGOS; contract by the 
Ministry of Health, engage in 
consultancy services, planning to 
establish a social  enterprise 
Surviving 
NNGDO 5 2001  Greater Accra, Eastern 
and Brong Ahafo 
Focus on agriculture 
and climate change 
education 
6 Funded solely by UN Agencies, income 
generating activities through 
consultancy, relies on corporate and 
individual donations 
Precarious 
NNGDO 6 2001 Greater Accra, 
Western, Central, Volta 
Focus on the 





23 Funded 60% through external donors, 
secure corporate funding to implement 
corporate social responsibility, secure 






NNGDO 7 1993 Upper West, Northern,  
Greater Accra, Volta,  
Western, Brong-Ahafo, 
Ashanti 
Focus on the 
promoting educational 
and health facilities in 
communities in 
addition to economic 
empowerment 
7 Depend largely on external donor 
funding, generate income through 
consultancy, publication and ICT 
training 
Precarious 
NNGDO 8 1987 Northern, Upper West, 
Upper East, Brong-
Ahafo, Ashanti, Volta, 
Western, Central, 




Extractive industry  
23 Highly donor dependent, engage in 
consultancy and subgrant to other 
NNGDOs 
Sustainable 
NNGDO 9 2004 Greater Accra Health Education in 
communities in the 
Greater Accra Region 
4 Donations from board of directors, 
reliance on community volunteers,  
External donor funding, contracted by 
the Ghana AIDs Commission and the 
Ministry of Health 
Precarious 
NNGDO 10 2006 Greater Accra Basic education, 
empowering and 
advocating for persons 
with disability. 
6 Income generating activities, donations 
from individuals and corporate 
organisations, external donor funding 
Thriving 
NNGDO 11 1992 Greater Accra, 
Northern, Central  
Policy advocacy in 
education, agriculture 
and health sectors 
5 Funded by 4 main international donors, 
engage in consultancy services 
Surviving 
NNGDO 12 2005 Northern, Upper West 
and  Upper East 
Health, Education, 
Agriculture and Child 
rights 
15 Funded 80% by external donors; engage 
in income generating activity through 
consultancy; transport business and 
hiring of office space, donations from 
individual and corporate organisations 
Surviving 
NNGDO 13 2008 Northern  An advocacy 
organisation in health, 
education agriculture, 
youth  and women’s 
empowerment 
6 Funded mainly through consultancy and 





NNGDO 14 1996 Northern  Focus on assisting 
communities in the 




5 Initially had 5 external donors 
supporting the organisation but 
currently relies on only one INGO 
through partnership 
Precarious 
NNGDO 15 2003 Northern  Agriculture and food 
security 
10 Funded 90% by external donors; engage 
in income generating activities through 
microcredit scheme, relies on individual 
donations 
Surviving 




with a focus on women 
empowerment and 
SRHR interventions. 
12 Funded 90% through more than 20 
external donors including bilateral, 
multilateral and INGOs, engage in 
microcredit and financial services, 
planning to establish social enterprise to 
train youth and women. 
Sustainable 
NNGDO 17 1986 Northern Focus on education, 
agriculture and  local 
governance with the 
aim of empowering 
communities to hold 
duty bearers to account 
33 Initially funded 100% by one bilateral 
donor but now seeking other sources of 
funding through microcredit, vocational 
training centre and consultancy services 
Thriving 





7 International donors, consultancy in 
capacity building, agro processing and 
microcredit 
Thriving 
NNGDO 19 1997 Northern Focus on health and 
governance with 
particular emphasis on 
advocacy against witch 
camp and catering for 
the need of the elderly 
5 Initially had funding from external 
donors but currently has no donor 
support, relies on individual donations, 
community volunteers, engage in 
farming and rearing of livestock 
Precarious 
NNGDO 20 2002 Northern, Upper West 
and Upper East 
Focus on health, 
education, food 
security,  water, 
sanitation and Hygiene 
8 Relies mainly on INGOs through 
partnerships, engage in income 
generating activities in microcredit, 





NNGDO 21 2006 Northern, Upper West, 
Upper East, Greater 
Accra and Ashanti 
Health and Governance 12 Relies mainly on external donor funding 
and  individual or corporate donations 
Surviving 
NNGDO 22 2001 Northern Focused on enhancing 
the quality of life for 
poor and marginalised 
through interventions 
in health, education, 
governance and 
livelihoods 
15 International donors, local NGOs, 
District Assemblies, corporate and 
individual donations, microcredit 
schemes and consultancy 
Thriving 
NNGDO 23 2009 Northern Health, Education and 
Agriculture 
4 Contributions from board of directors, 
individual donations, INGOs and 
consultancy 
Precarious 
NNGDO 24 1995 Northern, Upper West 
and Upper East 
Basic Education 31 Funded 90% by one bilateral donor but 
currently exploring other sources 
including consultancy 
Thriving 
NNGDO 25 2008 Northern Basic and Secondary 
Education, Women’s 
empowerment 
5 Depend on external donor funding, 
social enterprise and individual 
donations 
Surviving 
NNGDO 26 2007 Northern Youth empowerment, 
health, education and 
agriculture 
10 Depend largely on external donor 
funding, local NGOs and income 
generating activities 
Precarious 




14 Depend 85% on external donor funding; 
income generating activities 
Surviving 
NNGDO 28 2009 Northern, Upper West, 
Upper East and Volta 
Health, education, 
agriculture, youth, 
gender and social 
exclusion 
18 Mainly through external donors, social 
enterprise, individual donations 
Surviving 
NNGDO 29 2008 Northern, Upper West 
and Upper East 
Health, education, 
agriculture and human 
rights focusing on the 
prevention of early 
child marriage and 
offering support to 
women accused of 
witchcraft. 
10 Depend mainly on external donors and 









12 Funded mainly through INGO, 
contributions from Executive Director 
and engagement in consultancy and 
microcredit. 
Thriving 
NNGDO 31 2005 Upper West and 
Northern 
Health, Education, 
Agriculture and Local 
Governance 
6 Funded mainly through external donors; 
social enterprise, consultancy and 
multiple donations from individuals and 
corporate organisations. 
Surviving 
NNGDO 32 1992 Northern and Upper 
West 
Health, Education, 
Agriculture and food 
security, Water, 
Sanitation and Hygiene 
12 Donor grants, consultancy, social 
enterprise, individual and corporate 
donations 
Thriving 
** Description of NNGDOs financial situation was based on self-reported information from the survey questionnaire. I define precarious NNGDOs as those at the verge of collapsing 
because they are currently not implementing any project and have no expectation of funding. Surviving NNGDOs are mainly project-based and do not have independent funds of 
their own. Their viability and survival is highly dependent on donor funding. Thriving NNGDOs are those that have moved away from surviving by implementing mechanisms that 
will make the sustainable. On the other hand, sustainable NGDOs are those that are able to mobilise resources to achieve their mission over time by meeting the needs of all 




Appendix 3: List of respondents and interview schedule 
No. Name of NGO Designation Date of Interview Duration of 
Interview 
1.  NNGDO 1   Executive Director 17-3-2016 1:50:58 
2.  NNGDO 2   Programmes Manager 1-4-2016 55:43 













5.  NNGDO 5  Executive Director 6-4-2016 1:46:15 
6.  NNGDO 6  Executive Director 6-5-2016 1:31:16 
7.  NNGDO 7  Programmes Manager 30-5-2016 1:44:03 
8.  NNGDO 8  Director, Finance and 
Administration 
2-6-2016 1:50:41 
9.  NNGDO 9  Executive Director 4-5-2016 1:07:20 
10.  NNGDO 10  Executive Director 3-3-2016 1:59:03 
11.  NNGDO 11  Executive Director 6-6-2016 1:44:34 






13  NNGDO 13  Executive Director 19-4-2016 1:14:14 






15  NNGDO 15  Executive Director 20-4-2016 1:35:13 

















19.  NNGDO 19 Executive Director 25-4-2016 2:18:20 






21.  NNGDO 21 Programmes Manager 26-4-2016 1:07:45 






23.   NNGDO 23  Executive Director 27-4-2016 1:14:14 






25.  NNGDO 25 Executive Director 29-4-2016 1:49:57 
26.  NNGDO 26 Programmes Manager 31-4-2016 1:05:02 






28.    NNGDO 28  Executive Director 29-4-2016 1:03:26 
29.  NNGDO 29  Programmes Director 16-5-2016 1:22:24 
30.  NNGDO 30  Executive Director 26-5-2016 1:24:44 
31.  NNGDO 31  Executive Director 23-4-2016 2:03:39 
32.  NNGDO 32  Executive Director 17-3-2016 1:45:09 
 INTERVIEW WITH DONOR REPRESENTATIVES 
1 Donor 1  Senior Programme Officer 18-1-2016 1:43:33 
 Donor 2  Programmes Director 





 Donor 3  Senior Programme Manager 15-2-2016 1:10:30 
 Donor 4  Programme Officer 27-3-2016 1:25:32 
 Donor 5  Grants Manager 





 Donor 6  Project Coordinator 18-4-2016 1:28:22 
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 Donor 7  Country Director 28-4-2016 1:31:19 
 Donor 8  Finance Manager 10-6-2016 44:52 
 BUSAC Grants Manager 26-5-2016 30:02:46 
 KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS 
 West African Civil Society 
Institute  
Head of Research  





 Consultant 1  Resource Mobilisation 
Specialist 
27-3-2016 59:45 
 Consultant 2  Grants Acquisition Specialist 21-3-2016 1:07:38 
 Ghana Coalition of NGOs in 
Health  
National Chairman  






 Northern Network for 
Educational Development  
Network Coordinator 16-8-2015 56:03 
 Kasa Initiative Ghana Network Coordinator 16-3-2016 1:07:43 
 Coalition for Development of 














 Ministry of Finance  Budget Analyst  





 Corporate Foundation  Sustainability and Impact 
Manager  
2-6-2016  1:11:55 
 University of Ghana Department of Sociology 





 NGDO Leaders  Executive Director, Tamale 
Executive Director, Tamale 
Executive Director, Wa 









 Integrated Social Development 
Centre (ISODEC) 
Policy Analyst 6-9-2015 40:06:18 
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Mr. Emmanuel Kumi 
Department of Social and Policy 
Sciences, University of Bath 
Bath, BA2 7AY, United Kingdom 
The Executive Director 
NGDO 1 
Accra, Ghana          
 
8th March 2016. 
                                                      
Dear Sir, 
 
FOLLOW UP FOR PARTICIPATION IN IN-DEPTH QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
I write to request for your participation in an in-depth interview on ‘‘Response of Ghanaian Non-
Governmental Development Organisations to a Changing Aid Landscape’’ between March and July 
2016. 
Your organisation has been selected as one of the NGOs for this qualitative research because you 
indicated in an earlier survey I conducted in October 2015 that you are putting measures to diversify 
your sources of funding as well as employing a number of strategies to ensure your organisational 
sustainability.  
The interview will mainly cover these topics: Resource mobilisation strategies and challenges, NGOs’ 
strategic responses and its impact on governance and institutional structure of the organisation, 
organisational relationship with stakeholders, the history of how the organisation was established and 
the role of NGO leaders and fieldworkers. 
Your participation in this research will contribute towards a better understanding of how Ghanaian NGOs 
are responding to changes in their operating environment in terms of funding and its effects on their 
organisation. The information provided will not only be used for  academic purposes as a partial fulfilment 
for the attainment of my PhD degree but will also be shared with other organsiations and the wider 
research community through conferences, workshops and publication of research findings in journal 
articles and books. In return to your participation, I am happy to share the research findings with your 
organisation. 
In case you have further questions or need clarifications about my identity or participant’s 
confidentiality and rights, please feel free to contact Professor James Copestake (PhD Supervisor), 
Department of Social and Policy Sciences, University of Bath. Email: j.g.copestake@bath.ac.uk. 
Telephone: +44 (0) 1225 38 3859. You can also contact Dr. Akosua K. Darkwah, Centre for Gender 
Studies and Advocacy, University of Ghana, P.O. Box LG 57, Legon, Accra, Ghana, Email: 
keseboa@ug.edu.gh. 






                        
INTERVIEW GUIDE OR SCHEDULE FOR NGO LEADERS 
 
Introduction  
The following questions serve as a guide for engaging NGDO leaders towards a better understanding of 
the research study on the response of Ghanaian NGDOs to a changing aid landscape. Information 
provided will be strictly confidential and will not be disclosed or shared with third parties without your 
permission as indicated in the consent form. 
 
Resource Mobilisation Strategies and Challenges 
1. What are the major sources of funding for your organisation? How do you identify,  approach 
and select these sources of funding? 
2. To what extent has funding been a major challenge for your organisation? If so, in what specific 
ways? 
3. What has been the trend in the inflow of funding for this organisation for the past five years? 
4. In the last five years, how would you describe your organisational financial situations? Stable, 
surviving, thriving or sustainable? Could you please explain your answer? 
5. How will you describe  the availability of domestic and foregin funding for your organisation? 
6. Comparing domestic funding and support and external donor funding which one is more 
sustainable for your organisation? Explain the choice of your answer? 
7. Apart from donor funding, do you know of any other altenative sources of income for your 
organisation? If so, what are they? What are the factors that might promote or constrain your 
ability to seek for alternative sources of funding? 
8. Do you seek for domestic funding and support for your organisation? If Yes, what are they? 
9. To what extent does domestic funding and support serve as an alternative resource mobilisation 
for your organisation? 
10. Do you have an established resource mobilisation department or a fund raising officer in charge 
of seeking for domestic resources? 
11. Do you engage in commercial or income generating activities? If so, what are they and the 
rationale behind?  
12. Do you think commercial activities or income generating activities can be an alternative and a 
viable source of funding for your organisation? If Yes, why? 
13. Do you think your engagement in commercial or income-generating activities will affect your 
organisational vision goals and mission? 
14. What are the challenges facing this organisation in your attempt to engage in commercial 
activities or income generating activities? 
15. What mechanisms are you putting in place to ensure the sustainability of your commercial 
activities? 
16. Have you ever tried seeking for  private sector funding? Were you successful or not? What factors 
accounted for this? 
17. Do you think your organisation has the necessary requirements (e.g. human and financial 
resources) to increase your engagement with private sector funding? 
18. Do you expect your engagement with private sector funding to increase, remain the same or 
decline in the next coming years? If Yes, Why do you say so? 
19. To what extent are income from internally generated activities (IGA) and private sector funding 
different from donor or government funding? Which of these is easier to raise,has more flexibility 
and is more sustainable?   
20. Do you think the environment within which you operate have any influence on your ability to 
mobilise domestic resources?  
21. To what extent does your oganisational mission, capacity, identity and visibility affect your 
ability to mobilise domestic resources?  
22. What challenges does your organisation face in its attempt to mobilise resources to support your 
activities? By way of management, how do you address this challenge? 
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NGDOs external environment: Donor funding modalities and relationship  
23. Do you seek funding from foreign donor agencies to support your activities? What are these 
sources? 
24. Who are the main external donors for your organisation? What form of support do they provide? 
25. What specific form of funding do you receive? Is it project funding, core funding or both? How 
would you describe the availability of core funding for this organisation? 
26. Over the last five years, has there been a donor that  has stopped providing project and core 
funding to support your activities? What were the reasons given? 
27. Do you think the reduction or stoppage of  project and core funding affect your organisation and 
its growth? If so, in what specific ways? If not explain the choice of your answer 
28. What is management doing to ensure that you become sustainable when there is no core funding? 
29. What accounts for NGOs operating in different thematic areas or shifting their focus? Do you 
have experience of that? What are its effects on NGOs? 
30. What is your perspective on donor-pooled funding mechanism for NGOs and CSOs in Ghana? 
31. How would you describe your relationship with your donors?  
32. Can you please describe how you developed relationship with these donors, for how long and has 
the relationship changed over the years? If yes, what accounted for the change? 
33. How do you describe the impact of donor agencies on the operations of NGOs in Ghana? 
34. To what extent are donor  agencies helping NGOs to become more independent  and self-
sustaianble in their operation? What accounts for this? 
35. To what extent has Ghana’s attainment of a lower-middle-income country status affected the 
inflows of funding into this organisation? What are its implications for your organisation? 
 
NGDOs Agency and strategies for survival  
36. How diversified are the sources of funding for your organisation? To what extent do you think 
funding diversification is important for your organisation?  
37. What are the different diversification strategies used by your organisation? What are its 
importance?  
38. How does your organisational brand and visibility affect your ability to get resources? 
39. What mechanisms or strategies are you putting in place to ensure that your organisation maintains 
its brand and visibility in its ever-changing environment? Please outline and give example of how 
these strategies affect the operations of your organisation? 
40. How do you respond to changes in your operating environment?  
41. What specific strategies do you use in responding to these changes? What are key factors that 
influence your decision to adopt these strategies? 
42. What are  the rationale behind the strategies you adopt?  
43. Who are the key actors within the organisation that shape the decision to adopt such strategies 
and how do you arrive at a collective decision?  
44. Do you take into account the effects such strategies will have on your operations when adopting 
them? 
45. Who do you think are the major stakeholders of  your organisation? How would you describe 
your relationship with these stakeholders?  
46. How would you describe the current operating environment of NGOs in Ghana? 
47. Do you collaborate with other NGOs to implement projects? Who are these? 
48. What relationship exist between your organisation and other NGOs? What are the benefits of 
collaboration to your NGO? 
49. From your perspective, what are the practical lessons you would like to share with Ghanaian 








Appendix 5: Interview guide for donor representatives 
 
Mr. Emmanuel Kumi 
Department of Social and Policy Sciences 
University of Bath 
Bath, BA2 7AY, United Kingdom 
 
 
Information sheet for Donor Agencies 
The Response of Ghanaian Non-Government Development Organisations (NGDOs) to a 
Changing Aid Landscape. 
This study examines the response of Ghanaian non-governmental development organisations (NGDOs) 
to a changing development aid landscape. This research explores how NGDOs frame their response to an 
uncertain operating environment in terms of donor funding and relationship with other stakeholders. In 
addition, the study is interested in examining the factors that constrain or promote NGDOs’ ability to 
secure alternative sources of  income. 
Your organisation is invited to participate in this study through an interview to help is gain insight from 
your experience as a donor agency (an organisation that provides funding to support the activities and 
projects of NGOs in Ghana). Your participation will contribute towards a better understanding of how 
Ghanaian NGDOs are responding to changes in their operating environment. Information provided will 
be used for academic purposes as a partial fulfilment for the attainment of my PhD degree. Findings may 
also be discussed and published with the wider research community through conferences, journal articles 
and books. There are no benefits attached to the completion of this questionnaire, however your 
organisation will be acknowledged in the final thesis. 
Your participation is voluntary and you are free to withdraw from the study at any time. In addition, you 
are free not to answer any questions you do not wish to answer. Information provided will be strictly 
confidential and will not be disclosed or shared with third parties without your permission. In addition, it 
will be stored safely. I will also be happy to share research findings with your organisation. This research 
has received ethical approval from the University, according to the procedures specified by the University 
Social Sciences Ethics Committee. In case you have further questions or need clarifications about 
researcher’s identity or participant’s confidentiality and rights, please feel free to contact the following: 
Professor James Copestake (PhD Supervisor), Department of Social and Policy Sciences, University of 
Bath. Email: j.g.copestake@bath.ac.uk. Telephone: +44 (0) 1225 38 3859. In Ghana, you may contact 
Dr. Akosua K. Darkwah, Centre for Gender Studies and Advocacy, University of Ghana, P.O. Box LG 
57, Legon, Accra, Ghana, Email: keseboa@ug.edu.gh or  Dr. Louis Boakye-Yiadom, Department of 
Economics, University of Ghana, P.O. Box LG 57, Legon, Accra, Ghana, Email: lboakye-
yiadom@ug.edu.gh 
 









The following questions serve as a guide for engaging donor agencies towards a better understanding of 
the research study on the response of Ghanaian NGOs to a changing aid landscape. Information provided 
will be strictly confidential and will not be disclosed or shared with third parties without your permission 
as indicated in the consent form. 
 
1. What are some of the projects or programmes of local NGOs funded by your organisation within 
the last five years? 
2. How much funding has your organisation disbursed to local NGOs within the last five years? 
3. How do you call for funding proposals from local NGOs? 
4. On an average, how many project proposals do you receive when there is a call for funding? How 
many of them are approved? 
5. What are the selection criteria for funding the activities of local NGOs? 
6. Are there differences in the selection criteria for smaller and new and bigger and old NGOs? 
7. How do you ensure that the selection criteria for funding is fair to both smaller and bigger NGOs? 
8. How do you address the perceived discrimination against small and new NGOs  in relation  to  
funding application? 
9. What mechanisms are there in your organisation to provide feedback on funding proposals to  
local NGOs? 
10. Do you allocate funds towards NGOs self-sustaining activities? If Yes, how much and what are 
the conditions attached? 
11. How does your organisation ensure that local NGOs become sustainable and self-reliant in order 
to reduce their dependence on you as a donor? 
12. As a donor, what do you think are the strategic responses employed by  local NGOs to ensure 
their sustainability? Are there differences between smaller and bigger NGOs? 
13. Are there conditions attached to funding the activities of local NGOs? If Yes, what are these 
conditions? 
14. How does these conditionalities affect the strategic responses of NGOs to  resource 
diversification? 
15. To what extent does donor conditionalities affects NGOs ability to resource diversification? 
16. Do you think local NGOs respond innovately and creatively to donor conditions? What facilitates 
these creative responses? 
17. How would you describe your relationship with local NGOs? Does this relationship affect the 
ability of NGOs to diversify their sources of funding and operations? 
18. Do you think that there has been a change in your funding and priority areas over the last five 
years? If Yes, what are the changes? 
19. What are the factors responsible for such changes in funding and priority areas? 
20. Do you inform and consult local NGOs when there is a change in your funding and priority areas? 
If Yes, are these changes negotiable? 
21. How does a change in your funding and  priority areas affect the activities of NGOs?  
22. How does NGOs alliance, network or consortium influence your decision to fund their project? 
What is the rationale behind this? 
23. What is the rationale behind alliance or partnership formation among NGOs as part of your 
application requirements? 
24. To what extent does Ghana becoming a lower middle income affect the support you give to NGOs 




Appendix 6: Interview guide for NGDO networks and coalitions 
 
Letter to NGO Networks and Key Informants 
 
Mr. Emmanuel Kumi 
Department of Social and Policy 
Sciences 
University of Bath 
Bath, BA2 7AY, United Kingdom 
        
Address of Network/ Key Informant 
 
                                                       
Dear Sir, 
REQUEST FOR PARTICIPATION IN NGO RESEARCH 
I write to request for your participation in a research study ‘‘Response of Ghanaian Non-Governmental 
Development Organisations to a Changing Aid Landscape’’. I am a PhD student in Social and Policy 
Sciences at the University of Bath, United Kingdom. My research aim is to explore the strategic responses 
employed by Ghanaian NGOs in ensuring their survival and sustainability. In order to realise this aim, I 
am seeking for your cooperation in this research by participating in a key informant interview. 
 
The interview will mainly cover these topics: Resource mobilisation strategies and challenges, NGOs’ 
strategic responses and its impact on governance and institutional structure of the organisation, 
organisational relationship with stakeholders. You have been selected as key one of the key informants 
for this research because of your expertise and role played in the networking and coalition building aspect 
of NGOs operating in the health sector in Ghana. 
Your participation in this research will contribute towards a better understanding of how Ghanaian NGOs 
are responding to changes in their operating environment in terms of funding and its effects on their 
organisation. The information provided will not only be used for  academic purposes as a partial fulfilment 
for the attainment of my PhD degree but will also be shared with other organsiations and the wider 
research community through conferences, workshops and publication of research findings in journal 
articles and books. In return to your participation, I am happy to share the research findings with your 
organisation. 
In case you have further questions or need clarifications about my identity or participant’s confidentiality 
and rights, please feel free to contact Professor James Copestake (PhD Supervisor), Department of Social 
and Policy Sciences, University of Bath. Email: j.g.copestake@bath.ac.uk. Telephone: +44 (0) 1225 38 
3859. You can also contact Dr. Akosua K. Darkwah, Centre for Gender Studies and Advocacy, University 
of Ghana, P.O. Box LG 57, Legon, Accra, Ghana, Email: keseboa@ug.edu.gh. 










INTERVIEW GUIDE OR SCHEDULE FOR NGO COALITION/ NETWORKS 
 
1. Could you please give a brief background of the Coalition/Network? 
2. What is the rationale behind the formation of this Coalition? 
3. What are the main goals and objectives of this Coalition? 
4.  What is the total membership of this coalition and the requirements for joining this coalition? 
5. Is it compulsory for all NGOs operating in this sector to be members of the coalition? Are 
individuals allowed to join this Coalition/Network? 
6. How do you regulate the activities of your member organisation? 
7. What is the function of the coalition secretariat and the lead or focal agencies in the various 
regions? 
8. What are the major sources of funding for the Coalition? 
9. To what extent is the coalition secretariat able to secure funding (core and project) for its 
members?  
10.  Describe the process involved in securing funding for the Coalition/Network members? Please 
outline and give example of funding/ programmes that have been secured by the Coalition? 
11.  How do you select members to implement projects or grants secured by the 
Coalition/Network? 
12. Does the coalition secretariat implement projects on its own? If Yes, what is the rationale 
behind? 
13. How would you describe the financial situation of the Coalition? 
14. Has the coalition experienced any changes in its sources of funding over the last five years? If 
Yes, what factors accounts for this? 
15. How does the Coalition ensure that its members are able to maintain their financial and 
operational sustainability? 
16. What strategic responses is the Coalition advocating to its members in order for them to be 
more independent  and self-sustaianble in their operation? 
17. How would you describe inter-organisational relationship and information sharing among 
members of the Coalition/Network? 
18. How would you describe the operating environment of NGOs in this sector? 
19. How do you engage stakeholders in your operating environment? 




Appendix 7: Interview guide for government officials and corporate organisations 
 
Mr. Emmanuel Kumi 
Department of Social and Policy 
Sciences 
University of Bath 
Bath, BA2 7AY, United Kingdom 
National Headquarters 
Department of Social Welfare 
Accra- Ghana          
 
                                                       
Dear Sir,  
REQUEST FOR PATICIPATION IN A RESEARCH STUDY ON 
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS (NGOs) IN GHANA 
 
I write to request for your participation in a research study ‘‘Response of Ghanaian Non-Governmental 
Development Organisations to a Changing Aid Landscape’’. I am a PhD student in Social and Policy 
Sciences at the University of Bath, United Kingdom. My research aim is to explore the strategic responses 
employed by Ghanaian NGOs in seeking funding.  
In order to realise this aim, I am seeking for your cooperation in this research by participating in a key 
informant interview. The interview will mainly cover these topics: Classification of NGOs in Ghana, 
NGO registration process, database of Ghanaian NGOs, regulatory framework for NGOs and requirement 
for establishing a social enterprise as an NGO. 
You have been selected as key one of the key informants for this research because of your expertise and 
role played in the registration and regulatory process of NGOs operating in Ghana. Your participation in 
this research will contribute towards a better understanding of how Ghanaian NGOs are responding to 
changes in their operating environment. The information provided will not only be used for  academic 
purposes as a partial fulfilment for the attainment of my PhD degree but will also be shared with other 
organsiations and the wider research community through conferences, workshops and publication of 
research findings in journal articles and books. In return to your participation, I am happy to share the 
research findings with your organisation. 
In case you have further questions or need clarifications about my identity or participant’s confidentiality 
and rights, please feel free to contact Professor James Copestake (PhD Supervisor), Department of Social 
and Policy Sciences, University of Bath. Email: j.g.copestake@bath.ac.uk. Telephone: +44 (0) 1225 38 
3859. 
 









INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR OFFICIALS AT THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE 
  
1. What is the definition of an NGO in Ghana? 
2. Which categories of NGOs operate in Ghana? What is the difference between Civil Society 
Organisations (CSOs), NGOs and Community-Based Organisations (CBOs). 
3. How does the DSW classify NGOs in Ghana?  What is the rationale behind the classification and 
why is it that there is no distinction between national NGOs? 
4. Do you have an updated database of all NGOs operating in Ghana? 
5. How many NGOs are currently operating in the country? What is the regional breakdown in terms 
of NGO numbers? 
6. What are the requirements for operating an NGO in Ghana?  
7. Please kindly describe the registration process for operating an NGO in Ghana? Do NGOs register 
permanently or temporary?  
8. Is there a difference in the registration process for International and Local NGOs? 
9. How long does it take for an NGO to get a certificate of recognition from the DSW? 
10. Why do you ask NGOs to renew their certificate? What are the requirements for certificate 
renewal? 
11. What do you do to ensure that registered NGOs without a valid certificate are not in operation? 
Do you de-register non-compliance NGOs in Ghana? 
12. What are the monitoring mechanisms used by the DSW to ensure NGOs compliance with 
government regulations? 
13. Are NGOs allowed to undertake commercial activities as they are registered as non-profit 
organisations? 
14. What are the requirements for an NGO that wants to undertake commercial activities or a social 
enterprise? 
15. What does your agency do to NGOs that operate or undertake commercial activities without 
proper documentation? 
16.  What type of taxes do NGOs engaging in commercial activities pay? Do these NGOs get 
government support in the form of tax exemption or subsidies? 
17. What challenges does your agency face in its attempt to monitor and regulate the activities of 
NGOs in Ghana? 




INTERVIEW GUIDE OR SCHEDULE FOR CORPORATE ORGANISATIONS 
1. What are some of the projects or programmes of local NGOs funded by your organisation within 
the last five years? 
2. How much funding has your organisation disbursed to local NGOs within the last five years as 
part of your Corporate Social Responsibility? How do you call for funding proposals from local 
NGOs? 
3. On an average, how many project proposals do you receive when there is a call for funding? 
How many of them are approved? 
4. What are the selection criteria for funding the activities of local NGOs? 
5. How will you describe your relationship with NGOs? 
6. Do you engage with NGOs when implementing your Corporate Social Responsibility? 
7. What factors account for your limited engagement with local NGOs in Ghana? 
8. What accounts for your organisation’s preference to fund directly programmes and projects and 
not use the services of NGOs? 
9. Do you involve stakeholders in the planning and implementation of your programmes and 
projects? 
10. To what extent are your community programmes and projects sustainable? 
11. What account for your organisation preference to fund one-off projects rather than long-terms 
community development projects? 
12. How does the absence of a regulatory framework in terms of incentives affect your ability to 
support local NGOs? 
13.  How would you describe the business environment in Ghana and what are its implications on 
your Corporate Social Responsibility 
14.  What is your perception about NGOs complain that they submit proposals and do not get 
feedbacks from the organisation. Others also complain of stolen ideas by foundations without 
their knowledge? 
15. How do you ensure that the selection criteria for funding is fair to both smaller and bigger NGOs? 
16. How do you address the perceived discrimination against small and new NGOs  in relation  to  
funding application? 
17. What mechanisms are there in your organisation to provide feedback on funding proposals to  
local NGOs? 
18. Do you allocate funds towards NGOs self-sustaining activities? If Yes, how much and what are 
the conditions attached? 
19. How does your organisation ensure that local NGOs become sustainable and self-reliant in order 
to reduce their dependence on traditional donors? 
20. As a donor, what do you think are the strategic responses employed by  local NGOs to ensure 
their sustainability? Are there differences between smaller and bigger NGOs? 
21. Are there conditions attached to funding the activities of local NGOs? If Yes, what are these 
conditions? 
22. How does these conditionalities affect the strategic responses of NGOs to  resource 
diversification? 
23. To what extent does donor conditionalities affects NGOs ability to resource diversification? 
24. Do you think local NGOs respond innovately and creatively to donor conditions? What 
facilitates these creative responses? 
25. How would you describe your relationship with local NGOs? Does this relationship affect the 
ability of NGOs to diversify their sources of funding and operations? 
26. Do you think that there has been a change in your funding and priority areas over the last five 
years? If Yes, what are the changes? 
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27. What are the factors responsible for such changes in funding and priority areas? 
28. Do you inform and consult local NGOs when there is a change in your funding and priority 
areas? If Yes, are these changes negotiable? 
29. How does a change in your funding and  priority areas affect the activities of NGOs?  
30. How does NGOs alliance, network or consortium influence your decision to fund their project? 







Appendix 8: Income mobility matrix for NNGDOs 
NNGDO budgets and income mobility matrix  
NNGDOs’ size was measured by average annual income. Results on annual average income were self-
reported given that respondents were unwilling to disclose data on their financial information (budget and 
expenditure). Faced with the challenge of non-disclosure, I relied on income bands within which 
NNGDOs annual average budget fell. Respondents indicated from six income bands within which their 
budget fell between 2010 and 2015 in a survey. This was considered the appropriate way given the non-
disclosure of financial information.  
Although 16 out of the 59 NNGDOs reported publishing their annual financial report upon request from 
individuals, this was always not the case. Many reported that their financial reports and annual budgets 
were given to their donors rather than the public. For this reason, it would have been ideal to use the 
actual budget but I am unable to do so. To this end, I used an income mobility matrix to account for how 
NNGDOs’ income level had changed between 2010 and 2015. In doing so, I adjusted for inflation 
between 2010 and 2015. Data on NNGDOs’ annual budget was collected in 2015/2016 financial year. 
Inflation adjustments to income bands 
 2010         2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
(a) Inflation rates       
 
Consumer Price Index (CPI)    341.8 371.1 404.0    
   100.0 116.6 136.5 160.5 
Reported rate%    8.5 8.5 8.8  13.5 
            
17.0  17.7 
Calculated rate%  108.5 108.8 116.6 117.0 117.5 
       
Linked index (2012=100) 84.6 91.8       100.0     116.6     136.5  160.5 
Rebased index (2015=100) 52.7 57.2       62.3     72.6      85.0  100.0 
       
(b) Inflation adjusted 
band  boundaries           GH₵          GH₵      GH₵ 
          
GH₵ 
                          
GH₵   GH₵ 
Boundary of categories 1 to 2 37,938 34,940 32,100 27,530 23,516 20,000 
Boundary of categories 2 to 3 94,845 87,350 80,250 68,825 58,791 50,000 
Boundary of categories 3 to 4 189,691 174,701 160,500 137,650 117,582 100,000 
Boundary of categories 4 to 5 284,536 262,051 240,750 206,475 176,374 150,000 
Boundary of categories 5 to 6 379,382 349,402 321,000 275,300 235,165 200,000 
(c) Equivalent categories in real terms (2011 compared to 2015 in GH₵) 
 2011 2011 2011 2015 2015 2015 
 Lower Upper Category lower upper category 
   20,000 1  34,940 1, 2 
 20,000 50,000 2 34,940 87,350 2, 3 
 50,000 100,000 3 87,350 174,701 3,4, 5 
 100,000 150,000 4   174,701 262,051 5, 6 
 150,000 200,000 5   262,051 349,402 6 








Income mobility matrix for NNGDOs17 






N10 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 1 11 
N14 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 1 11 
N37 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 1 11 
N58 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 1 11 
N21 1 1 1  1 2 2 1 2 12 
N39 1 1 1  2 2 3 1 2 12 
N42 1 1 1  2 2 3 1 2 12 
N2 1 2 1  2 3 1 1 2 12 
N4 1 1 2  2 3 2 1 2 12 
N30 1 2 1  3 3 4 1 3 13 
N16 1 1 2  2 3 3 1 3 13 
N23 1 1 3  3 3 2 1 3 13 
N44 2 2 2  3 1 1 2 1 21 
N51 1 2 2  2 2 2 2 2 22 
N52 1 2 2  2 3 4 2 3 23 
N5 2 2 3  3 3 3 2 3 23 
N27 1 2 3  4 4 6 2 4 24 
N43 1 2 3  3 4 5 2 4 24 
N47 3 3 3  3 2 2 3 2 32 
N13 1 3 3  3 3 2 3 3 33 
N46 3 3 4  5 3 2 3 3 33 
N31 3 3 4  3 4 3 3 3 33 
N49 2 3 3  4 4 4 3 4 34 
N53 2 3 4  4 4 6 3 4 34 
N3 3 3 4  4 5 4 3 4 34 
N57 1 3 3  4 5 5 3 5 35 
N38 3 3 3  4 5 6 3 5 35 
N6 1 3 6  6 6 5 3 6 36 
N12 4 4 1  1 3 1 4 1 41 
N26 2 4 5  6 5 5 4 5 45 
N45 4 4 4  5 4 5 4 5 45 
N48 4 4 4  4 5 5 4 5 45 
N33 4 4 5  5 5 5 4 5 45 
N41 4 4 3  3 6 6 4 6 46 
N32 3 4 6  4 6 6 4 6 46 
N25 4 4 5  5 6 6 4 6 46 
N36 4 4 5  5 6 6 4 6 46 
N54 6 5 4  2 2 3 5 2 52 
N11 1 5 5  1 6 5 5 5 55 
N19 4 5 5  6 5 4 5 5 55 
N20 4 5 5  6 5 4 5 5 55 
N22 4 5 6  6 6 6 5 6 56 
N56 5 5 6  6 6 6 5 6 56 
N34 2 6 6  6 6 6 6 6 66 
N29 4 6 6  6 6 5 6 6 66 
N1 5 6 6  6 6 6 6 6 66 
                                                          
17 The income mobility matrix has been adjusted for inflation. The adjusted income categories were used in 
creating the shift category between 2010 and 2015. The data presented is based on income at current prices for 
each year within the five income bands measured in GH₵ for NNGDOs. 
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N7 5 6 6  6 6 6 6 6 66 
N8 6 6 6  6 6 6 6 6 66 
N9 6 6 6  6 6 6 6 6 66 
N15 6 6 6  6 6 6 6 6 66 
N17 6 6 6  6 6 6 6 6 66 
N18 6 6 6  6 6 6 6 6 66 
N28 6 6 6  6 6 6 6 6 66 
N35 6 6 6  6 6 6 6 6 66 
N40 6 6 6  6 6 6 6 6 66 
N50 6 6 6  6 6 6 6 6 66 
N55 6 6 6  6 6 6 6 6 66 
N24 6 6 6  6 6 6 6 6 66 




Appendix 9: Sources of funding for sampled NNGDOs 
Categories of donors Name of funder 
Bilateral Donor Agencies   Agence Française de Développement (AFD) 
 Austrian Development Agency 
 Australian Agency for International Development (AUSAID) 
 Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) 
 Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) 
 Department for International Development (DFID) 
 Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 
(GIZ)  
 Falkland Islands Development Corporation (FIDC)  
 Flanders Department of Foreign Affairs 
 Japan International Cooperation Agency  (JICA) 
 Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) 
 United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
Multilateral Donor Agencies  European Union (EU) 
 Islamic Development Bank 
 World Bank 
 
United Nations Agencies 
 Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) 
 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization(UNESCO)  
 United Nation Environment Programme (UNEP) 
 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
 United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) 
 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) 
 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
 United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund 
(UNICEF) 
 United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) 
 World Food Programme (WFP) 
International Non-Governmental 
Organisations (INGDOs) 
 Action Aid-Ghana 
 Adventist Development Relief Agency (ADRA) 
 AFRIKIDS-Ghana 
 Amnesty International  
 AXIS-Denmark 
 Bread for the World 
 Catholic Organization for Relief and Development Aid 
(CORDAID) 
 Christian Children’s Fund of Canada (CCFC) 
 Danish Church Aid 
 Diakonia- Sweden 
 Interchurch Organisation for Development Cooperation 
(ICCO) 
 Building Walls of Wisdom 
 CARE International, Ghana  
 Comic Relief 
 Cross Roads International 
 Family Health International (FHI360) 
 Edify 
 Educo- Spain 
 German Development Service 
 Girls Not Brides 
 Global Communities 




 International Citizenship Service 
 International Service 
 Ipas-Ghana 
 Oxfam GB- Ghana 
 Project Abroad 
 Pamoja Africa 
 Feed the Minds 
 Plan International-Ghana  
 Planned Parenthood Association of Ghana (PPAG) 
 PlaNet Finance 
 Reaching for Change 
 Rights To Play-Ghana 
 Simavi 
 Self-Help Africa 
 SNV Ghana 
 Theatre4Change 
 Tools for Self Reliance –UK 
 Tree Aid Ghana 
 Tzedek 
 Voluntary Service Overseas (VSOs) 
 Water Aid-Ghana 
 Women Thrive Worldwide 
 World University Service of Canada (WUSC) 
 World Vision International- Ghana 
 World Women’s Day of Prayer 
International Councils and 
Institutes 
 African Youth Panel 
 International Council on Social Welfare (ICSW) 
 International Institute for Tropical Agriculture (IITA) 
 Alliance for Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) 
 International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) 
Foundations and Charitable 
Trust 
 AFC Consultants International  
 African Capacity Building Foundation 
 African Women Development Fund (AWDF) 
 American Contract Bridge League (ACBL) 
 Barnes and Noble 
 Big Lottery Fund 
 Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 
 Centre for the Book 
 Create Change Foundation 
 Disability Rights Fund 
 Emerging Markets Foundation (EMpower) 
 ENI Foundation 
 Foundation Beyond Belief 
 Free the Slaves 
 FRIDA (The Young Feminist Fund) 
 Gavi Alliance 
 Geneva Global 
 Ghana Friendship Group in Denmark 
 Global Fund 
 Humanistic Service Corps 
 Humanity United  
 Human Dignity Foundation 
 Intel 
 Marselliborg Gymnasium 
 Making All Voices Count (MAVC) 
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 MasterCard Foundation 
 McKechnie Elementary, Vancouver  
 Michael Essien Foundation 
 Natural Resource Governance Initiatives (NRGI) 
 New England Biolabs Foundation 
 Omidyar Network 
 Open Society Foundation 
 Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA) 
 RAVI Foundation 
 RFSU (The Swedish Association for Sexuality Education) 
 Robert Carr Fund 
 Rotary International 
 The Trull Foundation 
 Youth Harvest Foundation 
 Zochonis Charitable Trust 
Earned Income (e.g. income 
generating activities and social 
enterprise) 
 Agriculture (e.g. Soya Bean Production, Cassava cultivation, 
Bee-keeping,  Buying and hiring of farm inputs like tractors to 
farmers), Compost making, Stock piling of agricultural 
produce and selling them later on the market, Rearing of 
livestock 
 Agro processing (e.g. Establishment of shea butter and cassava 
(gari) processing plant). 
 Construction Services (Latrines for households, communities 
and  institutions , Small towns water systems, Sanitation Credit 
Schemes and revolving funds on sanitation, rain water 
harvesting) 
 Urban waste collection and management 
 Retail shop/ Charity shop (Sales of crafts, second-hand clothes 
and operating drinking spots). 
 Operation of a radio station and  community information  
centre 
 Consultancy (e.g. research, capacity-building trainings, writing 
funding proposals for other NGOs and private organisations). 
 Hiring of conference centres and equipment (e.g. projectors, 
public address system etc.), establishment of youth centres for 
event organising. 
 Renting part of office space to other NGOs, corporate 
organisations and individuals for fee. 
 Event organising (e.g. cultural and drama troops) 
 Investments (e.g. Endowment Fund, Impact Investment, Social 
Mutual Funds) 
 International volunteers’ fees and contributions.  
 Membership Dues from NGOs belonging to a network or 
coalition. 
  Profits from Microcredit/ VSLA (e.g. group or individual loan 
for Shea butter extraction, maize and rice cultivation etc.) 
 Social enterprise (e.g. Commercial Sachet Water Production;  
Basic Schools) 
 Sales for publications and training manuals and organising 
capacity-building programmes (e.g. books-Governance 
manuals, magazines, NGO reports).  
 Secretarial services – (e.g. operating ICT Centres, photocopy, 
lamination, fax, etc.). 




 Tourism services through the provision information on tourist 
sites. 
 Vocational training (Beads and soap making, cook stoves, 
hairdressing, batik, tie and dye). 
Individual Donations  Annual fund raising dinners/ Galas. 
 Street Fundraising/ Face-to-face fundraising. 
 Donation boxes at vantage places like Banks and shopping 
centres. 
 Donations from religious institutions (e.g. Churches).  
 Contributions from Board members or Chief Executives. 
 Volunteer contribution 
Government Institutions  Community Water and Sanitation Agency (CSWA) 
 Domestic Violence Support Unit (DVSU) 
 Department of Social Welfare (DSW) 
 Ghana Aids Commission (GAC) 
 Ghana Education Service (GES) 
 Ghana Health Service (GHS) 
 Legal Aid  Scheme, Ghana 
 Microfinance and Small Loans Centre (MASLOC)  
 Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) 
 Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA) 
 Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection  
 Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development 
(MLGRD) 
 National Youth Authority (NYA) 
  Rural Enterprise Programme (REP) 
Global Alliances and  Umbrella 
Organisations 
 Africa Sex Workers Alliance 
 Alliance for Strengthening Education in Ghana (ASEG)  
 Civil Society in Development (CISU) 
 Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition 
 Ghana - Global Alliance for Clean Cook Stoves 
 International Rainwater Harvesting Alliance 
 NGOs Coalition in Health 
 Northern Ghana Network for Development (NGND) 
 Northern Network for Educational Development 
 Shea Network Ghana 
 Water and Sanitation Network (WASNET) 
Corporate philanthropy   Banking institutions (e.g. Access Bank, Barclays, Zenith, 
EcoBank) 
 Cosmos Energy Civil Society Support 
 Promasidor Ghana. Limited (Cowbell)  
 ENI Ghana Foundation 
 Telecommunication Companies (e.g. MTN Foundation, TIGO, 
Vodafone Foundation)  
 Unilever Ghana Limited 
 Institute of Entrepreneurship and Public Speaking 
 International Fertilizer Development Centre (IFDC) 
 Market Development Programme (MADE) 
 Mennonite Economic Development Associates (MEDA) 
 WASTE (Advisors on Urban Environment and Management) 
National  NGDOs   Alliance for Reproductive Health Rights (ARHR) 
 Centre for Democratic Development (CDD) 
 Centre for Agricultural Research and Development (CARD) 
 Choice-Ghana 
 Hope for Future Generations (HFFG) 
 Foundation for African Women's Advancement (FAWA) 
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 Ghana Developing Communities Association (GDCA) 
 Institute for Policy Alternative (IPA) 
 Institute for Social Development (ISODEC) 
 Net Organisation for Youth Empowerment and Development 
(NOYED)  
 Northern Sector Awareness Centre (NORSAAC) 







Appendix 10: Funding criteria for NNGDOs 
 
Gender Equality & Social Inclusion (GESI) – Small Grants Component 
Theme:  
Strengthening citizen engagements with local governance institutions (including district assemblies and 
traditional authorities) for sustainable and inclusive access to quality public goods and services and 
economic resources. 
Eligibility Criteria for the small NGOs and CSOs at the district level  
1.    Should be able to state clearly the results and outcomes that will be achieved from the project; 
2.    Must demonstrate a track record in working with and delivering results for the target social groups; 
3.    Should have linkages with other Civil Society Organisations at district and local levels to leverage 
additional capacities; 
4.    Should provide bank statements for the past six (6) months); 
5.    Must be registered with the  Registrar-General’s Department with Tax Identification Number; 
6.    Be known by community leaders in the communities where they seek to operate their project; 
7.    Should be able to submit references from the District Assembly, Traditional Council or a funding 
organisation/agency. 
8.    Must not have been blacklisted by any donor agency, governmental agency or national CSO; 
9.    STAR Ghana may request additional information at the due diligence stage of the process when 
shortlisted; 
10. Should provide 2015 audited accounts – for organisations which have been in existence for 3 years 





Appendix 11: Template funding application form 
SECTION 1a:  INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR ORGANISATION 
1.1 Name of 
Organisation/Coalition/Network 
 
1.2 Is your organisation a network/coalition/platform? Yes      No 
 If your answer to question 1.2 is yes, Is your coalition/network/platform formalized by a memorandum 
of understanding for this funding?    Yes       No 
1.3 How many people are on your 
board/advisory committee and how 
were they elected / appointed?  
 
Outline the skills and experiences the 
Trustees/Board bring to the 
organisation to help achieve the 
objectives for this funding 
 
1.4 Organisation registration number (if 
applicable) 
 
1.5 Date organisation was 
formed/established 
 
1.6 How does your organisation make a practice of ensuring equal opportunities for all citizens  in the 
workplace and/or social inclusion ( men, women, boys and girls, persons with disability and other 
excluded social groups) in your programme/project work?  
 
Please provide examples. 
1.8 Address 
If the organisation has multiple offices, 
please give details of the head office  
 
1.9 Telephone number   
1.10 Email  
1.11 Website   
SECTION 1b: KEY CONTACT PERSON 
1.12 Name  
This is the only person that STAR-
Ghana will contact about this 
application 
 
1.13 Designation   
1.14 Contact address  
(if different from above) 
 
1.15 Email  
1.16 Telephone number[s]  
SECTION 1c: ORGANISATIONAL  FINANCES  
1.17 Do you prepare monthly management accounts?  
If yes, please provide details of the monthly management accounting process 
 
1.18 Please describe below the organisations process for auditing.  When will the current financial year end?  
 
1.19 How is the annual budget managed?  
 
1.20 What percentage of your average annual turnover for the past two years will this funding represent?  
(a) Income for year ending  2013: 
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(b) Income for year ending  2014: 
(c) Average annual income:  
(d) Percentage of average annual turnover requested:  
𝒂𝒎𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒇𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒓𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒅
𝑨𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆 
 𝑿 𝟏𝟎𝟎 =  % 
[Please attach certified audited accounts for 2013 and 2014] 
 
1.21 Who will be responsible for the financial accounting of funds provided under this project?  
Name:  
Designations:  
Job description:  
[Please attach CV] 
1.22 Please explain how this project will provide value for money?  
 
SECTION 1d: ADDITIONAL ORGANISATIONAL INFORMATION 
1.23 How many staff do you employ? Full time female  
Part time female  
Full time male  
Part time male   
1.24 Number of staff by type Senior management  
Administration, Finance, 
Operations   
 
Programmes   
Support   
1.25 Please provide the details of the staff member who will manage the project  
Name:  
Designation: 
Job description:  
[please attach CV] 
1.26 How is your organisation governed?  
 
1.27 Has your organisation ever been blacklisted by STAR-Ghana or any of its donors (EU, DANIDA, DFID, 
and USAID)? If yes, provide details  
 
1.28 Does your organisation have any outstanding audit/project queries from STAR-Ghana or any of its 
donors? If yes, provide details 
 
1.29 Please describe your organisation’s linkages with other organisations and agencies, including CSOs, 
media organisations, traditional authorities, professional associations and state agencies and how these 
will support the implementation of your project: 
 
SECTION 2:  PROJECT SUMMARY 
Please give brief details of proposed project 
2.1 What is the title of your project  
2.2 What is the rationale for the project?  
 





2.4 What is the proposed duration of your 
project (in months)? 
 
 
2.5 Which stage(s) of the Elections ‘value chain’ 
does your project focus on?   
 
2.6 What is the focus region(s)/district(s) of your 
proposed project? Why did you select these 
area(s)? 
 
2.7 Who are the main targets of your action?18  
2.8 What changes do you expect to achieve by 
the end of the project?  
 
2.9 What key strategies will you adopt to achieve 
project results? How innovative are these 
strategies 
 
2.10 What relevant previous experiences and 
other competencies does your organisation 
have to achieve the results of the project?  
 
2.11 How would you build on the gains and/or 
lessons from previous actions/initiatives to 
enhance the effectiveness of your project?  
 
2.12 (a)  How will you mainstream gender 
equality into your proposed project and 
ensure that gender inequality is not 
perpetuated? 
 
(b) How will you ensure that barriers (formal 
or informal) to participation for socially 
excluded groups are removed, their 
opportunities enhanced and that 
discrimination is not perpetuated? 
 
2.13 a) How will men, women, boys and girls 
benefit from the project? 
 
(b) How will social group that are typically 
discriminated against (excluded) benefit 
from the project? 
 
2.14 What risks do you foresee in the 
implementation of your proposed project?  
How will you address or mitigate these risks? 
Please attach as a table  
 
2.15 How will your project contribute to peaceful, 
credible, issues-based and inclusive elections 
locally (project area) and beyond? 
 
SECTION 3:  RESULTS 
3.1 What are the measurable milestones that will show progress towards achieving the results over the 
stipulated project period? How do you propose to achieve and measure the results offered? (a results 
framework is attached to assist you) see attached 
 
 
3.2 What are the cumulative results expected at the end of this project?  (this should be a summation of the 
end of year target(s) in your results framework) 
 
3.3 How will you disaggregate the Outcomes of your results e.g. men, women, youth, disabled persons, 
people living with HIV/AIDS, people in remote locations, the poor etc 
 
SECTION 4:  IMPLEMENTATION PLAN/MONITORING,  EVALUATION & LESSON LEARNING  
4.1 How will the implementation of your project and achievement of its objectives be monitored?  
 
4.2 Who will be involved in monitoring the project? 
 
                                                          
18 Targets refer to the actors and stakeholders whose actions, knowledge and attitudes your project seeks to influence 
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4.3 What tools and approaches are you planning to use? 
 
4.4 How will your results framework be used in monitoring the project? 
 
4.5 How will the learning from this project be captured and incorporated into your organisation? 
 





Do you have specific ideas for key learning questions to be answered through the implementation of this 
project? If yes, please state them here 
4.8 Using the template provided, describe the activities, and sub-activities if applicable, that will be required 
to achieve each of your objectives.  (an activity plan matrix is attached to assist you) 
SECTION 5:  PROJECT BUDGET 
5.1 Using the budget template provided, please give a detailed budget for this project.  
 
Attach the templates to your applications  
5.2 Give details of any other grants or funding you have received in the last 3 years as an 
organisation/coalition/network/platform/alliance:  
 




SECTION 6:  ATTACHMENTS 
 
Please ensure that you have attached the following:  
Registration certificate [s] 
Certified audited accounts for 2013 and 2014 
Risk matrix 
Completed results matrix 
Completed activity plan matrix 
Completed budget spreadsheet 
Relevant CVs  
 
 
 
 
